This book explores 'difficult conversations' in feminist theory as an integral part of social and theoretical transformations. Focussing on intersectionality within feminist theory, this book critically addresses questions of power and difference as a central feminist concern, rather than assuming that the needs and experiences of elite women apply to all women. It presents ethical, political, social, and emotional dilemmas while negotiating difficult conversations, particularly in terms of sexuality, class, 'race', ethnicity, and cross-identification between the researcher and researched. Topics covered (...) include challenging cultural relativism; queer marginalisation; research and affect; and feminism and the digital realm. This book is aimed primarily at students, lecturers and researchers interested in epistemology, research methodology, gender, identity, and social theory. The interdisciplinary nature of the book is aimed at reaching the broadest possible audience, including those engaged with feminist theory, anthropology, social policy, sociology, psychology, and geography. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:For the Love of All Creatures: The Story of Grace in Genesis by William GreenwayRyan JuskusFor the Love of All Creatures: The Story of Grace in Genesis William Greenway GRAND RAPIDS, MI: EERDMANS, 2015. 178 PP. $18.00The morning I started reading William Greenway's For the Love of All Creatures, my toddler stumbled into my bedroom holding an injured cockroach. After my startled response caused him to drop it, (...) I trapped and threw the cockroach outside. Had no children been present, I probably would have killed it. Later, I read Greenway's injunction to "love the cockroach," for "we reflect the image of God when we are wholly and without qualification seized by love for the cockroach and for every creature" (102). Did I love that injured cockroach, I wondered; was I seized in a "transcendent moment," my love "absolute and unqualified" (102)? Unpreoccupied by such quotidian dilemmas, Greenway instead proposes a spirituality of grace, of awakening to having been seized by love for all creatures. The moral and spiritual genius of "the primeval history" of Genesis 1–11, he argues, is its holding together the "knowing, insightful idealism" of the seven-day Creation narrative with the "hyperrealism" of the Flood narrative (140). Together they proclaim the "decisive, life-affirming asymmetry" that gracious love is more primordial and ultimate than evil (144). Greenway's book joins a growing body of literature reclaiming biblical texts from overly anthropocentric readings. Asserting the priority of moral sensibility to ethical reasoning, Greenway does not help me know whether I loved that cockroach—beyond mourning that in a fallen world, we "choose the lesser of two evils" (103)—but his Creation spirituality contributes a distinctive approach to animal ethics.Greenway contrasts his creature-loving reading with both materialist and anthropocentric interpretations, against which he argues that the redactors skillfully wove together the Genesis 1–11 narratives to bear a "spiritual truth" that awakens readers to love for all creatures (4). Contrasting this spiritual wisdom to two other influential Creation narratives—the Babylonian Enuma Elish and Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan, the latter carried to completion by Charles Darwin—Greenway draws out the interconnections between politics, cosmology, anthropology, God, and evil that each narrative renders.A provocative but carefully developed reading of the Flood as the "birth of the God of grace" and an interpretation of the seven-day Creation through the lens of exiled, suffering Israel, follow (67). The latter, Greenway argues, cultivates a life-affirming spirituality with an "infinite sensitivity to every other [End Page 205] being" (105). The both/and character of the primeval history's spirituality is summed up in Greenway's oft-repeated phrases "seized by love for all creatures" (i.e., idealism) yet "with eyes wide open to injustice and suffering" (i.e., realism). For a criterion to evaluate Creation narratives, Greenway distinguishes between a "logic of domination" and a "logic of dominion." He concludes that whereas the Hobbesian-Darwinian narrative recognizes fallenness and the Enuma Elish promotes realism, both fail to testify to the asymmetry between good and evil that Greenway thinks essential to a creature-loving spirituality of dominion. Gracious love is the most primordial and ultimate reality. The ethic of daily life, lived along the continuum between domination and dominion, is to "maximize dominion" (121).Regardless of whether one accepts Greenway's premises regarding authority, epistemology, and biblical interpretation, his argument is insightful and thought provoking. Engaging the oppressed communities highlighted by feminist, womanist, and postcolonial thinkers would have complicated his story of "the modern West" and his assessments of sacrifice, hierarchy, sin, and imago Dei. Also, a number of ambiguities—such as claiming to value multiple religious traditions while arguing for the superiority of Genesis—beg for further clarity. However, Greenway's contribution to a life-affirming spirituality in harmony with biblical testimony is laudatory. He may not help me know how to love a cockroach, but he successfully accounts for why such an ethical dilemma coheres with a Genesis-cultivated spirituality. The book would have wide appeal in undergraduate, seminary, or ecclesial contexts. [End Page 206]Ryan JuskusDuke UniversityCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

