The current study examined the effects of cardiorespiratory fitness, identified with a continuous graded cycle ergometry, and aerobic exercise on cognitive functioning and entropy of the electroencephalogram (EEG) in 30 adolescents between the ages of 13 and 14 years. Higher and lower fit participants performed an executive function task after a bout of acute exercise and after rest while watching a film. EEG entropy, using the sample entropy measure, was repeatedly measured during the 1500ms post-stimulus interval to evaluate changes in (...) entropy over time. Analysis of the behavioural data for lower and higher fit groups revealed an interaction between fitness levels and acute physical exercise. Notably, lower fit, but not higher fit, participants had higher error rates for NoGo relative to Go trials in the rest condition, whereas in the acute exercise condition there were no differences in error rates between groups; higher fit participants also had significantly faster reaction times in the exercise condition in comparison with the rest condition. Analysis of EEG data revealed that higher fit participants demonstrated lower entropy post-stimulus than lower fit participants in the left frontal hemisphere, possibly indicating increased efficiency of early stage stimulus processing and more efficient allocation of cognitive resources to the task demands. The results suggest that EEG entropy is sensitive to stimulus processing demands and varies as a function of physical fitness levels, but not acute exercise. Physical fitness, in turn, may enhance cognition in adolescence by facilitating higher functionality of the attentional system in the context of lower levels of frontal EEG entropy. (shrink)

With the clarity that James deemed obligatory, Some Problems of Philosophy outlines his theory of perception. The early chapters expose the defects of intellectualism and monism and the advantages of empiricism and pluralism. The novelty that enters into concrete perceptual experience, and that is disallowed by the rationalizing intellect, suggests exciting possibilities. Denied any absolute truth in an ever-changing world, privy to only a piece of the truth at any given moment, the individual can, with faith and good will, help (...) create order out of chaos. Some Problems in Philosophy, published posthumously, represents an important advance in William James’s thought. (shrink)

In evolutionary biology changes in population structure are explained by citing trait fitness distribution. I distinguish three interpretations of fitness explanations—the Two‐Factor Model, the Single‐Factor Model, and the Statistical Interpretation—and argue for the last of these. These interpretations differ in their degrees of causal commitment. The first two hold that trait fitness distribution causes population change. Trait fitness explanations, according to these interpretations, are causal explanations. The last maintains that trait fitness distribution correlates with population change but does not cause (...) it. My defense of the Statistical Interpretation relies on a distinctive feature of causation. Causes conform to the Sure Thing Principle. Trait fitness distributions, I argue, do not. *Received July 2009; revised October 2009. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy/Institute for the History, Philosophy of Science and Technology, University of Toronto, Victoria College, 91 Charles Street West, Toronto, ON M5S 1K7, Canada; e‐mail: denis[email protected]. (shrink)

We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications (...) of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biologythe `explananda of selection' debate and the `units of selection' debate. (shrink)

The primary concern of this paper is Hume's account of the moral difference between humans and other animals. In order to clarify this difference Hume's views regarding reason, sympathy, and human sentiment are examined. The purpose of this investigation is threefold. First, Hume's position on the moral difference between humans and other animals is clarified. It is argued that this difference is properly traced to Hume's account of the sentiment of humanity. Second, Hume is defended against the claim that his (...) position on this matter is inconsistent. Third, it is argued that Hume's theory of morality leaves open the possibility that some earthly species other than our own may be properly understood as moral. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Little theoretical attention has been paid to the question of what obligations corporations and other business enterprises have to the four billion people living at the base of the global economic pyramid. This article makes several theoretical contributions to this topic. First, it is argued that corporations are properly understood as agents of global justice. Second, the legitimacy of global governance institutions and the legitimacy of corporations and other business enterprises are distinguished. Third, it is argued that a deliberative democracy (...) model of corporate legitimacy defended by theorists of political CSR is unsatisfactory. Fourth, it is argued that a Rawlsian theoretical framework fails to provide a satisfactory account of the obligations of corporations regarding global justice. Finally, an ethical conception of CSR grounded in an appropriately modest set of duties tied to corporate relationships is then defended. This position is cosmopolitan in scope and grounded in overlapping arguments for human rights. (shrink)

Psychological individualism is motivated by two taxonomic principles: (i) that psychological states are individuated by their causal powers, and (ii) that causal powers supervene upon intrinsic physiological state. I distinguish two interpretations of individualism--the 'orthodox' and the 'alternative'--each of which is consistent with these motivating principles. I argue that the alternative interpretation is legitimately individualistic on the grounds that it accurately reflects the actual taxonomic practices of bona fide individualistic sciences. The classification of homeobox genes in developmental genetics provides an (...) illustration. When applied to the taxonomy of psychological kinds, alternative individualism has some surprising consequences. In particular, externalist taxonomies of thought are consistent with the alternative interpretation, and hence consistent with individualism. I conclude, on this basis, that the individualism/externalism dispute which has long preoccupied philosophy of psychology is an empty one. (shrink)

