1. Thomson's critique: Despite the efforts of his followers to show that Heidegger had a progressive theory of technology, his work is clouded by nostalgia. His positive contribution is a fragmentary opening toward a phenomenology of daily technical practice, which I use to develop de Certeau's distinction between the strategic control of technical systems and their tactical usage by subordinates. Heidegger himself made no such application of his own phenomenological approach. 2. Stump's critique: Can an ontological essentialism and (...) a historically oriented constructivism be combined as Questioning Technology attempts to do? Stump claims they cannot, but assumes that I accept far more ontological and epistemological baggage from each position than I do. In fact, what I retain from essentialism is primarily the analysis of the basic technical relation to reality, and from constructivism, historical and hermeneutic methods of analysis of the realization of that relation in actual systems and devices. These elements of the two theories are compatible. (shrink)

The anti-utopian technology critique of Ellul, Postman, and other important social analysts has been the primary mode of critical response to technological developments since the 1950s. However, this mode of technology critique has had a disappointingly small effect on the way we, as a society, receive technology. Rather than attribute this failure to the negativity of the anti-utopian perspective, this article suggests that there are other important and largely overlooked factors at work—in particular, the critics' inability to (...) speak about technology in a way that relates to us as social individuals coping with the contingencies and realities of the day-to-day use of technological devices. The purpose of this analysis is not to suggest that we abandon as irrelevant the work and ideas of technology critics such as Ellul and Postman but, on the contrary, to find a way to reframe their important ideas for wider acceptance. (shrink)

In this article I analyse the extent to which there has been a shift in the cultural turn in legal scholarship and specifically from visual to what I call material jurisprudence, that is from visual to material ways of knowing law. I do so through an analysis of Desmond Manderson’s edited collection, Law and the Visual: Representations, Technologies, Critique, and Katherine Biber’s monograph, In Crime’s Archive: The Cultural Afterlife of Evidence. Inspired by the material turn in the arts and (...) humanities I apply a material lens as defined by historians of emotions working within this turn to these books. Using this lens, I analyse the extent to which the authors conceptualise and analyse their primary sources in material terms. In so doing it is my intention to encourage scholars of visual jurisprudence to consider the multisensorial nature of law by considering the material as a constitutive part or instead of the visual as has happened elsewhere in the arts, humanities and social sciences, as well as to do so with greater specificity and depth. (shrink)

This paper explores the political import of Husserl’s critical discussion of the epistemic effects of the formalization of rational thinking. More specifically, it argues that this discussion is of direct relevance to make sense of the pervasive processes of ‘technization’, that is, of a mechanistic and superficial generation and use of knowledge, to be observed in current contexts of governance. Building upon Husserl’s understanding of formalization as a symbolic technique for abstraction in the thinking with and about numbers, I argue (...) that processes of technization, while being necessary and legitimate procedures for the reduction of complexities, also may give rise to politically unresponsive and ultimately dysfunctional ‘economies of thinking.’ This paper is structured in three parts. In the first part I outline Husserl’s account of the formalization and technization of thought and knowledge. In the second part I make my case for the political import of this account, departing in this context from positions that (a) regard Husserl’s discussions of formalization and its effects as merely epistemological, or that (b) try to mobilize Husserl for a one-sided critique of instrumental reason. In the final part I address a major shortcoming of Husserl’s account, namely its neglect of the concrete and historically evolving technological infrastructures of processes of formalization/technization. (shrink)

Recent technological developments in automation threaten to eliminate the jobs of millions of workers in the near future, raising worrisome questions about how to satisfy their welfare. One proposal for addressing this issue is to provide all citizens with a “universal basic income” (UBI) that ensures everyone with a social minimum. The aim is to give all individuals an unrestricted cash grant that provides them with an income that does not depend on status, wealth, or employment. The question this (...) paper explores is whether UBI can replace work in the age of automation. Work has financial and non-pecuniary benefits that provide individuals with an income, as well as self-realization, self-respect, and community. While the provision of UBI will supplement the financial benefits of work, the question remains whether such a grant can replace these non-pecuniary benefits. The first section outlines the benefits and burdens of work. The second section considers the effects of technology on work in the context of automation. The third section examines the arguments for UBI that make it a philosophically attractive alternative to traditional welfare policies. Finally, the last section evaluates whether the benefits of UBI can replace the loss of work in terms of its non-pecuniary benefits. (shrink)

