There is perhaps no greater constant in religious intuition and experience than the presence of light. In spiritual traditions East and West, light is not only ubiquitous but something that assumes strikingly similar forms in altogether different historical and cultural settings. This study examines light as an aspect of religiously valued experiences and its entailments for mystical theology, philosophy, politics, and religious art. The essays in this volume make an important contribution to religious studies by proposing that it is misleading (...) to conceive of religious experience in terms of an irreconcilable dichotomy between universality and cultural construction. An esteemed group of contributors, representing the study of Asian and Western religious traditions from a range of disciplinary perspectives, suggests that attention to various forms of divine radiance shows that there is indeed a range of principles that, if not universal, are nevertheless very widely occurring and amenable to fruitful comparative inquiry. What results is a work of enormous scope, demonstrating compelling cross-connections that will be of value to scholars of comparative religions, mysticism, and the relationship between art and the sacred. Contributors: * Catherine B. Asher * Raoul Birnbaum * Sarah Iles Johnston * Matthew T. Kapstein * Andrew Louth * Paul E. Muller-Ortega * Elliot R. Wolfson * Mimi Hall Yiengpruksawan * Hossein Ziai. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that in recent literature on mechanistic explanations, authors tend to conflate two distinct features that mechanistic models can have or fail to have: plausibility and richness. By plausibility, we mean the probability that a model is correct in the assertions it makes regarding the parts and operations of the mechanism, i.e., that the model is correct as a description of the actual mechanism. By richness, we mean the amount of detail the model gives about the (...) actual mechanism. First, we argue that there is at least a conceptual reason to keep these two features distinct, since they can vary independently from each other: models can be highly plausible while providing almost no details, while they can also be highly detailed but plainly wrong. Next, focusing on Craver's continuum of ?how-possibly,? to ?how-plausibly,? to ?how-actually? models, we argue that the conflation of plausibility and richness is harmful to the discussion because it leads to the view that both are necessary for a model to have explanatory power, while in fact, richness is only so with respect to a mechanism's activities, not its entities. This point is illustrated with two examples of functional models. (shrink)

The quality of phenomenological research in nursing has been a subject of long‐standing debate and critique, but conversation took a particularly contentious turn following publication of John Paley's 2017 Phenomenology as Qualitative Research (Routledge), which elicited strong reactions. Faculty in nursing doctoral programs now face a challenge: in light of current controversies, what can we teach that is appropriately labeled phenomenological, and is there a way to present philosophical concepts that might equip students to avoid the most egregious mistakes of (...) the past? In this article, I suggest that ordinary clinical nursing practice is an inherently phenomenological enterprise, and creative bedside insights belong at the center of our teaching, as they embody an everyday phenomenology which exemplifies core elements of the phenomenological method. Instead of following ever‐more‐precisely elaborated instructional manuals, I propose, our students should begin their studies of phenomenology by returning attention to the way creative insight emerges during routine care. Bedside insights have been rendered invisible by our discipline's valuing of technical proceduralism over artistry in research and by the turn to evidence‐based practice in clinical work, but they are a valuable pathway to learning and should be part of our response to the current crisis. (shrink)

Neutralists have argued that there is something illiberal about linking access to gift-like resources to work requirements. The central liberal motivation for basic income is to provide greater freedom to choose between different ways of life, including options attaching great importance to non-market activities and disposable time. As argued by Philippe Van Parijs, even those spending their days surfing should be fed. This article examines Van Parijs' dual commitment to a ‘real libertarian’ justification of basic income and the public enforcement (...) of a strong work ethos, which serves to boost the volume of work at a given rate of taxation. It is argued (contra Van Parijs) that this alliance faces the neutrality objection: the work ethos will largely offset the liberal gains of unconditionality by radically restricting the set of permissible options available. A relaxed, non-obligatory ethos might avoid this implication. This view, however, is vulnerable to the structural exploitation objection: feasibility is achieved only because some choose to do necessary tasks to which most people have the same aversion. In light of these objections, the article examines whether there is a morally untainted feasibility path consistent with liberal objectives. (shrink)

