dr Tadeusz Adam Ożóg, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

Argues that the key distinction between human and nonhuman social cognition consists in our complex, diverse and flexible capacities to shape each other's minds in ways that make them easier to interpret.

It is obvious that every inventor should be rewarded for the intellectual effort, and at the same time be encouraged to successively improve his or her discovery and to work on subsequent innovations. Patents also ensure that patent owners are officially protected against intellectual piracy, but protection of intellectual property may be difficult to accomplish. Nevertheless, it all comes down to this basic question: Does a contradiction exist between medical ethics and the “Medical and Surgical Procedure Patents” system? It may (...) well turn out that medical-procedure patents can have a negative influence on the standard of medical care. Medical-method patents may also interfere with the physician-patient relationship. At present, physicians do not question the usefulness of patent protection for medicines, biotechnology, equipment and devices, but they strongly oppose it for surgical procedures. (shrink)

The article presents two concepts of indexicality. The first, more standard and narrow, identifies indexicality with systematic (meaning controlled) context-sensitivity. The second, broader (derived from the work of Jerzy Pelc), conceives indexicality in terms of the potential variability of the general semiotic characteristics expressions (with respect to the context of use). The text introduces the concept of a pragmatic matrix that serves for a schematic representation of contextual variation. I also recapitulate briefly the views of Jerzy Pelc on the meaning (...) (manner of use) and use of expressions, and briefly indicate its relationship approaches with contemporary debates around contextualism and status of non-sentential speech acts. Finally, the relationship between the broader notion of indexicality and the directival theory of meaning is analyzed. (shrink)

I argue for two claims. First I argue against the consensus view that accurate behavioral prediction based on accurate representation of cognitive states, i.e. mind reading , is the sustaining function of propositional attitude ascription. This practice cannot have been selected in evolution and cannot persist, in virtue of its predictive utility, because there are principled reasons why it is inadequate as a tool for behavioral prediction. Second I give reasons that favor an alternative account of the sustaining function of (...) propositional attitude ascription. I argue that it serves a mind-shaping function. Roughly, propositional attitude ascription enables human beings to set up regulative ideals that function to mold behavior so as to make it easier to coordinate with. (shrink)

The paper considers certain properties of intermediate and moda propositional logics.The first part contains a proof of the theorem stating that each intermediate logic is closed under the Kreisel-Putnam rule xyz/(xy)(xz).

I defend an alternative to the two traditional accounts of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition: metacognition as primary versus social cognition as primary. These accounts have complementary explanatory vices and virtues. They also share a natural assumption: that interpretation in terms of mental states is “spectatorial”, aiming exclusively for an objective description of the mental facts about self and others. I argue that if one rejects this assumption in favor of the view that interpretation in terms of mental (...) states also plays important regulative roles with respect to minds and behavior, a new and superior conception of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition comes into view. On this conception, person-level metacognitive concepts are socio-cognitive tools that shape us into better cognitive agents and more predictable cognitive objects, thereby enhancing our abilities at social coordination. Mastery of these metacognitive concepts relies on subpersonal, non-conceptual, procedural metacognition. This reconceptualization of the relationship between metacognition and social cognition combines the complementary explanatory virtues of the two traditional conceptions, while avoiding their complementary explanatory vices. (shrink)

In this paper, we are going to analyze the phenomenon of modal incompleteness from an algebraic point of view. The usual method of showing that a given logic L is incomplete is to show that for some L and some cannot be separated from by a suitably wide class of complete algebras — usually Kripke algebras. We are going to show that classical examples of incomplete logics, e.g., Fine logic, are not complete with respect to any class of complete BAOs. (...) Even above Grz it is possible to find a continuum of such logics, which immediately implies the existence of a continuum of neighbourhood-incomplete Grz logics. Similar results can be proved for Löb logics. In addition, completely incomplete logics above Grz may be found uniformly as a result of failures of some admissible rule of a special kind. (shrink)