The concept of the environment appears to be indispensably involved in adaptive explanation. Quite what its role is, however, is a matter of some dispute. The environment is customarily viewed as the dual of the organism; a wholly external, discrete, autonomous cause of evolution. On this view, the external environment is the principal cause of the adaptedness of form, and the determinant of what it is to be an adaptation. I argue that this conception of the environment neither adequately explains (...) nor individuates evolutionary adaptations. Instead, adaptation, properly construed, is an evolutionary response to affordances. The environment, traditionally construed, underdetermines an organism’s affordances. Instead, I argue that the environment takes its place in evolutionary models not as a discrete causal entity, but as an abstraction. (shrink)

Emmet Gowin à la fondation Henri Cartier-Bresson (14 mai-27 juillet 2014) / Lewis Baltz au Bal (23 mai-24 août 2014) Depuis quelques semaines, les Parisiens ont la chance de pouvoir découvrir deux figures légendaires de la photographie américaine contemporaine, deux géants incontournables et pourtant peu exposés en France jusque-là : Lewis Baltz, au Bal, et Emmet Gowin à la fondation Henri Cartier-Bresson. De la même génération (ils sont nés dans les années 1940), ces deux artistes ont en commun (...) - (...) Arts plastiques et autres – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Given a class $$\mathcal {C}$$ of models, a binary relation $$\mathcal {R}$$ between models, and a model-theoretic language L, we consider the modal logic and the modal algebra of the theory of $$\mathcal {C}$$ in L where the modal operator is interpreted via $$\mathcal {R}$$. We discuss how modal theories of $$\mathcal {C}$$ and $$\mathcal {R}$$ depend on the model-theoretic language, their Kripke completeness, and expressibility of the modality inside L. We calculate such theories for the submodel and the quotient (...) relations. We prove a downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem for first-order language expanded with the modal operator for the extension relation between models. (shrink)

From an enactive approach to human activity, we suggest that the use of appearance-enhancing drugs is better explained by the sense-making related to body image rather than the cognitive evaluation of social norms about appearance and consequent psychopathology-oriented approach. After reviewing the main psychological disorders thought to link body image issues to the use of appearance-enhancing substances, we sketch a flexible, dynamic and embedded account of body image defined as the individual’s propensity to act and experience in specific situations. We (...) show how this enacted body image is a complex process of sense-making that people engage in when they are trying to adapt to specific situations. These adaptations of the enacted body image require effort, perseverance and time, and therefore any substance that accelerates this process appears to be an easy and attractive solution. In this enactive account of body image, we underline that the link between the enacted body image and substance use is also anchored in the history of the body’s previous interactions with the world. This emerges during periods of upheaval and hardship, especially in a context where athletes experience weak participatory sense-making in a sport community. We conclude by suggesting prevention and intervention designs that would promote a safe instrumental use of the body in sports and psychological helping procedures for athletes experiencing difficulties with substances use and body image. (shrink)

Properties of non‐canonical GC base pairs and their relations with mechanochemical cleavage of DNA are analyzed. A hypothesis of the involvement of the transient GC wobble base pairs both in the mechanisms of the mechanochemical cleavage of DNA and epigenetic mechanisms involving of 5‐methylcytosine, is proposed. The hypothesis explains the increase in the frequency of the breaks of the sugar‐phosphate backbone of DNA after cytosines, the asymmetric character of these breaks, and an increase in break frequency in CpG after cytosine (...) methylation. As an alternative hypothesis, probable implication of GC+ Hoogsteen base pairs is considered, which now exemplify the best‐studied non‐canonical GC base pairs in the DNA double helix. Also see the video abstract here https://youtu.be/EUunVWL0ptw. (shrink)

This is a survey article in which I explore some important recent work on the topic in question, Kant’s formula of the end in itself (or “formula of humanity”). I first provide an overview of the formulation, including what the formula seems roughly to be saying, and what Kant’s main argument for it seems to be. I then call the reader’s attention to a variety of questions one might have about the import of and argument for this formula, alluding to (...) some of the works in which philosophers have recently raised or tried to answer these questions. Then, for the bulk of the paper, I focus my discussion on two issues of contention: the identity of the “end in itself” that the formula refers to, and the relation between the value of the end in itself and the value of other ends. I do not attempt to argue for a particular position of my own regarding these issues. Instead, I explain a number of the more interesting or influential recent attempts to answer these questions, compare these approaches in various ways, draw implications from them, and raise concerns about some of them. I also suggest that an important link connects the question about the identity of the end in itself and the question about the relation between the value of the end in itself in relation to the value of other ends: How one answers these questions commits one to a position on the thorny issue of whether, how, and how fully, autonomy is manifested through empirical (not simply pure) practical reason. (shrink)

