It has been claimed that ‘virtuous structures’ can foster moral agency in organisations. We investigate this in the context of employee involvement in corporate philanthropy, an activity whose moral status has been disputed. Employing Alasdair MacIntyre’s account of moral agency, we analyse the results of eight focus groups with employees engaged in corporate philanthropy in an employee-owned retailer, the John Lewis Partnership. Within this organisational context, Employee–Partners’ moral agency was evidenced in narrative accounts of their engagement in philanthropic activities and (...) in their disputes about the moral status of corporate philanthropy. (shrink)

It has become orthodox to read Nietzsche as proposing the ‘sublimation’ of troublesome behavioural impulses. On this interpretation, he is said to denigrate the elimination of our impulses, preferring that we master them by pressing them into the service of our higher goals. My thesis is that this reading of Nietzsche’s conception of self-cultivation does not bear scrutiny. Closer examination of his later thought reveals numerous texts that show him explicitly recommending an eliminatory approach to self-cultivation. I invoke his theory (...) of the will to power in order to explain why he persistently valorises both elimination and sublimation as preconditions of healthy subjective unity. I conclude that which of these two approaches he recommends in a given situation depends on whether or not the impulse in question can be put to use within the overall economy of our drives. (shrink)

A. W. Carus champions Rudolf Carnap’s ideal of explication as a model for liberal political deliberation. Constructing a linguistic framework for discussing social problems, he argues, promotes the resolution of our disputes. To flesh out and assess this proposal, I examine debate about the social institutions of marriage and adoption. Against Carus, I argue that not all citizens would accept the pragmatic principles underlying Carnap’s ideal. Nevertheless, explication may facilitate inquiry in the social sciences and be used to create models (...) that help us to understand past disputes. This latter application reveals explication’s potential for refining the social histories that inform contemporary political discourse. (shrink)

This paper presents a novel account of what motivates internalism about justification in light of recent attempts to undermine the intuitions long thought to favour it (Srinivasan in Philos Rev 129:395–431, 2020). On the account I propose, internalist intuitions are sensitive to epistemic agency. Internalist intuitions track a desire to acknowledge the epistemic agency one has in virtue of being in a position to meet the standards one is accountable to.

This essay examines Deleuze’s relation to new materialism through an engagement with new materialist claims about the human and nonhuman relation and about agency. It first considers the work of Elisabeth Grosz and then moves on to a consideration of Deleuze’s own conception of a new materialism/new naturalism. I seek to show that Deleuze is an ethically motivated naturalist concerned with an ethical pedagogy of the human, which he derives from his reading of Spinoza. I seek to illuminate some of (...) the principal features of this ethically guided materialism/naturalism and show that even in his later work with Felix Guattari, which situates all life, human and nonhuman, on a plane of immanence, there remains a recognition that the human animal is ethically distinguished as the inventive species par excellence. My main claim, then, is that Deleuze’s project cannot be aligned with a new materialism that supposes a flat ontology and that does away with an ethical distinction between the human and the nonhuman. Although Deleuze bequeaths a complex legacy to post-modern thought in his thinking about the human, it should not be supposed that he has no affinities with aspects of a humanist position and pedagogy. (shrink)

In attempting to determine the text of Sophocles in the places presently to be discussed, it is notmy purpose to put forward a series of novelties which, though more or less plausible, are essentially incapableof proof. I seek rather to plead for the reception of certain ascertained but neglected variants, and to establish their claims by a survey of the relevant evidence. After a somewhat prolonged study of the data, I am convinced that the chief hope of progress— apart from (...) the discovery of fresh material—lies in a more methodical use of the ancient scholia and lexicographers. Although their value has long been acknowledged, they have been employed unintelligently or at haphazard, largely because the character of their information and its sources have been imperfectly understood. One of the chief aids which they afford is in passages where the genuine reading has been displaced by an explanatory gloss. This is a possibility which critics have always recognized, but, while ready enough to suggest that the word selected for expulsion is a gloss on some other, they frequently fail to demonstrate that it is used as a gloss at all. Leaving such guess–work aside, we shall still find various grades of probability. It should be a minimum requirement that the word removed from the text is, either itself or as one of a class, a well-attested gloss of the proposed substitute. Thus in El. 800, where LA with most other MSS. have καταξως but four of the recentiores κατ' ξιαν, I think that Bothe and Monk were right in preferring κατάξι' ν. (shrink)

