Principlism has been advocated as an approach to resolving concrete cases and issues in bioethics, but critics have pointed out that a main problem for principlism is its lack of a method for assigning priorities to conflicting ethical principles. A version of principlism referred to as 'specified principlism' has been put forward in an attempt to overcome this problem. However, none of the advocates of specified principlism have attempted to demonstrate that the method actually works in resolving detailed clinical cases. (...) This paper shows that when one tries to use it, specified principlism fails to provide practical assistance in deciding how to resolve concrete cases. Proponents of specified principlism have attempted to defend it by arguing that it is superior to casuistry, but it can be shown that their arguments are faulty. Because of these reasons, specified principlism should not be considered a leading contender in the search for methods of making justifiable decisions in clinical cases. (shrink)

The nuclear community frequently refers to the concept of “future generations” when discussing the management of high-level radioactive waste. However, this notion is generally not defined. In this context, we have to assume a wide definition of the concept of future generations, conceived as people who will live after the contemporary people are dead. This definition embraces thus each generation following ours, without any restriction in time. The aim of this paper is to show that, in the debate about (...) nuclear waste, this broad notion should be further specified and to clarify the related implications for nuclear waste management policies. Therefore, we provide an ethical analysis of different management strategies for high-level waste in the light of two principles, protection of future generations—based on safety and security—and respect for their choice. This analysis shows that high-level waste management options have different ethical impacts across future generations, depending on whether the memory of the waste and its location is lost, or not. We suggest taking this distinction into account by introducing the notions of “close future generations” and “remote future generations”, which has important implications on nuclear waste management policies insofar as it stresses that a retrievable disposal has fewer benefits than usually assumed. (shrink)

In his article 'Specifying, balancing and interpreting bioethical principles' (Richardson, 2000), Henry Richardson claims that the two dominant theories in bioethics - principlism, put forward by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Bioethics , and common morality, put forward by Gert, Culver and Clouser in Bioethics: A Return to Fundamentals - are deficient because they employ balancing rather than specification to resolve disputes between principles or rules. We show that, contrary to Richardson's claim, the major problem with principlism, either (...) the original version, or the specified principlism of Richardson, is that it conceives of morality as being composed of free-standing principles, rather than as common morality conceives it, as being a complete public system, composed of rules, ideals, morally relevant features, and a procedure for determining when a rule can be justifiably violated. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:When OPRR Comes Calling:Enforcing Federal Research RegulationsCharles R. Mccarthy (bio)In an update following this article, Ruth Macklin responds to the revelation that the controversial Hall-Stillman embryo-splitting experiment at George Washington University was conducted—contrary to federal regulations—without prior institutional review board (IRB) review. This revelation altered Dr. Macklin's view of the ethical status of the research. Undoubtedly such revelations also raise general questions for administrators and researchers in many (...) institutions, including, for example: How do allegations of noncompliance with federal regulations arise? When should allegations of infractions of the regulations be reported? Who has an obligation to report? To whom should reports be made? What sort of inquiry should take place? Who should conduct the inquiry? If a determination is made that infractions have occurred, what sanctions are appropriate? And, what publicity is given to the allegations, before, during, and after an evaluation?Some of these questions can be answered in a straightforward manner, while the answers to others depend on the circumstances of the case. This article provides some general answers to these questions.1BackgroundThe Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is the largest supporter of biomedical and behavioral research in the world. Somewhere between 25 and 33 percent of its medical research budget is devoted to the support of research involving human subjects. In accordance with the Public Health Service Act, DHHS has issued Regulations for the Protection of Human Subjects (45 CFR 46). The DHHS Secretary has delegated responsibility for promulgating and administering the regulations to the Office for Protection from Research Risks (OPRR), which is located within the National Institutes of Health.When an institution receives an award from a DHHS agency to carry out research involving human subjects, it is required to negotiate, or to have on file, an "assurance of compliance" document that provides detailed information [End Page 51] specifying how the institution plans to comply with the regulations for the protection of human subjects. Most major research institutions in the country have on file a "multiple project assurance" (MPA) document, which extends DHHS regulations to all human subjects research conducted or sponsored by that institution, irrespective of the source of funding. The regulations and the assurance of compliance require any research project involving human subjects to be reviewed and approved by an institutional review board (IRB) prior to initiation of the research. In addition, the project must be re-reviewed by the IRB at appropriate intervals—in no case, less than once a year. Institutional compliance with these and other requirements of the regulations has improved during the last 30 years and appears to be at a high level. However, from time to time, allegations of noncompliance arise, as they did in the George Washington University embryo-splitting experiment, and set in motion the review process described below.How do Allegations of Noncompliance Arise?Allegations or indications of noncompliance with federal regulations for the protection of human subjects may come from a variety of sources. Most commonly, the institution's IRB discovers that research involving humans is going forward without the required prior IRB review and approval, or that approved research is being conducted in a way that is contrary to the stipulations of the IRB. The Hall-Stillman case came to the attention of George Washington University's IRB because the research protocol was submitted to the IRB after the research had been carried out. In this case, there could be no doubt that an infraction had occurred.Information about possible noncompliance also frequently derives from a funding agency's Initial Review Group (IRG) (commonly called a Study Section) when it has reason to suspect noncompliance in a project it is reviewing for possible funding. An actual case that occurred some years ago involved a research application that proposed to perform brain biopsies on normal volunteers. The IRG that reviewed the application lost little time in questioning whether an IRB had approved the protocol. In this case, it was not enough for the IRG to recommend disapproval of the proposal for funding; it also was obliged to report the possible infraction to OPRR.Whistleblowers, including research subjects, nurses, students, members of the... (shrink)