The question of whether chemical structure is reducible to Everettian Quantum Mechanics (EQM) should be of interest to philosophers of chemistry and philosophers of physics alike. Among the three realist interpretations of quantum mechanics, EQM resolves the measurement problem by claiming that measurements (now interpreted as instances of decoherence) have indeterminate outcomes absolutely speaking, but determinate outcomes relative to emergent worlds (Maudlin, 1995). Philosophers who wish to be sensitive to the practice of quantum chemistry (e.g. Scerri, 2016) should be interested (...) in EQM because Franklin and Seifert (2020) claim that resolving the measurement problem also resolves the reducibility of chemical structure, and EQM is the interpretation which involves no mathematical structure beyond that used by practicing scientists. Philosophers interested in the quantum interpretation debate should be interested in the reducibility of chemistry because chemical structure is precisely the kind of determinate three-dimensional fact which EQM should be able to ground if it is to be empirically coherent (see Allori, 2023). The prospects for reduction of chemical structure are poor if it cannot succeed in EQM; the prospects for EQM as a guide to ontology are poor if it cannot reduce chemical structure. -/- Unfortunately for proponents of chemical reduction and EQM, there are three serious barriers to the reduction of chemistry to EQM. The first concern is that quantum treatments of chemical structure rely on the Born-Oppenheimer approximation, which holds nuclear locations fixed while minimizing the energy of the electronic configuration (Hendry, 2022), but this approximation is not licensed by EQM. The Born-Oppenheimer approximation relies on nuclei and molecular orbitals being simultaneously present, but in the three-dimensional ontology following from the Everett interpretation these only emerge at different energy scales and are not simultaneously present (Miller, 2023). The second concern is that the emergent worlds of EQM are supposed to be decoherent at the macro-scale (A. Wilson, 2020), but the recent development of superchemistry suggests that chemical reactions can occur in coherent states (Zhang et al., 2023). The third concern is that emergent worlds are only pragmatic pseudo-processes (Wallace, 2012b), but this means EQM trades realist physics for mere instrumentalism about chemistry. Absent a commitment to chemical realism, reduction is an empty promise. The prospects for reduction of chemical structure to EQM are therefore poor. (shrink)

Plato’s Republic is governed by an analogy drawn between the structures of cities and souls. Because the inner workings of souls are difficult to discern, we might better find the soul’s nature and virtues by looking at the city’s nature and virtues. Despite successfully using the analogy to discern the nature of the soul, its virtues, and its proper ordering, the Republic frequently obscures the very analogy that functions as its guiding thread, and it is not at all obvious whether (...) the political material in Books V–VII has a psychological correlate. This essay develops a psychological reading of key moments in the dialogue where the city-soul analogy fades in favor of more apparently political content. Focusing on the Allegory of the Cave, it argues that when the Cave is read as a “psychic drama,” it discloses reason’s drama within the soul. Like the freed prisoner, reason must be liberated from imprisonment alongside the sub-rational elements of the soul so that it may see the truth by which it can be nourished. However, reason must also descend, like the prisoner, to the sub-rational elements of the soul in order to care for them, for its own sake and for theirs. Read this way, the Republic presents an account of reason which rules the passions in the “precise sense” of Book I, that is, for their sake, and not simply for its own liberation and well-being. (shrink)

