Results for 'Reasons for Attitudes'

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  1. Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 149-175.
    I argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being (ir)rational. The problem can be solved, I propose, by understanding the normative force of reasons for attitudes in terms of blameworthiness. I present a puzzle about the existence of epistemic and mental blame which poses a challenge for the very (...)
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  2. All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).
    As rational agents, we are governed by reasons. The fact that there’s beer at the pub might be a reason to go there and a reason to believe you’ll enjoy it. As this example illustrates, there are reasons for both action and for belief. There are also many other responses for which there seem to be reasons – for example, desire, regret, admiration, and blame. This diversity raises questions about how reasons for different responses relate to (...)
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  3.  10
    We have reason to think there are reasons for affective attitudes.Shane Ward - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (10):3969-3987.
    There are reasons for many things. For instance, we can have reasons to watch our favorite movie and believe that it will live up to the hype. These are cases of reasons for beliefs and actions. We can also have reasons for affective attitudes: we can have reasons to be excited the movie is releasing, to fear that our friends won’t like it as much as we do, and to be relieved that they did. (...)
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  4.  67
    How there Could be Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Alexander Heape - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3):667-680.
    Barry Maguire has recently argued that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes like fear and admiration differs fundamentally from that of reasons. These arguments appear to raise new and serious challenges for the popular ‘reasons-first’ view according to which normative support of any kind comes from reasons. In this paper, I show how proponents of the reasons-first view can meet these challenges. They can do so, I argue, if they can successfully meet some (...)
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  5. Normative Reasons for Love, Part I.Aaron Smuts - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):507-517.
    Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no-reasons (...)
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  6. There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.Barry Maguire - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):779-805.
    A dogma of contemporary ethical theory maintains that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is the very same as the nature of normative support for actions. The prevailing view is that normative reasons provide the support across the board. I argue that the nature of normative support for affective attitudes is importantly different from the nature of normative support for actions. Actions are indeed supported by reasons. Reasons are gradable and contributory. The support (...)
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  7. We Have No Reason to Think There Are No Reasons for Affective Attitudes.David Faraci - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):225-234.
    Barry Maguire argues that there are no reasons for affective attitudes. ‘There is no reason for your incredulous reaction to’ this thesis, he claims. In this paper, I argue that we have no reason to accept his thesis. I first examine Maguire's purported differences between reasons for action and so-called reasons for affective attitudes. In each case, I argue that the differences are exaggerated and that to the extent they obtain, they are best explained by (...)
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  8. Schroeder on the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem for Attitudes.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2013 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (3):1-8.
    Mark Schroeder has recently offered a solution to the problem of distinguishing between the so-called " right " and " wrong " kinds of reasons for attitudes like belief and admiration. Schroeder tries out two different strategies for making his solution work: the alethic strategy and the background-facts strategy. In this paper I argue that neither of Schroeder's two strategies will do the trick. We are still left with the problem of distinguishing the right from the wrong kinds (...)
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    Reasons for providing assisted suicide and the expressivist objection: a response to Donaldson.Esther Braun - 2024 - Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (10):721-722.
    According to the expressivist objection, laws that only allow assisted dying for those suffering from certain medical conditions express the judgement that their lives are not worth living. I have recently argued that an autonomy-based approach that legally allows assisted suicide for all who make an autonomous request is a way to avoid the expressivist objection. In response to this, Thomas Donaldson has argued that rather than avoiding the expressivist objection, an autonomy-based approach extends this objection. According to Donaldson, this (...)
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  10. Reasoning in attitudes.Franz Dietrich & Antonios Staras - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1–31.
    People reason not only in beliefs, but also in intentions, preferences, and other attitudes. They form preferences from existing preferences, or intentions from existing beliefs and intentions, and so on. This often involves choosing between rival conclusions. Building on Broome (Rationality through reasoning, Hoboken, Wiley. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118609088, 2013) and Dietrich et al. (J Philos 116:585–614. https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil20191161138, 2019), we present a philosophical and formal analysis of reasoning in attitudes, with or without facing choices in reasoning. We give different accounts of (...)
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  11. Reasons as Reasons for Preferences.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (3):297-311.
