This research examines whether the items of some of the most well-established five-factor inventories refer to competence. Results reveal that both experts and laymen can distinguish between items that refer to how competently a behavior is performed and items that do not. Responses to items that refer to competence create a higher-order factor in the personality inventories, and the variability in responses to competence-related items in personality self-ratings is best modeled as a general factor rather than as also tied to (...) the specific Big Five factors. We suggest that a focused debate on what personality items should refer to is likely to have considerable positive consequences for both theory and measurement of personality. (shrink)

In its basic sense, the term "human" is a term of biological classification: an individual is human just in case it is a member of the species Homo sapiens . Its opposite is "nonhuman": nonhuman animals being animals that belong to other species than H. sapiens . In another sense of human, its opposite is "inhuman," that is cruel and heartless (cf. "humane" and "inhumane"); being human in this sense is having morally good qualities. This paper argues that biomedical research (...) and therapy should make humans in the biological sense more human in the moral sense, even if they cease to be human in the biological sense. This serves valuable biomedical ends like the promotion of health and well-being, for if humans do not become more moral, civilization is threatened. It is unimportant that humans remain biologically human, since they do not have moral value in virtue of belonging to H. sapiens. (shrink)

Fred Feldman has argued that consequentialists can answer the well-known by replacing the utilitarian axiology with one that makes the value of receiving pleasures and pains depend on how deserved it is. It is shown that this proposal is open to three interpretations: the Fit-idea, which operates with the degree of fit between what recipients get and what they deserve; the Merit-idea, which operates with the magnitude of the recipients' desert or merit; and the Fit-Merit idea which is a combination (...) of and. It is argued that none of these ideas will do, among other things because they fail to take into account the fact that justice involves inter-personal comparisons. (shrink)

Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, and (...) that, although this relational or egalitarian form of prioritarianism is hit by the levelling down objection, the Parfitian form is also hit by it, or worse objections, if it is fully worked out. (shrink)

Many philosophers think that if you're morally responsible for a state of affairs, you must be a cause of it. Ingmar Persson argues that this strand of common sense morality is asymmetrical, in that it features the act-omission doctrine, according to which there are stronger reasons against performing some harmful actions than in favour of performing any beneficial actions. He analyses the act-omission doctrine as consisting in a theory of negative rights, according to which there are rights not to (...) have one's life, body, and property interfered with, and a conception of responsibility as being based on causality. This conception of responsibility is also found to be involved in the doctrine of double effect. The outcome of Persson's critical examination of these ideas is that reasons of rights are replaced by reasons of beneficence, and we are made responsible for what is under the influence of our practical reasons. The argument gives rise to a symmetrical, consequentialist morality which is more demanding but less authoritative than common sense morality, because reasons of beneficence are weaker than reasons of rights. It is also argued that there are no non-naturalist external practical reasons, and all practical reasons are desire-dependent: so practical reasons cannot be universally binding. The question is whether such a morality possesses enough authority to command our compliance. This seems necessary in order for us to cope with the greatest moral problems of our time, such as aid to developing countries and anthropogenic climate change. (shrink)

We respond to a number of objections raised by John Harris in this journal to our argument that we should pursue genetic and other biological means of morally enhancing human beings (moral bioenhancement). We claim that human beings now have at their disposal means of wiping out life on Earth and that traditional methods of moral education are probably insufficient to achieve the moral enhancement required to ensure that this will not happen. Hence, we argue, moral bioenhancement should be sought (...) and applied. We argue that cognitive enhancement and technological progress raise acute problems because it is easier to harm than to benefit. We address objections to this argument. We also respond to objections that moral bioenhancement: (1) interferes with freedom; (2) cannot be made to target immoral dispositions precisely; (3) is redundant, since cognitive enhancement by itself suffices. (shrink)