This essay aims to show how feminist theoretical and practical perspectives have enriched and deepened debate about moral and social issues generated by the proliferation and commodification of new reproductive techniques. It evaluates alternative feminist appraisals beginning with the first group to organize a collective response to the medicalization of infertility and explores several weaknesses working within their assessment: objectification of infertile women, naturalizing constructions of motherhood, hostility to technology, and an overly simplistic conception of power relations. Next, it shows (...) how subsequent feminists have reframed the issues to overcome these weaknesses, drawing on themes prominent in recent theoretical debates: the need to reclaim women's agency, to revalue mothering, and to reappraise power relations. Lastly, it weighs the prospects for a collaborative politics that is sensitive to the social marginalization of vulnerable women and suggests practical strategies for responding to mounting pressures to procreate at any price. (shrink)

Focusing on the context of graduate training in educational research in the United States today, this article is organized into two principal parts. The first overviews the state of research training in order to emphasize the preoccupation with, indeed dominance of, study of methodology. This has turned ‘how to do research’ into valuing method as technology for its own sake, and thus into technologization. The second part turns to three critiques of technology that together point to potential totalization in research: (...) technologization that limits research processes and potential results. The writings of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Ellul provide a broad frame; the three specific critiques are found in contributions from Henry Adams, Aldous Huxley, and Donna Haraway. The conclusion calls for a questioning of the current form of graduate training and by implication its hold on current research practice. (shrink)

In this article, we address the problem of the potential crisis in people’s life’s meaning due to massive automation-driven technological unemployment. Assuming that the problem of (re)distribution of economic resources to the whole of society in such a scenario will be solved (e.g. through provision of a Universal Basic Income), the question arises concerning the meaning of people’s lives in a world in which almost everyone does not have to (or even could not) work in order to live. Here, (...) we side with many current proposals that paid work is not the only possible source of meaning and hence, that a meaningful life could indeed be led in a post-work society. We especially focus on one of the most developed accounts, Danaher’s Virtual Utopia (Danaher, 2016, 2019, 2022). According to him, living immersed in playful virtual worlds where new, expanded and personalized possibilities of personal and collective experiences and actions, could not only be perfectly meaningful lives, but furthermore, “be the utopia we are looking for” (Danaher, 2019, p. 270). However, our analysis will suggest that although it is a very well thought and carefully articulated position, it suffers from various important problems. Our criticism will be based on an alternative framework to think about life’s meaning and the conditions for leading a good life in general. This alternative is based on the philosophy of buen vivir (“good living”). This notion has its roots in common aspects of various Latin American indigenous cultures regarding a community-centered way of life where humans, society and nature are taken to be deeply interconnected and interdependent, and where the notions of respect, harmony and balance are at the core of this interrelationship (Gudynas, 2011; Acosta, 2008; Beling et al., 2021). Buen vivir has many facets, but we will focus on three: the importance of healthy human communities, the human-nature relationship, and the intrinsic value of nature. Based on these, we argue that the Virtual Utopia is not a good candidate for human’s post-work utopia because i) it unnecessarily augments the environmental damage that is already involved in massive labor automation; ii) it entails an unnecessary and detrimental dependence on technology for human relationships; and iii) increases the severance of the link between humanity and nature. We conclude that the buen vivir approach is a promising candidate for an alternative utopian project, but one that needs further construction. (shrink)

