Most people encounter art images as digital reproductions on a computer screen instead of as originals in a museum or gallery. With the development of digital technologies, high-resolution artworks can be accessed anywhere and anytime by a large number of viewers. Since these digital images depict the same content and are attributed to the same artist as the original, it is often implicitly assumed that their aesthetic evaluation will be similar. When it comes to the digital reproductions of art, however, (...) it is also obvious that reproductions do differ from the originals in various aspects. Besides image quality, resolution, and format, the most obvious change is in the representation of color. The effects of subjectively varying surface-level image features on art evaluation have not been clearly assessed. To address this gap, we compare the evaluation of digital reproductions of 16 expressionist and impressionist paintings manipulated to have a high color saturation vs. a saturation similar to the original. We also investigate the impact of viewing time and expertise, two other aspects that may impact the perception of art in online contexts. Moreover, we link these dimensions to a recent model of aesthetic experience [the Vienna Integrated Model of Top-Down and Bottom-Up Processes in Art Perception ]. Results suggest that color saturation does not exert a major influence on liking. Cognitive and emotional aspects, however, are affected – to different extents for experts and laypersons. For laypersons, the increase in color saturation led to more positive assessments of an artwork, whereas it resulted in increased confusion for art experts. This insight is particularly important when it comes to reproducing artworks digitally. Depending on the intended use, increasing or decreasing the color saturation of the digitally reproduced image might be most appropriate. We conclude with a discussion of these findings and address the question of why empirical aesthetics requires more precise dimensions to better understand the subtle processes that take place in the perception of today’s digitally reproduced art environment. (shrink)

For every structure M of finite signature Mekler 781) has constructed a group G such that for every κ the maximal number of n -types over an elementary equivalent model of cardinality κ is the same for M and G . These groups are nilpotent of class 2 and of exponent p , where p is a fixed prime greater than 2. We consider stable structures M only and show that M is CM -trivial if and only if G (...) is CM -trivial. Furthermore, we obtain that the free group F 2 in the variety of 2 -nilpotent groups of exponent p>2 with ω free generators has a CM -trivial ω -stable theory. (shrink)

In this paper, we investigate a new model theoretical tree property (TP), called the antichain tree property (ATP). We develop combinatorial techniques for ATP. First, we show that ATP is always witnessed by a formula in a single free variable, and for formulas, not having ATP is closed under disjunction. Second, we show the equivalence of ATP and [Formula: see text]-ATP, and provide a criterion for theories to have not ATP (being NATP). Using these combinatorial observations, we find algebraic examples (...) of ATP and NATP, including pure groups, pure fields and valued fields. More precisely, we prove Mekler’s construction for groups, Chatzidakis’ style criterion for pseudo-algebraically closed (PAC) fields, and the AKE-style principle for valued fields preserving NATP. We give a construction of an antichain tree in the Skolem arithmetic and atomless Boolean algebras. (shrink)

Let S and T be countable complete theories. We assume that T is superstable without the dimensional order property, and S is interpretable in T in such a way that every model of S is coded in a model of T. We show that S does not have the dimensional order property, and we discuss the question of whether $\operatorname{Depth}(S) \leq \operatorname{Depth}(T)$ . For Mekler's uniform interpretation of arbitrary theories S of finite similarity type into suitable theories T s (...) of groups we show that $\operatorname{Depth}(S) \leq \operatorname{Depth}(T_S) \leq 1 + \operatorname{Depth}(S)$. (shrink)

We introduce the large-cardinal notions of ξ-greatly-Mahlo and ξ-reflection cardinals and prove (1) in the constructible universe, L, the first ξ-reflection cardinal, for ξ a successor ordinal, is strictly between the first ξ-greatly-Mahlo and the first Π1ξ-indescribable cardinals, (2) assuming the existence of a ξ-reflection cardinal κ in L, ξ a successor ordinal, there exists a forcing notion in L that preserves cardinals and forces that κ is (ξ+1)-stationary, which implies that the consistency strength of the existence of a (ξ+1)-stationary (...) cardinal is strictly below a Π1ξ-indescribable cardinal. These results generalize to all successor ordinals ξ the original same result of Mekler–Shelah [A. Mekler and S. Shelah, The consistency strength of every stationary set reflects, Israel J. Math.67(3) (1989) 353–365] about a 2-stationary cardinal, i.e. a cardinal that reflects all its stationary sets. (shrink)

The paper continues [1]. Let S be a complete theory of ultraflat (e.g. planar) graphs as introduced in [4]. We show a strong form of NOTOP for S: The union of two models M1 and M2, independent over a common elementary submodel M0, is the primary model over M1 ∪ M2 of S. Then by results of [1] Mekler's construction [6] gives for such a theory S of nice ultraflat graphs a superstable 2-step-nilpotent group of exponent $p (>2)$ with (...) NDOP and NOTOP. (shrink)

Collingwood’s “Libellus de Generatione: An Essay in Absolute Empiricism” was a tract of strenuous philosophical revisionism; never published, perhaps unpublishable, supposedly destroyed, it survived. He begins by stressing his obligations to David Hume; he offers his thematic: “absolute denial of any such concept as substance and the resolution of all reality into the reality of experience.” “The reality of mind is the process of its experience, its life, and nothing else”. Or, “the mind is a mirror... whose being is solely (...) the activity of reflecting”; it has no “substance of its own of which this activity is only a reflection”. Collingwood’s entire career as student and teacher... (shrink)