Within intellectual history there has been a widening interest over the last decades in rediscovering intellectuals who used to be renowned when they were active, but who for various reasons have been more or less forgotten over time. The Swedish writer Ellen Key (1849–1926) was a famous intellectual who gained her reputation through books, pamphlets, and hundreds of lectures on topics such as pedagogy, peace, and women’s rights—topics that were at the top of a general intellectual agenda around 1900. I (...) will focus on her idea of internationalism that was founded on an evolutionary life philosophy of development. Her engagement in internationalism was built on an idealist foundation of philosophical, religious, and humanitarian beliefs organized around peace and a problematization of the nation. Key advocated a kind of patriotism as her path towards developing internationalism. In this article, Key’s work is contextualized and conceptualized in the discussion of internationalism of her contemporaries. (shrink)

Indicators of food sovereignty and food democracy center on people having the right and ability to define their food polices and strategies with respect to food culture, food security, sustainability and use of natural resources. Yet food sovereignty, like democracy, exists on multiple and competing scales, and policymakers and citizens often have different agendas and priorities. In passing a ban on the use of genetically-modified seeds in agriculture, Jackson County, Oregon has obtained some measure of food sovereignty. Between 2016 and (...) 2017 ethnographic research was undertaken in rural Southern Oregon where local community and State of Oregon priorities regarding the use of GMO crops are in conflict. This article presents ethnographic research findings about the expression and negotiation of multiple food sovereignties by civil society in rural southern Oregon and the State of Oregon via democratic processes. In particular, these findings illustrate the effects of socio-political power dynamics on local and state acts of food sovereignty, democracy and agrifood policy by analyzing what the different expressions of food sovereignty reveal for its implementation at the local level. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism is a value-loaded concept that seems to become popular in intervals. The latest cosmopolitan period started after the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the Soviet Union and concentrated mostly on aspects such as “a new world order”, and often with reference to Kant. It might be questioned if the cosmopolitan period still exists. Here it is suggested that a historical understanding of cosmopolitanism together with experience from later social and political experiences might give a new (...) perspective on the difficulties of creating a better world in a Kantian sense, including cosmopolitan education. Considering its history and taking concern of experience Kant’s cosmopolitanism still is relevant, not least in its broader sense. (shrink)

There are strong links between astrobiology and environmental concern. Astrobiology is the study of the origin, evolution and distribution of life in the universe—including Earth. Understanding life, and in particular the basic conditions for life, is important for our ability to create a sustainable future on Earth. The connection goes both ways, however. The preservation of biodiversity and of pristine environments on Earth is of the greatest importance for our ability to study life, its origin, distribution and future. Of special (...) interest from an astrobiology perspective is the preservation of areas with conditions that can serve as analogues to extraterrestrial environments, areas with conditions similar to those under which life originated on Earth, and in general environments where extreme adaptations can be studied. Astrobiology also presents some direct environmental challenges that need to be considered, namely in the form of forward and back contamination. Both issues need to be approached from a technical perspective, but also from a societal perspective. And both must be understood within a broader context of ensuring the sustainability of practices, both scientific and commercial. (shrink)

I am grateful to Daniel Little for his insightful reply to my recent article in Social Epistemology about what appears to be a flaw in Jon Elster’s conception of mechanisms. I agree with much of what Little says, but want to amplify a different underlying problem with Elster’s conception than Little suggests in his reply. This underlying problem connects nicely with a passage in Little’s reply, which he thinks unconnected with the point on which I focus.

On many accounts, the criterion of our diachronic identity or persistence consists in or comprises some psychological conditions. As on Locke's account, these conditions often include one's appealing to the relation of remembering having an experience of. Contemporary theorists are unlikely to claim simply that a necessary condition for Pm at tm being the same person as Pn at a later time, tn, is that Pn remembers having experiences had by Pm at tm. They are more likely to appeal, as (...) does Derek Parfit, to a ‘continuity of memory’ or ‘overlapping chains’ of memories, that is, to assert that Pn must at least remember having experiences had by somebody, Pn-1, existing at some time in-between tm and tn, that Pn-1 in turn must remember having experiences had by somebody Pn-2 … and so on back to Pm. (shrink)