Maximilian de Gaynesford has argued against the standard view that the reference of the first-person pronoun ‘I’ is determined by a rule linking the referent to some feature of the context of use. In this paper, we argue that de Gaynesford's arguments are inconclusive. Our main aim, however, is to formulate a novel version of the reference rule for ‘I’. We argue that this version can deal with several problematic cases. Our strategy involves analysing the so-called agent of the context (...) as the person responsible for a particular speech act. From this analysis, we exclude a particular class of uses of ‘I’, uses that we believe are best understood as demonstrative. (shrink)

This paper criticizes non-constructive uses of set theory in formal economics. The main focus is on results on preference aggregation and Arrow’s theorem for infinite electorates, but the present analysis would apply as well, e.g., to analogous results in intergenerational social choice. To separate justified and unjustified uses of infinite populations in social choice, I suggest a principle which may be called the Hildenbrand criterion and argue that results based on unrestricted axiom of choice do not meet this criterion. The (...) technically novel part of this paper is a proposal to use a set-theoretic principle known as the axiom of determinacy ), not as a replacement for Choice, but simply to eliminate applications of set theory violating the Hildenbrand criterion. A particularly appealing aspect of \ from the point of view of the research area in question is its game-theoretic character. (shrink)

The article contains an exposition of the moral philosophy of J. P. Sartre as well as a trial of its evaluation. The author presents the social basis and main theses of Sartre’s.philosophical system and stresses the questions of social conditioning, real contents, and functions of the situational ethics of Sartre. According to the author, the situational ethics of Sartre, being an expression of feelings of intellectuals, middle-class, and students in the period of violent changes in our civilization, simply describes a (...) certain type of man, peculiar to these conditions and this time. Therefore, this type cannot be considered a definite universal construction of a human subject. Pessimism, characteristic for the existentialism, as an expression of.certain social and political conditions, can be easily surmounted, provided that a possibility of definite social transformations can be demonstrated. This gives evidence of a positive alternative which proposes development of social democracy, elimination of the remnants of worship of the individual, as well as a more and more full realization of social humanism, that are limiting the experiments of existentialism. Together with an increasing conviction of a possibility to surmount and to abolish the capitalistic alienation and together with the development of socialist democracy, when marxist thinking comprises more and more effectively all aspects of human fates, the social basis of existentialism and its influence are losing ground. On the other hand, whatever might be said about arbitrariness and subjectivism of many theses of existentialism, it has raised many essential questions of particular importance in our time. These are: 1) subjective aspect of human freedom in situations of a choice of an action; 2) responsibility of an individual to himself, other people, and history; 3) contradiction between general systems of valuation and norms and of a definite situation in which a choice is taken; 4) danger of a non-authentic apparent communication; 5) danger of a lost of personality in conditions of consumptionist civilisation; 6) necessity of responsibility and engagement; 7) necessity of forbearance, tolerance and respecting the subjective world of other persons; 8) existence of conflict situations. According to the author, a resolution of the above problems, which are important for a modern man, can be done only basing on marxism which should be conceived in a creative way. It is necessary, however, to reject arbitrary assumptions of the existentialist metaphysics, ethical formalism, and, above all, ahistorical conception of freedom. The opinions of Sartre that the, good a priori cannot exist, that everybody should determine his own existence, and that in each situation he should maintain his creative attitude and moral alertness, are in a certain sense and within certain limits right and productive. However, depriving people of a possibility to build any system of values and norms of a super-subjective character is a risky thing and may lead to moral relativity and nihilism. The social function of the existentialism is also a double one. On the one hand, existentialism, which demonstrates a super-historical and unchangeable character of the drama of human existence, in some way confirms and justifies the social system submitted to critic. On the other hand, as it states a moral and idealistic outsidership, bareness, and loneliness of a human individual in a modern bourgeois 1society, existentialism presents an important ethical indictment directed to the capitalistic society and indirectly shows a necessity to create such relations which would remove the tragic gap between individual and society. This is the reason of a peculiar paradox that for same people the existentialism is a point of departure from the files of the revolutionary movement, and for others a point which leads into marxism – cum duo faciunt idem, non est idem. (shrink)