Being open to persuasion can help show respect for an interlocutor. At the same time, open-mindedness about morally objectionable claims can carry moral as well as epistemic risks. Our aim in this paper is to specify when there might be duty to be open to persuasion. We distinguish two possible interpretations of openness. First, openness might refer to a kind of mental state, wherein one is willing to revise or abandon present beliefs. Second, it might refer to a deliberative (...) practice, according to which one is willing to engage with opposing reasons. We suggest these two interpretations are conceptually and empirically distinct. Once disambiguated, we suggest that different contexts may make different forms of openness appropriate as expressions of respect. (shrink)

Guilt appeals have been found effective in stimulating ethical consumption behaviors in western cultures. However, studies performed in Confucian cultural contexts have found contradictory results. We aim to investigate the inconclusive results of research on guilt and ethical consumption and to explain the inconsistencies. We aim to better understand the influence of guilt on ethical consumption in a Chinese Confucian context and to explore the culturally relevant individual-level concept of interdependent self-construal as a moderator. We build our argument on the (...) Confucian ethics of ren-yi-li where the virtue of propriety specifies role-based obligations depending on the proximity of one’s relationship to others and may thus limit ethical behaviors that are directed to those who are relationally distant. We hypothesize a positive relationship between guilt and ethical consumption that is, however, negatively moderated by interdependent self-construal. Put another way, consumers who define themselves strongly through their relationships with close others are less likely to compensate for guilt through ethical consumption. We find the hypothesized model supported in a survey of 314 Chinese consumers. The results suggest that guilt appeals can stimulate ethical consumption in Confucian cultures. However, guilt appeals may not be enough, as the moderating effect suggests that they will be most effective when combined with an ethical consumption initiative that conforms to the Confucian li principle. As this principle implies prioritizing close over distant relationships, it follows that consumers may be more likely to respond to guilt appeals which are linked to ethical consumption initiatives whose beneficiaries they feel connected to. (shrink)

We study a long-recognised but under-appreciated symmetry called dynamical similarity and illustrate its relevance to many important conceptual problems in fundamental physics. Dynamical similarities are general transformations of a system where the unit of Hamilton’s principal function is rescaled, and therefore represent a kind of dynamical scaling symmetry with formal properties that differ from many standard symmetries. To study this symmetry, we develop a general framework for symmetries that distinguishes the observable and surplus structures of a theory by using the (...) minimal freely specifiable initial data for the theory that is necessary to achieve empirical adequacy. This framework is then applied to well-studied examples including Galilean invariance and the symmetries of the Kepler problem. We find that our framework gives a precise dynamical criterion for identifying the observables of those systems, and that those observables agree with epistemic expectations. We then apply our framework to dynamical similarity. First we give a general definition of dynamical similarity. Then we show, with the help of some previous results, how the dynamics of our observables leads to singularity resolution and the emergence of an arrow of time in cosmology. (shrink)

Inattentional blindness studies have shown that an unexpected object may go unnoticed if it does not share the property specified in the task instructions. Our aim was to demonstrate that observers develop an attentional set for a property not specified in the task instructions if it allows easier performance of the primary task. Three experiments were conducted using a dynamic selective-looking paradigm. Stimuli comprised four black squares and four white diamonds, so that shape and colour varied together. Task instructions specified (...) shape but observers developed an attentional set for colour, because we made the black–white discrimination easier than the square–diamond discrimination. None of the observers instructed to count bounces by squares reported an unexpected white square, whereas two-thirds of observers instructed to count bounces by diamonds did report the white square. When attentional set departs from task instructions, you may fail to see what you were told to look for. (shrink)

Inattentional blindness studies have shown that an unexpected object may go unnoticed if it does not share the property specified in the task instructions. Our aim was to demonstrate that observers develop an attentional set for a property not specified in the task instructions if it allows easier performance of the primary task. Three experiments were conducted using a dynamic selective-looking paradigm. Stimuli comprised four black squares and four white diamonds, so that shape and colour varied together. Task instructions specified (...) shape but observers developed an attentional set for colour, because we made the black–white discrimination easier than the square–diamond discrimination. None of the observers instructed to count bounces by squares reported an unexpected white square, whereas two-thirds of observers instructed to count bounces by diamonds did report the white square. When attentional set departs from task instructions, you may fail to see what you were told to look for. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, David Rondel argues that symbolic (or semiotic) objections to markets hold significant argumentative force. Rondel distinguishes betweenIncidentalmarkets andPervasivemarkets, where Incidental markets describe individual instances of exchange and Pervasive markets comprise the social management of goods by an institutional market arrangement. In this reply, I specify a key insight that buttresses Rondel’s distinction. The distinction as it is currently characterized fails to identify when Incidental markets become Pervasive. This opaqueness allows scholars that defend (...) markets without limits to question the analytical distinctiveness of Incidental and Pervasive markets. I show that by incorporating the market’s price mechanism as an indicator of a properly Pervasive market, Rondel’s distinction is not only able to tackle the aforementioned retort, but also allows for important reflections on what types of institutions should be considered markets at all. (shrink)

This paper offers a Thomistic defense of gossip as a licit means of protecting third parties from harm by known offenders. After first clarifying what constitutes gossip, it draws from Thomas Aquinas to identify the narrow set of conditions under which gossip might be both permissible and obligatory. It concludes by specifying how the duty to gossip might work in Christian institutions, and especially within institutions where there are weak systems of formal accountability.

