This paper examines a patient with borderline mental capacity, where the healthcare team is conflicted about how to proceed. This case demonstrates the complicated intersection between undue influence and mental capacity, allowing us to explore how the law is applied in clinical practice. Patients have the right to decline or accept medical treatments offered to them. In Singapore, family members perceive a right to be involved in the decision-making process for sick and elderly patients. Elderly patients, dependent on mainly family (...) members for care and support, sometimes submit to their overbearing influence resulting in decisions that fail to protect the patients’ own best interests. However, the clinicians’ own well-intentioned influence, driven by a desire for the best medical outcome can also be undue, and neither influence should seek to be a substitution for the patient’s decision. Following Re BKR [2015] SGCA 26, we are now obliged to examine how mental capacity can be affected by undue influence. A lack of capacity can be found when a patient fails to appreciate the presence of undue influence or is susceptible to undue influence due to their mental impairment causing their will to be overborne. This then paves the way for the health care team to decide based on best interests, because the patient is determined to be lacking in mental capacity. (shrink)

Justice, according to Thomas Aquinas, is a personal virtue. Modern theorists, by contrast, generally treat justice as a virtue of social institutions. Jean Porter rightly argues that both perspectives are necessary. But how should we conceive the relationship between the virtue of justice and the justice of institutions? I address this question by drawing from Aquinas’s account of the role of the convention of money in mediating relations of just exchange. Developing Aquinas’s account, I defend two conclusions and raise (...) one problem. The conclusions are: Aquinas does presuppose the need for just institutions in just relations; Aquinas highlights the importance of an underappreciated consideration: the way institutions mediate just or unjust relationships. The problem, which naturally arises from bringing together the virtue of justice and the justice of institutions, is whether and how individuals can act justly in a context of structural injustice. (shrink)

Robert Sparrow argues that several initially plausible arguments in favor of the deployment of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) in warfare fail, and that their deployment faces a serious moral objection: deploying AWS fails to express the respect for the casualties of war that morality requires. We critically discuss Sparrow’s argument from respect and respond on behalf of some objections he considers. Sparrow’s argument against AWS relies on the claim that they are distinct from accepted weapons of war in that they (...) either fail to transmit an attitude of respect or they transmit an attitude of disrespect. We argue that this distinction between AWS and widely accepted weapons is illusory, and so cannot ground a moral difference between AWS and existing methods of waging war. We also suggest that, if deploying conventional soldiers in some situation would be permissible, and if we could expect deploying AWS to cause fewer civilian casualties, then it would be consistent with an intuitive understanding of respect to deploy AWS in this situation. (shrink)

These essays strike a judicious yet thought-provoking balance between theoretical and historical perspectives.

Beginning with an analysis of the problematic relation of ‘the particular’ to ‘the universal’ in canonical political texts, this paper explores a variety of frameworks for the study of classical Greek political thought. Specifically, after investigating the influence of Quentin Skinner’s contextualism, the paper examines the ideas, approaches, and methods of Bernard Williams, Leo Strauss, and Josiah Ober. I draw attention to each figure’s distinctive motivations for returning to ancient Greece and to the influence of particular political ideals on those (...) motivations. I also assess their strengths and weaknesses and offer a critical commentary on their chief ideas. Toward the end of the paper, I outline a novel dialectical framework for the study of classical Athens – one that emphasizes the remoteness of the ancient past and the contribution that our studies might make to self-knowledge. In sketching this framework, I focus on what I call ‘ethical Athens’, ‘philosophical Athens’, and ‘critical Athens’. (shrink)

After biologist Deborah Gordon made a series of experimental discoveries in the 1980s, she argued that a change in terminology regarding the division of labor among castes of specialists was needed. Gordon’s investigations of the interactive effects of ants in colonies led her to believe that the established approach Edward O. Wilson had pioneered was biased in a way that made some alternative candidate adaptive explanations invisible. Gordon argued that this was because the term “division of labor” implied a division (...) among specialists that was unwarranted, and proposed “task allocation” as a better description that did not bias research against the alternative causes she had discovered. Gordon’s empirical findings and theoretical proposals also vindicate the initial critics of Wilson’s human sociobiology who have been dismissed as political radicals, but her proposals have been widely misunderstood by many contemporary behavioral ecologists. The terminological and methodological confusions rampant in contemporary discourse can be clarified by applying a framework developed by Elisabeth Lloyd involving an analysis of the constraints imposed by different research questions. Applying this framework will show how the methodological problems involving description raised by the initial critics of Wilson’s human sociobiology extended to his analysis of ants, indicating that they were not challenging Wilson’s naturalistic approach to the study of human evolution, but rather his methods. It will also show how confusion over how Gordon’s proposed research questions have been conflated with the possible answers she has argued ought to be investigated. This in turn will clarify contemporary disputes over her proposal to abandon the term “division of labor.”. (shrink)

In this paper, we outline a new method for evaluating the human impact of machine-learning applications. In partnership with Underwriters Laboratories Inc., we have developed a framework to evaluate the impacts of a particular use of machine learning that is based on the goals and values of the domain in which that application is deployed. By examining the use of artificial intelligence in particular domains, such as journalism, criminal justice, or law, we can develop more nuanced and practically relevant understandings (...) of key ethical guidelines for artificial intelligence. By decoupling the extraction of the facts of the matter from the evaluation of the impact of the resulting systems, we create a framework for the process of assessing impact that has two distinctly different phases. (shrink)