In a 2008 paper, Walmsley argued that the explanations employed in the dynamical approach to cognitive science, as exemplified by the Haken, Kelso and Bunz model of rhythmic finger movement, and the model of infant preservative reaching developed by Esther Thelen and her colleagues, conform to Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s deductive-nomological model of explanation (also known as the covering law model). Although we think Walmsley’s approach is methodologically sound in that it starts with an analysis of scientific practice rather (...) than a general philosophical framework, we nevertheless feel that there are two problems with his paper. First, he focuses only on the deductivenomological model and so neglects the important fact that explanations are causal. Second, the explanations offered by the dynamical approach do not take the deductive-nomological format, because they do not deduce the explananda from exceptionless laws. Because of these two points, Walmsley makes the dynamical explanations in cognitive science appear problematic, while in fact they are not. (shrink)

A distinguished cross-cultural researcher presents a brave, heartfelt and exciting challenge to the social sciences: the creation of an international, moral order. He advocates the use of cross-cultural research to uncover a common core of values and morality. This research would then be used to ameliorate problems and guide policy in the light of those values. He shows his procedures at work in the study of ten major social and personal ills, such as mental illness, divorce, sex roles, and child (...) abuse. His research leads him inexorably to the concept of the moralnet -- the social group that provides values and support. When these are disrupted, problems are aggravated or even created. 'The work of Naroll fits in well with. (shrink)

In the literature on dynamical models in cognitive science, two issues have recently caused controversy. First, what is the relation between dynamical and mechanistic models? I will argue that dynamical models can be upgraded to be mechanistic as well, and that there are mechanistic and non-mechanistic dynamical models. Second, there is the issue of explanatory power. Since it is uncontested the mechanistic models can explain, I will focus on the non-mechanistic variety of dynamical models. It is often claimed by proponents (...) of mechanistic explanations that such models do not really explain cognitive phenomena . I will argue against this view. Although I agree that the three arguments usually offered to vindicate the explanatory power of non-mechanistic dynamical models are not enough, I consider a fourth argument, namely that such models provide understanding. The Voss strong anticipation model is used to illustrate this. (shrink)

In the moral vacuum and world of shifting values following World War I, Aldous Huxley was both a sensitive reflector and an articulate catalyst. This work provides a highly illuminating analysis of Huxley's evolution from skeptic to mystic. As Milton Birnbaum shows, in a perceptive interpretation of Huxley's poetry, fiction, essays and biographies--what evolved in Huxley's moral and intellectual pilgrimage was not so much a change in direction as a shift in emphasis. Even in the sardonic Huxley of the (...) 1920s and 1930s, there is a moral concern. In the later Huxley, there are traces of the satirical skepticism which delighted his readers in the decades preceding World War II.A man of letters, a keen observer, seeker of new ways while profoundly knowledgeable in the truths of ancient wisdom, Huxley tried to achieve a symbiotic synthesis of the best of all worlds. In clarifying and interpreting Huxley's intellectual, moral, and philosophical development, Birnbaum touches upon all the subjects that came under the scrutiny of a singularly encyclopedic mind.This book is of great worth to those interested both in Huxley the brilliant satirist and in Huxley the seeker of salvation. In his search, Huxley typified the modern quest for values. Milton Birnbaum's study is an invaluable guide in that journey. His new introduction takes account of research and analysis of Huxley that has occurred since this book's original publication. (shrink)