"When John Dewey died in 1952, he was memorialized as America's most famous philosopher, revered by liberal educators and deplored by conservatives, but universally acknowledged as his country's intellectual voice. Many things conspired to give Dewey an extraordinary intellectual eminence: He was immensely long-lived and immensely prolific; he died in his ninety-third year, and his intellectual productivity hardly slackened until his eighties." "Professor Alan Ryan offers new insights into Dewey's many achievements, his character, and the era in which his (...) scholarship had a remarkable impact. He investigates the question of what an American audience wanted from a public philosopher - from an intellectual figure whose credentials came from his academic standing as a philosopher, but whose audience was much wider than an academic one." "Ryan argues that Dewey's "religious" outlook illuminates his politics much more vividly than it does the politics of religion as ordinarily conceived. He examines how Dewey fit into the American radical tradition, how he was and was not like his transatlantic contemporaries, why he could for so long practice a form of philosophical inquiry that became unfashionable in England after 1914 at the latest."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

Many practices available for use in health service psychology are ineffective or harmful. How we describe these practices is important to scientific discourse and science communication with policy-makers and the general public. The label “pseudoscience” is typically applied in these cases, though the meaning of pseudoscience varies widely creating a quagmire for transparent and accurate communication. To clarify this issue, we review several prominent definitions of pseudoscience as well as consider how the term is used amongst psychology scholars and science-communicators. (...) We define two additional terms adapted from the medical literature, contemporary and alternative psychotherapies and low-value practices, and discuss their strengths and limitations. Finally, we recommend the broader category of low-value practices for use due to its definitional clarity, lack of competing definitions, and potential for clarifying research programs. (shrink)

The use of a ‘human-centred’ artificial intelligence approach (HCAI) has substantially increased over the past few years in academic texts (1600 +); institutions (27 Universities have HCAI labs, such as Stanford, Sydney, Berkeley, and Chicago); in tech companies (e.g., Microsoft, IBM, and Google); in politics (e.g., G7, G20, UN, EU, and EC); and major institutional bodies (e.g., World Bank, World Economic Forum, UNESCO, and OECD). Intuitively, it sounds very appealing: placing human concerns at the centre of AI development and use. (...) However, this paper will use insights from the works of Michel Foucault (mostly _The Order of Things_) to argue that the HCAI approach is deeply problematic in its assumptions. In particular, this paper will criticise four main assumptions commonly found within HCAI: human–AI hybridisation is desirable and unproblematic; humans are not currently at the centre of the AI universe; we should use humans as a way to guide AI development; AI is the next step in a continuous path of human progress; and increasing human control over AI will reduce harmful bias. This paper will contribute to the field of philosophy of technology by using Foucault's analysis to examine assumptions found in HCAI [it provides a Foucauldian conceptual analysis of a current approach (human-centredness) that aims to influence the design and development of a transformative technology (AI)], it will contribute to AI ethics debates by offering a critique of human-centredness in AI (by choosing Foucault, it provides a bridge between older ideas with contemporary issues), and it will also contribute to Foucault studies (by using his work to engage in contemporary debates, such as AI). (shrink)

I argue that any plausible decision theory for agents with incomplete preferences which obeys the Never Worse Principle will violate Transitivity. The Never Worse Principle says that if one option never does worse than another, you shouldn’t disprefer it. Transitivity says that if you prefer X to Y and you prefer Y to Z, then you should prefer X to Z. Violating Transitivity allows one to be money pumped. Although agents with incomplete preferences are already, in virtue of having incomplete (...) preferences, vulnerable to being money pumped, I argue that the money pump argument for Transitivity is more serious than the one for Completeness. (shrink)

This paper attempts to fill an epistemological gap in our theorizing about love with a sketch of an epistemology of love that unfolds by addressing Whitney Houston’s famous epistemological questions pertaining to how we can know whether another loves us. After arguing for three possible sources of the knowledge of love, it offers initial answers to how the knowledge of the presence or absence of another’s love can be acquired from the relevant possible sources previously established. These initial answers, though, (...) are unsatisfying because they invite more difficult questions that are then addressed, such as those pertaining to the kinds of things that constitute love’s expressions along with how to detect these expressions given the possibility of false positives. Addressing these questions ultimately leads to a sharpened, Aristotle-inspired account of how to acquire the knowledge of the presence or absence of another’s love by inferring it, respectively, from the successful or failed detection of love’s expressions. (shrink)