O.T. 463 sq.BRUHN followed Zielinski in adopting είδε from F, and used the variant together with others as establishing the value of Fas an independent source. We have already seen reason for refusing to attach much importance to the authority of this MS. , but it should be observed that both readings are recognized by Σ, and the question between επε and είδε must be settled on its merits. Γ itself has πε written over the last syllable of είδε, and (...) Zenodotus read επ for εδ in Hom. O 207. Zielinski thinks that Eur. Andr. 998 τελουμένων δ Δελς εσεται πέτρα is an echo of this passage, but the inference is by no means certain. It may be that the original text of Trin points to the true solution, that πε fell out by haplography, and the isolated ε became εσε or δε. (shrink)

This essay provides a close reading of the intriguing aphorism entitled “In the great silence”’ that opens the final part of Nietzsche’s text of 1881, Dawn (Morgenröthe). Highly enigmatic and interpretatively demanding, aphorism 423 of the book is an instance of Nietzsche's unique style of doing philosophy and reveals important facets of his thinking. Our essay in particular attempts to illuminate Nietzsche’s thinking on nature, the sublime, and silence. We bring him into rapport with Emerson in an effort to clarify (...) the aphorism’s teaching on silence and with Santayana to illuminate the nature and character of our sympathy with nature. (shrink)

This book provides the first systematic interpretation of what Aristotle thinks occurrent emotions are and points to some philosophical merits of his account. It is argued that he holds that emotions are representational pleasures or distresses that are formed in response to other intentional states that apprehend their objects. Even this bare formulation of his view is notable in several respects. First, the idea that the pleasures or distresses of emotions are representational--directed at objects in the world (or ourselves)--contrasts sharply (...) with accounts that identify emotions with non-representational sensations or feelings. Second, the notion that emotions are pleasurable or distressful responses to other intentional states that apprehend their objects provides a fundamental contrast with many current accounts which instead view emotions as (in part) modes of apprehension or kinds of epistemic state themselves. Third, Aristotle's view stands in opposition to motivational accounts of emotions, insofar as while he thinks that emotions interact with desires or motivational states in important ways, he does not think they are themselves (even in part) motivational states. They are representational pleasures or distresses alone. Together, these three points give Aristotle a novel understanding of the representational role emotions play; namely, neither descriptive, nor prescriptive, but reactive. Besides developing these ideas, both textually and philosophically, the book also explores how Aristotle individuates emotion types; his understanding of the material dimension of emotions; and how his view can provide a novel explanation of recalcitrant emotions, a notoriously problematic phenomenon for many recent accounts of emotions. (shrink)

It is a somewhat vexed question whether presuppositions are always accommodated into the global context of utterance of the sentence, or whether they may sometimes be accommodated into a local context - the context of some subsentential constituent. Von Fintel (2008) argues that there is no local accommodation. He shows that presuppositions in the scope of universally quantified sentences, which have traditionally been handled via local accommodation (eg Heim 1983), can be accounted for by assuming that conversational participants select a (...) domain of quantification such that every relevant element of it has the property required by the presupposition in the scope. It is shown that this domain selection mechanism cannot account for a related set of data involving presupposition triggers in the restrictor rather than scope of the universal. We also discuss the relationship between quantified sentences and conditionals, and general consequences for the theory of presupposition accommodation. (shrink)