In this essay, we focus on Max Weber’s concept of rationalization to understand and make sense of the rise of bureaucratic, corporate governance and online learning in higher education. We reveal the distinct disconnect between human interaction and online platforms and how such disconnection is antithetical to higher learning. We also show how Weber’s analysis helps us recognize the uniquely crass commercialism embedded in the very rationalization that makes online learning in universities thinkable and actionable. Our use of online learning (...) is only one illustration of Weber’s concept of rationalization, but it provides an important understanding of the nefarious effects rationalization has on human interaction. The nexus of marketization, technology, and higher education represents, on our view, a juggernaut against faculty autonomy, academic freedom, and humane learning and should be directly challenged. One difficulty this challenge faces is the degree to which online learning has become ubiquitous and taken-for-granted. It has, as Weber clarifies, been rationalized. (shrink)

The goal of the modern scientific project, as defined by such thinkers as Descartes and Bacon, is "mastery of nature." Martin Heidegger, in an interpretation of mastery of nature that has left its imprint on post-modern critique of science, maintains that the essence of modern science lies in a projection of "technological being" upon nature. This projective "assault" has its origin in the "self-grounding" project of modern metaphysics, in which the human subject attempts to secure a self-sufficient position (...) over against all possible objects. ;The dissertation examines Heidegger's "technological thesis" from the vantage point of the history and philosophy of science. Adopting the vis viva debate between Leibniz and the Cartesians as a point of departure, it identifies and develops, historically and systematically, two themes upon which hinges the question of the technological essence of modern science and its relationship to the "self-grounding" project: the "rationalism" of modern science, and modern science's view of natural teleology. The main argument of the dissertation is that examination of the relationship between these two themes reveals the "teleology of reason" in modern science. ;Chapter's One and Two focus on Leibniz' disagreement with Descartes over the ontology of corporeal substance. From that discussion emerge our two metaphysical themes, which are addressed in Chapter's Three and Four respectively. On the basis of the results of those chapters it is argued that the problem of "mastery of nature" resides in a clash, indigenous to reason, between the intrinsic teleology of nature, through which nature is rendered intelligible to reason, and the teleology of reason itself, which is freedom. ;The conclusion shows that Heidegger ignores tendencies within science, and within the very self-grounding project itself, which run counter to his pessimistic portrayal of science as an "assault" upon nature. Finally, the prospect for a non-coercive resolution to the clash of teleologies in modern science through the "ravishing of nature" is considered. (shrink)

Heidegger maintains that the root of modern technology, like that of all other technologies, lies in technē. However, because the art dimension of technē is suppressed in modern technology, the essence of this technology becomes a Gestell that enforces product-making, and thus drives technology beyond the control of human beings. The more fundamental reason underlying this “frame-becoming” nature is “the mathematical” that emerges in ancient Greece, which, through the Cartesian subject-object dichotomy, turns the world into the images represented by the (...) subject, and things into definite objects. To escape the dictatorship of the Gestell, it is necessary to re-realize the art-dimension of technē in modern technology, i. e. to let the gentle granting nature of the enowning re-master technology. In this respect, both Heidegger and Heisenberg were inspired by or at least resonated with Lao Zi or Zhuang Zi’s Dao. Confucians will greatly appreciate the critique of modern technology by Heidegger, and especially his view of returning “home” to overcome the possible dangers brought about by technology. However, from the perspective of Confucianism, Heidegger’s critique contains some shortcomings: for example, his ignorance of the individualistic impact in the Gestell and his unidirectional “ontological difference,” which leads him to a view of “home” that lacks “family” and therefore renders his solution loose and rootless. Only an organic community originated in the family, be it Confucian or Amish, can effectively reduce the control of modern technology over the human being. (shrink)