RésuméLes philosophes appartenant à la tradition lockienne considèrent qu'en tant que personnes ou sujets de pensée et d'expérience, nous sommes distincts de nos organismes humains. Cela conduirait, selon des théoriciens qui veulent plutôt nous identifier à ces organismes, à un dédoublement paradoxal des sujets en question. Les objectifs principaux de cet article sont, premièrement, de soutenir à l'encontre de cet argument que la séparabilité des personnes par rapport à leurs organismes peut être comprise d'une manière non paradoxale; et deuxièmement, de (...) souligner qu'il ne faut par inférer de cette séparabilité que nous soyons identiques aux personnes plutôt qu'aux organismes humains. (shrink)

Recently the importance of addressing values in discussions of risk perception and adaptation to climate change has become manifest. Values-based approaches to climate change adaptation and the cultural cognition thesis both illustrate this trend. We argue that in the wake of this development it is necessary to take the dynamic relationship between values and beliefs seriously, to acknowledge the possibility of bi-directional relationships between values and beliefs, and to address the variety of values involved. The dynamic relationship between values and (...) beliefs, we claim, highlights the need to bring ethical considerations to bear on climate change communication. In particular, we must ask whether it is acceptable to tailor information about the risks of climate change in an effort to maximize communicative effectiveness given the values of the target group. (shrink)

Philosophers of science have often favoured reductive approaches to how-possibly explanation. This article identifies three alternative conceptions making how-possibly explanation an interesting phenomenon in its own right. The first variety approaches “how possibly X?” by showing that X is not epistemically impossible. This can sometimes be achieved by removing misunderstandings concerning the implications of one’s current belief system but involves characteristically a modification of this belief system so that acceptance of X does not result in contradiction. The second variety offers (...) a potential how-explanation of X. It is usually followed by a range of further potential how-explanations of the same phenomenon. In recent literature the factual claims implied by the second variety have been downplayed whereas the heuristic role of mapping the space of conceptual possibilities has been emphasized. I will focus especially on this truth-bracketing sense of potentiality when looking closer at the second variety in the paper. The third variety has attracted less interest. It presents a partial how-explanation of X. Typically it aims to establish the existence of a mechanism by which X could be and was generated. The third conception stands out as the natural alternative for the advocate of ontic how-possibly explanations. This article transfers Salmon’s view that explanation-concepts can be broadly divided into epistemic, modal, and ontic to the context of how-possibly explanations. Moreover, it is argued that each of the three above-mentioned varieties of how-possibly explanation occurs in science. To recognize this may be especially relevant for philosophers. We are often misled by the promises of various why-explanation accounts, and seem to have forgotten nearly everything about the diversity of how-possibly explanations. (shrink)

In his challenging paper,1 Vojin Rakic argues against our claim that ‘there are strong reasons to believe’ that moral bioenhancement should be obligatory or compulsory if it can be made safe and effective.2 Rakic starts by criticising an argument that we employed against John Harris.3 ,4 In this argument we maintain, among other things, that moral bioenhancement cannot be wholly effective if our will is free in what is called an ‘indeterministic’ or ‘contra-causal sense’; that is, if our choices are (...) not fully determined by our biology and environmental circumstances. Rakic contends that we ‘do not take into account the possibility that we can have an entirely free will that does not limit the effectiveness of moral bio-enhancement’. We can use ‘our freedom to decide to be morally bio-enhanced’.In reply, we would like to insist that if our freedom is freedom in this indeterministic sense, we cannot use this freedom to decide to subject ourselves to effective moral bioenhancement, since this effectiveness presupposes that our will is fully determined by biological causes that this enhancement influences. If certain sub-atomic processes are indeterministic, probabilistic, we cannot make them deterministic. We cannot change the laws …. (shrink)