According to a prominent view of evolutionary theory, natural selection and the processes of development compete for explanatory relevance. Natural selection theory explains the evolution of biological form insofar as it is adaptive. Development is relevant to the explanation of form only insofar as it constrains the adaptation-promoting effects of selection. I argue that this view of evolutionary theory is erroneous. I outline an alternative, according to which natural selection explains adaptive evolution by appeal to the statistical structure of populations, (...) and development explains the causes of adaptive evolution at the level of individuals. Only together can a statistical theory of selection and a mechanical theory of development explain why populations of organisms comprise individuals that are adapted to their conditions of existence. (shrink)

Over the course of human history, the sciences, and biology in particular, have often been manipulated to cause immense human suffering. For example, biology has been used to justify eugenic programs, forced sterilization, human experimentation, and death camps—all in an attempt to support notions of racial superiority. By investigating the past, the contributors to _Biology and Ideology from Descartes to Dawkins_ hope to better prepare us to discern ideological abuse of science when it occurs in the future. Denis R. (...) Alexander and Ronald L. Numbers bring together fourteen experts to examine the varied ways science has been used and abused for nonscientific purposes from the fifteenth century to the present day. Featuring an essay on eugenics from Edward J. Larson and an examination of the progress of evolution by Michael J. Ruse, _Biology and Ideology_ examines uses both benign and sinister, ultimately reminding us that ideological extrapolation continues today. An accessible survey, this collection will enlighten historians of science, their students, practicing scientists, and anyone interested in the relationship between science and culture. (shrink)

Several notions of computability-theoretic reducibility between [Formula: see text] principles have been studied. This paper contributes to the program of analyzing the behavior of versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and related principles under these notions. Among other results, we show that for each [Formula: see text], there is an instance of RT[Formula: see text] all of whose solutions have PA degree over [Formula: see text] and use this to show that König’s Lemma lies strictly between RT[Formula: see text] and RT[Formula: see (...) text] under one of these notions. We also answer two questions raised by Dorais, Dzhafarov, Hirst, Mileti, and Shafer on comparing versions of Ramsey’s Theorem and of the Thin Set Theorem with the same exponent but different numbers of colors. Still on the topic of the effect of the number of colors on the computable aspects of Ramsey-theoretic properties, we show that for each [Formula: see text], there is an [Formula: see text]-coloring [Formula: see text] of [Formula: see text] such that every [Formula: see text]-coloring of [Formula: see text] has an infinite homogeneous set that does not compute any infinite homogeneous set for [Formula: see text], and connect this result with the notion of infinite information reducibility introduced by Dzhafarov and Igusa. Next, we introduce and study a new notion that provides a uniform version of the idea of implication with respect to [Formula: see text]-models of RCA0, and related notions that allow us to count how many applications of a principle [Formula: see text] are needed to reduce another principle to [Formula: see text]. Finally, we fill in a gap in the proof of Theorem 12.2 in Cholak, Jockusch, and Slaman. (shrink)

Quel sens y a-t-il à faire de la philosophie et à l'enseigner? Si aujourd'hui la réponse à ces questions semble complexe, et peut-être même impossible à trouver, cette réflexion de haute volée propose des trajets dans la philosophie - de la philosophie première à la philosophie morale et politique - qui s'éloignent des pratiques actuelles parfois dénaturantes. Un ouvrage qui s'adresse à ceux qui voudraient se risquer à emprunter ce chemin escarpé et merveilleux de la connaissance : la philosophie.

Voir, entendre, toucher, ce n'est pas simplement avoir des sensations. La perception nous donne à voir, entendre, toucher quelque chose. Mais que perçoit-on au juste ? Des choses, des faits, des apparences ? En quel sens et à quelles conditions perçoit-on des objets ? Quelle part y prend le sujet percevant ? L'objectivation perceptuelle est-elle essentiellement conceptuelle ? Le présent ouvrage explore ces questions et tente d'y répondre à travers une confrontation avec plusieurs grands moments de la théorie de la (...) perception au XXe siècle : la phénoménologie husserlienne, la psychologie gestaltiste, l'internalisme de Searle, les débats contemporains autour des contenus perceptuels. Centré sur la question de l'intentionnalité de la perception sensible, il poursuit trois objectifs principaux : défendre un dualisme phénoménal de la passivité sensorielle et de l'activité attentionnelle, en opposition aux théories monistes de la perception ; tenter de réhabiliter, de reformuler et de réactualiser le problème de l'analyse de l'expérience ; esquisser enfin une solution d'ensemble au problème du rapport entre l'expérience et la pensée conceptuelle. (shrink)

By means of a consideration of Whitman (1998) the present paper considers the meanings of ‘Panglossianism’ and the relation between group and individual levels in evolution. It establishes the connection between the Panglossian policy prescription of laissez-faire and the mistaken evolutionary theory of group selection. Analysis of the passages in Hayek cited by Whitman shows that, once these passages are taken in context, and once the appropriate meaning of the term ‘Panglossian’ has been clarified, they fail to defend Hayek from (...) this charge, but, on the contrary, confirm that Hayek was, indeed, ‘a Panglossian evolutionary theorist’. (shrink)

Introduction à l'ouvrage: À l'École de Brentano, Paris, Vrin, 2007.