European Vision and the South Pacific, first published in 1960, is the most acclaimed of all Bernard Smith’s many texts on art history and cultural theory. In conjunction with its 1992 companion-piece, Imagining the Pacific, and supported by collations of art and cartography from Cook’s and other voyages, this work also established his reputation as a major presence in Pacific-centred research. Likewise, the ongoing influence of European Vision and the South Pacific has seen Smith claimed as a foundational figure in (...) post-colonial scholarship, as one who ‘anticipated’ aspects of Edward Said’s late-1970s analysis of orientalism. But while there are important parallels and overlaps in the thinking of this pair, their differences and divergences are at least as significant. Above all, Smith’s Pacific-centred writings need to be understood as the unique intellectual achievements they undeniably are. (shrink)

The discovery in 1980 of a hoard of church plate in the ancient monastery of Derrynaflan, Co. Tipperary, Ireland , at a stroke added significantly to the corpus of Insular metalwork, extended our knowledge of early-medieval European altar plate, and raised afresh important questions about patronage, craft organization, wealth, trade, and exchange. Issues of importance to the interpretation of the history of early-medieval Ireland brought into sharp focus included the relative significance of the Viking invasions as a disrupting influence on (...) Irish society in the ninth century and the form and origins of the liturgy practiced in the early Irish church. Above all, the extension of the known variety of motifs and decorative techniques has greatly enriched the understanding of one of the great ecclesiastical arts of medieval Europe. The circumstances of the finding of the hoard led to litigation lasting almost seven years, which eventually enabled the state to replace the law of treasure trove with new measures to protect archaeological finds in Ireland and to rescue substantial numbers of artifacts, many of them also adding significantly to the corpus of early Irish art. (shrink)

Argumentation schemes bring artificial intelligence into day to day conversation. Interpreting the force of an utterance, be it an assertion, command, or question, remains a task for achieving this goal. But it is not an easy task. An interpretation of force depends on a speaker’s use of words for a hearer at the moment of utterance. Ascribing force relies on grammatical mood, though not in a straightforward or regular way. We face a dilemma: on one hand, deciding force requires an (...) understanding of the speaker’s words; on the other hand, word meaning may shift given the force in which the words are spoken. A precise theory of how mood and force relate helps us handle this dilemma, which, if met, expands the use of argumentation schemes in language processing. Yet, as our analysis shows, force is an inconstant variable, one that contributes to a scheme’s defeasibility. We propose using critical questions to help us decide the force of utterances. (shrink)

This paper argues that a wise person is an intellectually virtuous person. The intellectual virtue requirement is explained as a necessary condition for wisdom, intuitively the highest epistemic good. This provides an answer to Duncan Pritchard’s question as to the significance of the intellectual virtues for the epistemological project. In other words, the requirement explains why the intellectual virtues are central to the concerns of epistemology. The paper starts by providing an overview of intellectual virtue. An overview of recent analytic (...) philosophical literature on wisdom is set out. This discussion leads to the claim that the wise person understands how to live well. The claim that intellectual virtues are required for understanding how to live well is then examined. The case is made that understanding how to live well in a modally robust way requires possession of the intellectual virtues. (shrink)

Fools rush in. ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM (London, 1711). The full quotation is, “For Fools rush in where Angels fear to tread.” Id. at 66. She who hesitates is lost. Adaptation of the line, “The woman that deliberates is lost.” JOSEPH ADDISON, CATO: A TRAGEDY, AND SELECTED ESSAYS 30 (2004). See also OLIVER WENDALL HOLMES, SR., THE AUTOCRAT AT THE BREAKFAST TABLE 29 (1858) (“The woman who ‘calculates’ is lost.”). American legal realism numbers among the most important theoretical (...) contributions of legal academia to date. Given the movement’s influence, as well as the common centrality of certain key figures, it is surprising that privacy scholarship in the United States has paid next to no attention to the movement. This inattention is unfortunate for several reasons, including that privacy law furnishes rich examples of the indeterminacy thesis — a key concept of American legal realism — and because the interdisciplinary efforts of privacy scholars to explore extra-legal influences on privacy law arguably further the plot of legal realism itself. (shrink)