G. E. Moore raised the question of whether consequentialists ought to maximize actual rather than expected value, and came down in favour of the former alternative. But rather recently Frank Jackson has presented an example which has been widely thought to clinch the case in favour of the alternative view. This article argues for a sort of compromise between these rival views, namely that while we ought to do what maximizes actual value, we ought to try to do what maximizes (...) expected value. It is claimed that consequentialists could consistently adopt this view, though in Jackson's case they are certain that, if they try to maximize expected value, they shall most likely not maximize actual value. (shrink)

Interdisciplinary research within the field of sustainability studies often faces incompatible ontological assumptions deriving from natural and social sciences. The importance of this fact is often underrated and sometimes leads to the wrong strategies. We distinguish between two broad approaches in interdisciplinarity: unificationism and pluralism. Unificationism seeks unification and perceives disciplinary boundaries as conventional, representing no long-term obstacle to progress, whereas pluralism emphasizes more ephemeral and transient interdisciplinary connections and underscores the autonomy of the disciplines with respect to one another. (...) Both approaches have their merits and pitfalls. Unification runs the risk of scientific imperialism, while pluralism can result in insurmountable barriers between disciplines. We made a comparison of eight distinct interdisciplinary attempts at integration of knowledge across social and natural sciences. The comparison was carried out as four pairwise comparisons: environmental economics versus ecological economics, environmental history versus historical ecology, resilience theory versus political ecology, and socio-biology versus actor-network theory. We conclude by showing that none of these prominent eight interdisciplinary fields in and of itself manages to provide, in a satisfactory way, such an integrated understanding of sustainability. We argue for pluralism and advocate complex ways of articulating divergent ontological assumptions. This is not equivalent to pursuing knowledge unification either through scientific imperialism or by catering to the requirements of narrow practical utility. It means prioritizing interdisciplinary integration by simultaneously acknowledging the role of societal and natural factors in accounting for sustainability issues. (shrink)

In the preface to the second edition of his deservedly popular Practical Ethics, Peter Singer notes that one of the ‘two significant changes” of his ‘underlying ethical views” consists in dropping the tentative suggestion that ‘one might try to combine both the “total” and the “prior existence” versions of utilitarianism, applying the former to sentient beings who are not self-conscious and the latter to those who are”. On the total view our aim is ‘to increase the total amount of pleasure (...) ” regardless of ‘whether this is done by increasing the pleasure of existing beings, or increasing the number of beings who exist”, whereas on the prior existence view we ‘count only beings who already exist, prior to the decision we are taking, or at least will exist independently of that decision”. Instead he proposes ‘that preference utilitarianism draws a sufficiently sharp distinction between these two categories of being to enable us to apply one version of utilitarianism to all sentient beings”. (shrink)

The Retreat of Reason brings back to philosophy the ambition of offering a broad vision of the human condition. One of the main original aims of philosophy was to give people guidance about how to live their lives. Ingmar Persson resumes this practical project, which has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy, but his conclusions are very different from those of the ancient Greeks. They typically argued that a life led in accordance with reason, a rational life, would also (...) be the happiest or most fulfilling. By exploring the irrationality of our attitudes to time, identity, and responsibility, Persson shows that the aim of living rationally conflicts not only with the aim of leading the most fulfilling life, but also with the moral aim of promoting the maximization and just distribution of fulfilment for all. The Retreat of Reason challenges some of our most fundamental ideas about ourselves. (shrink)

This paper argues that causing beings to exist can benefit them. It is sketched how this view avoids Derek Parfit’s repugnant conclusion by rejecting the transitivity of the relation better/worse than. It handles Jeff McMahan’s asymmetry consisting in that reasons against letting beings with bad lives exist are significantly stronger than reasons for letting beings with good lives exist by putting it down to the conditions making lives bad being more potent than those making them good. The latter asymmetry is (...) reflected in negative feelings being stronger than positive, including compassion being stronger than positive sympathy. Compassion is a chief source of benevolence. Neither the absence of consciousness nor the physical non-existence of possible beings hinders compassion for them. What hinders it is the same as what hinders compassion for existing beings unknown to us: lack of the detailed information about what their lives would be like which facilitates empathy. (shrink)

i) it is morally permissible to engage in reproduction, whether natural or artificial, despite knowledge that a large number of embryos will fail to implant and quickly die, then ii) it is morally permissible to produce embryos for other purposes that involve killing them, for instance, to harvest stem cells that may be used to save lives.