It's not uncommon for scientists to give different explanations of the same phenomenon, but we currently lack clear guidelines for deciding whether to treat such accounts as competitors. This article discusses how science studies can help create tools and guidelines for thinking about whether explanations compete. It also specifies how one family of discourse rules enables there to be differing accounts that appear to compete but don't. One hopes that being more aware of the linguistic mechanisms making compatible accounts appear (...) to compete will prevent people from wasting resources trying to show which account is right. (shrink)

This paper proposes an original account, based on the capabilities approach, that explains which kinds of attachment to natural resources are sufficiently morally weighty to give rise to special resource rights. The paper provides a critique of current attachment theories, which fail to provide a clear way to differentiate between what is a preference and what is a legitimate attachment, and thereby justify overreaching resource rights. It then examines Armstrong’s welfarist account of natural resources justice, and argues that the capabilities (...) approach can be used to specify the relevant dimensions of well-being, as elements of human flourishing. A capabilities-based account is appealing because it is more limited in scope than existing attachment theories, and able to make finer distinctions regarding the scope and content of individuals’ rights claims. Attachment claims are legitimate when the valuable basic capabilities held by individuals depend on their relationship to specific natural resources. By using capabilities as a mediating concept, we can detect more precisely when attachment claims are normatively significant and can ground special resource rights. (shrink)

Building on a phenomenological analysis of the Tunisian Revolution, this article puts forward the concept of critical experience as a type of experience in which the very experiential structures prove subversive of otherwise established orders (e.g. political, ethical, technological, epistemological etc.). In order to trace the anarchic, but generative impulses of such critical experience, the article develops a variation of the phenomenological reduction called an anarcheological reduction. In the anarcheological reduction, registers of critical experience are accessed in which the aforementioned (...) anarchic impulses elicit a constitutive quasi-transcendental structuring of fields of possible experience. In order to describe the always singular, contingent trajectories along which such quasi-transcendental structuring takes place, the term generative vector is introduced. The article concludes by specifying how the quasi-transcendental registers accessed in the anarcheological reduction are different from other quasi-transcendental registers and accordingly suggesting this type of reduction as a valuable methodological supplement in critical phenomenology. (shrink)

How and why does artistic improvisation matter aesthetically? In this paper I will offer a hypothesis for answering this question: artistic improvisation matters aesthetically, because its aesthetic experience specifies the dynamics of the aesthetic engagement with art in an exemplarily enactive way. This depends, I will argue, on improvisation being paradigmatic for human experience as such. Indeed, focusing on the anthropological dimension of improvisation, it should be stressed that, far from being the exception to regulated behavior, improvisation is the way (...) human beings organise their interactive relations with(in) the natural and social environment. (shrink)

Under what circumstances can people convert natural resources into private property? John Locke famously answered this question by positing what has become known as the _Lockean proviso_: a person has the power to unilaterally appropriate natural resources ‘at least where there is enough and as good left in common for others’. This Lockean proviso has been widely embraced by right-libertarians who maintain that a relevant act appropriates only if others are not left worse off. However, this proviso is multiply ambiguous (...) with there being various ways of specifying its distinct elements. Daniel Attas has argued that all proposed specifications render the proviso either implausible or unsatisfied. However, there are three seemingly plausible specifications that he either fails to consider or does not adequately address. This paper attempts to show that these specifications are either unacceptable, go unsatisfied, or fail to support right-libertarianism. (shrink)

Contrary to the common-sense view and positivist aspirations, scientific concepts are often imprecise. Many of these concepts are ambiguous, vague, or have an under-specified meaning. In this paper, I discuss how imprecise concepts promote integration in biology and thus benefit science. Previous discussions of this issue focus on the concepts of molecular gene and evolutionary novelty. The concept of molecular gene helps biologists integrate explanatory practices, while the notion of evolutionary novelty helps them integrate research questions into an interdisciplinary problem (...) New directions in the philosophy of science, Springer, Dordrecht, 2014). In what follows, I compare molecular gene and evolutionary novelty to another imprecise concept, namely biological lineage. This concept promotes two other types of scientific integration: it helps biologists integrate theoretical principles and methodologies into different areas of biology. The concept of biological lineage facilitates these types of integration because it is broad and under-specified in ways that the concepts of molecular gene and evolutionary novelty are not. Hence, I use the concept of biological lineage as a case study to reveal types of integration that have been overlooked by philosophers. This case study also shows that even very imprecise concepts can be beneficial to scientific practice. (shrink)

A model of when and where saccades are made necessarily incorporates a model of the “When” and “Where” of target selection. We suggest that the framework proposed by Findlay & Walker does not specify sufficiently how selection processes contribute to the spatial and temporal determinants of saccade generation. Examples from across-trial priming in visual search and from the inhibition of temporally segmented distractors show linkage between the processes involved in computing when and where selection operates, so that (...) there is cooperation rather than competition between so-called Where and When pathways. Aspects of spatial selection may also determine the remote distractor effect on saccades. The detailed relations between the processes involved in selection and saccade generation may be best understood in relation to detailed computational accounts of the processes. (shrink)