Moral pluralism is the norm in contemporary society. Even the best philosophical arguments rarely persuade moral opponents who differ at a foundational level. This has been vividly illustrated in contemporary debates in bioethics surrounding contentious issues such as abortion and euthanasia. It is readily apparent that bioethics discourse lacks an empirical explanation for the broad differences about various topics in bioethics and health policy. In recent years, social and cognitive psychology has generated novel approaches for defining basic differences in moral (...) intuitions generally. We propose that if empirical research using social intuitionist theory explains why people disagree with one another over moral issues, then the results of such research might help people debate their moral differences in a more constructive and civil manner. We illustrate the utility of social intuitionism with data from a national physician survey. (shrink)

What are the prospects for ambitious political reform in communities of traditional, passionate, and even self-righteous citizens? Can thoughtful legislators create a healthy society for citizens whose judgment is typically unsound? In a searching and provocative analysis, Ryan Balot addresses these timely - though universal - political questions by offering a novel interpretation of Plato's Laws. Turning to the ancient past is essential to reinvigorating our contemporary understanding of these all-important issues. Previous readers have either celebrated the work's idealism (...) or denounced its totalitarianism. Balot, by contrast, refuses to interpret the dialogue as a political blueprint, whether admirable or misguided. He shows instead that it constitutes Plato's greatest philosophical investigation of political life. In this transformative re-appraisal, Balot reveals that Plato's goal was to cultivate a tragic attitude toward our political passions, commitments, and aspirations. The result is a profound political inquiry with far-reaching consequences. (shrink)

This article offers two arguments for the centrality of historical studies to constructive theological ethics. The first is pedagogical: it is argued that precisely because historical texts call for reflective interpretation, the close study of these texts can provide insights that are not readily available in other ways. The second is more foundational: the Christian moral tradition is the proper subject matter of Christian theological ethics, and because that tradition evolves over time and cannot be understood apart from some account (...) of that evolution, historical studies are a constitutive part of Christian theological ethics. This claim is defended through an ex- amination of the historical dimension of the interpretation of Scripture as a moral document. The essay closes with some reflections on the institutional implications of these arguments. (shrink)

Some authors argue that it is permissible for clinicians to conscientiously provide abortion services because clinicians are already allowed to conscientiously refuse to provide certain services. Call this the symmetry thesis. We argue that on either of the two main understandings of the aim of the medical profession—what we will call “pathocentric” and “interest‐centric” views—conscientious refusal and conscientious provision are mutually exclusive. On pathocentric views, refusing to provide a service that takes away from a patient's health is professionally justified because (...) there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to refuse to provide that service (e.g., it does not heal, and it is contrary to the goals of medicine). However, providing that same service is not professionally justified when providing that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. Likewise, the thesis turns out false on interest‐centric views. Refusing to provide a service is not professionally justified when that service helps the patient fulfill her autonomous preferences because there are compelling reasons, based on professional standards, to provide that service (e.g., it helps her achieve her autonomous preferences, and it would be contrary to the goals of medicine to deny her that service). However, refusing to provide that same service is not professionally justified when refusing to provide that service would be contrary to the goals of medicine. As a result, on either of the two most plausible views on the goals of medicine, the symmetry thesis turns out false. (shrink)

In this response, I address Professor Rhonheimer’s charge that I deny the rational character of the natural law in my recent book. On the contrary, my theory of natural law is developed through an extended analysis of the ways in which reason draws on and informs the intelligibilities inherent in nature, understood in diverse ways. In this response, I focus on two issues to which Professor Rhonheimer gives extended attention, the first interpretative, the second constructive—namely, first, Aquinas’s conception of reason, (...) its scope and limits, and secondly, the prospects for moral universalism. (shrink)

INTUITIVELY, WE RECOGNIZE at least two broad ways in which we talk about musical performances. On the one hand, we talk about them as lasting twenty minutes, having a tempo of 120 quarter notes per minute, being a string quartet, loud or soft, sounding like a trumpet rather than a cornet, and out of tune. These descriptions refer to the nonaesthetic properties of musical performances. On the other hand, we talk about musical performances as being expressive of sorrow, sounding thematically (...) unified, having a swinging rhythm, portraying the harshness of living under economic distress, representing the howling of a wolf, and placid. These descriptions refer to the aesthetic qualities of musical performances. (shrink)

It is a great privilege to have been invited to speak on this occasion. I shall not talk about Janet Semple's life, since I did not know Janet Semple well. I first came across her work when the Oxford University Press sent me a copy of her Ph.D. thesis, asking for my opinion as to its publishability. I groaned—yet another study of the panopticon! I opened it, started reading—and read it straight through. It was so clear, insightful, powerful in its (...) interpretation and beautifully written. I am delighted to see that it has appeared as Bentham's Prison. I was, at a later stage, equally pleased to be involved in persuading Janet to publish some of her research on Bentham's medical and health interests. I shall not try to evaluate her work today. I think I might best honour her by trying to reflect upon some of the wider issues that surround Bentham's concerns with prisons and hospitals—issues raised by her work. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to link aspects of Kierkegaard’s experimental writings with new contemporary ecological perspectives which—in the act of interpenetration—are fusing philosophy, science, literature, anthropology, political thought, new economic perspectives, and visual and sound media, in order to open up new ways to live and flourish on a damaged planet—in our “age of disintegration.” I present Kierkegaard’s diagnosis of his time as “the age of disintegration” (from 1848) as something that can be connected to the contemporary socio-political conditions (...) in late modernity, and to the new epoch on the horizon which we are now experiencing. I interpret Kierkegaard’s expression “out into the middle of life” as the kernel of Kierkegaard’s authorship of interruption and unsettling. I argue it can be implicitly included in aspects of ecological perspectives offered by innovative writers today. (shrink)

On Marx -- Selections -- A note on the selections -- Notes on James Mill -- The German ideology -- Theses on Feuerbach -- The Communist manifesto -- Capital -- The civil war in France -- Critique of the Gotha programme.