Since the time of Brunck there has been a more or less general acquiescence in his substitution of πνθμεθα for πνθομεθα, inasmuch as there is no obvious reason to be alleged in support of the optative. Campbell, it is true, found the optative more in accord with the feeling of the blind and weary Oedipus; but who will listen to this nowadays? Therefore it is the more surprising that Radermacher should retain the optative as expressing the eager wish to attain (...) the goal, basing himself on J. M. Stahl's Syntax of the Greek Verb, p. 482. For Stahl, who admits the existence of certain exceptional instances to be justified in this sense, expressly excludes from the category this passage as well as El. 57 and 760, and seeks to limit the scope of his pronouncement to the writings of Aristophanes, Xenophon and the Orators—a curious combination. (shrink)

Although the significs movement that Victoria, Lady Welby (1837–1912) inspired was dedicated to better understanding meaning, she has largely been forgotten by analytic philosophers of language. Significs was to educate “the great world of hearers and the growing world of readers” to better interpret science and philosophy, evincing a focus on the audience for intellectual activity that it remains vital for academics to consider. Her arguments that the metaphorical associations of terminology are part of their significance for others also pertain (...) to contemporary programs of conceptual engineering which seek to craft and stipulate the meaning of terms. Welby would prefer, I contend, P. F. Strawson’s connective model of analysis, in which the aim is neither to replace nor reduce our concepts, but rather to carefully describe their interrelations. Connective analysis, she would argue, encourages us to keep others, rather than ourselves, firmly in view. I close by turning the lens afforded by Welby’s suggestions for educational reform upon the way we might best communicate philosophical ideas throughout society. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on Nietzsche's analyses of religion and Christianity, as well as a religious figure such as Saint Paul, so as to highlight the character of his critical procedures and the probing manner in which he subjects so‐called “spiritual” phenomena and matters to psychological scrutiny. Nietzsche attempts to develop a purely psychological explanation of the religious states, including the need for salvation, one that will be free of mythology. One prejudice Nietzsche attacks in Dawn is that of “pure spirit”. (...) He seeks to expose the costs to the health of the body of a teaching of pure spirituality. An important point to note is that, on Nietzsche's account, Paul and Christianity both stand in opposition to science. According to Nietzsche, Christianity is said to be a religion out of touch with reality and is mortally opposed to the wisdom of the world or to “science”. (shrink)

This chapter considers how care of the self is a fundamental part of the task of experimenting with what the ethical, when freed from the constraints of moral fanaticism, might mean. Nietzsche provides a sustained critique of moral fanaticism that carries important implications for contemporary analysis of security. Through his psychological probing of the “fantastical instincts” and of the need for the feeling of power Nietzsche is led to cultivate skepticism about politics in Dawn and to favor instead a program (...) of therapeutic self‐cultivation. Nietzsche also admires Epictetus on account of his dedication to his own ego and for resisting the glorification of thinking and living for others. Nietzsche holds to the view that human beings need to be discouraged from making important decisions while in a condition of romantic love, observing how too much of life is easily squandered with the chanciness of marriages rendering any great advance of reason and humanity impossible. (shrink)

This chapter discusses how the final aphorism, 575, of Nietszsche's Dawn, presents a positive vision of humanity as future‐oriented and self‐cultivating. It explores how Nietzsche's vision of humanity as future‐oriented and self‐creating is taken up once again by him in his later writings. In the final aphorism Nietzsche's use of the symbolism of flight is significant. This final aphorism is entitled "We aeronauts of the spirit". As Duncan Large has pointed out, the aeronauts in the aphorism are flying an "air‐ship", (...) and their flying out over the sea indicates "how close is their kinship to their more earthbound, or at least sea‐bound mariner‐cousins". In addition to his use of the sea as a metaphor for both the infinity of the future and humanity's orientation toward this future, Nietzsche draws upon the metaphor of flight to elaborate on this continuation of human development. (shrink)

Nietzsche's wider political thinking has been widely recognized as therapeutic in orientation, as part of its connection to the history of psychology. This chapter examines the remarks that Nietzsche does make with respect to the political in Dawn, focusing on his concern with the effects on humanity of capital and industrial development upon Europeans. It explores his remarks on migration as a therapeutic measure for the workers of Europe and considers some of the problematic claims involved in Nietzsche's appeal to (...) migration as a key part of his therapeutic approach. The chapter discusses whether or not Nietzsche's therapeutic politics in Dawn can be defended. Nietzsche contends that money substitutes for truth, and that the same fanaticism that previously drove truth‐seeking now drives people to the increasing, and increasingly rapid, acquisition of wealth. (shrink)