In his magnum opus, the _Historical and Critical Dictionary_, Pierre Bayle offered a series of brilliant criticisms of the major philosophical and theological systems of the 17 th Century. Although officially skeptical concerning the attempt to provide a definitive account of the truths of metaphysics, there is reason to see Bayle as a reluctant skeptic. In particular, Todd Ryan contends that Bayle harbored deep sympathy for the attempt by Descartes and his most innovative successor, Nicolas Malebranche, to establish a (...) metaphysical system that would provide a foundation for the new mechanistic natural philosophy while helping to secure the fundamental tenets of rational theology. Through a careful analysis of Bayle’s critical engagement with such philosophers as Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke and Newton, it is argued that, despite his reputation as a skeptic, Bayle was not without philosophical commitments of his own. Drawing on the full range of Bayle’s writings, from his early philosophical lectures to his final controversial writings, Ryan offers detailed studies of Bayle’s treatment of such pivotal issues as mind-body dualism, causation and God’s relation to the world. (shrink)

At Phaedo 74b–c an important argument is given for the non–identity of perceptible equals and equality. The argument is usually understood as an application of Leibniz’s Law in which the predicate appears unequal is affirmed of perceptible equals but not equality. But this reading requires explaining why the plural locution the equals themselves is initially used for equality, and why the additional predicate appears as inequality is denied of it. In this paper, an account of the equality premise is given (...) which allows for an initial grasp of equality as a plurality (suitably expressed by a plural locution), and introduces a generic predicate for appearance, appears its opposite (rightly denied of equality). The former ensures that the question of non–identity is not begged, while the latter secures a role for every element in the premise. So understood, the argument is both more robust and carefully formulated than is usually thought. (shrink)

Scott Aiken and Thomas Dabay contend that a satisfactory account of truth is both infallibilist and antiskeptical. Externalist correspondence theories, they say, preserve the infallibility of the truth-relation yet invite skeptical qualms. In tying truth to experience, pragmatist theories resist skeptical challenges, but embrace a fallibilism that renders their account of truth inconsistent and even incoherent. While agreeing with Aiken and Dabay that externalist accounts are vulnerable to skepticism, I dispute each of the four arguments they offer against pragmatist fallibilism. (...) Though partially successful against Peirce’s more popular view that truth is the final belief of a community of inquirers, their arguments are wholly ineffective against Dewey’s account of truth as warranted assertability. (shrink)

Lisciandra poses a challenge for robustness analysis as applied to economic models. She argues that substituting tractability assumptions risks altering the main mathematical structure of the model, thereby preventing the possibility of meaningfully evaluating the same model under different assumptions. In such cases RA is argued to be inapplicable. However, Lisciandra is mistaken to take the goal of RA as keeping the mathematical properties of tractability assumptions intact. Instead, RA really aims to keep the modeling component while varying the corresponding (...) mathematical formulation. Thus, her argument concerning whether the associated mathematical properties of certain assumptions can be kept intact is irrelevant to the success of RA. Furthermore, we explicate and develop Lloyd’s account of “model robustness” to provide solutions to Lisciandra’s challenges. Our solutions are, namely, error analysis and independent empirical support. We conclude that although complex economic models do face potential dangers, there are solutions and robustness analysis need not be given up.. (shrink)

I make the case that what gets called epistemic paternalism isn’t correctly labelled as such. This mislabelling is problematic for two reasons. First, paternalism in general faces strong challenges to its permissibility. Second, the scope for action of epistemic paternalism is somewhat narrow given the typical concerns of applied epistemology. Having clarified epistemic paternalism and discussed the above considerations, this paper introduces epistemic benevolence. The case is made that the epistemic benevolence-based approach can avoid some of the strong challenges that (...) epistemic paternalism faces and is often more suitable for the concerns of applied epistemology than a paternalist approach. To make these points, first, I make the case for a particular analysis of the epistemic paternalist act and, second, I explain epistemically benevolent acts as acts motivated by a concern for the epistemic welfare of another agent or agents. Given this characterisation, I argue that epistemic benevolence includes epistemic paternalism but extends beyond epistemic paternalism. I consider an objection to epistemic benevolence, which motivates laissez faire epistemic liberalism, a rival theoretical approach. Outlining this alternative serves to provide a further theoretical option relevant for work in applied epistemology. I offer some considerations as to why epistemic benevolence approach should still be favoured. (shrink)

