In this article, I examine and criticize John Searle's account of the relation between mind and body. Searle rejects dualism and argues that the traditional mind-body problem has a 'simple solution': mental phenomena are both caused by biological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain. More precisely, mental states and events are macro-properties of neurons in much the same way that solidity and liquidity are macro-properties of molecules. However, Searle also maintains that the mental is 'ontologically (...) irreducible' to the physical, a view which follows from his understanding of the status and nature of consciousness. Consciousness is essential to the mind; subjectivity is essential to consciousness; and no purely objective, physical description of consciousness could ever capture or explain its essentially subjective character. None the less, Searle maintains that irreducibility is a 'trivial' result of our 'definitional practices' and is entirely compatible with his theory. I contend that this latter claim is based on an equivocation: Searle's conclusion only seems to follow because he alters and trivializes what philosophers ordinarily mean by 'reduction'. I also maintain that Searle's position is reductionist in the ordinary, nontrivial sense. For this reason, his theory fails to accommodate the subjective character of consciousness and fails to solve the traditional mind-body problem. Finally, I briefly discuss Searle's claim that he is not an epiphenomenalist, and argue that given the assumptions of his view there is no interesting causal role for consciousness in the physical world. (shrink)

Phenomenologists such as Merleau?Ponty have argued that the ordinary teleological relation between an embodied agent and the world is neither ?subjective? nor ?cognitive?, i.e. that it is not normally mediated by a chain of explicit cognition occurring within a distinct mental subject. Yet, while this seems true from a first?person, phenomenological perspective, I argue that teleological forms of explanation require the ascription of Intentional states. Intentional states, however, are usually regarded as subjective, cognitive states. In order to reconcile the phenomenology (...) with the logic of teleology, I introduce the notion of ?body?intentionality?. I maintain that we can use a modified version of Jonathan Bennett's concept of a teleological law to specify third?person empirical criteria for a pre?cognitive, pre?subjective kind of Intentionality. I also argue that this notion of body?intentionality provides us with at least a partial solution to the mind?body problem that avoids the inadequacies of the computational theory of mind. (shrink)

Las corrientes filosóficas de inspiración cartesiana tarde o temprano tienen que afrontar el solipsismo como un resultado al menos plausible de su desarrollo. La Fenomenología no podía evitar la misma suerte. Después de un rápido panorama en lo tocante a la fenomenología husserliana y el solipsismo, pasamos a exponer críticamente el texto de las Meditaciones cartesianas de Husserl, específicamente la quinta. Intentaremos señalar la insuficiencia de la exposición husserliana a la hora de superar, desde sus propias bases, la amenaza del (...) solipsismo. (shrink)

After a period during which the theological categories of sin and forgiveness were ignored or trivialized, presently these notions are being rediscovered. What could their impact be on bioethics, either in the narrow sense of medical ethics, or in the more encompassing sense of the ethics of the life sciences? This essay begins with describing the processes of transcending and ethitization, which gave rise to the biblical notion of sin. It portrays the theological foundation of sin in terms of a (...) twofold refusal of proper relations to God and other humans. Through the practise of confession in the face of God (coram deo), sin is placed into a horizon of hope for forgiveness and reconciliation. The heuristic and hermeneutical significance of these categories results from their introducing a “surplus value,” which transcends biological and ethical considerations. This additional dimension is illustrated in view of care (cura) for the injured, and in view of individual as well as collective willingness to forgive. (shrink)

The freedom, in Latin libertas, is the object of philosophical reflection since Plato. Yet as the determined philosophical direction it took the form of the „liberalism” on the turning point of the sixteenth and seventeenth century, represented by two philosophers: Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778). Among contemporary scholars Isaiah Berlin is standing out. From his point of view the philosophical problem of the freedom should be examined in two aspects: the negative freedom i.e. the attribute of not hindered (...) freedom in making choices and the positive freedom as opportunity of being the master of one’s own fate. The author of the article, after critical demonstrating the conception of liberalism, sketches the theory of freedom from the position of Christian ethics. As a starting point he takes the conception of man as a person whose rational activities take on the form of twofold freedom of choice. In the psychological aspect, this freedom assumes the ambivalent form of doing good or evil, however in the moral aspect it turns out to be freedom put in order by the hierarchy of objective moral values. In this meaning the freedom also organizes the whole free man's activity and becomes creative strength of his moral personal perfection. It also defines the crucial sense of Christian philosophical science of truth about freedom. (shrink)

Purcell proposes “a small step in the direction of expanding the notion of persons in communion, as a hermeneutic constant for understanding universal humanity in history”. The human-person-as-communional is his heuristic device for exploring both humanity as a communion of persons, and the drama of humanity “as the unfolding and contraction of human persons in social and historical communion and excommunication with one another and their transcendent personal source”.

In the last 25 years, Roman Catholic moral theology has debated issues ranging from the sources of moral theology to the role of ecclesiastical authority in moral theology. In 1993, Pope John Paul II issued his encyclical letter Veritatis Splendor, which addresses issues in fundamental moral theology. The encyclical must be understood against the background of ongoing debates since Pope Paul VI's 1968 encyclical on birth control (Humanae Vitae). It is not clear what the impact of Veritatis Splendor will be. (...) However, it seems safe to say that it will be deployed in debates about issues such as birth control, artificial reproduction, sterilization, and abortion. (shrink)

Given that his writings span well over forty years of maturing genius and that the audiences to whom these writings were directed were as varied as the Pelagians, Donatists, and Manichees, not to mention the Sunday flock, is it any wonder that Augustine’s thought found a home in Wittenberg as well as in Trent? T. Kermit Scott, associate professor of philosophy at Purdue University, begins his survey accordingly by acknowledging that “[p]art of the task of interpreting Augustine at this late (...) date is to make plausible how able and informed students have come to such divergent views”. (shrink)