This paper explores the sense in which modern societies can be said to be rational. Social rationality cannot be understood on the model of an idealized image of scientific method. Neither science nor society conforms to this image. Nevertheless, critique is routinely silenced by neo-liberal and technocratic arguments that appeal to social simulacra of science. This paper develops a critical strategy for addressing the resistance of rationality to rational critique. Romantic rejection of reason has proven less effective than (...) strategies that conceptualize modern artefacts, systems, and organizations as rationally underdetermined. This approach first appears in Marx's analysis of capitalist economics. Although he lacks the concept of underdetermination, Marx gets around the silencing effect of social rationality with something very much like it in his discussion of the length of the working day. Frankfurt School Critical Theory later blended romantic elements with Marxian ones in a suggestive but ambiguous mixture. The concept of underdetermination reappears in contemporary science and technology studies, now clearly articulated and philosophically and sociologically elaborated. But somewhere along the way the critical thrust was diluted. Critical theory of technology attempts to recover that thrust. Here its approach is generalized to cover the three main forms of social rationality. (shrink)

Technology has been at the centre of existentialist (e.g. Heidegger) and sociological (e.g. Marcuse) critique for a long time. The latest versions of criticism rely on the results of “science and technology studies”: they argue that essentialist conceptualisations of technology should be replaced while aiming at “democratizing technology” (e.g. Feenberg). However, even these approaches are characterised by a shortcoming when it comes to providing a normative basis: as contemporary technology intermeshes with the elementary levels of existence (such as perception (...) or cognition), it remains in the blind spot of those users, who could “democratize” it through their critique. Accordingly, the formal normative bases (e.g. the one provided by Feenberg, who relies on Habermas’ democracy principle), need to be complemented with substantive claims. For this purpose, a phenomenological-existentialist framework is elaborated with the help of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. It is argued that due to the ongoing expansion of social systems relying on various forms of technology (Luhmann), the “mediated flesh” becomes rigid. By losing the plasticity of the chiasm, subjects are exposed to existential crises unmanageable by mere technology (e.g. mental disorders). Such experience of technologically induced social suffering could serve as a normative basis for criticising the over-expansion of technology. (shrink)

This inquiry is situated at the intersection of two enigmas. The first is the enigma of the status of Kant's practice of critique, which has been the subject of heated debate since shortly after the publication of the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason. The second enigma is that of Foucault's apparent later 'turn' to Kant, and the label of 'critique', to describe his own theoretical practice. I argue that Kant's practice of 'critique' should (...) be read, after Foucault, as a distinctly modern practice in the care of the self, governed by Kant's famous rubric of the 'primacy of practical reason'. In this way, too, Foucault's later interest in Kant - one which in fact takes up a line present in his work from his complementary thesis on Kant's Anthropology - is cast into distinct relief. Against Habermas and others, I propose that this interest does not represent any 'break' or 'turn' in Foucault's work. In line with Foucault's repeated denials that he was interested after 1976 in a 'return to the ancients', I argue that Foucault's writings on critique represent instead both a deepening theoretical self-consciousness, and part of his project to forge an ethics adequate to the historical present.
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Marcuse was the face of the Frankfurt School during the 1960s and '70s. His eclipse led, among other unfortunate consequences, to the disappearance of his critique of science and technology. That critique is based on an experiential ontology that derives in part from Marcuse’s background in phenomenology. In this paper I trace the roots of that ontology in his early interpretation of Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. One-Dimensional Man takes up the phenomenological critique in a (...) Marxist vein. This critique is newly relevant now that we face impending environmental catastrophe due to climate change. Thus the study of Marcuse today is not simply academic, but once again politically significant. (shrink)

This essay examines and criticizes G. A. Cohen's interpretation of Marx's materialistic conception of history as presented in Cohen's book Karl Marx's Theory of History. In particular, the author attacks Cohen's Primacy Thesis, the claim that (for Marx) human technology is the primary explanatory factor for economic and social change and for historical development generally. The focus of the attack is Cohen's way of distinguishing between the material and social characteristics, or the content and form, of a system of production. (...) The argument is that Cohen's distinctions are defective and therefore fail to provide adequate support for the Primacy Thesis and that, moreover, the position that Cohen defends is not Marx's. (shrink)

