This article is an attempt to take an overview of the current position of utilitarian theory. It begins by providing a definition of utilitarianism as it is found in the works of Bentham, Mill and Sidgwick. These authors are all interpreted as intuitionists. It is claimed that the main rivals to utilitarianism are egoism on the one hand, and reflective non-egoistic pluralism, as found in the work of Ross, on the other. The significance of disagreement between proponents of these (...) views is explained, and modern attempts to ground utilitarianism are found lacking. The article ends with a plea for history. (shrink)

The career of Oxford philosopher Roger Crisp has produced a wonderfully rich yield of elegant, lucid philosophizing that combines in a rare mix historical erudition and brilliant, creative, and highly interdisciplinary ethical argument. Crisp is steeped in Aristotle and Mill, W. D. Ross and Derek Parfit, but his deepest source of inspiration is by his own admission the Victorian era Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick, author of the famous Methods of Ethics. Although Sidgwick has been regarded as a (...) kind of master of those who know by everyone from Brand Blanshard and C. D. Broad to John Rawls and Peter Singer, his star has been on an especially dramatic ascent in recent decades, in very... (shrink)

This paper attempts to locate, within an actualist ontology, truthmakers for modal truths: truths of the form or . In Sect. 1 I motivate the demand for substantial truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 21 criticise Armstrong's account of truthmakers for modal truths. In Sect. 31 examine essentialism and defend an account of what makes essentialist attributions true, but I argue that this does not solve the problem of modal truth in general. In Sect. 41 discuss, and dismiss, a theistic (...) account of the source of modal truth proposed by Alexander Pruss. In Sect. 5 I offer a means of (dis)solving the problem. (shrink)

"Robert Audi's magisterial "The Good in the Right" offers the most comprehensive and developed account of rational ethical intuitionism to date."--Roger Crisp, St. Anne's College, University of Oxford "This is an excellent book.

Ross Poole displays the social content of the various conceptions of morality at work in contemporary society, and casts a strikingly fresh light on such fundamental problems as the place of reason in ethics, moral objectivity and the distinction between duty and virtue. The book provides a critical account of the moral theories of a number of major philosophers, including Kant, Marx, Nietzsche, Habermas, Rawls, Gewirth and MacIntyre. It also presents a systematic critique of three of the most significant (...) responses to modernity: liberalism, nationalism and nihilism. It takes seriously the suggestion that men and women are subject to different conceptions of morality, and places the issue of gender at the centre of moral philosophy. Poole has written a valuable addition to the Ideas series. (shrink)

We assess Meyer’s formalization of arithmetic in his [21], based on the strong relevant logic R and compare this with arithmetic based on a suitable logic of meaning containment, which was developed in Brady [7]. We argue in favour of the latter as it better captures the key logical concepts of meaning and truth in arithmetic. We also contrast the two approaches to classical recapture, again favouring our approach in [7]. We then consider our previous development of Peano arithmetic including (...) primitive recursive functions, finally extending this work to that of general recursion. (shrink)

We collect together some misgivings about the logic R of relevant inplication, and then give support to a weak entailment logic $DJ^{d}$ . The misgivings centre on some recent negative results concerning R, the conceptual vacuousness of relevant implication, and the treatment of classical logic. We then rectify this situation by introducing an entailment logic based on meaning containment, rather than meaning connection, which has a better relationship with classical logic. Soundness and completeness results are proved for $DJ^{d}$ with respect (...) to a content semantics, which embraces the concept of meaning containment. (shrink)

We critically evaluate the ways in which competence in medical ethics has been evaluated. We report the initial stage in the development of a relevant, reliable and valid instrument to evaluate core critical thinking skills in medical ethics. This instrument can be used to evaluate the impact of medical ethics education programmes and to assess whether medical students have achieved a satisfactory level of performance of core skills and knowledge in medical ethics, within and across institutions.

