One of the challenges facing AI governance is the need for multiple scales. Universal human rights require a global scale. If someone asks AI if education is harmful to women, the answer should be “no” regardless of their location. But economic democratization requires local control: if AI’s power over an economy is dictated by corporate giants or authoritarian states, it may degrade democracy’s social and environmental foundations. AI democratization, in other words, needs to operate across multiple scales. Nature allows the (...) multiscale flourishing of biological systems through fractal distributions. In this paper, we show that key elements of the fractal scaling found in nature can be applied to the AI democratization process. We begin by looking at fractal trees in nature and applying similar analytics to tree representations of online conversations. We first examine this application in the context of OpenAI’s “Democratic Inputs” projects for globally acceptable policies. We then look at the advantages of independent AI ownership at local micro-levels, reporting on initial outcomes for experiments with AI and related technologies in community-based systems. Finally, we offer a synthesis of the two, micro and macro, in a multifractal model. Just as nature allows multifractal systems to maximize biodiverse flourishing, we propose a combination of community-owned AI at the micro-level, and globally democratized AI policies at the macro-level, for a more egalitarian and sustainable future. (shrink)

This article presents the new German law on advance directives from 1 September 2009. The history of the parliamentary process of this law is described, the present regulations are explained, their relevance for medical practice discussed and shortcomings are identified. Finally, the new law is compared with other regulations in the international context. Previously established legal practice in Germany has now become largely confirmed by the new law: An advanced directive must be respected in any decision concerning medical treatment, regardless (...) of the stage of the illness. It can be informally revoked at any time, even with limited decision-making capacity. Nobody may be obliged to issue a directive in any way. Advance directives do not need notarisation or routine updating after certain time intervals. Provided that the patient, who is no longer mentally competent, has issued a lasting power of attorney, or provided that the patient has been appointed a healthcare proxy by the courts, this authorised surrogate must assert the patient's will. The role of the guardianship court is clarified: it only needs to be involved in cases of disagreement as to the patient's will. The new German law thus combines more legal certainty with a liberal emphasis on patient autonomy and flexible, adaptable regulations. (shrink)

According to interpretivism, all there is to having an intentional property is being best interpreted as having it. I present a regress-or-circularity argument against this. In §1, I elucidate interpretivism, and in §2, I present the argument against it.

Ullin Thomas Place died on 2nd January 2000 at the age of seventy-five. I had met him a little over three years earlier, in November 1996, during the annual 'Mind and Brain' symposium organized by Peter Fenwick and held at the Institute of Psychiatry in London. At that meeting Professor Place delivered a slightly shortened version of the paper reproduced here, in which he told his personal story — a pilgrim's progress? — recounting, as he put it, 'the history of (...) a thought process leading from an adolescent interest in mystical experience to an article entitled‘Is consciousness a brain process?’[Place, 1956] in which I argued for an affirmative answer to that question'. (shrink)

PurposeThe paper suggests overcoming the polarization of today's debate on peer‐to‐peer systems by defining a fair balance between the principle of precaution and the principle of openness. Threats arising from these file sharing applications‐systems should not be a pretext to limit freedom of research, speech or the right “freely to participate in the cultural life of the community”, as granted by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948. The paper aims to take sides in today's debate.Design/methodology/approachThe paper adopts an (...) interdisciplinary approach, including network theory, law and ethics. The method draws on both theoretical and empirical material so as to stress the paradox of the principle of precaution applied to P2P systems and why the burden of proof should fall on the party proposing that one refrain from action.FindingsCensors and opponents of P2P systems who propose to apply the principle of precaution to this case deny the premise upon which that principle rests. “Levels of evidence” required by the precautionary principle show that – in many cases in which the outcomes of technology are ignored – another principle is needed for orienting action, namely, the principle of openness.Social implicationsAlarm about how P2P systems undermine crucial elements of the societies often led to the ban of this technology. The paper illustrates why it should not be the case: rather than shutting these networks down, they should be further developed.Originality/valueThe paper provides the comprehensive picture of a far too often fragmented debate. (shrink)

Applying Fineman’s vulnerability theory, this paper will explore the role of emotions within the legal profession and the specific vulnerabilities that arise from their traditional and contemporary treatment within law. It will consider how the notion of professionalism in law has traditionally disregarded or excluded emotions as irrelevant or even dangerous in a manner which is philosophically and psychologically flawed as well as damaging to mental health and wellbeing. This approach has created longstanding unacknowledged vulnerabilities for the profession as a (...) whole and individual practitioners. It will then explore how the shifting legal services landscape, and the resultant evolution of the profession, has led to a growing contemporary interest in the use of emotional competencies (often characterised as ‘soft skills’ or ‘emotional intelligence’). These are now increasingly exploited as tools to enhance profitability. However, this leads to a dichotomy as, despite their increasing utilisation, emotions are still not fully acknowledged or incorporated within law’s core professional values. This generates further individual and institutional vulnerabilities around mental health and wellbeing which require urgent attention to ensure the health of the contemporary profession. The paper concludes with suggestions for reforms to alleviate these vulnerabilities and promote greater future resilience within law. (shrink)