Facing Heidegger s critique of modern technology, the author analyses the question of technology and ethical responsibility and the call for reflexivity towards technology. He examines Heidegger s thoughts about how science and technology conceal the enigmatic and distinctive presencing of Being and exhibits how modern technology has brought unintended consequences and risks. The author extends the deliberation among diverse epistemologies, interested parties and laypersons, a component of reflexive modernization. Such epistemic community opens the way for a new reflexive (...) democratization of technology, in which different actors should be involved in decision making about technology as it affects the society, the environment and individuals.". (shrink)

This is the first in-depth critical appraisal in English of the political, legal, and cultural writings of Carl Schmitt, perhaps this century's most brilliant critic of liberalism. It offers an assessment of this most sophisticated of fascist theorists without attempting either to apologise for or demonise him. Schmitt's Weimar writings confront the role of technology as it finds expression through the principles and practices of liberalism. Contemporary political conditions such as disaffection with liberalism and the rise of extremist political organizations (...) have rendered Schmitt's work both relevant and insightful. John McCormick examines why technology becomes a rallying cry for both right- and left-wing intellectuals at times when liberalism appears anachronistic, and shows the continuities between Weimar's ideological debates and those of our own age. (shrink)

One of the less comprehensible passages in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment is paragraph 9 (KU, AA 5: 216 – 219) where the author rhetorically asks: when we perform a pure judgment of taste, does taking pleasure in a beautiful object come first and only then does (any) aesthetic judgment follow or is it the other way around? The partial conclusions from elaborating this question will then be used to support my assumption that art can be (...) used as a revolutionary and empowering force, much in the way Walter Benjamin hoped the cinema could be used. (shrink)

Sergius Bulgakov (1871–1944) was one of the centrally important Russian Orthodox theologians of the past century. His theological system (Sophiology) is among the most detailed and comprehensive attempts at a novel, Orthodox systematic theology developed in engagement with western philosophical and theological movements. His first major work of theology, Unfading Light (1917), incorporates an early Orthodox critique of the radical Christian transhumanism propounded by Nikolai Fedorovich Fedorov (1829–1903). Fedorov had developed an account of humanity's prospects for a technologically facilitated (...) eschatology. The goals of this article are: (1) to provide a concise summary Fedorov's ideas on technologized resurrection; (2) to provide an overview of Bulgakov's sympathetic critique of Fedorov's model; and (3) to discuss the ongoing relevance of that critique vis‐à‐vis current and future Christian dialogue with the transhumanist movement. (shrink)

The primary aim of research is to explore the complex relationships in the digital era between technology, culture, aesthetics, and values. This investigation digs deeply into the underlying philosophical underpinnings of our digital environment, going beyond superficial interpretations. The research negotiates the tricky territory where technology and culture collide by drawing on concepts from philosophy, sociology, and cultural studies. For measuring, the research study, used E-Views software and generated results, including descriptive statistics, unit root test analysis, co-integration analysis, and histogram (...) analysis. The investigation starts with investigate at digital aesthetics and how it might influence how people see beauty and usefulness in the digital sphere. Digital aesthetics are demonstrated to encapsulate cultural narratives and societal ideals through everything from immersive experiences to minimalist interfaces. The main emerging theme is ethical considerations, which invites critical thought on algorithmic prejudice, privacy, and spying. The research pushes readers to think about the moral ramifications of technical decisions by challenging the ideals ingrained in technological systems. The research goes beyond personal ethics to include more general cultural norms and societal values issues. It has been demonstrated that digital technologies alter societal conceptions of identity, community, and human flourishing, forcing society to reconsider the future it hopes to build. Overall, research found that technology philosophy provides a framework for moral analysis and cultural criticism, enabling people and society to wisely and preemptively negotiate the challenges of the digital era. Through the adoption of a technological philosophy rooted in critical analysis and cultural sensitivity, readers are encouraged to envisage and work towards a digital future that is more equitable, kind, and loving. (shrink)

