This volume brings together a range of theoretical responses to issues in Irish politics. Its organising ideas: recognition, equality, and democracy set the terms of political debate within both jurisdictions. For some, there are significant tensions between the grammar of recognition, concerned with esteem, respect and the symbolic aspects of social life, and the logic of equality, which is primarily concerned with the distribution of material resources and formal opportunities, while for others, tensions are produced rather (...) by certain interpretations of these ideas while alternative readings may, by contrast, serve as the basis for a systematic account of social and political inequality. The essays in this collection will explore these interconnections with reference to the politics of Northern Ireland and the Republic. The Republic has gone through a period in which its constitution was the focus for a liberal politics aimed at securing personal autonomy, while Northern Ireland’s political landscape has been shaped by the problem of securing political autonomy and democratic legitimacy. While the papers address key questions facing each particular polity, the issues themselves have resonances for politics on each side of the border. (shrink)

In recent years there has been much debate over whether recognition has displaced, or should displace, redistribution as the pre‐eminent concern of contemporary politics. That debate is not about whether we should continue to pursue an egalitarian ideal, since equality is as much a goal for the politics of recognition as it is for the politics of redistribution. In this essay, I address only issues of recognition and ask what kind of equal recognition we can (...) reasonably demand or pursue. I argue that we can expect to secure equal recognition of difference or particularity only if that recognition is mediated by more general forms of recognition. Certainly that approach is implied if we hold that difference should be recognised because that difference matters to the recognised rather than to the recogniser. Thus, I challenge the prevailing view that the politics of difference should replace the politics of universalism; rather, the politics of difference presupposes a form of universalism. I also use a distinction between status and merit recognition to indicate the difficulties that confront the goal of equal recognition if we insist that particularity or difference should be the object of unmediated recognition. I use cultural and religious identities as the main foci for my argument, but I also consider how far that argument translates to issues of sexuality and gender. (shrink)

Equality, diversity and radical politics -- Value incommensurability -- Empathic imagination and its limits -- Critiquing compassion-based social relations -- Egalitarianism, disability and monistic ideals -- Equality, identity and disability -- Paradox and the limits of reason.

In this paper I analyze interpersonal and institutional recognition and discuss the relation of different types of recognition to various principles of social justice (egalitarianism, meritarianism, legitimate favouritism, principles of need and free exchange). Further, I try to characterize contours of good autonomous life, and ask what kind of preconditions it has. I will distinguish between five kinds of preconditions: psychological, material, cultural, intersubjective and institutional. After examining what the role of recognition is among such preconditions, and (...) how they figure in the work of Axel Honneth, Nancy Fraser and Charles Taylor, I suggest a somewhat complex and hopefully rich picture of interpersonal and institutional recognition as a precondition of autonomous good life. (shrink)

Liberal egalitarianism is commonly criticized for being insufficiently sensitive to status inequalities and the effects of misrecognition. I examine this criticism as it applies to Ronald Dworkin’s ‘equality of resources’ and argue that, in fact, liberal egalitarians possess the resources to deal effectively with recognition-type issues. More precisely, while conceding that the distributive principles required to realize equality of resources must apply against a particular institutional background, I point out, following Dworkin, that among the principles guiding this (...) background is a ‘principle of independence,’ and that this principle, properly interpreted, requires government to protect people against the disadvantageous effects of wrongful prejudicial discrimination. Moreover, I give an account of wrongful prejudice which is grounded in a particular interpretation of the abstract egalitarian principle Dworkin requires for a government to be legitimate and which goes a long way toward acknowledging status inequalities. Finally, I suggest other resources within the theory for responding to residual problems of recognition not addressed by the principle of independence. (shrink)

In this article I shall examine how some recent work on equality has thrown light on the thorny issue of how equality relates to the recognition of difference. It has been argued that, whilst equal...