    I argue that all reasons for actions and attitudes consist in reasons for preferences; call this view RP. According to RP, reasons for A to believe that p just consist in reasons for A to prefer their believing that p to their not believing that p, and reasons for A to have a pro-attitude or perform an action just consist in reasons for A to prefer that she has that attitude/performs that action. I (...)
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  12.  11
    Relationships and Reasons for Belief.Lindsay Crawford - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 87-108.
    The central dispute between evidentialists and pragmatists about reasons for belief concerns whether or not non-evidential considerations can be reasons for belief. In recent work, some pragmatists about reasons for belief have made their case for pragmatism by appealing, in part, to a broad range of cases in which facts about one’s relationships with significant others (friends, romantic partners, and the like) appear to give one non-evidential reasons to have beliefs skewed in their favor. This chapter (...)
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  13. Content-Related and Attitude-Related Reasons for Preferences.Christian Piller - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:155-182.
    In the first section of this paper I draw, on a purely conceptual level, a distinction between two kinds of reasons: content-related and attitude-related reasons. The established view is that, in the case of the attitude of believing something, there are no attitude-related reasons. I look at some arguments intended to establish this claim in the second section with an eye to whether these argument could be generalized to cover the case of preferences as well. In the (...)
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  14. Tractors and Transactors: Some Possible Infrastructural Reasons for the Ambivalent Attitudes of Males Toward Females in the New Guinea Highlands.David Black - 1981 - Nexus 2 (1):6.
     
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  15. Normative Reasons for Love, Part II.Aaron Smuts - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (8):518-526.
    Are there normative reasons for love? More specifically, is it possible to rationally justify love? Or can we at best provide explanations for why we love? In Part I of this entry, I discuss the nature of love, theories of emotion, and what it takes to justify an attitude. In Part II, I provide an overview of the various positions one might take on the rational justification of love. I focus on the debate between defenders of the no-reasons (...)
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  16.  24
    Reasons for and insights about HPV vaccination refusal among ultra‐Orthodox Jewish mothers.Rivka Zach & Miriam Ethel Bentwich - 2023 - Developing World Bioethics 23 (4):300-311.
    BackgroundVaccination against human papillomavirus (HPV) is a pivotal tool for preventing a significant cause of cervical cancer. One particular culturally recognized context associated with negative attitudes toward the HPV vaccine is the religiousness of parents. However, relatively speaking, there remains a scarcity of studies that have focused specifically on religious groups, especially non-Christian groups. PurposeTo better understand the basis for members of an ultra-Orthodox Jewish community to object to the HPV vaccine and how such objections can and cannot be (...)
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    Reasons for Comfort and Discomfort with Pharmacological Enhancement of Cognitive, Affective, and Social Domains.Laura Y. Cabrera, Nicholas S. Fitz & Peter B. Reiner - 2014 - Neuroethics 8 (2):93-106.
    The debate over the propriety of cognitive enhancement evokes both enthusiasm and worry. To gain further insight into the reasons that people may have for endorsing or eschewing pharmacological enhancement, we used empirical tools to explore public attitudes towards PE of twelve cognitive, affective, and social domains. Participants from Canada and the United States were recruited using Mechanical Turk and were randomly assigned to read one vignette that described an individual who uses a pill to enhance a single (...)
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  18. Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief.Rebecca Wallbank & Andrew Reisner - 2020 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. New York: Routledge.
    This chapter explores two kinds of testimonial trust, what we call ‘evidential trust’ and ‘non-evidential trust’ with the aim of asking how testimonial trust could provide epistemic reasons for belief. We argue that neither evidential nor non-evidential trust can play a distinctive role in providing evidential reasons for belief, but we tentatively propose that non-evidential trust can in some circumstances provide a novel kind of epistemic reason for belief, a reason of epistemic facilitation. The chapter begins with an (...)
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  19.  10
    Reasons for Believing in God.David M. Holley - 2009 - In Meaning and Mystery: What It Means to Believe in God. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 51–68.
    This chapter contains sections titled: Theoretical and Practical Points of View Life‐Orienting Stories Stories About God Reflecting on a Theistic Story Attitudes and the Discernment of Meaning Priority of the Story Notes.