Following a suggestion of Feys, we use “rigorous implication” as a translation of Ackermann's strenge Implikation ([1]). Interest in Ackermann's system stems in part from the fact that it formalizes the properties of a strong, natural sort of implication which provably avoids standard implicational paradoxes, and which is consequently a good candidate for a formalization of entailment (considered as a narrower relation than that of strict implication). Our present purpose will not be to defend this suggestion, but rather to present (...) some information about rigorous implication. In particular, we show first that the structure of modalities (in the sense of Parry [4]) in Ackermann's system is identical with the structure of modalities in Lewis's S4, and secondly that (Ackermann's apparent conjecture to the contrary notwithstanding) it is possible to define modalities with the help of rigorous implication. (shrink)

Research indicates that actors who intentionally bring about harmful consequences are blamed more for their actions than those who do so unintentionally. However, in many instances of harmful behavior, intentions are ambiguous. The Culpable Control Model of Blame (CCM) predicts that the degree to which an actor is blamed for causing a harmful outcome is strongly influenced by information about the actor’s character, motives, or desires and that initial blame assessments impact important blame-related criteria such as judgements regarding the actor’s (...) intent. Deviant causal sequences, those in which negative outcomes occur in ways that the actor did not foresee, are highly unlikely, or are coerced, include circumstances that could mitigate assignment of blame. Such sequences provide a test of predictions derived from the CCM. Findings of three studies supported a model in which participants ascribed greater blame to an actor with opprobrious character, motives, or desires, which, in turn, affected judgments of a main criterion related to intent, and, in the last step, accounted for ascriptions of intent. These findings support the CCM’s contention that blame-reactions to an actor and outcome influence judgments about criteria, such as intent, that are often considered to be determinants rather than consequences of blame. (shrink)

The definition of death was clearer one hundred years ago than it is today. People were declared dead if diagnosed with permanent cessation of both cardio‐circulatory function and respiratory function. But the definition has been muddled by the development of new technologies and interventions—first by cardiopulmonary resuscitation and ventilators, which were introduced in the mid‐twentieth century, and now by extracorporeal membrane oxygenation, which creates the ability to keep oxygenated blood circulating, with or without a beating heart or functioning lungs. In (...) Defining Death: The Case for Choice, Robert Veatch and I argue that the definition of death should focus on “what change in a human being is so fundamental that we can say the individual is no longer with us as a member of the human community bearing rights such as the right not to be killed.” We assert that this decision is a normative issue about which different stakeholders may believe that different changes are fundamental, and we therefore propose that the optimal policy solution may be to allow stakeholders to choose their own definition within a reasonable range of options. There are three caveats that need to be highlighted regarding this approach. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003) 569-570 [Access article in PDF] Ross Harrison, editor. Henry Sidgwick. New York: Published for The British Academy by Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. v + 122. Cloth, $24.95. Henry Sidgwick consists of papers by Stefan Collini, John Skorupski, and Ross Harrison, with replies by Jonathan Rée, Onora O'Neill, and Roger Crisp.Collini's rich and witty paper considers two pictures (...) of Victorian intellectuals—the "public moralist," such as John Stuart Mill, and the academic specialist. Sidgwick in the 1880s and 1890s does not fit comfortably into either camp. He champions the academic philosopher over Leslie Stephen or Mathew Arnold; he contributes to Mind rather than writing to newspapers or standing for parliament; he refuses to take a public stand on the Boer war despite opposing it. He would not have been a teledon. But he also exerts influence on university policies (founding Newnham College for women, opposing the Latin and Greek requirement for admission), through Royal Commissions, and through his personal connections to those in power. (He had as brothers-in-law the Prime Minister and the Archbishop of Canterbury.) He represents one solution to the new problem of combining academic specialization with practical concerns. [End Page 569]One quibble: Collini argues that Sidgwick wields his analytic method in order to end public debate; disagreements rest on conceptual confusions. But Sidgwick's late essays do not close with "a thin, dry question to which... the answer is more or less obvious," but with controversial proposals (44): to prevent war, individual cultivation of impartiality is more important than external arbitration; there are no significant differences between moral requirements on states and individuals; the unequal distribution of luxuries is morally defensible if and only if necessary for "aesthetic progress"; sociology is suspect and must be kept distinct from ethics. A second paper on clerical veracity is needed given controversy about the first.Harrison's slightly diffuse paper places Sidgwick in the utilitarian tradition of discussing sanctions for morality. (Crisp argues neatly that Bentham and Mill are closer to Sidgwick than Harrison allows.) Harrison closes by arguing that Sidgwick should not have been bothered by the dualism of practical reason—the view that utilitarianism and egoism conflict and that there are no decisive arguments for choosing between them. He should have ended the Methods with utilitarianism. The conflict between egoism and utilitarianism "should not matter" because "these are truths of practical rather than speculative reason." Conflict shows only that "we are not in the best of all possible worlds" (114). This helps if, with Harrison, Sidgwick's worry is the "theoretical" one that rival properties claim to be right-making (110). But Sidgwick sees the problem as practical: when egoism and utilitarianism conflict, I must decide which to follow.Skorupski also rejects the dualism. There are many true underived claims about reasons for action. Each can be seen as an instance of the "Feeling/Disposition Principle" (F): "If there's a reason to feel f there's reason to do what feeling f characteristically disposes one to do" (74). For example, if there is a reason to feel gratitude, there is a reason to express this gratitude. Egoistic reasons are the products of F when desire is the feeling. Any impartial theory, because it goes beyond the feelings of a particular individual in a particular situation, cannot be a case of F and so counts as a principle of practical reason. True claims about reasons for action are either many or, if restricted to practical reason, one. (Skorupski adds that an impartial theory, since indefeasible, trumps egoism. For example, my reason to express gratitude is defeated by noting that general good is not served by expressing gratitude, but need not be defeated by noting that my own good is not served. This, however, seems mere assertion. I suspect it, and F, are best pursued in Skorupski's Ethical Explorations [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999].)Showing that an impartial theory is not a case of F does not, by itself, show that it is a principle of practical reason... (shrink)