Jonathan Quong | : Alan Patten presents his account of minority rights as broadly continuous with Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources. This paper challenges this claim. I argue that, contra Patten, Dworkin’s theory does not provide a basis to offer accommodations or minority rights, as a matter of justice, to some citizens who find themselves at a relative disadvantage in pursuing their plans of life after voluntarily changing their cultural or religious commitments. | : Alan Patten considère (...) que sa théorie des droits des minorités s’inscrit en continuité avec celle de l’égalité des ressources chez Donald Dworkin. Cet article interroge cette affirmation. Je soutiens que, contrairement à ce que pense Patten, la théorie de Dworkin ne fournit pas de base en vue d’accommodations ou des droits de la minorité, en ce qui a trait à la justice, à des citoyens relativement désavantagés par la poursuite de leur plan de vie après avoir volontairement changé de culture ou d’engagements religieux. (shrink)

Rosemary Hennessy, Materialist Feminism and the Politics of DiscourseRichard J. Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish QuestionDavid Ames Curtis, The Castoriadis ReaderDavid Ames Curtis, World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and the ImaginationMorris Kaplan, Sexual Justice: Democratic Citizenship and the Politics of Desire.

6. The Method of Equality: Politics and Poetics, by Jacques Rancière -- 7. Of the Poverty of Our Liberty: The Greatness and Limits of Hegel's Doctrine of Ethical Life, by Axel Honneth -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index.

Abstract In 1995, the constitution of the Mexican state of Oaxaca was reformed to recognise indigenous usages and customs for the election of municipal governments. This recognition is problematic from a normative perspective, as women, new?comers and dwellers in municipal sub?units are disenfranchised in a good number of indigenous municipalities of the state. Nevertheless, this article argues against a summary assessment of the (presumably illiberal) consequences of this recognition policy. Following James Tully, it advocates an intercultural, dialogical and (...) inclusive procedure to tackle the perils of the politics of recognition in Oaxaca and Mexico. However, this procedure?based approach raises problems of its own related to the issues of representation and intra?communal divisions. As a result, the ultimate role of substantive commitments, in particular to individual rights, needs to be recognised. Despite these shortcomings, though, an approach based on an intercultural, dialogical and inclusive conflict?solving procedure is the best option to deliver more just answers to indigenous demands for recognition. (shrink)

An important contribution of Alan Patten’s Equal Recognition is the conception of neutrality that grounds his defence of minority cultural rights. Built in to his conception of neutrality of treatment is a notion of ‘fairness’ whose effect is to provide an upfront, across the board limitation on the demands cultural minorities may legitimately make on the rest of society. There must be limits on the duty to accommodate, but it obscures more than it illuminates to build this into the (...) content of the right to equal recognition itself. We see more clearly what is at stake in these conflicts by articulating the value of self-determination independently and taking account of necessary limits to its satisfaction as part of a second-stage analysis of what duties may be claimed and against whom. Familiar principles of discrimination law exemplify this alternative model. This presents the interest in self-determination more robustly, while acknowledging that the claims of duty arising out of it are defeasible. The result is a more flexible and nuanced exploration of the complex moral issues involved when fundamental interests clash. (shrink)

Alan Patten | : Equal Recognition seeks to restate the case in favour of liberal multiculturalism in a manner that is responsive to major objections that have been advanced by critics in recent years. The book engages, among other questions, with two central unresolved problems. First, how should ideas of culture and cultural preservation be understood, given widespread suspicion that these ideas rely on an unavowed, but objectionable, form of essentialism? And, second, what exactly is the normative basis of (...) cultural rights claims, and what are the limits on those claims? My four commentators advance a variety of different criticisms of the book’s answers to these questions. I offer replies to each of their main challenges. | : Equal Recognition réaffirme l’argument en faveur du multiculturalisme libéral de façon à répondre aux objections majeures qui lui ont été adressées ces dernières années. Le livre se penche, entre autres, sur deux problèmes centraux, non résolus. Premièrement, comment les idées de culture et de préservation culturelle devraient être comprises, étant donné la suspicion répandue selon laquelle ces idées se fondent sur une forme d’essentialisme aussi inavoué que répréhensible? Deuxièmement, quelle est exactement la base normative des requêtes de droits culturels, et quelles sont les limites à ces requêtes? Mes quatre commentateurs avancent une variété de critiques différentes quant aux réponses que ce livre apporte à ces questions. Je réponds ici à chacune d’elles. (shrink)

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Within the umbrella of equal recognition, several principles of linguistic justice can be distinguished. A first, the per-capita principle, mandates prorating language recognition based on a per-capita distribution. A second, the equal-services principle, prescribes upholding the official languages as the languages in which the state speaks and in which public services are provided, irrespective of changing numbers of speakers. Alan Patten defends the prorated per-capita principle. I argue (...) for the equal-services principle, which practically will often amount to a form of linguistic maximin: the more vulnerable the language, the more numerous the resources. (shrink)

