The letter from Georges Florovsky to Davis McCaughey is a reflection after reading the Report The Era of Atomic Power: Report of a Commission (1946). Florovsky gives his own arguments against the development of research concerning nuclear weapons and their use. These include: treating an attempt at a technical transformation of the world as a human claim to put oneself in God’s place, i.e., to be a God-man. Another group of indictments against the use of the atomic bomb concerned ethical (...) issues and human responsibility for the war. Florovsky’s letter is his contribution to the discussion on the threat posed by the atomic bomb. (shrink)

In the entrance hall of our family house in Leamington Spa stands a slender Regency style table of noble wood and fine proportions. It suits the house, which dates from 1828, perfectly. Few visitor...

Pervasive feminism is a component located in emotionality—feminist emotion—and contains women's primary agency. Because affect and emotions are elusive, an interpretive conceptual tool is necessary and is key to making use of their potential for feminist politics aimed at women's empowerment and well-being and to build gender equality. This essay builds on contemporary feminist theory and affect theory and draws from multidisciplinary research. It presents a new theoretical framework anchored in hermeneutics and phenomenology to pin down the affective component of (...) women's multifaceted, intersectional emotional experiences of gender. A case study also illustrates how the theoretical premises around the concept of feminist emotion are compatible with and useful for feminist praxis. (shrink)

This volume presents a many-faceted view of the great Oxford philosopher R. G. Collingwood. At its centre is his Autobiography of 1939, a cult classic for its compelling 'story of his thought'. That work is accompanied here by previously unpublished writings by Collingwood and eleven specially written essays on aspects of his life and work.

A pergunta pelo ser do homem é a origem da antropologia tanto filosófica quanto pedagógica. Neste horizonte, pode-se resumir a resposta à pergunta dizendo: o ser humano não só é efeito do diálogo, mas humaniza e se humaniza por meio do diálogo. Quando se planeja ambientes orientados a desenvolver as potências anímicas do diálogo em todos, e em cada um dos participantes da cena pedagógica, igualmente se está tanto em meio a uma antropologia pedagógica quanto a uma didática antropológica. Esta (...) foi a tradição que Christoph Wulf, na segunda metade do século XX e no começo do século XXI, sistematizou. Dentro desta corrente de pensamento se enquadra a investigação intitulada Diálogo: condição de formação. Assim, pode-se afirmar que este projeto se baseia na tradição alemã que põe a Bildung no centro, como uma categoria que, ao mesmo tempo, tem uma fundamentação filosófica e alguns efeitos tanto na concepção quanto na ação pedagógica. Palavras-chave: Diálogo. Antropologia pedagógica. Christoph Wulf. Gadamer. (shrink)

Some might ask "Why Locke's theory of knowledge now?" Though appreciated for his social philosophy, Locke has been criticized for his work in the field of epistemology ever since the publication of the Essay. It is even as if Locke serves only as an example of how not to think. When people criticize Locke, they usually cite the hostile commen taries of Berkeley, Kant, Husserl, or Sellars. But, one might ask, are they not all so eager to show the excellence (...) of their own epistemo logical views that they distort and underestimate Locke's thought? Russell aptly noted in his History of Western Philosophy that: No one has yet succeeded in inventing a philosophy at once credible and self-consis tent. Locke aimed at credibility, and achieved it at the expense of consistency. Most of the great philosophers have done the opposite. A philosophy which is not self-consis tent cannot be wholly true, but a philosophy which is self-consistent can very well be wholly false. The most fruitful philosophies have contained glaring inconsistencies, but for that very reason have been partially true. There is no reason to suppose that a self consistent system contains more truth than one which, like Locke's, is obviously more or less wrong. (B. Russell, A History of Western Philosophy [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945], p. 613. ) Here Russell is uncommonly charitable with Locke. (shrink)