Après le succès du Courage de la nuance, Jean Birnbaum poursuit son enquête sur l''héroïsme du doute' avec une réflexion personnelle et politique sur l'enfance. Dans ce nouveau livre, il montre comment la naissance d'un enfant fait vaciller toute certitude. Ce qui l'intéresse, c'est une expérience banale mais qui a peu attiré l'attention des penseurs: devenir le parent d'un enfant, c'est constater ses effets sur notre rapport aux autres et sur notre vision politique des choses. Si, depuis Socrate, le (...) philosophe est celui qui dynamite nos préjugés, alors le bébé s'impose comme le plus subversif des philosophes. Cette fois encore, Jean Birnbaum mêle réflexions et émotions. Il se tourne vers des auteurs aimés (Hannah Arendt, Georges Bernanos, Roland Barthes, Rosa Luxemburg...) et puise dans sa propre expérience. À l'heure où le mouvement 'No kids' dénonce la procréation comme une catastrophe intime et écologique, ce livre proclame la solidarité essentielle entre espoir d'une société meilleure et promesse de la vie donnée, transmise, sauvée ; il n'y a pas d'émancipation sans générations, pas d'avenir sans enfants, pas de fraternité sans bébés."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that explaining cognitive behavior can be achieved through what I call hybrid explanatory inferences: inferences that posit mechanisms, but also draw on observed regularities. Moreover, these inferences can be used to achieve unification, in the sense developed by Allen Newel in his work on cognitive architectures. Thus, it seems that explanatory pluralism and unification do not rule out each other in cognitive science, but rather that the former represents a way to achieve the latter.

Asserting that previous attempts to characterize the essence of the cosmos have fallen short for their lack of an adequate conceptual arsenal, as exemplified by Maimonides' and Aristotle's impasse, he consolidates these eclectic influences into a defined set of metaphysical "tools." Birnbaum presents these tools at the outset of God and Good. He then uses them to build a model that is applicable to all the arenas from which its influences were initially derived.

Social determinants of health are a subject of growing interest, yet criticisms have emerged about the way determinants are conceptualized in nursing. A tendency to focus on readily observable living conditions and measurable demographic characteristics can divert attention, it has been said, from the less visible underlying processes which shape social life and health. To illustrate how the analytic perspective determines what becomes visible or invisible as a “determinant” in health, this paper presents a case exemplar. Drawing from news reports (...) and research in real estate economics and urban policy analysis, it explores a single local infectious illness outbreak through a series of progressively more abstract units of inquiry, considering mechanisms of lending and debt financing, housing supply, property valuation, tax policy, change in the structure of the financial industry, and international patterns of migration and capital flow, among other factors, which contributed in various ways to creating unsafe living conditions. An analytic exercise calling attention to dynamism and complexity in social processes, the paper offers a political‐economy‐based approach that serves as a cautionary note against oversimplification in discussions of health causality. (shrink)

Raoul Moati intervenes in the critical debate that divided two prominent philosophers in the mid-twentieth century. In the 1950s, the British philosopher J. L. Austin advanced a theory of speech acts, or the "performative," that Jacques Derrida and John R. Searle interpreted in fundamentally different ways. Their disagreement centered on the issue of intentionality, which Derrida understood phenomenologically and Searle read pragmatically. The controversy had profound implications for the development of contemporary philosophy, which, Moati argues, can profit greatly by (...) returning to this classic debate. In this book, Moati systematically replays the historical encounter between Austin, Derrida, and Searle and the disruption that caused the lasting break between Anglo-American language philosophy and continental traditions of phenomenology and its deconstruction. The key issue, Moati argues, is not whether "intentionality," a concept derived from Husserl's phenomenology, can or cannot be linked to Austin's speech-acts as defined in his groundbreaking _How to Do Things with Words_, but rather the emphasis Searle placed on the performativity and determined pragmatic values of Austin's speech-acts, whereas Derrida insisted on the trace of writing behind every act of speech and the iterability of signs in different contexts. (shrink)

Self-Ownership, Liberal Neutrality and the Realm of Freedom: New Reflections on the Justification of Basic Income. A review of Axel Gosseries and Yannick Vanderborght (eds), Arguing about Justice: Essays for Philippe Van Parijs.