Axel Honneth is best known for his critique of modern society centered on a concept of recognition. Jacques Rancière has advanced an influential theory of modern politics based on disagreement. Underpinning their thought is a concern for the logics of exclusion and domination that structure contemporary societies. In a rare dialogue, these two philosophers explore the affinities and tensions between their perspectives to provoke new ideas for social and political change. -/- Honneth sees modern society as a field in (...) which the logic of recognition provides individuals with increasing possibilities for freedom and is a constant catalyst for transformation. Rancière sees the social as a policing order and the political as a force that must radically assert equality. Honneth claims Rancière's conception of the political lies outside of actual historical societies and involves a problematic desire for egalitarianism. Rancière argues that Honneth's theory of recognition relies on an overly substantial conception of identity and subjectivity. While impassioned, their exchange seeks to advance critical theory's political project by reconciling the rift between German and French post-Marxist traditions and proposing new frameworks for justice. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Demands for Equality Demands for Recognition Demands for Self‐Determination Shifting the Grounds of Liberalism Notes.

ABSTRACT This article explores the theorization of (in)visibility in Honneth, Ranciere, Cavell and Tully. It situates the work of Honneth and Ranciere against the background of Wittgenstein's account of continuous aspect perception and aspect change in order to draw out their accounts of invisibility and the aesthetic character of transitions to visibility. In order to develop a critical standpoint on these theoretical positions, it turns to Cavell's concept of soul-blindness and investigates the form of invisibility through the example of racism (...) as addressed by Gaita, Fanon and Memmi. This analysis provides the basis for a critical evaluation of the strengths and limitations of Ranciere's and Honneth's approaches and leads to the proposal that Tully's public philosophy provides a more adequate way of addressing the issues of struggle and uptake that are central to the transition from invisibility to visibility. (shrink)

To assess the ability of the disconnected cerebral hemispheres to recognize images of the self, a split-brain patient was tested using morphed self-face images presented to one visual hemifield at a time while making “self/other” judgments. The performance of the right and left hemispheres of this patient as assessed by a signal detection method was not significantly different, though a measure of bias did reveal hemispheric differences. The right and left hemispheres of this patient independently and equally possessed the ability (...) to self-recognize, but only the right hemisphere could successfully recognize familiar others. This supports a modular concept of self-recognition and other-recognition, separately present in each cerebral hemisphere. (shrink)

© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. In this introduction, we first give a brief overview of the debate over multiculturalism in political theory. We then situate Alan Patten’s Equal Recognition in that context by highlighting his major normative thesis, according to which there are reasons of principle, in a liberal democracy, to grant special forms of public recognition and accommodation to cultural minorities. Finally, we present a succinct summary of the nine articles that (...) follow this introduction and that critically engage with Patten’s arguments. (shrink)

‘Sovereignty’, Arendt says, ‘is contradictory to’ the human condition. It is not, in any event, the kind of thing that can be shared across generations. Subsequent generations lack sovereignty to the precise degree that they are bound by the decisions of their predecessors. It is no answer to say that contemporary citizens participate in the sovereignty of a whole, transgenerational people. To paraphrase de Tocqueville, later generations are not free because they are not entirely equal, and they are not equal (...) because they are not entirely free. Where ‘sovereignty’ is a metaphysical concept that transcends time, recognition is an act of the imagination that extends empathy diachronically in both directions. An earlier generation treats its successors with recognition and respect by bequeathing the best system it can manage and entrusting later generations to exercise the same freedom that it enjoyed. Democratic law can exist across generations only through negation. Later citizens may accept as valid the law made by their predecessors. But, in doing so, they implicitly affirm their right to alter, amend, or abolish what came before. Only by freely affirming the choices of their predecessors can current citizens participate in something approaching freedom. (shrink)

This conceptual paper revisits the concept of equality as a base of distributive justice and contends that it is underspecified, both theoretically and in terms of its ethical and pragmatic application to human resource management (HRM) within organizations. Prior organizational literature focuses primarily upon distributive equality of remunerative outcomes within small groups and implicitly employs an equity-based conception of inputs to define equality. In contrast, through exposition of the philosophical roots of equality principles, we reconceptualize inputs (...) as de facto equal and consider the systemic application of distributive equality in the form of status leveling practices. Ethical ramifications of distributive equality so viewed are explored. We conclude by arguing that, to implicitly insert a stronger ethics focus into the study and practice of HRM, perhaps there should be "equality theory" competing with equity theory for recognition in managerial and scholarly discourse. (shrink)