Contemporary philosopher William Desmond has many companions in thought, and one of the most important of these is Augustine. In lucid prose that draws on the riches of a vibrant philosophical-theological tradition, Renée Kӧhler-Ryan explores Desmond’s metaxological philosophy. She elaborates on how Desmond’s philosophical work in discovering how humans are constantly “between” remains in conversation with a tradition of thinkers that includes Plato, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Shakespeare. This book concentrates especially on how Desmond both draws upon and develops (...) some of the central insights in Augustine. At the same time, it brings together philosophy, theology, and literature into a rich engagement of ideas that impact the way humans think and live. Whether considering how our elemental wonder at creation brings us closer to God, or how our most intimate revelations about being human happen in the interior space of prayer, reading Desmond with Augustine illuminates a porous and interdisciplinary space of inquiry. Companions in the Between is a unique contribution to the growing body of scholarship on William Desmond’s thought. It opens with a foreword from Desmond. Its pages will entice any reader who wants to know more about how contemporary philosophy can contest a space where philosophers are formulaically expected to shy away from divine transcendence. (shrink)

Smith thinks it possible to sympathize with certain non-sentient beings, such as the human dead. Consequently, some commentators argue that Smith’s theory supports ecocentrism. I reject that Smith’s theory has this implication. Sympathizers in Smith’s theory can imagine themselves as non-sentient beings, but they will lack the relevant evaluative concerns. The situation of a non-sentient being, as that being confronts the situation, remains inaccessible to the sympathizer. I will also address the limits of sympathetic concern within Smith’s theory,; highlight a (...) related problem about how our efforts to sympathize with others should be constrained,; and suggest a solution. (shrink)

Rethinking Cooperation with Evil advances the theological conversation on this topic from both speculative and practical vantage points. To facilitate his argument, Connors utilizes historical analyses that contrast Aquinas's method of moral reasoning with that of the casuist treatment of cooperation. Consequently, the book includes numerous case studies that will be of interest both to moral theologians and readers new to the topic.