John. R. Searle’s account of perception is often called the intentionality theory of perception (ITP). ITP maintains direct realism. According to direct realism, physical objects are directly perceived. Searle denies Locke's representational theory of perception since the latter is an antithesis of direct realism. Searle's contention is that, first, according to the representational theory of perception, subjective ideas (mind-dependent entities) are the only object of perception, we do not perceive physical objects at all. Second, Searle says that on the face (...) of the resemblance thesis, the representational theory of perception is not secured because the former is insufficient to explain the latter. This paper is an attempt to reflect on these two charges raised by Searle. First, I will try to show how we can conceive physical objects are objects (indirect) of perception within Locke’s representational theory of perception. Then, it will be argued that Locke’s representationalist theory of perception can be upheld without the support of the resemblance thesis. (shrink)

In Seeing Things as They Are (Searle 2015), Searle developed a direct realist’s theory of perception. According to direct realism, physical objects are directly and immediately perceived. Searle claims that Berkeley’s theory of perception goes against direct realism. For Searle, Berkeley’s theory suggests that only subjective experiences (ideas) are directly and immediately perceived, not physical objects. Contrary to Searle, G. S. Pappas claims that Berkeley’s theory of perception is consistent with the view that physical objects are immediately perceivable (Pappas 1982; (...) Pappas 1987). Given the conflicting interpretations of Berkeley’s theory of perception, this paper attempts to defend Searle’s position on Berkeley’s theory of perception. It refutes Pappas’ interpretation by arguing that he is inconsistent with Berkeley’s theses of ontological phenomenalism and heterogeneity thesis. (shrink)

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than (...) that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards. (shrink)

In research textbooks, and much of the research practice, they describe, qualitative processes and interpretivist epistemologies tend to dominate visual methodology. This article challenges the assumptions behind this dominance. Using exemplification from three existing visual data sets produced through one large education research project, this article considers the affordances and constraints of the research process focusing particularly on analysis. It examines how and when the visual can be incorporated, gives some critical reflections on the role and use of visual methods (...) to fulfil different research intents, and, in particular, considers combining large, open-ended data sets with acceptable and rigorous analysis techniques. We then explore arguments about the nature of visual data, what is considered epistemologically appropriate and the decision-making which accompanies any appraisal of process in education research. The intention is to challenge ourselves, and fellow visual methods researchers, to develop a more complete understanding of the theory and practice of visual research. (shrink)

Would democratic theory in its empirical and normative guises be in a better position without the theory of the deliberative public sphere? In this paper I explore recent theories of agonistic democracy that have answered this question in the affirmative. I question their assertionthat the theory of the public sphere should be abandoned in favor of a model of democratic politics based on political contestation. Furthermore, I explore one of the fundamental assumptionsat work in the debate about the theory of (...) the public sphere’s status, namely the assumed opposition between consensus and contestation. Questioning the rigid nature of the opposition, I go on to argue that the deliberative theory of the public sphere actually facilitates the development of the agonistic approach to democratic theory and practice. Key Words: agonistic democracy • deliberative democracy • democratic theory • Habermas • theory of the public sphere. (shrink)

With the publication of The God Delusion Richard Dawkins became enthroned as the unofficial ‘Emperor’ for a cadre of writers advancing a rhetorically robust form of anti-theism dubbed ‘The New Atheism’ by Wired Magazine contributing editor Gary Wolf. Many have cheered Dawkins and his court, seeing in their writings just what they long to see. For, after the fashion of the fairy-tale Emperor's fabled new clothes, the ‘new atheism’ has seen naturalism wrapping itself in a fake finery of counterfeit meaning (...) and purpose. (shrink)

I offer an appreciation and critique of Ernst Fehr’s altruism research in experimental economics that challenges the "selfishness axiom" as an account of human behavior. I describe examples of Fehr’s experiments and their results and consider his conceptual terminology, particularly his "biological" definition of altruism and its counterintuitive implications. I also look at Fehr’s experiments from a methodological perspective and examine his explanations of subjects’ behavior. In closing, I look at Fehr’s neuroscientific work in experimental economics and question his adherence (...) to a subjective expected utility interpretation of subjects’ behavior. Key Words: altruism • Ernst Fehr • strong reciprocity • neuroeconomics • experimental economics. (shrink)

This thesis is neither e page to page commentary nor en assessment of Hume's place in the history of Philosophy. It mainly consists in an attempt at justifying a certain approach to the Interpretation of his theory of value with special reference to morals.

Frank Jackson has abandoned his famous knowledge argument, and has explained why in a brief "Postscript on Qualia" . This explanation consists of a direct argument, and an attempt to explain away the intuition that lies at the heart of the knowledge argument. The direct argument is clarified and found to be subtly question-begging. The attempt to explain away the key intuition is reviewed and found to be inadequate. False memory traces, which Jackson mentions at the beginning of the direct (...) argument, are discussed and found not to materially affect the force of the knowledge argument. (shrink)

Translation with notes of Ammonius' Commentary on Aristotle's Categories.

Taking an analytic and historical approach, this work develops and defends Althusserian critical theory. This theory, it is argued, produces knowledge of how a particular class of people, in a particular time, in a particular place, is dominated, oppressed, or exploited. Moreover, without relying on a general notion of human emancipation, concrete critical theory can suggest political means for the alleviation of these conditions. Because it puts Althusser’s ideas in dialogue with contemporary social science and philosophy, the book as a (...) whole makes contributions to Althusser studies, to Anglo-American political philosophy, and to current debates in the philosophy of the social sciences. (shrink)