The debate between Marcuse and Habermas over technology marked a significant turning point in the history of the Frankfurt School. After the 1960s Habermas's influence grew as Marcuse's declined and Critical Theory adopted a far less Utopian stance. Recently there has been a revival of quite radical technology criticism in the environmental movement and under the influence of Foucault and constructivism. This article takes a new look at the earlier debate from the standpoint of these recent developments. While much of (...) Habermas's argument remains persuasive, his defense of modernity now seems to concede far too much to the claims of autonomous technology. His essentialist picture of technology as an application of a purely instrumental form of nonsocial rationality is less plausible after a decade of historicizing research in technology studies. The article argues that Marcuse was right after all to claim that technology is socially determined even if he was unable to develop his insight fruitfully. The article derives a new approach to technology criticism from both constructivism and Habermas's communication theory. The essence of technology is shown to be historical and reflexive, like the essence of other social institutions. As such an institution, its rationality is always implemented in value?biased forms subject to political critique. (shrink)

The present text shows that the prevailing view of Martin Heidegger's approach to society and technology is not only based on prejudice, but more importantly works to obscure a more relevant perception of reality. Heidegger's “phenomenological hermeneutic” sought to uncover technology's hidden truth, beyond the appearance of technology as framing our existence (Gestell). Even if we acknowledge that technology has now reached a planetary and all-encompassing dissemination – becoming, in effect, the leading figure of our time – we still need (...) to remain vigilant to the metaphysical notions embedded in such a characteristic. We should seek other ways of living with and within technology. A radical critique should seek topologies and “orders” that are universal and preliminary, so that by potentially exceeding every demarcation we can be liberated to a way of listening – a “hearing” (Hören) – to a “constellation” of a different “essence of technology”. (shrink)

Herbert Marcuse’s oeuvre is driven by the recurring theme of“emancipation”—that is, the attempt to liberate man from socialexploitation and the projection of an alternative society, a socialistsociety which Marcuse describes as “free, happy, and non-repressive.”1 This suggests that Marcuse saw the existing society as pathological and therefore it needs to be diagnosed and remedied. His readings on Marx led him to his initial findings that the capitalist social order is the primordial cause of thesepathologies, and, hence, it is the transformation (...) of this social order that can bring emancipation to fruition. Inasmuch as this struggle for emancipation requires an active political agent, a critical theorist is, therefore, bound to seek for this agent. This is precisely what concerned Marcuse in his pre-World War II writings. His theory of historicity, which straddles Heidegger, Hegel, andMarx, is a search for that viable political agent who can be the hope of emancipation. Thus, Marcuse’s theory of historicity is premised, among other things, on the attempt to develop a theory of emancipation, and I call this “Marcuse’s first theory of emancipation.”. (shrink)

It is clear that we have to do something in our time concerning global warming yet before we can actually change the world, we must first understand our world. According to Heidegger, technology itself is not good or bad, but the problem is, that technological thinking (calculative thinking) has become the only form of thinking. Heidegger saw that the essence of technology nowadays is enframing – Ge-stell, which means that everything in nature is ‘standing-reserve’ (Bestand). Enframing (as apparatus) is (...) one way of uncovering, which for Heidegger meant truth. Truth can appear in many ways and the danger is that this truth of representational-calculative thinking becomes the only truth. We claim that the calculative way of thinking must be changed and we posit that Gelassenheit (slow thinking, releasement, letting-go) is the remedy. It does not mean some kind of mysticism or irrationality. The notion of Gelassenheit includes the idea of to let learn. We as teachers and educators have to learn how to think outside of the technological ‘Ge-stell’ and start thinking and acting in radically new ways. Like Arne Naes and Michael Zimmerman we connect the overcoming of technological ‘Ge-stell’ with so called deep ecology. We have to ‘learn to think’ and act within the deep ecology. We call for an educational ecological imperative. Every teacher and educationalist has to think what they can do (not as private person but as professionals) in order to prevent the coming eco-catastrophe. (shrink)