1. The philosophical problem of what we see My topic revolves around what is apparently a very basic question. Stripped of all additions and in its leanest, most economical form, this is the question: "What do we see?" But in this most basic form the question admits of at least three different interpretations. In the first place, one might understand it to be an epistemological question, perhaps one with skeptical overtones. "What do we see?", on this reading, is short for (...) something like "What things in the world are we justified in believing we see, given the possibility of evil demon scenarios and all the other impedimenta to genuine sight that have become the working tools of epistemologists over the last 350 years?" I shall not be concerned with the question in this skeptical sense. I intend the parenthetical addition to the question, "What do we see (when we do)?", along with the bald-faced assumption that the condition so specified at least sometimes obtains, to rule out discussion along these sorts of epistemological lines, at least for the purposes of this paper. Whether or not this condition in fact obtains, of course, will not effect the position I’m defending. (shrink)

Uncertainty and vagueness/imprecision are not the same: one can be certain about events described using vague predicates and about imprecisely specified events, just as one can be uncertain about precisely specified events. Exactly because of this, a question arises about how one ought to assign probabilities to imprecisely specified events in the case when no possible available evidence will eradicate the imprecision (because, say, of the limits of accuracy of a measuring device). Modelling imprecision by rough sets over an (...) approximation space presents an especially tractable case to help get one’s bearings. Two solutions present themselves: the first takes as upper and lower probabilities of the event X the (exact) probabilities assigned X ’s upper and lower rough-set approximations; the second, motivated both by formal considerations and by a simple betting argument, is to treat X ’s rough-set approximation as a conditional event and assign to it a point-valued (conditional) probability. (shrink)

In Athens during the late Classical and Hellenistic periods, it was customary for a man who was borrowing a large sum of money to pledge some property as security for the repayment of his loan. To show that this property was legally encumbered, a flat slab of stone, called a horos, was set up, and an inscription, indicating the nature of the lien on the property, was inscribed on the horos. These horoi served to warn third parties that the man (...) who pledged the property as security was not free to sell it or otherwise alienate it until the loan was repaid. The terminology which is used on these horoi to indicate that the property has been pledged as security varies. On a relatively small number of horoi, only seven, the property is described as ‘lying under ’ for a debt, the amount of which may or may not be specified. The texts found on a far greater number of horoi, some 128 in all, use a different type of expression. On these horoi, the property is said to have been ‘sold on condition of release’ . The terminology used on the horoi to describe this kind of lien presents a striking contrast with that employed by the Attic orators: in their speeches we find the verbs ποκεσθαι and ποτιθναι when it is a question of pledging security for a loan, but never ππρασθαι with the addition of the prepositional phrase π λσει. (shrink)

For John Buridan, truth-bearers are assertions. This fact explains why the inference ‘p is true, therefore p’ may fail. On the one hand, the tense of the verb plus the time of utterance do not determine the time about which a sentence is intended to be true: the intention of the speaker is needed. On the other hand, since the meaning of vocal and written words is conventional, it may seem that they can be used with different meanings on each (...) side of the inference. While the antecedent may talk about a situation different from the present one, this doesn’t make it the actual situation of utterance, and the words have meanings only in the actual situation of use. Although such situations are different, in both of them we are asked to see the importance of identifying features of which the disquotational schema doesn’t keep track and that can only be specified in the context of use. (shrink)

Under what conditions are material objects, such as particles, parts of a whole object? This is the composition question and is a longstanding open question in philosophy. Existing attempts to specify a non-trivial restriction on composition tend to be vague and face serious counterexamples. Consequently, two extreme answers have become mainstream: composition (the forming of a whole by its parts) happens under no or all conditions. In this paper, we provide a self-contained introduction to the integrated information theory of consciousness (...) (IIT). We show that IIT specifies a non-trivial restriction on composition: composition happens when integrated information is maximized. We compare the IIT-restriction to existing proposals and argue that the IIT-restriction has significant advantages, especially in response to the problems of vagueness and counterexamples. An appendix provides an introduction to calculating parts and wholes with a simple system. (shrink)

The permissibility of nudging in public policy is often assessed in terms of the conditions of transparency, rationality, and easy resistibility. This debate has produced important resources for any ethical inquiry into nudging, but it has also failed to focus sufficiently on a different yet very important question, namely: when do nudges undermine a patient’s voluntary consent to a medical procedure? In this paper, I take on this further question and, more precisely, I ask to which extent the three (...) conditions of transparency, rationality, and easy resistibility can be applied to the assessment of voluntary consent too. After presenting two examples, designed to put pressure on these three conditions, I show that, suitably modified, the three conditions can remain significant in the assessment of voluntary consent as well. However, the needed modifications are very substantial and result in a rather complicated view. To propose a tidier solution, I argue that nudging undermines voluntary consent if and only if it cannot be ‘interpersonally justified’ to the patient. I use the three modified conditions to motivate the idea of interpersonal justification and also to further specify the principles it involves. My resulting view is especially attractive because it builds on already existing insights from the debate on nudging, updates those insights with an eye to medical consent, and finally unites them in an elegant and simple framework. (shrink)