In part I, we presented an algebraic-style of semantics, which we called “content semantics,” for quantified relevant logics based on the weak systemBBQ. We showed soundness and completeness with respect to theunreduced semantics ofBBQ. In part II, we proceed to show soundness and completeness for extensions ofBBQ with respect to this type of semantics. We introducereduced semantics which requires additional postulates for primeness and saturation. We then conclude by showing soundness and completeness forBB d Q and its extentions with respect (...) to this reduced semantics. (shrink)

We present an algebraic-style of semantics, which we call a content semantics, for quantified relevant logics based on the weak system BBQ. We show soundness and completeness for all quantificational logics extending BBQ and also treat reduced modelling for all systems containing BB d Q. The key idea of content semantics is that true entailments AB are represented under interpretation I as content containments, i.e. I(A)I(B) (or, the content of A contains that of B). This is opposed to the truth-functional (...) way which represents true entailments as truth-preservations over all set-ups (or worlds), i.e. (VaK) (if I(A, a) = T then I(B, a)= T). (shrink)

This thesis concerns the source of modal truth. I aim to answer the question: what is it in virtue of which there are truths concerning what must have been the case as a matter of necessity, or could have been the case but isn't. I begin by looking at a dilemma put forward by Simon Blackburn which attempts to show that any realist answer to this question must fail, and I conclude that either horn of his dilemma can be resisted. (...) I then move on to clarify the nature of the propositions whose truth I am aiming to find the source of. I distinguish necessity de re from necessity de dicto, and argue for a counterpart theoretic treatment of necessity de re. As a result, I argue that there is no special problem concerning the source of de re modal facts. The problem is simply to account for what it is in virtue of which there are qualitative ways the world could have been, and qualitative ways it couldn't have been. I look at two ways to answer this question: by appealing to truthmakers in the actual world, or by appealing to non-actual ontology. I develop a theory of truthmakers, but argue that it is unlikely that there are truthmakers for modal truths among the ontology of the actual. I look at the main possibilist ontology, David Lewis' modal realism, but argue that warrant for that ontology is unobtainable, and that we shouldn't admit non-actual possibilia into our ontology. I end by sketching a quasi-conventionalist approach to modality which denies that there are modal facts, but nevertheless allows that we can speak truly when we use modal language. (shrink)