In recent years, scholars have devoted more attention to the “prophetic” critique of mass media. Clifford Christians has served as both an originator and an ongoing contributor to these discussions. Beginning with his doctoral thesis on Jacques Ellul, a concern for the prophetic has been a consistent thread throughout his career. This paper begins by examining Ellul's influence on Christians's approach, with an emphasis on media ecology, ontology, and the concept of technique. I then summarize Christians's critique of (...) Ellul, and explain how his unique vision addresses Ellul's shortcomings. In outlining Christians's unique approach, I highlight the ways in which authenticity serves as an axial value permeating his work. In Christians's work, prophetic witness against technological fetishism is a means of protecting certain universal values such as “cultural continuity” and “authentic Being.” Through a brief examination of media coverage of Barack Obama, Sarah Palin, Jim Wallis, and the United Church of Christ, I show how Christians's discussion of authenticity and prophetic critique are not only applicable but uniquely relevant in the emerging new media environment. At this critical juncture in media, Christians's prophetic voice is among the most relevant and necessary that critical scholarship has to offer. (shrink)

This article examines why Günther Anders, one of the 20th century’s most formidable critics of technology, deemed a critique of technology necessary at all. I argue that the radical philosophy of industrialism in Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen (The Obsolescence of Human Beings) and related texts is a response to what Anders’s work presents as inadequacies of traditional Marxism, with its focus on class struggle and property relations. In effect, his critique of technology, which is more attentive to forms (...) of domination emergent with mechanization, would come to supplant classical Marxist thought. The piece concludes with some thoughts about how Anders’s ‘post-Marxist’ perspective provides insights for contemporary Marxism and, in turn, how the latter can throw light on problems in Anders’s philosophy of the machine. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: References and Further Reading.

Over the last decade there has been a veritable explosion of Anglo-American interest in the works of Weimar constitutional and political theorist, Carl Schmitt. There has been concurrently a revival in the treatment of technology as a subject worthy of social-philosophical inquiry. Yet the two scholarly movements have surprisingly passed each other by. Surprisingly because as I demonstrate the German critique of technology is crucial for understanding the works of Schmitt, especially his criticisms of liberalism, and vice versa, theoretical (...) confrontations with technology, often dismissed as excessively abstract, could benefit greatly by observing the way in which Schmitt incorporated theoretical engagements with technology into practical-political treatises. The conjuncture of the critiques of liberalism and technology in Schmitt's writings may shed fresh light on the perennial problem of "technocracy" in liberal democracies and the potential for authoritarianism latent within it. The context in which fascism first emerged in Europe was characterized by a structural transformation--a fusion--of the economy, society and politics as welfare state conditions eclipsed the nineteenth century's--supposedly separate--state/society configuration. As the perceived agent of this transformation technology consequently aroused exhilaration, awe and fear irrespective of whether it was perceived as beneficial or detrimental. The analyses on the part of the intellectuals who engaged technology in this context were sometimes hysterical but also sometimes quite perspicacious. Soviet Communism, fascism and liberal technocracy were all posed as solutions to this situation. Since the 1970s industrial societies have undergone another structural transformation as a Fordist welfare state configuration gives way to a globalized one. This process has brought down Soviet Communism, but fascism has reemerged and liberal technocracy transmutes itself in not necessarily progressive ways. The considerations on these political alternatives in the wake of this century's first technological transformation by fascism's most brilliant promoter and liberalism's most relentless critic may not provide facile answers in the midst of this century's second transformation. But we must properly understand the past to accurately assess the present and insure that the disastrous outcome that befell a fragile liberal democracy such as Weimar's does not occur again. (shrink)