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  20. Kierkegaard on the Relationship Between Practical and Epistemic Reasons for Belief.Z. Quanbeck - 2024 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (2):233-266.
    On the dominant contemporary accounts of how practical considerations affect what we ought to believe, practical considerations either encroach on epistemic rationality by affecting whether a belief is epistemically justified, or constitute distinctively practical reasons for belief which can only affect what we ought to believe by conflicting with epistemic rationality. This paper argues that Søren Kierkegaard offers a promising alternative view on which practical considerations can affect what we ought to believe without either encroaching on or (necessarily) conflicting (...)
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  21. Reasons for action: Justification vs. explanation.James Lenman - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Modern philosophical literature distinguishes between explanatory reasons and justifying reasons. The former are reasons we appeal to in attempting to explain actions and attitudes. The latter are reasons we appeal to in attempting to justify them.
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  22.  23
    F.M. Dostoevsky on the Reasons for "Remarkable Dislike" Europe to Russia.Aleksey A. Lagunov & Andrey Yu Smirnov - 2021 - RUDN Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):25-33.
    The relevance of the article is due to the authors attempt to apply some of the philosophical concepts of F.M. Dostoevsky to the comprehension of contemporary sociocultural reality. The purpose of this study is to clarify the reasons for the historically unfriendly attitude of Europe towards Russia by analyzing the works of F.M. Dostoevsky dedicated to this problem. In the process of writing the article, the published Diaries of the writer were used; diary entries unpublished during the writer's life; (...)
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    From Soundness of Memory to Soundness of Text: An Evaluation on the Reasons for the Development of Hadith Taṣḥīf Literature in the IV./X Century.Üsame Bozkurt - 2022 - Tasavvur - Tekirdag Theology Journal 8 (1):445-459.
    One of the most important issues for the ideal transmission of hadith texts and isnāds is that there is no error in the writing of these expressions. For this purpose, it is seen that the hadith scholars try to create an awareness about the mistakes in the hadiths and the names of the narrators and try to minimize the mistakes by writing works. The most important examples of this literature seems to have been given in IV. /X century. In this (...)
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  24. Names of Attitudes and Norms for Attitudes.Inga Nayding - 2015 - Disputatio 7 (40):1-24.
    Fictionalists claim that instead of believing certain controversial propositions they accept them nonseriously, as useful make-believe. In this way they present themselves as having an austere ontology despite the apparent ontological commitments of their discourse. Some philosophers object that this plays on a distinction without a difference: the fictionalist’s would-be nonserious acceptance is the most we can do for the relevant content acceptance-wise, hence such acceptance is no different from what we ordinarily call ‘belief’ and should be so called. They (...)
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  25. Blameworthiness for Non-Culpable Attitudes.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):48-64.
    Many of our attitudes are non-culpable: there was nothing that we should have done to avoid holding them. I argue that we can still be blameworthy for non-culpable attitudes: they can impair our relationships in ways that make our full practice of apology and forgiveness intelligible. My argument poses a new challenge to indirect voluntarists, who attempt to reduce all responsibility for attitudes to responsibility for prior actions and omissions. Rationalists, who instead explain attitudinal responsibility by appeal (...)
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  26.  70
    The Right Kind of Reason for the Wrong Kind of Thing.Laura Tomlinson Makin - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (1-2):106-126.
    This paper offers a novel solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem that afflicts Fitting-Attitude analyses of value. I argue that we can distinguish reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind by being clear about what our reasons are for. In Wrong Kind of Reason cases, our reason to have a certain affective attitude is a reason for an action, and it is this category-mistake that is the source of the problem.
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  27. Moral Virtue and Reasons for Action.Michelle N. Mason - 2001 - Dissertation, The University of Chicago
    This dissertation urges philosophers to reevaluate how they frame the question of the rationality of moral action. Its motivation is the thought that approaches to the question have suffered from mistakes in the relata. On the part of theories of practical reason, philosophers adopt an inadequate theory of action. On the part of moral theory, philosophers hold narrow conceptions of moral worth. As a result, not only have we failed to vindicate the thought that the moral agent acts well, our (...)