The founder of early German Romantic philosophy, Friedrich Schlegel, is a pivotal figure in the history of philosophy because of the way that he establishes many of the themes by which nineteenth-century continental thought separates itself from Kant. Yet our view of his depth and originality as a thinker has often been distorted by his proximity to Hegel, who propounded a highly polemical and reductive reading of Schlegel. One of the ways in which our view of Schlegel is distorted by (...) Hegel's reading is our association of Schlegel with the stance of irony. While Schlegel considered irony as merely one of several fruitful ways to rethink the relation of the subject to the absolute, Hegel used a reductive reading of... (shrink)

Motivation and emotion are not clearly defined and differentiated in Rolls's The brain and emotion, reflecting a widespread problem in conceptualizing these phenomena. An adequate theory of emotion cannot be based upon reward and punishment alone. Basic mechanisms of arousal, agonistic, and prosocial motives-emotions exist in addition to reward-punishment systems.

Revonsuo's evolution-based theory places the nightmare as a prototype dream, which fully realizes its biological function. However, individuals who experience both repetitive (PTSD) nightmares and/or lifelong nontraumatic nightmares demonstrate impaired psychological functioning and attenuated information-processing. The importance of reconciling these discrepancies are addressed and ideas for providing stronger empirical tests of the model are presented. [Revonsuo].

1. Understanding.--2. Purpose.--3. Conciliation.--4. Justice.--5. Justice, science and religion as contributions to civilization.--6. Uniformitarian process under supreme law.

The standard Hilbert-style of axiomatic system yields the assertion of axioms and, via the use of rules, the assertion of theorems. However, there has been little work done on the corresponding axiomatic rejection of non-theorems. Such Hilbert-style rejection would be achieved by the inclusion of certain rejection-axioms (r-axioms) and, by use of rejection-rules (r-rules), the establishment of rejection-theorems (r-theorems). We will call such a proof a rejection-proof (r-proof). The ideal to aim for would be for the theorems and r-theorems to (...) bemutually exclusive and exhaustive. That is, if a formula A is a theorem then it is not an r-theorem, and if A is a non-theorem then it is an r-theorem. In this paper, I present a rejecion system for the first-degree formulae of a large number of relevant logics. (shrink)

The references to "Chicago" (meaning, of course, the University of Chicago) Schools of economics and history of religion, and the quotation of Allan Bloom, who may be considered to belong to a Chicago school of philosophy, may suggest a general endorsement of "Chicago" ideas. This is not the case.

This article explores the contrasting arguments for the place of the arts in education made by the two distinguished arts educators—the American Elliot Eisner and British dance and physical education theorist Graham McFee. Both scholars begin with the premise that the arts should be central to a liberal education and then diverge. McFee argues, from his success in seeing dance as part of the National Curriculum in the UK, that a conceptually precise and closely focused philosophical rationale is critical, whereas (...) Eisner takes the opposite path—arguing for the inclusion of the arts because they embody the most profoundly central task of all education—the nuanced development of mind. (shrink)

Byrne & Hilbert (2003; henceforth B&H) do not adequately explain how it is that phenomenal colors are physical, as their physicalism claims. This explanation requires more characterization of the relationship between the epistemology and nature of color than B&H provide. With this characterization, we can see that a physicalist need not accept unknowable color facts, as B&H do.

Small corpora remain an important resource for addressing questions requiring specialized data not found in large general purpose corpora. But do these small corpora have sufficient data to analyze low-frequency phenomena? This article presents a case study of the try-and-V pseudocoordination construction in English, which has an unusual morphosyntactic restriction: neither verb can be inflected. Diachronic corpora elucidate its origin as reanalysis from ambiguous usage of non-finite verbs in the late 1500s. Dialectal corpora reveal variation in frequency but not grammatical (...) properties. And child language corpora reveal productive usage even by young children. These results are considered successful and the outlook is optimistic for addressing low-frequency phenomena beyond contemporary, standard English, especially as more, and more diverse, corpora become available. (shrink)