Nancy Fraser has elaborated a framework for analyzing different forms of oppression using the categories of redistribution and recognition. This framework has come under criticism from Iris Marion Young and Judith Butler, despite the fact that all three theorists similarly insist that justice is not reducible solely to economic justice and that struggles against ‘cultural’ forms of oppression are equally important. Drawing on the debate between these theorists, in this article I examine the ways in which their respective theoretical (...) frameworks are potentially problematic or do not go far enough in theorizing the complex interconnections among economics, politics and culture. For example, Fraser’s binary economy/culture and Young’s distinction between culture and structure are overly broad and potentially misleading. Butler and Fraser also appear to adopt undertheorized and economistic conceptualizations of ‘the economy’ and capitalism. In the course of my critique, I propose a somewhat different approach to analyzing the causes of various forms of oppression and the relation between different emancipatory struggles. Among other things, I argue that social relationships need to be disaggregated further, into more than just two categories, and that the economic and the cultural (as well as the political) should be analyzed as always complexly overdetermining each other. (shrink)

`Due recognition is a vital human need', argues Charles Taylor. In this article I explore this oft-quoted claim from two complementary and equally appealing perspectives. The bottom—up approach is constructed around Axel Honneth's theory of recognition, and the top—down approach is exemplified by T. M. Scanlon's brief remarks about mutual recognition. The former can be summed up in the slogan `wronging by misrecognizing', the latter in the slogan `misrecognizing by wronging'. Together they provide two complementary readings of (...) the claim that due recognition is a vital human need: one starts from needs, shows how we have a multifarious need for adequate recognition and builds up to a view about wronging; the other starts from wronging and discusses the kind of interest or need that we have of standing in relations where wronging is absent. (shrink)

Everyone cares about recognition: no one wants to be treated with disrespect, insulted, humiliated, or simply ignored. In this compelling new book, McBride examines how a basic need for recognition is the motivation behind struggles for inclusion and equality in contemporary society.

In an era of heightened concern about injustice in relations of identity and difference, political theorists often prescribe equal recognition as a remedy for the ills of subordination. Drawing on the philosophy of Hegel, they envision a system of reciprocal knowledge and esteem, in which the affirming glance of others lets everyone be who they really are. This book challenges the equation of recognition with justice. Patchen Markell mines neglected strands of the concept's genealogy and reconstructs an unorthodox (...) interpretation of Hegel, who, in the unexpected company of Sophocles, Aristotle, Arendt, and others, reveals why recognition's promised satisfactions are bound to disappoint, and even to stifle.Written with exceptional clarity, the book develops an alternative account of the nature and sources of identity-based injustice in which the pursuit of recognition is part of the problem rather than the solution. And it articulates an alternative conception of justice rooted not in the recognition of identity of the other but in the acknowledgment of our own finitude in the face of a future thick with surprise. Moving deftly among contemporary political philosophers, the close interpretation of ancient and modern texts, and the exploration of rich case studies drawn from literature, history, and modern politics, Bound by Recognition is at once a sustained treatment of the problem of recognition and a sequence of virtuoso studies. (shrink)

In recent years, artificial intelligence has made significant progress, leading to a wide variety of applications, such as speech recognition, product recommendations, language translation, and many other applications. Although gender equality and artificial intelligence can be considered separate fields, they are closely related and mutually influence each other. The purpose of this paper is to outline various aspects of relationship between gender equality and artificial intelligence, to identify interrelationship between them, and to present challenges and possible solutions (...) to problems arising from their connection. This text will present the issue of gender equality in the development of artificial intelligence, but also the impact of artificial intelligence on gender equality; challenges and possible solutions, successful examples and case studies, legislation and policies supporting gender balance in artificial intelligence, the impact of gender equality on quality and innovation in artificial intelligence; the future of dynamics of development of relationship of gender equality and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Charles Taylor’s ‘Politics of Recognition’ has given philosophical substance to the idea of ‘recognition’ and has solidified a link between recognition and multiculturalism. I argue that Taylor oversimplifies the valuational basis of recognition; fails to appreciate the difference between recognition of individuals and of groups; fails to articulate the value of individuality; fails to appreciate the difference between race and ethnoculture as dimensions of identity; and fails to appreciate equality as a recognitional value. The (...) value of recognition in education goes beyond multiculturalism, and the reasons for multiculturalism go far beyond recognitional concerns. (shrink)