     
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  28. Deliberative Control and Eliminativism about Reasons for Emotions.Conner Schultz - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Are there are normative reasons to have – or refrain from having – certain emotions? The dominant view is that there are. I disagree. In this paper, I argue for Strong Eliminativism – the view that there are no reasons for emotions. My argument for this claim has two premises. The first premise is that there is a deliberative constraint on reasons: a reason for an agent to have an attitude must be able to feature in that (...)
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  29.  40
    Reasons for Action.James Rachels - 1971 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):173 - 187.
    We can often explain a person's action by citing some fact which prompted him to do what he did. For example:Tom quit his job because he was offered more money elsewhere;Dick took his daughter to the dentist because she had a toothache;Harry rushed out of the theater because it was on fire.In each case there are four elements which fit together in a characteristic pattern. The first is the fact that Tom has been offered more money, that Dick's daughter has (...)
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  30. The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    There is currently a wide-ranging philosophical discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons for those attitudes. The question is what the distinction shows about the nature of the attitudes, and about reasons and normativity in general. The distinction is deemed to apply to reasons for different kinds of attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as so-called proattitudes, e.g. admiration (...)
     
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  31. A framework of values: reasons for conserving biodiversity and natural environments.Pierfrancesco Biasetti - 2016 - Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 18 (3):527-545.
    The idea that «natural» environments should be protected is a relatively recent one. This new attitude is reflected in the activities of preservation and restoration of natural environments, ecosystems, flora and wildlife that, when scientifically based, can be defined as conservation. In this paper, we would like to examine the framework of values behind these activities. More specifically, we would like to show that there is no single specific reason that can justify conservation in each of its manifestations It is (...)
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  32.  29
    Searching for the cognitive basis of anti-vaccination attitudes.Marjaana Lindeman, Annika M. Svedholm-Häkkinen & Tapani J. J. Riekki - 2023 - Thinking and Reasoning 29 (1):111-136.
    Research on the reasons for vaccine hesitancy has largely focused on factors directly related to vaccines. In contrast, the present study focused on cognitive factors that are not conceptually related to vaccines but that have been linked to other epistemically suspect beliefs such as conspiracy theories and belief in fake news. This survey was conducted before the Covid-19 pandemic (N = 356). The results showed that anti-vaccination attitudes decreased slightly with cognitive abilities and analytic thinking styles, and strongly (...)
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    The Problem of Connecting Polytheism to Allah’s Wish as the Reason for Denial of the Polytheists in Tafsīrs.Muhammed Ersöz - 2021 - Cumhuriyet İlahiyat Dergisi 25 (1):93-113.
    In the Qurʾān, it is mentioned that those who disbelieve insist on not believing by putting forward various excuses. One of them is that deniers attribute polytheism to Allah’s wish. When those who disbelieve are asked why they do not believe, they argue that they cannot deny unless Allah wills. On the other hand, expressions in line with the words spoken by the polytheists in the Qurʾān are also attributed to Allah. Such a paradoxical appearance between the verses requires a (...)
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  34. Reasoning, rational requirements, and occurrent attitudes.Wooram Lee - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1343-1357.
    This paper explores the sense in which rational requirements govern our attitudes like belief and intention. I argue that there is a tension between the idea that rational requirements govern attitudes understood as standing states and the attractive idea that we can directly satisfy the requirements by performing reasoning. I identify the tension by (a) illustrating how a dispositional conception of belief can cause trouble for the idea that we can directly revise our attitudes through reasoning by (...)
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  35. Practical Reason, Sympathy and Reactive Attitudes.Max Khan Hayward - 2017 - Noûs:51-75.
    This paper has three aims. First, I defend, in its most radical form, Hume's scepticism about practical reason, as it applies to purely self-regarding matters. It's not always irrational to discount the future, to be inconstant in one's preferences, to have incompatible desires, to not pursue the means to one's ends, or to fail to maximize one's own good. Second, I explain how our response to the “irrational” agent should be understood as an expression of frustrated sympathy, in Adam Smith's (...)
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  36.  57
    Common Knowledge, Common Attitudes and Social Reasoning.Richmond H. Thomason - 2021 - Bulletin of the Section of Logic 50 (2):229-247.