This book's critical approach addresses the anachronism, essentialism and ethnocentrism that underlie contemporary theoretical and methodological uses of the term «cosmopolitanism». It explores the concept of cosmopolitan reason from the viewpoints of comparative literature, psychoanalysis, phenomenology, postcolonialism and moral philosophy.

Today talk of rights is very much in vogue both in philosophical and popular ethics; so much so that it is common to find even philosophers unabashedly going straight to discussing what rights we have without touching on what their foundation might be. This is so in spite of there being a time-honoured tradition of scepticism about rights, conceived as ‘natural’ ones, going back at least to Jeremy Bentham. The present paper is intended as a contribution to this sceptical tradition (...) for I shall try to prove that there are no natural rights or that nobody is the holder of any such right. (shrink)

Some authors argue that we have a moral obligation to leave Mars the way it is, even if it does not harbour any life. This claim is usually based on an assumption that Mars has intrinsic value. The problem with this concept is that different authors use it differently. In this chapter, I investigate different ways in which an uninhabited Mars is said to have intrinsic value. First, I investigate whether the planet can have moral standing. I find that this (...) is not a plausible assumption. I then investigate different combinations of objective value and end value. I find that there is no way we can know whether an uninhabited Mars has objective end value and even if it does, this does not seem to imply any moral obligations on us. I then investigate whether an uninhabited Mars can have subjective end value. I conclude that this is very plausible. I also investigate whether an uninhabited Mars can have objective instrumental value in relation to some other, non-Mars related end value. I find also this very plausible. It is also highly plausible, however, that spreading life to a presently uninhabited Mars can also have subjective end value, as well as objective instrumental value. I mention shortly two ways of prioritising between these values: The utilitarian method of counting the number of sentient beings who entertain each value and determining the strength of the values to them. Finding a compromise that allows colonisation on parts of the planet while leaving other parts untouched. These methods should be seen as examples, not as an exhaustive list. Also, I do not take a definitive stand in favour of any of the two approaches, though it seems at least prima facie that the second approach may have a better chance of actually leading to a constructive result. (shrink)

Isaac Levi is more interested in inquiry and how it progresses than he is in metaphysics. Questions concerning the role of disposition predicates in inquiry are more central to him than those concerning the nature and reality of dispositions. It has not stopped him from giving me and others very useful metaphysical advice. Currently, where empirical metaphysics is in vogue, there is every reason to see whether the two forms of philosophical interest might interlock substantially. Levi has stimulating ideas indeed (...) on the two forms of philosophical interest, and has recently summarized them in the slogan: “The reality of dispositions is a work in progress”. We can learn much about what kinds of dispositions are acceptable from tracing and comparing the histories of successful and less successful disposition predicates in scientific inquiry. Levi explores one route along which dispositions become real. His idea is that the introduction of dispositions facilitates covering law explanation by increasing the number of laws. The successful disposition predicate eventually becomes integrated in scientific theory, much like an ordinary theoretical term, whereas the unsuccessful does not. My impression is that Levi thinks that this is the only way a disposition can become real. To evaluate this claim, an alternative course suggested by Jon Elster is introduced. I then try to bring out the differences between Levi's and Elster's views on dispositions, partly by suggesting that they resemble two aspects of full explanations discussed by Wesley Salmon. But more about that below. (shrink)