The article makes a critical assessment if Heidegger’s conception of an authentic life. After presenting a number of social reasons which account for the current expansion of anthropological problems within philosophy, the author observes that the criticism of contemporary philosophical anthropologies – first and foremost of existentialism – is one of the fundamental tasks confronting the marxist philosophy. The reason for the critical studies on existentialism rests not only in the fact of its dealing with certain problems arising in definite (...) social circun1stances, which, incidentally, marxism has to face too, but also because the problems of the philosophy of man are an integral part of Marxism itself, and have so far been rather neglected. The author further presents the basic tents of Heidegger’s philosophy, his conception of atheism, the thesis of human solitude and the necessity of making choice without a chance of learning beforehand anything about the things to be chosen. He lays the main stress on the problems of an „authentic life”. As Heidegger put it, the authentic life is nothing else but our courage to face the whole truth about our existence. An authentic man is he who „realises that he is a nonentity, and from that position evaluates his whole life”. Only the authentic man is free in the full meaning of the word, „since he knows that all he has achieved will eventually be blotted out, that he is alone and condemned to death”. Therefore, terror and anxiety constitute the essence of our existence. Understanding of the essence of death and conscious acceptance of fear and the necessity of choice determine our freedom. Living through our existence, understood as being-to-death, delivers us from the non-authentic life. That is how – concludes the author – rebelling against the bourgeois-style life, which strips a man of his identity is reduced to the dimension of the deliverance within an individual consciousness – „an apparent deliverance”, as Marx put it while criticizing Stirner’s nihilism, to which Mounier added the term „the alienation of Narcissus” – the deliverance which emancipates an individual not only from „conformism resulting from living in a community”, but also life understood as a realisation of life itself through social expression. What only remains is the sense of nullity of one’s own existence. That is how the rebellion turned into a self-contradicting value – freedom became synonymous with the alienation of inter-human ties. The alienation of individuals, the sense of absurdity of everything that surrounds them, and questioning and subsequent rejection of all social value and forms – all this has been advanced to the rank of a virtue, and recognized as the hallmark of freedom and the „authentic life”. (shrink)

Ethical concerns regarding the conceptual framework for the determination of death by neurological criteria, including several clinical and diagnostic practices, are addressed. The significance of a diagnosis of brain death, diagnostic criteria, and certain technical aspects of the brain-death exam are presented. Standard and ancillary tests that typically help achieve prudential certitude that an individual has died are indicated. Ethical concerns surrounding interinstitutional variability of testing protocols are evaluated and considered, as are potential apnea-testing confounders such as hypotension, hypoxemia, hypercarbia, (...) and penumbra effects during ancillary testing. Potential adjustments to apnea-testing protocols involving capnography, thoracic impedance monitors, or spirometers to assess respiratory efforts are discussed. Situations in which individuals determined to be brain dead “wake up,” or fail to manifest the imminent cessation of somatic functioning typically seen when supported only by a ventilator, are also briefly reviewed. (shrink)

The main thesis of this article states that patriotism constitutes a key role in the process of globalization. The author perceives the moral dimension of nation and homeland categories as the validation of such a position. Patriotism, which is not chauvinism, deeply connects with its own nation, as well as homeland, and due to its very nature, should be open to foreigners and other nations.

Dnia 2 czerwca zmarł w Warszawie Jerzy Pelc, założyciel oraz wieloletni redaktor „Studiów Semiotycznych”. Przez prawie pół wieku troszczył się On o to, aby na ich łamach ukazywały się wspomnienia pozgonne upamiętniające polskich i zagranicznych uczonych semiotyków. Wspomnienia te albo pisał sam, albo prosił o ich napisanie osoby najlepiej znające dorobek i działalność naukową zmarłego. Jego odejście postawiło nas wszystkich w sytuacji niemożliwej: sam nie może być autorem wspomnienia, a tylko On mógłby kompetentnie napisać kilka słów o swoim ogromnym dorobku (...) naukowym [...]. (shrink)