    For as long as there have been theories about common knowledge, they have been exposed to a certain amount of skepticism. Recent more sophisticated arguments question whether agents can acquire common attitudes and whether they are needed in social reasoning. I argue that this skepticism arises from assumptions about practical reasoning that, considered in themselves, are at worst implausible and at best controversial. A proper approach to the acquisition of attitudes and their deployment in decision making leaves room (...)
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  37.  75
    Unauthorized copying of software: an empirical study of reasons for and against.Mikko T. Siponen & Tero Vartiainen - 2007 - Acm Sigcas Computers and Society 37 (1):30-43.
    Computer users copy computer software - this is well-known. However, less well-known are the reasons why some computer users choose to make unauthorized copies of computer software. Furthermore, the relationship linking the theory and the practice is unknown, i.e., how the attitudes of ordinary end-users correspond with the theoretical views of computer ethics scholars. In order to fill this gap in the literature, we investigated the moral attitudes of 249 Finnish computing students towards the unauthorized copying of (...)
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    Do the reactive attitudes justify public reason?Collis Tahzib - 2022 - European Journal of Political Theory 21 (3):423-444.
    According to public reason liberalism, the laws and institutions of society must be in some sense justifiable to all reasonable citizens. But why care about justifiability to reasonable citizens? Recently, Gerald Gaus has developed a novel and sophisticated defence of public justification. Gaus argues that our everyday reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation presuppose public justification and that these reactive attitudes are essential to social life. In this article, I challenge the first premise by considering cases in which (...)
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  39.  36
    Why Reasons Are Explanations.Stephen Finlay - 2024 - Philosophia 52 (4):1001-1014.
    In his book _Normative Reasons_ (Logins A in Normative reasons: between reasoning and explanation. Cambridge University Press, 2022), Artürs Logins accepts that a normative reason to do A is always an answer to a ‘Why A?’ question, but rejects the unifying explanationist theory which identifies reasons always as explanations. On his Erotetic Theory, ‘Why A?’ questions sometimes seek an explanation (in No-Challenge contexts) but sometimes seek rather an argument (in Challenge contexts). This article defends a unifying, end-relational explanationist (...)
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  40. Explaining Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2012 - Deutsches Jahrbuch Fuer Philosophie 4:112-126.
    What does it mean to call something a “reason”? This paper offers a unifying semantics for the word ‘reason’, challenging three ideas that are popular in contemporary philosophy; (i) that ‘reason’ is semantically ambiguous, (ii) that the concept of a normative reason is the basic normative concept, and (iii) that basic normative concepts are unanalyzable. Nonnormative uses of ‘reason’ are taken as basic, and as meaning explanation why. Talk about normative reasons for action is analyzed in terms of explanations (...)
     
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  41. A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - Philosophical Perspectives 33 (1):62-104.
    This paper champions the view (REG) that the concept of a normative reason for an agent S to perform an action A is that of an explanation why it would be good (in some way, to some degree) for S to do A. REG has numerous virtues, but faces some significant challenges which prompt many philosophers to be skeptical that it can correctly account for all our reasons. I demonstrate how five different puzzles about normative reasons can be (...)
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  42.  42
    Withholding and withdrawing treatment for cost‐effectiveness reasons: Are they ethically on par?Lars Sandman & Jan Liliemark - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (2):278-286.
    In healthcare priority settings, early access to treatment before reimbursement decisions gives rise to problems of whether negative decisions for cost‐effectiveness reasons should result in withdrawing treatment, already accessed by patients. Among professionals there seems to be a strong attitude to distinguish between withdrawing and withholding treatment, viewing the former as ethically worse. In this article the distinction between withdrawing and withholding treatment for reasons of cost effectiveness is explored by analysing the doing/allowing distinction, different theories of justice, (...)
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  43. Attitudes Toward Mandatory COVID-19 Vaccination in Germany A representative analysis of data from the socio-economic panel for the year 2021.Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Carsten Schröder & Thomas Rieger - 2022 - Deutsches Ärzteblatt International 119:335-41.