While all of the great philosophers are difficult to read, Heidegger and Wittgenstein seem to be so in striking ways. Their writings are oddly reluctant to yield up to us what we might think of as ‘their philosophical claims’; and both seem to manifest an attitude towards argument unlike that of most contemporary philosophers. This paper will re-consider these features of Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s work in the light of some common themes in their understanding of philosophical confusion. Given that understanding, (...) writings that would combat such confusion must meet rather distinctive objectives and, as a result, may be required to take on rather distinctive forms. The paper will explore these possibilities, drawing, in particular, on the motif of ‘recollection’ upon which both Heidegger and Wittgenstein draw, Heidegger's scattered remarks on 'formal indication', and The Sophist lectures’ discussion of Platonic dialectic. (shrink)

This paper explores difficulties that resolute readers of the early Wittgenstein face, arising out of what I call the ‘sheer lack’ interpretation of their ‘austere’ conception of nonsense, and the intelligibility of philosophical confusion—there being a sense in which we rightly talk of a ‘grasp’ of philosophical nonsense and indeed of its ‘logic’. Such readers depict philosophical and ‘plain’ nonsense as distinct psychological kinds; but I argue that the ‘intelligibility’ of philosophical confusion remains invisible to the kind of psychology that (...) the ‘sheer lack’ interpretation would make available to Wittgenstein. These concerns relate to well-established worries concerning whether the Tractatus’s ‘ladder’ can be climbed by thinking through arguments—or indeed by thinking full stop—if it is austerely nonsensical. Though I argue that these worries can be met, doing so requires another interpretation of ‘austerity’, which I call the ‘equivocation’ interpretation, and reveals the difference between resolute and non-resolute readings to be less clear cut than has been thought. Key here is the failure of some hard-and-fast distinctions that inform the literature—distinctions shaped by intuitions about mind, meaning, inference, logic, and nonsense—to serve us well. (shrink)

In “Sweatshops and Respect for Persons” we argued on Kantian grounds that managers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have the following duties: to adhere to local labor laws, to refrain from coercion, to meet minimum health and safety standards, and to pay workers a living wage. In their commentary on our paper Sollars and Englander challenge some of our conclusions. We argue here that several of their criticisms are based on an inaccurate reading of our paper, and that none of the (...) remaining criticisms successfully challenge our main arguments. By highlighting the shortcomings of their arguments we hope to advance discussion of the ethical treatment of workers in global supply chains. (shrink)

The authors analyze Takhtajan's system of classification of the Angiosperms in relation to the principles of evolutionary and cladistic systematics. It is shown that Takhtajan belongs to the evolutionary school: he identifies the ancestors of some taxa, he accepts polytomous branching and he groups taxa on the basis of primitive as well as derived character states. Takhtajan's notion of weighted similarity does not appear to be based on objective criteria, when determining the weight and evolutionary status of characters.After a summary (...) of the modifications brought out by Takhtajan in his 1980 version, the weak and strong points of evolutionary systems as a whole are emphasized. In these, the delimitation of taxa and their filiation are difficult to refute since they do not rely on precise criteria, which would ensure continuity and uniformity within a given system. However, these systems have some flexibility, which allows them to incorporate readily new information, a feature unfortunately missing in cladistic classifications. In fact, while it does have weaknesses from a theoretical point of view, the system of Takhtajan gives us an idea of flowering plants phylogeny that appears to be one of the most complete at the present time from both analytical and synthetic standpoints. (shrink)

The meaning of the concept of fusion is discussed in relation with the works of Payer and those of Van Tieghem. It is pointed out that there is a difference, at the theoretical level, between the concept of fusion congénitale as defined by Payer and the concept of concrescence congénitale formulated by Van Tieghem. The former is inobservable by definition, while the latter deals with intercalary growth. For Van Tieghem, anatomy can prove the existence of fusion, even if we do (...) not see it during ontogenesis.We distinguish three complementary methods for explaining the unions of organs: ontogenetic, typological and phylogenetic. We have attempted, not so much to defend one or other of these methods, as to show that they often invoke very different interpretations for the same morphological phenomena. It is probable that only an analysis of the writings of 19th century botanists will clarify the concept of fusion and more generally the epistemology of plant morphology. (shrink)