We prove that all finitely axiomatizable tense logics with temporal operators for ‘always in the future’ and ‘always in the past’ and determined by linear fows time are coNP-complete. It follows, for example, that all tense logics containing a density axiom of the form ■n+1F p → nF p, for some n ≥ 0, are coNP-complete. Additionally, we prove coNP-completeness of all ∩-irreducible tense logics. As these classes of tense logics contain many Kripke incomplete bimodal logics, we obtain many natural (...) examples of Kripke incomplete normal bimodal logics which are nevertheless coNP-complete. (shrink)

The popular interpretation of token‐reflexivism states that at the level of logical form, indexicals and demonstratives are disguised descriptions that employ complex demonstratives or special quotation‐mark names involving particular tokens of the appropriate expression‐types. In this article I first demonstrate that this interpretation of token‐reflexivism is only one of many, and that it is better to think of token‐reflexivism as denoting a family of distinct theoretical frameworks. Second, I contrast two interpretations of the idea of the token‐reflexive paraphrase of an (...) indexical sentence. The utterance approach claims that token‐reflexive paraphrases involve tokens of entire utterances. The sub‐utterance approach maintains that token‐reflexive paraphrases involve tokens of the particular indexical words used in the utterance. Next, I pose a problem that shows that neither of the two approaches is correct. The problem shows that the only viable version of the token‐reflexive proposition must somehow take into account the referential intentions of the speaker of the context. Therefore I conclude the article by sketching the framework of restricted intentional token‐reflexivism. I argue that it is an attractive semantic theory of distributed utterances that, among other things, enables automatic and intentional indexicals to be distinguished. (shrink)

The paper attempts to pose a problem for theories claiming that intentional attributions are essentially normative. Firstly, I argue that the claim is ambiguous. Secondly, that three possible interpretations of the claim can be distinguished: one that appeals to normative impositions put on agents of intentional states, another that exploits the fact that one can normatively assess the states in question and a further one that locates normativity in the domain of special intentional explanations. Thirdly, it is argued that each (...) interpretation faces serious difficulties: they either fail to provide a justification for the claim they intend to make or they contradict certain justified observations about intentional attributions. (shrink)

The bioethics of four principles, named as principlism, began in 1979 with the work of Principles of Biomedical Ethics by Tom Beauchamp and James F. Childress and has been widely criticized since the 80s. In recent years four rival approaches towards principlism have been specified in this critique. These include: a) impartial rule theory, developed by K. Danner Clouser; b) casuistry, represented by Albert Jensen, and c) virtue ethics, developed by Edmund D. Pellegrino. The critique of principlism presented by K. (...) Danner Clouser, Bernard Gert was not only defended by T. Beauchamp and J.F. Childress themselves, but also by others, including B. Andrew Lustig, David DeGrazia, and Henry Richardson. The discussion has not weakened but continued till the present time. It was presented extensively in the June issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. We want to join the discussion from the position of personalistic bioethics. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is modern representative democracy. Instead of discussing the many theories which strive to define and describe the essence of democracy, such as the classic, the competitive, the structural, the participatory, the concessionary, etc., it is our aim to present the various practical approaches to "democracy in action" in the post-Communist period, i.e., to characterize the various notions of the axiological and philosophical assumptions that provide the cornerstone of democracy.

This volume addresses foundational issues of context-dependence and indexicality, which are at the center of the current debate within the philosophy of language. Topics include the scope of context-dependency, the nature of content and the character of input data of cognitive processes relevant for the interpretation of utterances. There's also coverage of the role of beliefs and intentions as contextual factors, as well as the validity of arguments in context-sensitive languages. The contributions consider foundational issues regarding context-sensitivity from three different, (...) yet related, perspectives on the phenomenon of context-dependence: representational, structural, and functional. The contributors not only address the representational, structural and/or functional problems separately but also study their mutual connections, thus furthering the debate and bringing competing approaches closer to unification and consensus. This text appeals to students and researchers within the field. This is a very useful collection of essays devoted to the roles of context in the study of language. Its essays provide a useful overview of the current debates on this topic, and they put forth novel contributions that will undoubtedly be of relevance for the development of all areas in philosophy and linguistics interested in the notion of context. Stefano Predelli Department of Philosophy, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK. (shrink)