The great mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, Hermann Weyl, once called mathematics the “science of the infinite.” This is a fitting title: contemporary mathematics—especially Cantorian set theory—provides us with marvelous ways of taming and clarifying the infinite. Nonetheless, I believe that the epistemic significance of mathematical infinity remains poorly understood. This dissertation investigates the role of the infinite in three diverse areas of study: number theory, cosmology, and probability theory. A discovery that emerges from my work is that the epistemic role (...) of the infinite varies, often in surprising ways, across different domains of knowledge. -/- My first chapter examines the role of mathematical infinity in number theory. It is reasonable to think that theorems concerning finite patterns and structures in the natural numbers are particularly “simple” or “elementary.” Indeed, such statements are comprehensible to a wide range of investigators, regardless of their mathematical training. One might then expect proofs of these theorems to be similarly comprehensible. However, many proofs, especially those that utilize only finitary methods, are exceedingly difficult to understand. Consequently, one finds that finitary theorems are often re-proved using infinitary techniques. My claim is that this is because infinitary proofs are often explanatory, while finitary proofs are not. This chapter analyzes why this is the case. Along the way, I investigate other questions of long-standing interest in the philosophy of mathematics, e.g., the role of purity/impurity ascriptions and the nature of the content of a theorem. In particular, I diagnose the explanatory potential of the infinite by articulating a new construal of content. This new construal both saves intuitive epistemic ascriptions made in mathematical practice and explains the unexpected role of the infinite in providing explanatory proofs of finitary statements. Thus, in number theory, my claim is that the infinite often plays an explanatory role. -/- My second chapter turns to the role of the infinite in cosmology. It investigates a question much discussed by philosophers and physicists alike: is the spatial extent of the universe finite or infinite? Contemporary cosmological research has indicated that one of the essential determinants of the extent of the universe is the topology we ascribe to space. Topology is a global property, which may suggest that it is not testable through local observation. Nonetheless, some cosmologists have indicated that it may be empirically detected, thereby providing an answer to the question of spatial extent. I argue that, in fact, the epistemic status of the topology of space is extremely subtle and not well captured by any of the categories commonly employed by philosophers of science. In particular, I argue that topological properties are neither empirical nor a priori (even in suitably weakened senses). Furthermore, I claim that we should prefer topological properties that generate finite universe models (consistent with our best data) in order to avoid extremely thorny issues concerning the physics of an infinite universe. I argue for such a preference on the grounds of the simplicity and explanatory power of finite universe models. Thus, in cosmology, my claim is that the finite often plays an explanatory and simplifying role. -/- My third chapter investigates several paradoxes that arise in the foundations of infinitary probability theory: the Label Invariance Paradox, God’s Lottery, and Bertrand’s Paradox. I argue that these have been poorly understood because they do not expressly concern probability theory, but rather our intuitions about—and formal techniques for dealing with— infinite sets. The paradoxes in question are, in fact, symptoms of our complete reliance upon Cantorian cardinality and its associated criterion of sameness of “size.” That is, two sets have the same cardinality if and only if the elements of the sets can be placed in 1-1 correspondence. When applied to infinite sets, this criterion produces counterintuitive verdicts. For instance, given a fair lottery on the natural numbers, we expect that the probability of drawing an even number is 1/2, and likewise for drawing an odd number. However, one can construct “relabellings” of the naturals such that the probability of drawing an even number remains 1/2, while the probability for drawing an odd number becomes 1/4. I argue that, ultimately, it is the coarseness of Cantorian cardinality that generates the probabilistic paradoxes. I then propose that finer-grained measures of infinite sets from mathematical logic and number theory can help to dissolve the paradoxes in question. Thus, in probability theory, we find that particular kinds of infinitary techniques effectively systematize our theory, while others lead to paradox. (shrink)

Inflammatory responses are essential for the clearance of pathogens and the repair of injured tissues; however, if these responses are not properly controlled chronic inflammation can occur. Chronic inflammation is now recognized as a contributing factor to many age‐associated diseases including metabolic disorders, arthritis, neurodegeneration, and cardiovascular disease. Due to the connection between chronic inflammation and these diseases, it is essential to understand underlying mechanisms behind this process. In this review, factors that contribute to chronic inflammation are discussed. Further, we (...) emphasize the emerging roles of microRNAs (miRNAs) and other noncoding RNAs (ncRNA) in regulating chronic inflammatory states, making them important future diagnostic markers and therapeutic targets. Copyright Line: © 2015 The Authors BioEssays Published by Wiley‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA. (shrink)

I argue that if we accept the promotion of autonomy as an aim of education, then we should accept the promotion of skillful reflection as an aim of education. I set out the Dual Process Hypothesis of Reflection (DPHR), according to which both Type 1 and Type 2 cognitive processes play a role in an agent’s reflection. Next, I discuss how an agent’s reflection may be skillful, and how such reflection contributes to superior autonomy. I argue, however, that on the (...) DPHR, skillful reflection, and so the superior sort of autonomy, is not cultivated by staying neutral on the good. The cultivation of autonomy, and so reflection, requires the training of what is worthy of reflection. (shrink)

This chapter defends the view that Arthur Schopenhauer and Siddhattha Gotama were unquestionably pessimistic philosophers, insofar as they converged in locating the source of life’s suffering within the person rather than the external world. However, in the process of outlining the significant continuities between their respective phenomenological analyses of life’s suffering, this chapter detects an important divergence between them. This stems from their contrasting metaphysical positions and ultimately impacts upon their respective interpretations of the significance of life’s suffering, as well (...) as their proposed solutions to it. (shrink)

Building on Rodin's analysis, Ryan raise further issues about self-defense as a justification of modern nation state war. Principal among these is what he calls the "conscription paradox.".