Many of Nietzsche's texts, particularly those that form part of his later writings, have received significant individual attention within English‐speaking Nietzsche studies. This chapter argues that Nietzsche's core critical innovations in Dawn are in identifying why customary morality is a significant problem for humanity, and in developing a sustained critique of this form of morality in order to motivate critical re‐engagement with the ethical. In Dawn, Nietzsche attacks the view that everything that exists has a connection with morality and thus (...) a moral significance can be projected onto the world. Nietzsche's project in Dawn focuses on addressing the presumptions and prejudices of customary morality. The challenge of understanding the philosophical contribution that Dawn makes is complicated by Nietzsche's writing styles: he combines innovative deployment of aphorism and punctuation with use of multiple voices or characters, and a range of rhetorical devices. (shrink)

This chapter examines Nietzsche's remarks on Epicurus in the earlier middle writings, to provide an interpretative framework through which to clarify Nietzsche's thinking on death in Dawn. It considers some points of continuity between Nietzsche's account of death in Dawn and in his later texts. Nietzsche champions Epicurus as a figure who has sought to show mankind how it can conquer its fears of death. The chapter contends that Nietzsche uses Epicurean thinking as a strategy to do his work in (...) Dawn, picking up the Epicurean doctrine on death and putting it to critical effect. Nietzsche's fundamental aim in writing about death, within the wider context of his project in Dawn, is to counter our socially conditioned yearning for immortality. A careful reading of Epicurus attests to the significance of Epicureanism as a strategy informing Nietzsche's thinking on death in Dawn. (shrink)

This chapter clarifies several of the main aspects of Nietzsche's work on subjectivity, self, and drives in Dawn. It shows how Nietzsche's thinking on subjectivity, the self, and drives in Dawn emerges from his affirmation of the Enlightenment spirit, his hope for a new enlightenment, and his critical engagement with morality. The chapter examines the skeptical dimension of Nietzsche's thinking on subjectivity and the self. It points out how Nietzsche criticizes some of common presumptions about subjectivity and the self, using (...) the notion of drives to stimulate the critical engagement he is calling for. The chapter explores how Nietzsche maintains a commitment to the notion of self‐cultivation in Dawn. It also considers how Nietzsche's undermining of such presumptions leads him to make an important distinction between the subjectivity of an agent shaped by customary morality, and that of a free‐spirited ethical agent. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Early Life and Thought The Middle Period The Final Period and Late Writings.

This article brings into conversation two important literatures in contemporary political theory that have, for the most part, failed to engage one another: work spanning more than two decades on multiculturalism and identity politics, and neo-republican work on nondomination. The authors take as their starting-point two widely endorsed claims: that identities are constructs and that state actors play a crucial role in their construction. Their question is how democratic states should shape identity, and their central claim is that states should (...) do so in ways that promote what they call democratic nondomination. This ideal, they stress, is multifaceted. It has both an action-level and a system-level component. In addition, it has both an inter-agentive and an impersonal dimension. Attending to democratic nondomination in its complexity is crucial to the project of evaluating alternative possible forms of state identity construction. (shrink)

This essay argues for the value of teaching a unit that questions what it is that philosophers teach as a way of encouraging students to reflect on the nature of philosophy. I show how using ancient philosophy to frame this unit makes it especially urgent, since an important (and often overlooked) consequence of Socrates’s demarcation of philosophy from oratory is that philosophers are not in a position to teach anything. I have found that students are eager to engage the challenge (...) that this seems to pose for the contemporary philosophy classroom. Further, they can self-reflectively employ philosophical analysis to identify and critique ways of justifying what they learn from teachers of philosophy. (shrink)