In the academic year 1920-1921 at the University of Freiburg, Martin Heidegger gave a series of extraordinary lectures on the phenomenological significance of the religious thought of St. Paul and St. Augustine. The publication of these lectures in 1995 settled a long disputed question, the decisive role played by Christian theology in the development of Heidegger’s philosophy. The lectures present a special challenge to readers of Heidegger and theology alike. Experimenting with language and drawing upon a wide range of now (...) obscure authors, Heidegger is finding his way to Being and Time through the labyrinth of his Catholic past and his increasing fascination with Protestant theology. A Companion to Heidegger's Phenomenology of Religious Life is written by an international team of Heidegger specialists. (shrink)

Gaston Fessard employs Hegel’s dialectical logic to clarify how St. Ignatius’s _Spiritual Exercises_ envisage and prepare the decisions and choices between contrasting options or major turning points in spiritual life, in moments of what Ignatius would call _Election_.

There are good reasons for envisioning a global discourse about God, premised necessarily agreed upon perfections considered to be by definition proper to God, and for thinking through the implications of our understanding of God for morality. Philosophically, it makes sense to hold that claims about omnipotence, omniscience, and other superlative perfections are indeed maximal, and define “God” wherever the terminology of divine persons is taken up. Religiously too, it makes sense to assert that a deity possessed of perfections is (...) not just the deity of one’s own tribe or religion, but also the deity of the whole world, whether acknowledged as such or not. This essay delves into the larger set of rich complexities by three moves. First, I look into a single extended historical case of the extension of the discourse about God beyond the Christian West, the discourse on God proffered by Western Jesuit missionaries in India from the sixteenth to twentieth centuries. Second, I place next to that Jesuit learning the instance of a famed Hindu theologian’s discourse on God, God’s perfections, and their moral implications. Third, I briefly step back and assess the dangers and fruitful prospects inherent in thinking about God and morality in an interreligious context. (shrink)

This article concerns the morality of establishing regulated kidney markets in an effort to reduce the chronic shortage of kidneys for transplant. The article tries to rebut the view, recently defended by James Taylor, that if we hold autonomy to be intrinsically valuable, then we should be in favor of such markets. The article then argues that, under current conditions, the buying and selling of organs in regulated markets would sometimes violate two Kantian principles that are seen as moral constraints. (...) One principle forbids expressing disrespect for the dignity of humanity; the other forbids treating others merely as means. In light of the moral danger posed by regulated markets, the article advocates an alternative way of diminishing the current organ shortage, namely opt-out systems of cadaveric organ donation. (shrink)

Volume 37 contains papers and commentaries presented to the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy during 2022. Works: _Phaedo_, _Statesman_, _De Caelo_, _Metaphysics N_, _Enneads_. Topics: immortality, Forms; dialectic, myth, law; elements, inclination, place; mathematics and explanation; mystical union.

El artículo estudia cómo la fenomenología puede contribuir al quehacer teológico. A tal fin, el prof. Gilbert comienza por identificar los inicios de la fenomenología. Seguidamente, presenta lo que él denomina fenomenología “descriptiva”, marcada por las ciencias humanas, que sirvió para reconocer las características esenciales de la religión. Pero la fenomenología puede dar un paso más, ya estrictamente filosófico, para elaborar un modo de fenomenología “especulativa”. Finalmente, el artículo indica las aportaciones de esta esta fenomenológica al desarrollo de la teología, (...) estudiando las propuestas de Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion y Emmanuel Falque. (shrink)

This article surveys western business ethics' recent history to show how this ethic has neglected recently its religious traditions and become construed more narrowly as an applied philosophy and social science. It argues that this narrowness has confused business ethics' role in business education and helped to weaken the distinctiveness of certain institutions of higher education. It then suggests ways that western business ethics might become more integrated, interesting, and autonomous as an academic discipline by incorporating its key religious traditions.

In _Jesuit Superior General Luis Martín García and His Memorias_, David Schultenover presents an account and interpretation of Martín’s memoir covering most of his sixty years, including candid reflections on church-state events and his personal life.

Medical electives have long been part of the undergraduate curriculum, and many students choose to undertake a placement in a developing country. In countries where healthcare provision is hugely underresourced, students have found themselves under pressure to exceed their role. They have been expected to diagnose and treat patients without direct supervision from a qualified doctor. Some have found themselves running clinics and wards; others have found themselves to be the most qualified person available.1,2The British Medical Journal believes students should (...) not take on the role of a qualified doctor, “irrespective of any encouragement which students may receive from members of the host organisations to which they are attached”.3 This includes not diagnosing, prescribing, or treating any patient without strict clinical supervision. They feel that students fail to appreciate the dangers of treatment, particularly where familiar medical problems are complicated by unfamiliar poverty. Their deontological view is saying that students should treat their work …. (shrink)

Cora Diamond has recently criticised as mere legend the interpretation of a quip of Ramsey's, contained in the epigraph below, which takes him to be objecting to or rejecting Wittgenstein's Tractarian distinction between saying and showing. Whilst I agree with Diamond's discussion of the legend, I argue that her interpretation of the quip has little evidential support, and runs foul of a criticism sometimes made against intuitionism. Rather than seeing Ramsey as making a claim about the nature of propositions, as (...) Diamond does, we should understand him as making a claim about the grammar of the logical connectives. Such a view coheres with the extant evidence of the nature of Wittgenstein's and Ramsey's 1929 philosophical encounters. It is also compatible with attributing to Ramsey a recognition of Wittgenstein's distinction and with denying that criticising it is the lesson of the quip. (shrink)