This paper attempts to specify the conditions under which a psychological explanation can undermine or debunk a set of beliefs. The focus will be on moral and religious beliefs, where a growing debate has emerged about the epistemic implications of cognitive science. Recent proposals by Joshua Greene and Paul Bloom will be taken as paradigmatic attempts to undermine beliefs with psychology. I will argue that a belief p may be undermined whenever: (i) p is evidentially based on an intuition which (...) (ii) can be explained by a psychological mechanism that is (iii) unreliable for the task of believing p; and (iv) any other evidence for belief p is based on rationalization. I will also consider and defend two equally valid arguments for establishing unreliability: the redundancy argument and the argument from irrelevant factors. With this more specific understanding of debunking arguments, it is possible to develop new replies to some objections to psychological debunking arguments from both ethics and philosophy of religion. (shrink)

1. The philosophical problem of what we see My topic revolves around what is apparently a very basic question. Stripped of all additions and in its leanest, most economical form, this is the question: "What do we see?" But in this most basic form the question admits of at least three different interpretations. In the first place, one might understand it to be an epistemological question, perhaps one with skeptical overtones. "What do we see?", on this reading, is short for (...) something like "What things in the world are we justified in believing we see, given the possibility of evil demon scenarios and all the other impedimenta to genuine sight that have become the working tools of epistemologists over the last 350 years?" I shall not be concerned with the question in this skeptical sense. I intend the parenthetical addition to the question, "What do we see (when we do)?", along with the bald-faced assumption that the condition so specified at least sometimes obtains, to rule out discussion along these sorts of epistemological lines, at least for the purposes of this paper. Whether or not this condition in fact obtains, of course, will not effect the position I’m defending. (shrink)

At least some (perhaps the most serious) moral problems, public as well as private, concern the ways in which we should construe and specify the problems we face. The present paper, as the subtitle indicates, reexamines the conscience of Huckleberry Finn, which means both that I provide a close reading of key chapters of Mark Twain’s great novel and that I engage Jonathan Bennett’s well-known and oft-cited paper, “The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn.” Bennett tells us, early in his paper, that (...) an episode in chapter 16 of the novel “brilliantly illustrates how fiction can be instructive about real life.”1 I agree that fiction can teach us about life—though of course living beings must judge fiction’s .. (shrink)

A single protein molecule with one or more cysteine residues can occupy a plurality of unique residue and oxidation‐chemotype specified proteoforms that I term oxiforms. In binary reduced or oxidised terms, one molecule with three cysteines will adopt one of eight unique oxiforms. Residue‐defined sulfur chemistry endows specific oxiforms with distinct functionally‐relevant biophysical properties (e.g., steric effects). Their emergent complexity means a functionally‐relevant effect may only manifest when multiple cysteines are oxidised. Like how mixing colours makes new shades, combining (...) discrete redox chemistries—colours—can create a kaleidoscope of oxiform hues. The sheer diversity of oxiforms co‐existing within the human body provides a biological basis for redox heterogeneity. Of evolutionary significance, oxiforms may enable individual cells to mount a broad spectrum of responses to the same stimulus. Their biological significance, however plausible, is speculative because protein‐specific oxiforms remain essentially unexplored. Excitingly, pioneering new techniques can push the field into uncharted territory by quantifying oxiforms. The oxiform concept can advance our understanding of redox‐regulation in health and disease. (shrink)

BackgroundIn 2019, the Constitutional Court of South Korea ruled that the anti-abortion provisions in the Criminal Act, which criminalize abortion, do not conform to the Constitution. This decision will lead to a total reversal of doctors’ legal duty from the obligation to refuse abortion services to their requirement to provide them, given the Medical Service Act that states that a doctor may not refuse a request for treatment or assistance in childbirth. I argue, confined to abortion services in Korea that (...) will take place in the near future, that doctors should be granted the legal right to exercise conscientious objection to abortion.Main textConsidering that doctors in Korea have been ethically and legally obligated to refrain from abortions for many years, imposing a universal legal duty to provide abortions that does not allow exception may endanger the moral integrity of individual doctors who chose a career when abortion was illegal. The universal imposition of such a duty may result in repudiation of doctors as moral agents and damage trust in doctors that forms the basis of medical professionalism. Even if conscientious objection to abortion is granted as a legal right, most patients would experience no impediment to receiving abortion services because the healthcare environment of Korea provides options in which patients can choose their doctors based on prior information, there are many doctors who would be willing to provide an abortion, and Korea is a relatively small country. Finally, the responsibility to effectively balance and guarantee the respective rights of the two agents involved in abortion, the doctor and the patient, should be imposed on the government rather than individual doctors. This assertion is based on the government’s past behaviours, the nature of its relationship with doctors, and the capacity it has to satisfy both doctors’ right to conscientious objection and patients’ right to legal medical services.ConclusionWith regard to abortion services that will be sought in the near future, doctors should be granted the legal right to exercise conscientious objection based on the importance of doctor’s moral integrity, lack of impediment to patients, and government responsibility. (shrink)

Health care workers or others may wish to override parental decisions because of their impact on the health or safetySafety of a child or others. Justification of such an action requires two types of principle: an authorityAuthority principle that designates the process for reversal, and anPrincipal, interventionintervention principleIntervention principle that specifies the grounds for reversal. It is generally accepted that states may overruleOverruleparentsParents’ decisions for good cause. I argue that the role of the state is to provide sufficient protection against (...) parental malfeasance. Parental malfeasance can be construed as either exposing a child to harmHarm or as insufficient defense of the child’s interestsChild's interests. I propose a test to determine what sorts of parental decisions might trigger intervention. I also propose constraints on government action to minimize government unfairness in applying the test. I show how this plays out in application. (shrink)