    Background: Adequate immunity to COVID-19 apparently cannot be attained in Germany by voluntary vaccination alone, and therefore the introduction of mandatory COVID-19 vaccination is still under consideration. We present findings on the potential acceptance of such a requirement by the German population, and we report on the reasons given for accepting or rejecting it and how these reasons vary according to population subgroup. -/- Methods: We used representative data from the Socio-Economic Panel for the period January to December (...)
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  44. Ethics, Fitting Attitudes, and Practical Reason: A Theory of Normative Facts.Howard Nye - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    I present and defend (1) an account of ethical judgments as judgments about our reasons to feel specific motivationally laden attitudes, (2) an account of what an agent should do in terms of what would achieve ends that she has reason to be motivated to pursue, and (3) an account of an agent’s reasons for motivation (and thus action) in terms of the prescriptions of the most fundamental principles that guide her deliberations. Using these accounts, I explain (...)
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  45.  11
    Acting for reasons : a grass root approach.Ralf Stoecher - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New essays on the explanation of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 276-292.
    There are many accounts of what it is to act for a reason. Yet, most of these accounts are committed to what might be called the standard theory of human agency. According to the standard theory actions are events that result from the agent's having mental attitudes of a specific kind (e.g. a pair of beliefs and desires or a particular intention), which on the one hand cause the event and on the other hand show it to be reasonable (...)
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  46.  69
    Responsibility for Reason-Giving: The Case of Individual Tainted Reasoning in Systemic Corruption.Emanuela Ceva & Lubomira Radoilska - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):789-809.
    The paper articulates a new understanding of individual responsibility focused on exercises of agency in reason-giving rather than intentional actions or attitudes towards others. Looking at how agents make sense of their actions, we identify a distinctive but underexplored space for assessing individual responsibility within collective actions. As a case in point, we concentrate on reason-giving for one's own involvement in systemic corruption. We characterize systemic corruption in terms of its public ‘unavowability’ and focus on the redescriptions to which (...)
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  47. The right and the wrong kind of reasons.Jan Gertken & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12412.
    In a number of recent philosophical debates, it has become common to distinguish between two kinds of normative reasons, often called the right kind of reasons (henceforth: RKR) and the wrong kind of reasons (henceforth: WKR). The distinction was first introduced in discussions of the so-called buck-passing account of value, which aims to analyze value properties in terms of reasons for pro-attitudes and has been argued to face the wrong kind of reasons problem. But (...)
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  48.  21
    Deciding with dignity: The account of human dignity as an attitude and its implications for assisted suicide.Eva Weber-Guskar - 2019 - Bioethics 34 (1):135-141.
    Discussions about assisted suicide have hitherto been based on accounts of dignity conceived only as an inherent value or as a status; accounts of dignity in which it appears as a (contingent) attitude, by contrast, have been neglected. Yet there are two good reasons to consider dignity to be an attitude. First, this concept of dignity best allows us to grasp a crucial aspect of everyday language: people often express fears of losing their dignity—and it is not possible to (...)
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  49.  97
    Fitting-Attitude Analyses: The Dual-Reason Analysis Revisited. [REVIEW]Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (1):1-17.
    Classical fitting-attitude analyses understand value in terms of its being fitting, or more generally, there being a reason to favour the bearer of value. Recently, such analyses have been interpreted as referring to two reason-notions rather than to only one. The idea is that the properties of the object provide reason not only for a certain kind of favouring(s) vis-à-vis the object, but the very same properties should also figure in the intentional content of the favouring; the agent should favour (...)
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    Ethical attitudes of students and business professionals: A study of moral reasoning. [REVIEW]John A. Wood, Justin G. Longenecker, Joseph A. McKinney & Carlos W. Moore - 1988 - Journal of Business Ethics 7 (4):249 - 257.
    A questionnaire on business ethics was administered to business professionals and to upper-class business ethics students. On eight of the seventeen situations involving ethical dilemmas in business, students were significantly more willing to engage in questionable behavior than were their professional counterparts. Apparently, many students were willing to do whatever was necessary to further their own interests, with little or no regard for fundamental moral principles. Many students and professionals functioned within Lawrence Kohlberg's stage four of moral reasoning, the law (...)
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