Standard views of good death in human and veterinary medicine considerably differ from one another. Whereas the good death ideal in palliative medicine emphasizes the positive aspects of non-induced dying, veterinarians typically promote a quick and painless killing with the aim to end suffering. Recent developments suggest a convergence of both professions and professional attitudes, however. Palliative physicians are confronted with patients wishing to be ‘put to sleep’, while veterinarians have begun to integrate principles and practices from hospice care. We (...) will argue that the discourses on good human and animal deaths are not distinct, but that they interact and influence each other. On the one hand, veterinary medicine adapts techniques like chemotherapy or sedation from palliative end-of-life care. On the other hand, philosophers, veterinarians, pet owners, patients and the general public alike make certain assumptions about the analogy of human and animal dying or killing. Unfortunately, these interactions have only scarcely been reflected normatively, especially on the part of human medicine. Conflicts and misattributions with potential serious negative consequences for the patients’ wellbeing are provoked. For these reasons, palliative physicians and veterinarians are invited to engage in the debate around human and animal end-of-life care. (shrink)

This paper clarifies and defends against criticism our argument in _Unfit for the Future_ that there is no moral right to privacy. A right to privacy is conceived as a right that others do not acquire information about us that we reserve for ourselves and selected others. Information acquisition itself is distinguished from the means used to acquire it and the uses to which the information is put. To acquire information is not an action; it is to be caused to (...) be in an internal state. By contrast, means of acquisition and uses of information are actions that can be voluntarily controlled. We can therefore have rights against others that they stay away from certain means and uses but not from information acquisition in itself. An omniscient, omnipotent and omnibeneficient being is not thought to violate a right to privacy because its means and uses of information are morally acceptable. (shrink)

“Each and every important work of art leaves traces behind in its material and technique,” Theodor W. Adorno postulates in Aesthetic Theory, as he describes the way a composition is both a result of its own time and reacts critically to the time it belongs to. This quote demonstrates a reversal: rather than merely an expression or an outcome of an artist’s idea, art itself is regarded as a source for change. The work may come to affect its own tools (...) and materials and the social space around it. The primary question of this article is: what is it in musical composition that leaves the traces? This article attempts to move the focus away from discussion of finished works, and instead, depict how composition as a discipline engages in dialogue with its handcraft, historicity, and surrounding social world. I call this aspect of composition that possesses critical potential a lingering reflection. Slow and heteronomous in its nature, it presents a counterpoint to ideas that seem solid, are easily accessible and unquestioned. (shrink)

In Confrontations with the Reaper Fred Feldman puts forward puts forward an ethical theory called ‘justicized act utilitarianism’, JAU, according to which an act is morally right if and only if it maximizes universal justice level, i.e., brings it about that as many as possible get what they deserve. It is here argued that JAU is exposed to objections under the force of which it either loses its special emphasis on justice or its utilitarian character. It is also contended that, (...) contrary to what Feldman suggests, JAU does not deal more plausibly with procreation and abortion than do more familiar forms of utilitarianism. Rather, it deals less plausibly at least with abortion, due to difficulties in the concept of desert. (shrink)

In this article it will be argued that a Humean, projectivist theory of colour can be held consistent and plausible. This can be done without selling out to cognitivist intuitions about colours if the distinction between an everyday and a metalevel is upheld. The distinction, it will be argued, is both natural and philosophically uncomplicated.

According to Jon Elster, mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences. In the absence of laws, moreover, mechanisms provide explanations. In this paper I argue that Elster’s view has difficulties with progressing knowledge. Normally, filling in the causal picture without revising it should not threaten one’s explanation. But this seems to be Elster’s case. The critique is constructive in the sense that it is built up from a (...) discussion of a mechanism that might explain ‘unwarranted’ risk taking in connection with swimming—a mechanism that is mirrored in the proverb: The best swimmers drown. (shrink)

This paper presents an argument to the effect that the relation of exact similarity with respect to properties that are supervenient cannot be transitive. The point of departure is that, while a difference in respect of supervenient properties entails a difference in respect of subvenient properties, exact similiarity in respect of supervenient properties is compatible with differences in respect of subvenient properties. It is logically possible that two such sets of differences that each individually is insufficient for a difference as (...) regards the supervenient property together are sufficient for such a supervenient difference. This possibility claim is incompatible with the necessity claim entailed by the transitivity of exact similarity. Several objections to this argument are then considered. (shrink)