When should a company introduce a new ethical norm? This article uses the value-belief-norm theory to argue that the more an ethical issue threatens a company's ethical value and the more the company has an ethical responsibility to protect such value against such threat, then the more desirable it is for a company to establish ethical norms to protect said value. Distinguishing seven characteristics of an ethical issue and four conditions for a company's ethical responsibility helps identify the situations (...) in which a company should introduce a new ethical norm. The resulting framework, with corresponding guidelines, specifies two accelerators and one inhibitor that influence the desirable speed for introducing new norms. (shrink)

Behaviour is central to many fields, but metatheoretical definitions specifying the most basic assumptions about what is considered behaviour and what is not are largely lacking. This transdisciplinary research explores the challenges in defining behaviour, highlighting anthropocentric biases and a frequent lack of differentiation from physiological and psychical phenomena. To meet these challenges, the article elaborates a metatheoretical definition of behaviour that is applicable across disciplines and that allows behaviours to be differentiated from other kinds of phenomena. This definition (...) is used to explore the phenomena of language and to scrutinise whether and under what conditions language can be considered behaviour and why. The metatheoretical concept of two different levels of meaning conveyed in human language is introduced, highlighting that language inherently relies on behaviours and that the content of what-is-being-said, in and of itself, can constitute behaviour under particular conditions. The analyses reveal the ways in which language meaningfully extends human's behavioural possibilities, pushing them far beyond anything enabled by non-language behaviours. These novel metatheoretical concepts can complement and expand on existing theories about behaviour and language and contribute a novel piece of theoretical explanation regarding the crucial role that language has played in human evolution. (shrink)

Many state laws specify procedures for determining surrogate or proxy decision-makers for end-of-life care in the absence of an advance directive, living will, or other designation. Some laws also set forth criteria that the decision-maker must follow when making medical decisions for an incapacitated patient and determining whether to withdraw life-sustaining treatment. This article provides analysis of a medical ethics case on the question of how to address family allegations that the proxy decision-maker suffers from dementia and is unable (...) to make decisions for the patient. Cases such as this involve interwoven legal and ethical considerations including: how to address concerns that the proxy is making questionable or unreasonable decisions, how to evaluate the proxy's decisional capacity, strategies for enhancing communication, and standards for removing a proxy. This article suggests that “surrogacy ladders” in state law serve not only as a procedural mechanism, but also protect important ethical values such as tiers of moral authority for decision-making, relational autonomy, and privacy. (shrink)

While many papers may claim that virtual environments have much to gain from architectural and urban planning theory, few seem to specify in any verifiable or falsifiable way, how notions of place and interaction are best combined and developed for specific needs. The following is an attempt to summarize a theory of place for virtual environments and explain both the shortcomings and the advantages of this theory.

This essay examines the issue of questionably obtained information in journalism, defined as information obtained in violation of source expectations. The analysis combines Ross's theory of variable-weight duties and the case-based method of casuistry to specify the duties involved in journalist-source interaction and the sorts of circumstances that may justify weighting these duties differently. A three-part test is offered for determining when journalists have reasonable grounds for occasionally using questionably obtained information. These conservative guidelines for justifying exceptions guard against (...) arbitrary dismissal of legitimate source expectations. Meanwhile, several green light guidelines suggest strategies for preventing the problem of questionably obtained information. (shrink)

The corporate ethics literature has considerably focused on whether giving results in getting. However, the relationship between corporate philanthropy and performance and the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. Drawing on signaling and cue consistency theories, we develop and test a model that specifies whether, how, and when corporate philanthropy benefits relative competitive performance from a micro-process perspective. Using a Chinese sample of 1623 employees, 145 CEOs, and 145 human resources managers, we found that corporate philanthropy could positively influence relative competitive (...) performance through the internal processes—organization-level citizenship behaviors of employees. Moreover, work–life balance practices strengthen the aforementioned mediation. In particular, when a firm performs high levels of work–life balance practices, corporate philanthropy tends to promote more citizenship behaviors in the entire organization, thereby enhancing the relative competitive performance of the firm. By contrast, when organizations perform low levels of work–life balance practices, the aforementioned mediation becomes nonsignificant. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed. (shrink)

When Bayesian estimation is used to analyze Structural Equation Models, prior distributions need to be specified for all parameters in the model. Many popular software programs offer default prior distributions, which is helpful for novel users and makes Bayesian SEM accessible for a broad audience. However, when the sample size is small, those prior distributions are not always suitable and can lead to untrustworthy results. In this tutorial, we provide a non-technical discussion of the risks associated with the (...) use of default priors in small sample contexts. We discuss how default priors can unintentionally behave as highly informative priors when samples are small. Also, we demonstrate an online educational Shiny app, in which users can explore the impact of varying prior distributions and sample sizes on model results. We discuss how the Shiny app can be used in teaching; provide a reading list with literature on how to specify suitable prior distributions; and discuss guidelines on how to recognize behaving priors. It is our hope that this tutorial helps to spread awareness of the importance of specifying suitable priors when Bayesian SEM is used with small samples. (shrink)