The Covid-19 global pandemic had a profound effect on scientific practice. During this time, officials crucially relied on the work done by modellers. This raises novel questions for the philosophy of science. Here, I investigate the possibility of ‘natural models’ in predicting the virus’ trajectory for epidemiological purposes. I argue that to the extent that these can be consideredscientific models, they support the possibility of a continuum from scientific models to natural models differing in artifactual commitment. In making my case, (...) I draw from work on model organisms and natural experiments as well as recent work in epidemiology. (shrink)

On March 27, 1784, Goethe writes to Johann Gottfried Herder: -/- I have found–neither gold nor silver, but what makes me unspeakably happy–the os intermaxillare in the human! With Loder I compared human and animal skulls, came upon its trace, and look, there it is. Only, I beg of you not to mention it, since it must be handled confidentially. (WA 4.6:258). -/- The bone whose discovery so elated Goethe, then called the "intermaxillary bone" but now the "premaxilla," is a (...) pair of cranial bones that are located at the front of the upper jaw and bear the incisors in animals that have these teeth. Goethe expresses happiness in finding this bone specifically in humans, a discovery that opposed the prevailing anatomical opinion at the time. Goethe in the Roman Campagna (1787) – Johann Heinrich Wilhelm Tischbein -/- In his essay that was finished by the end of October 1784 and later given the title, "An Intermaxillary Bone of the Maxilla Is to Be Ascribed to the Human as well as to Animals." Goethe claims, citing the work of J. F. Blumenbach and Petrus Camper, that the bone has recently garnered attention as a "distinguishing mark" between humans and apes (LA 1.9:154). -/- Yet, upon reexamination of these anatomists' works, I argue that Goethe misrepresents their positions and overstates the significance of his discovery, at least in a certain sense: while Camper and Blumenbach do deny the intermaxillary bone to humans, they do not construe its absence as an important distinguishing mark between humans and animals. Not only did Goethe's discovery not have the significance he attributed to it, but also historians of science claim that he did not discover it all: the intermaxillary bone had already been described in the human by several anatomists before him. It would thus seem that Goethe misinterpreted the significance of what he had not found, and that his unspeakable happiness was unwarranted. -/- However, Goethe's discovery holds another, heretofore-unrecognized significance. I argue that it signals a change in his vision of nature to one that criticizes and departs from the anthropocentric ontology that grounded the natural sciences of his time. If this anthropocentricism is not overturned and the foundation of natural science not reconceived, Goethe maintains, then the study of nature will be indefinitely frustrated, always floundering, and never able to progress. In light of this threat, Goethe reconceives the foundation of natural science by developing anonathropocentric concept of nature that attempts to escape the pitfalls of the human-centered perspective. His concept of nature's harmony, which I argue reflects a nonathropocentric visions of nature, requires the revaluation of the terms in which historians have disputed his discovery of the intermaxillary bone; the originality of his discovery cannot be limited to establishing the bone's presence in humans but must be extended to the concept of nature's harmony complementary to it. -/- Goethe's discovery, I conclude, remains valuable and worthy of the excitement it initially incites in him. I show how it responds to a paradox of contemporary natural science in which the objective methods intended to eliminate anthropocentrism from the investigation of nature surreptitiously reintroduced it to that investigation. Furthermore, I argue that Goethe's nonanthropocentric vision of nature and his criticism of anthopocentricism are applicable to current questions in environmental ethics. By undermining the foundation of anthropocentric ethics, Goethe also challenges the present anthropocentric modus operandi that continues to condone the environmentally destructive anthropogenic activities responsible for species extinction, chemical pollution, and the loss of natural habitats and biodiversity, in addition to other signs of the Anthropocene. (shrink)

Three key components of a legal case are evidence, fact and judgement. In a well conducted judgement there will be an appropriate relation between these three components. Epistemologists investigating the nature of knowledge have been concerned with an analogous three components and their relation. More specifically, epistemologists have been concerned with justification, truth, and belief and how these three components need to be related if there is to be knowledge. Given the analogy, the research of epistemologists plausibly has insights to (...) offer to legal theorists. In fact, as we shall see, what epistemology have to offer legal theory actually goes beyond this as well. (shrink)