Since seminal essays like Adorno’s ‘The Culture Industry’ and Benjamin’s ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,’ the mass media has been of central concern for Critical Theory. Yet Critical Theorists have produced relatively little in the way of systematic analysis of the concrete institutions of mass communication. Early on, Habermas seemed to be headed in this direction, especially with the publication of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. However, in Habermas’s later years, this concern is (...) eclipsed, on the one hand by an ideal theory of communication which says relatively little about non-ideal institutions that “systematically distort” communication, and on the other hand by an increasing focus on properly “political” institutions and the formal structure of law, exemplified by his later work Between Facts and Norms. In this essay, I will show how the colonization of public space by private interests, via technological media, remains sorely under-theorized in Habermas’s work, and that this is not just a peripheral oversight but a central problem that Habermas fails to resolve. I will then give some preliminary suggestions as to how one might expand and develop the critique of systematically distorted communication in more fruitful directions by developing the idea of a politics of meaning. My argument is located within the extensive discussion generated by the relatively recent translation of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere into English, which has produced many useful and important criticisms. (shrink)

The article critically examines the Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Act 2021, its development process spanning 15 years, and its potential shortcomings in addressing the needs of India’s 27 million infertile couples. By scrutinizing the recommendations presented in the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare’s 129th report, the critique argues that the Act may not effectively cater to the diverse reproductive rights of the population. The article claims that most of its suggestions are in opposition to redefining families (...) and accepting inclusive family structures other than heterosexual marriages. The study posits that the Act, with its inherent limitations, perpetuates the reinforcement of patriarchal family structures that medical science intends to disrupt. In order to foster inclusivity and comprehensibility, the article advocates for necessary amendments that align with the interest of the general populace. (shrink)

So far aesthetics has played a limited role in our understanding of business activity, focused mainly on evaluating product quality and the character qualities (virtues) of the firm that produced them We draw on Heidegger’s fuller account of aesthetic value to show how a firm—like a work of art – can disclose the way human projects and technologies are already at work in a given context. In this way, we show that firms play an essential role in human self-understanding—a role (...) that Heidegger assigns primarily to works of art. We then apply the Heideggerian approach to the contemporary turn to artisanal products such as personalized handcrafts, craft beer and the “third wave” coffee movement. (shrink)

As a scientist, Michael Polanyi made significant advances in chemistry and economics. From that deep hands-on experience, he derived a powerful critique of prevailing ideas of knowledge and the proper role of science. He demonstrated that disregarding or eliminating the personal embodiment of knowing in the tacit dimension in pursuit of purely explicit and impersonal knowledge results in knowing that is misleadingly incomplete—“absurd.” If technology is the practical application of science, then it should be useful to extend his (...) class='Hi'>critique of science to technology. The pursuit of impersonal knowledge parallels the quest for efficiency through the standardizing and programming of technique while devaluing personal knowing in the form of embodied skills, institutional memory, and a “feel” for possibilities that leads to insightful breakthroughs. As technological development continues to accelerate and proliferate unsustainably, the idolizing of efficiency operates to subsume other values that would tend to constrain such development, raising concerns about the future of discovery, of the economic and social order, and of the human soul. (shrink)

Andrew Feenberg’s distinction between formal and substantive bias in the design of technology is interrogated. The two dimensions of his definition—inten­tion and the enhancement of specific social interests—are examined and eight logical possibilities arising from his argument are identified. These possibilities are explored through discussion of examples and it is argued that Feenberg has both: a) not broken sufficiently with substantivist philosophies of technology so that he retains ambivalence on technology’s ‘biased essence,’ and b) illegitimately rejected the idea of a (...) technology that is biased in itself. The latter category is important to critical theory of technology and the paper offers a conceptualization of it that draws on Habermas’s discourse ethics. (shrink)

This article critically evaluates the process of technology transfer from developed to developing countries. It considers market-based policies contained in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which are proposed as tools to promote the transfer of technologies that can abate greenhouse gas emissions contributing to climate change. It uses the case of India to exemplify the conditions that exist and issues that arise in a rapidly developing country that is a recipient of such investments. It contests the claim (...) that such market-based strategies embodied in the present climate policy framework can facilitate the transfer of technologies that offer ecologically sustainable and socially equitable solutions for developing countries. (shrink)