One challenge for those reading methodological debates in low consensus fields is determining the outcome when participants do not share standards. When parties to a debate do not agree on the standards to be used in assessing their arguments (i.e., quality), it may be useful to ask first if parties’ contributions meet their own expectations (i.e., integrity). Most protocols for review of qualitative research specify some form of quality assessment. These protocols normally require some test of internal coherence. (...) Coherence is also relevant when describing the match between a rebuttal and the argument it answers. In 2019,Nursing Inquirypublished a critique and rebuttal of the methods used by the Joanna Briggs Institute. In this essay, we attempted to use the Joanna Briggs Institute's own quality assessment standards to assess their rebuttal of this fundamental critique. We found it possible to use the Joanna Briggs Institute's own quality assessment standards to assess this rebuttal, and we found that JBI's rebuttal did not meet their own standards. (shrink)

There is widespread and growing concern among U.S. consumers about the treatment of farmed animals, and consumers are consequently paying attention to food product labels that indicate humane production practices. However, labels vary in their standards for animal welfare, and prior research suggests that consumers are confused by welfare-related labels: many shoppers cannot differentiate between labels that indicate changes in the way animals are raised and those that do not. We administered a survey to 1,000 American grocery shoppers to better (...) understand the extent to which consumers purchase and pay more for food with certain labels based on an assumption of welfare improvement. Results showed that 86% of shoppers reported purchasing at least one product with the following labels in the last year: “cage or crate-free”, “free-range”, “pasture-raised”, “natural”, “organic”, “no hormone”, “no antibiotic”, “no rBST”, “humane”, “vegetarian-fed”, “grass-fed”, “farm-raised”. Of those who purchased one of the aforementioned labels, 89% did so because they thought the label indicated higher-welfare production practices, and 79% consciously paid more for the product with the label because they thought that the label indicated better-than-standard animal welfare. However, many of these labels lack uniform standards for the production practices they represent, and some labels represent production practices that do not influence animal welfare, thus the degree of the animal welfare impact of a given label is highly variable. These results indicate that labels need to clearly and accurately specify their animal welfare benefits to improve the consumers’ ability to purchase products that align with their expectations. (shrink)

The effectiveness of decision rules depends on characteristics of both rules and environments. A theoretical analysis of environments specifies the relative predictive accuracies of the “take-the-best” heuristic (TTB) and other simple strategies for choices between two outcomes based on binary cues. We identify three factors: how cues are weighted; characteristics of choice sets; and error. In the absence of error and for cases involving from three to five binary cues, TTB is effective across many environments. However, hybrids of equal weights (...) (EW) and TTB models are more effective as environments become more compensatory. As error in the environment increases, the predictive ability of all models is systematically degraded. Indeed, using the datasets of Gigerenzer et al. (1999, Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, New York: Oxford University Press), TTB and similar models do not predict much better than a naïve model that exploits dominance. Finally, we emphasize that the results reported here are conditional on binary cues. (shrink)

In his new book ‘When the Grain of Wheat Doesn't Die. A Philosophical Archaeology of Revelation, Ruud Welten examines the concept of revelation from a philosophical, rather than a religious perspective. The focus is not on a higher power revealing itself to humanity, but on the revelation of human nature itself. Central to this examination is the phenomenological question regarding the nature of appearance. The primary concern is not what appears, but rather how the appearance itself occurs. Welten posits (...) that the notion of revelation and religious discourse surrounding it elucidate fundamental aspects of this phenomenological inquiry. -/- Interestingly, the seemingly peculiar title ‘When the Grain of Wheat Doesn't Die’ remains unexplained within the text. Those familiar with the New Testament will recognize a reference to the parable of the grain of wheat described in John 12:24: " Most assuredly, I say to you, unless a grain of wheat falls into the ground and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it produces much grain. He who loves his life will lose it, and he who hates his life in this world will keep it for eternal life." The core principle underlying this parable is that new possibilities emerge only through risking or relinquishing the old. The title thus alludes to a structure reminiscent of Christian concepts of rebirth or conversion, wherein a rupture with existing frameworks creates an opening for a new mode of existence. The question arises as to how this structure relates to the research described in the subtitle as "A Philosophical Archaeology of Revelation." -/- The subtitle first specifies a particular method ("a philosophical archaeology") and subsequently indicates the subject under investigation using this method ("revelation"). Archaeology as a philosophical method has gained prominence following Foucault's work. However, Welten employs the term archaeology not primarily in the Foucauldian sense, but rather views phenomenology and psychoanalysis as forms of archaeology that aim to uncover elements previously obscured from view. Upon initial examination, the metaphor of the grain of wheat and that of archaeology appear somewhat incongruous. Archaeology suggests the unearthing of the hidden, the revelation of an origin that has been obscured. The sowing of a grain, conversely, appears more indicative of something buried and concealed, deposited in the ground to facilitate the genesis of something new. For Welten, however, the point is that in both cases something must first be taken away before a new opening can occur that disrupts the existing order. This is exemplified in one case by the dying of the grain, and in the other, by the removal of the barren leaves. (shrink)

Developing tools is a crucial aspect of experimental practice, yet most discussions of scientific change traditionally emphasize theoretical over technological change. To elaborate on the role of tools in scientific change, I offer an account that shows how scientists use tools in exploratory experiments to form novel concepts. I apply this account to two cases in neuroscience and show how tool development and concept formation are often intertwined in episodes of tool-driven change. I support this view by proposing common normative (...) principles that specify when exploratory concept formation and tool development succeed to initiate scientific change. (shrink)