This essay defends a three-dimensional response-model theory of recognition of persons, and discusses the related phenomenon of recognition of reasons, values and principles. The theory is three-dimensional in endorsing recognition of the equality of persons and two kinds of relevant differences: merits and special relationships. It defends a ‘response-model’ which holds that adequacy of recognition of persons is a matter of adequate responsiveness to situation-specific reasons and requirements. This three-dimen- sional response-model is compared to Peter (...) Jones’s view, which draws the distinction between status and merit recognition, and mediated and unmediated recognition. The essay discusses a number of questions related to how recognition of situation-specific reasons, and more general values and principles, is related to recognition of persons. The three- dimensional response-model of recognition of persons is in principle compatible with a constructivist view, which holds that the validity of values and principles is dependent on acknowledgement or endorsement. But even if one is a realist on that issue and thinks of validity as independent of acknowledgement, acknowledging relevant values, reasons and principles is a hugely important precondition of actual interpersonal recognition. The essay analyses these connections. (shrink)

Paul Ricœur devoted much of his last ten years to studies and analyses of justice and recognition. This paper will trace the indelible bonds between justice and recognition and claim that recognition is a necessary condition for justice and that justice is the telos or goal of recognition. I begin this paper with a review of the multiple meanings of recognition in the two famous French dictionaries, the Littré and the Le Grand Robert. In his (...) book, The Course of Recognition, Ricoeur groups recognition under three headings, recognition as a form of knowledge or cognition, self-recognition, and recognition of the other on the social and judicial level. The complexities of the meanings of “to recognize” and “recognition” are important in their roles in the realm of justice. I include in the concept of justice, the judiciary, both civil and criminal; distributive justice; and, social and political justice. For each one of these, there are multiple meanings of recognition that are important to understanding their foundation and their scope. There are meanings of recognition that are relevant to other aspects of social justice as the recognition of marginal, oppressed, devalued, groups as deserving of being treated as equals. The structure of my paper is to go through the various meanings and categories of meanings of “to recognize” and “recognition.” I give an account of each of the types of justice and show how various kinds of recognition are relevant to each kind of justice. (shrink)

To understand Hegel’s concept of Sittlichkeit (ethical life) and the role that love and marriage play in it, we must understand his concept of recognition. It is a mistake, however, to think as some do that mutual recognition between equals is sufficient for Sittlichkeit. Rather, for Hegel, the more significant and powerful the recognizer, the more real the recognized. Ultimately recognition must come from spirit (Geist). Understanding this will allow us to see, despite Hegel, that he can (...) capture, better than other theorists, many of the central concerns of contemporary same-sex marriage proponents and help provide them a philosophical underpinning. (shrink)

I argue that the often-heard claim that all serious present-day political philosophers subscribe to the principle of equal respect and concern or to the doctrine of equal moral status or are in some other fundamental sense egalitarians is wrong. Also wrong is the further claim that the usual methods currently used in political philosophy presuppose basic equality. I further argue that liberal egalitarianism itself is wrong. There is no universal duty “of equal respect and concern” towards every person, for (...) one does not owe one’s nice sister and a serial rapist equal respect and concern. There is also no duty of the state to respect all citizens equally, for a state need not be equally concerned about murderous criminals on the one hand and their innocent victims on the other. The potential maneuver of saving liberal egalitarianism by claiming that people have equal rights is unsuccessful. Human beings clearly do not have equal rights, nor are they born with equal rights; and merely having an equality of some rights, for example of “basic” or human ones, would not suffice for egalitarianism. Appeals to “recognition respect” and related concepts are also to no avail. Trying to go back still a step further and to claim that certain rights inequalities or justified discriminatory rules are themselves “grounded” in equal respect and concern at some deeper, norm-generating level (like, for example, the original position or a discourse-ethical principle of justification) is also futile. Finally, I argue that the “This is not what we mean”-strategy of escaping the above arguments reduces egalitarianism to triviality and empty rhetoric. Liberal egalitarianism should be abandoned. (shrink)