What insight is there to gain when Adorno is put “beside himself”? The humoristic tendency of Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s famous essay on the culture industry highlights the non-categorical modalities borrowed from the avant-gardes and psychoanalysis that disorganize Kant’s supposedly invariant concepts a priori: partialities of the driven montage, allegorisation. This tendency opens on the decentering consequences for the thinking of another subject, beyond the logic of suspicion and the melancolic jouissance that block it.

10.00 THEODICY/THEOLOGY 10.01 Definition The accepted name for the entire subject comprising the problem of evil and its attempted resolution is theodicy, ...

Avec l’espace, disait Emmanuel Kant, le temps constitue la « forme a priori » de notre sensibilité. Autrement dit, le temps est l’horizon à travers lequel nous faisons l’expérience du monde, il structure notre façon d'aller à la rencontre de ce qui est. Or la modernité semble désormais compromettre les conditions de cette rencontre. Tout va de plus en plus vite : entre « fast-food », « speed dating » et haut débit, notre époque se distingue par la toute-puissance de (...) la vitesse. Ce qui est en jeu, ici, ce n’est plus seulement l’emballement de l’innovation technique, mais l’accélération du réel lui-même. Voilà l’une des désillusions du progrès : plus nous sommes équipés de machines, d’appareils censés nous faire gagner du temps, et plus nous avons le sentiment d’en manquer. Dans les relations sociales comme dans la vie intime, en politique comme en amour, notre quotidien est marqué par l’urgence, la peur de ne pouvoir suivre. La tyrannie du court terme comprime l’espace. Le triomphe de l’immédiat rend impossible toute vie au présent. Le règne de l’instantanéité enterre la mémoire et dynamite l’avenir. Bref, l’accélération des choses rétrécit le champ de l’expérience, à commencer par cette condition de toute vie humaine qu’on nomme confiance : « La confiance ne saurait être de l'ordre de l'instantané, écrit le philosophe Paul Virilio. Elle doit se construire, se mériter, dans le temps. La confiance instantanée, la foi instantanée, cela ne marche pas. Il faut du temps pour avoir confiance ». Reconstruire un espace de discussion, d’amitié et de justice, c’est donc ralentir le rythme, repartir à la conquête du temps long. Artistes, philosophes, géographes ou historiens, hommes d’images ou femmes de lettres, les intervenants tenteront de répondre ensemble à cette question : « Où est passé le temps? ». Trois jours durant, fidèle à sa tradition d'échanges et de dialogue, le Forum a confronté leurs réponses aux interrogations et aux objections du public. (shrink)

Par-dela les limites de la methode experimentale, tributaire des sens exterieurs, se deploie une experience toute spirituelle du monde suprasensible, royaume des choses morales et substances incorporelles, ainsi que du monde surnaturel, celui des arcanes de la grace et de la gloire. Meme dans le domaine des choses corporelles, ou l'experience sensible reste imparfaite, cette experience mystique qu'est l'illumination interieure est necessaire pour suppleer a l'insuffisance de l'experience des sens, simplement humaine et philosophique. Roger Bacon nous apparait a travers cet (...) ouvrage comme mystique, mais aussi comme humaniste et savant: cette harmonie dans sa personne n'est pas sans repondre a l'harmonie des choses ou le surnaturel s'ajoute a la nature pour la parfaire, puisque apres tout ces deux facons de connaitre le Createur et la creature peuvent bien eter la double manifestation d'un seul et meme gout imperieux pour l'experience. Roger Bacon peut bien s'eprnedre des donnees de la nature et des idees de la litterature profane sans pour autant se dejuger: s'il est vrai que c'est le meme Dieu qui a fait la Nature et l'Ecriture, c'est le meme Dieu qui nous illumine de l'illumination generale dans l'experience physique et de l'illumination interieure dans l'experience mystique. (shrink)