Flew's challenge to the religious believer asks him to specify what would count as a disproof for, e.g. ‘There is a God’. A statement of such a specifiable condition I called an ‘empirical denial’. In my earlier paper I was concerned to show that a statement is a statement whether or not it has such an empirical denial. I was not particularly concerned to show that there are some statements which do not have an empirical denial; my concern was to (...) show that it is not essential that they do. It was in connection with this point that the statement ‘John loves Mary’ was discussed. But this very same example may indeed serve as an example of a statement for which, in certain complex situations, there is no empirical denial. That is, in some circumstances, no matter what empirical conditions are specified, when the statement ‘John loves Mary’ is made, they could obtain and still John might love Mary, as the developing situation would make clear. If the condition specified is that John is cruel to Mary and shows no concern for her, details could always emerge in such a situation to explain why, even though he loved her, he was cruel and showed no concern. And so on. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to show how methods rooted in formal logic may be used to analyze socially important processes of persuasion. A formal approach to the theory of persuasion enables us to thoroughly research issues crucial in everyday life such as: how we argue, why we quarrel, where we are efficient in persuasion, when do we win a negotiation, how we influence others’ decisions, and the kinds of argumentative strategies that are apt to yield more accurate (...) beliefs for all parties involved.I concentrate on three aspects of persuasion practice: nature, success and cognitive value of argumentation process. From a logical perspective, I understand argumentation as reasoning which, after initiation through the opponent’s disagreement, is deployed by the proponent in order to persuade the audience to believe his thesis. Furthermore, I attempt to determine the ways in which we succeed in persuading others. Lastly, I try to specify when an argument is cognitively valuable and when it is reliable, in the sense that it helps us to track the truth. In order to analyze these matters, I investigate argumentation on two independent levels. The subjective level of people’s beliefs is the essential foundation of all persuasion -- every time we aim to make the audience believe our opinions and /or change their decisions. The second level is the objective field of truthfulness, where we consider whether a given argumentation will lead us to true or false conclusions. (shrink)

Aulis Aarnio addresses the question of how legal interpretations should be justified. Aarnio considers a justification to be rational only if the justification process has been conducted in a rational way, and if the final result of this process is acceptable to the legal community. According to Aarnio, a theory concerning the justification of legal interpretations should contain a procedural component specifying the conditions of rationality for legal discussions, and a substantial component specifying the material conditions of acceptability (...) for the final result. The procedural component of Aarnio’s theory formulates rules for the rationality of legal discussions. The substantial component specifies when the result of a legal interpretation can be called acceptable. Aarnio considers such a result acceptable if it is acceptable to a particular legal community in which there is consensus with respect to certain norms and values. (shrink)

To adequately deal with unpredictable and dynamic environments, normative frameworks typically deployed in mechanisms for modifying the norms at runtime are crucial. We present the syntax and operational semantics of programming constructs to facilitate runtime norm modification, allowing a programmer to specify when and how the norms may be changed by external agents or by the normative mechanism. The norms take on the form of conditional obligations and prohibitions, instantiating obligations and prohibitions. We present rule-based constructs for runtime modification (...) of the norms and their instances, and a mechanism for automatically updating the instances when their underlying norms change. Moreover, we investigate a mechanism for avoiding norm conflicts. (shrink)

A striking characteristic of contemporary science is its emphasis upon probability. This is especially notable in quantum mechanics.There is a respect in which probability is the same for all scientific theories. Verifiability requires that any theory predict certain numbers which can be compared with the numbers gained by actual operations of measuring. In actual practice these numbers, which we shall term theoretical measurables and operative measurables respectively, never correspond. It becomes necessary, therefore, for the scientist to specify when the (...) deviation between them is such that verification occurs. These specifications are defined by the theory of errors in which the concept of probability has an essential place and a specific meaning. But the theory of errors is the same for all applications; hence, probability as defined by the theory of errors is the same for all scientific theories. (shrink)

The thesis argued for in this work is that under certain conditions the use of violence is morally obligatory. The thesis is advanced as an alternative to both the pacifist and the liberal, right-oriented theses which are rooted in the idea that violence is evil. The defense consists of an exposition of the problems of the pacifist and liberal theses on the one hand and the development of a system that makes it possible to conceive of the use of violence (...) as morally obligatory on the other hand. ;The work begins with an examination of the socio-practical consequences of the idea that violent is evil--the blindness and insensitivity toward violence that most of us exhibit most of the time. Next comes an analysis of the pacifist and liberal moralities of violence that point out the two are grounded in similar utopian visions of a harmonious world and how they fail to be responsive to the demands of practice. The idea that violence is evil is examined next and a morally neutral conception of violence, an idea of non-abusive violence, is suggested as a preliminary to the consideration of an alternative morality of violence. ;The construction of an alternative begins with the outline of a schema for a moral system. The idea of human dignity is taken as its unifying notion and the ideals of justice, freedom and respect for persons as unfolding it. Moral rules understood as specifying moral obligation are taken as the mechanism of practical morality. The idea of moral policy is introduced as a middle ground between moral ideals and moral rules. The moral ideals are used to draw a distinction between savagery and a violent social world. The choice of a violent social world is understood as the choice of a world in which violence is morally regulated by rules that specify when we are morally obligated to use violence and when we are morally obligated to refrain from the use of violence. A discussion of such rules completes the construction of the alternative. (shrink)