Academic-industry collaborations and the conflicts of interest (COI) arising out of them are not new. However, as industry funding for research in the life and health sciences has increased and scandals involving financial COI are brought to the public’s attention, demands for disclosure have grown. In a March 2008 American Council on Science and Health report by Ronald Bailey, he argues that the focus on COI—especially financial COI—is obsessive and likely to be more detrimental to scientific progress and public health (...) than COI themselves. In response, we argue that downplaying the potential negative impact of COI arising out of academic-industry relationships is no less harmful than overreacting to it. (shrink)

Williams, Ron As I consider the list of previous AHOY recipients since the inaugural award in 1983, I can only say that this is an immeasurable honour. It means much to me because, for almost ten years now, Humanism has been there for my family. In 2005-2006, when separation of church and state school issues first crept into our lives, the Humanist Society of Queensland was to appear as the only beacon of secularist activism upon the deep northern horizon. So (...) in 2006 Andrea and I joined the HSQ. (shrink)

Ron Mallon explores how thinking and talking about kinds of person can bring those kinds into being. He considers what normative implications this social constructionism has for our understanding of our practices of representing human kinds, like race, gender, and sexual orientation, and for our own agency.

In this book Ron Amundson examines two hundred years of scientific views on the evolution-development relationship from the perspective of evolutionary developmental biology. This perspective challenges several popular views about the history of evolutionary thought by claiming that many earlier authors had made history come out right for the Evolutionary Synthesis. The book starts with a revised history of nineteenth-century evolutionary thought. It then investigates how development became irrelevant with the Evolutionary Synthesis. It concludes with an examination of the contrasts (...) that persist between mainstream evolutionary theory and evo-devo. This book will appeal to students and professionals in the philosophy and history of science, and biology. (shrink)

Jennifer Rose Carr’s (2020) article “Normative Uncertainty Without Theories” proposes a method to maximize expected value under normative uncertainty without Intertheoretic Value Comparison (hereafter IVC). Carr argues that this method avoids IVC because it avoids theories: the agent’s credence is distributed among normative hypotheses of a particular type, which don’t constitute theories. However, I argue that Carr’s method doesn’t avoid or help to solve what I consider as the justificatory problem of IVC, which isn’t specific to comparing theories as such. (...) This threatens the implementability of Carr’s method. Fortunately, I also show how Carr’s method can nevertheless be implemented. I identify a type of epistemic states where the justificatory problem of IVC is not a necessary obstacle to maximizing expected value. In such states, the uncertainty stems from indecisive normative intuitions, and the agent justifiably constructs each normative hypothesis on the basis of a consistent subset of her intuitions by reference to the same unit of value. This part of my argument complements not only Carr’s (2020) argument, but also some moderate defenses of IVC. The combination of Carr’s paper and mine helps to illuminate the conditions for maximizing expected value under normative uncertainty without unjustified value comparison. (shrink)

Informed by the philosophy of the virtual, Keith Ansell Pearson offers up one of the most lucid and original works on the central philosophical questions. He asks that if our basic concepts on what it means to be human are wrong then, what is this to mean for our ideas of time, being, consciousness? A critical examination ensues, one informed by a multitude of responses to a large number of philosophers. Under discussion is the mathematical limits as found in (...) Russell, questions on Relativity, Kant's notion of judgement, Popper, Dennett, Dawkins and Proust. He brings into the rapport the concepts of Bergson and their explosive insights into the idea of time. (shrink)

Some psychologists aim to secure a role for psychological explanations in understanding contemporary social disparities, a concern that plays out in debates over the relevance of the Implicit Association Test. Meta-analysts disagree about the predictive validity of the IAT and about the importance of implicit attitudes in explaining racial disparities. Here, I use the IAT to articulate and explore one route to establishing the relevance of psychological attitudes with small effects: an appeal to a process of “accumulation” that aggregates small (...) effects into large harms. After characterizing mechanisms of accumulation and considering some candidate examples, I argue that such mechanisms suggest how a contemporary attitude with small effects could figure in the explanation of large disparities, but they do not vindicate the importance of such an attitude since such mechanisms are typically also determined by competing causes. I close by sketching several strategies for advancing a defense of the relevance of attitudes with small effects. (shrink)