This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack containing a critique of the “objective preparations view” or OPV. It also aims to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted, including the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the (...) claim that the quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes the quantum state serves to assign probabilities. This makes it possible to recognize the full implications of the only testable feature of the theory, viz., the probabilities it assigns to measurement outcomes. Most important among these are the objective fuzziness of all relative positions and momenta and the consequent incomplete spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world. The latter makes it possible to draw a clear distinction between the macroscopic and the microscopic. This in turn makes it possible to understand the special status of measurements in all standard formulations of the theory. Whereas Bayesians have written contemptuously about the “folly” of conjoining “objective” to “probability,” there are various reasons why quantum-mechanical probabilities can be considered objective, not least the fact that they are needed to quantify an objective fuzziness. But this cannot be appreciated without giving thought to the makeup of the world, which Bayesians refuse to do. Doing this on the basis of how quantum mechanics assigns probabilities, one finds that what constitutes the macroworld is a single Ultimate Reality, about which we know nothing, except that it manifests the macroworld or manifests itself as the macroworld. The so-called microworld is neither a world nor a part of any world but instead is instrumental in the manifestation of the macroworld. Quantum mechanics affords us a glimpse “behind” the manifested world, at stages in the process of manifestation, but it does not allow us to describe what lies “behind” the manifested world except in terms of the finished product—the manifested world, for without the manifested world there is nothing in whose terms we could describe its manifestation. (shrink)

Official documents, such as the Word Anti-Doping Code (WADC), argue that sport can be deemed a homogenous and unitary concept. Even where different sports have varying characteristics, the homogenous view of a given sport (‘a sport’ or ‘the sport’) persists. The WADC, international and national sport associations aim to protect the spirit of (the) sport. In this picture, the intersection of sporting integrity and legal processes occupies a vital place. The article will posit that, from a legal perspective sport is (...) heterogeneous due to its governance, regulation, adjudication, and enforcement structures. International and national associations, such as sport federations and leagues, have separate normative orders. These normative orders lead to differences in ensuring sporting integrity. A plural normative environment is inherent in sport; thus, we need to deal with it. The article will conclude that although harmonising norms and interpretations related to sporting integrity through national and global institutions may be acceptable, these must be achieved by promoting good governance and human rights. (shrink)

Volume 45, Issue 3, August 2024, Page 278-301.

AbstractṢadr al-Dīn al-Dashtakī (d. 1498) has proposed a solution to the liar paradox according to which the liar sentence is a self-referential sentence in which the predicate ‘false’ is iterated. Discussing the conditions for the truth-aptness of the sentences with nested and iterated instances of the predicates ‘true’ and/or ‘false’, Dashtakī argued that the liar sentence is not truth-apt at all. In the tradition of Arabic logic, the central elements of Dashtakī's solution—the self-referentiality of the liar sentence and the implicit (...) iteration of the predicate ‘false’—were initially highlighted in two earlier solutions proposed by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) and Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 1322), respectively. Here I investigate all three solutions and show that Dashtakī's solution can be taken as a synthesis of the other two. None of these solutions seems to be convincing at the end of the day. Nevertheless, all of them include significant logical and philosophical insights. In particular, although Dashtakī's solution is not itself compelling, it is only a few steps away from a promising solution. The appendix to this paper includes translations of the relevant passages. (shrink)

Quiconque a visité la Chambre de la Signature, au Vatican, et s’est attardé devant « L’École d’Athènes » de Raphaël garde en mémoire l’image significative qu’offrent, au centre de la composition, les personnages d’Aristote et de Platon. C’est l’image, en raccourci, d’un dialogue poursuivi vingt années durant par le maître de l’Académie et son disciple de Stagire, l’un des plus féconds sans doute qu’ait jamais comptés l’histoire de la pensée philosophique. La première rencontre entre les deux hommes eut lieu probablement (...) au cours de l’année 366/5 avant notre ère. Ils vécurent ensemble, à Athènes, dans un commerce quasi constant, pour ainsi dire jusqu’à la mort de Platon, au mois de mai 347. Cependant, le maître avait laissé pour toujours son empreinte sur l’esprit du disciple. Au point que le lecteur attentif d’Aristote peut avoir l’impression de souvent trouver dans ses œuvres, comme disait Th. Gomperz, le « Platonicien » et l’« Asclépiade » confrontés l’un à l’autre sur toutes les grandes questions de la philosophie. Le difficile accord, parfois constaté dans le Corpus Aristotelicum, entre les thèses recommandées respectivement par l’héritier de l’Académie et le champion d’une philosophie nouvelle pose incontestablement le problème le plus redoutable que doit affronter l’exégèse. (shrink)

There’s a possibly more interesting general question: does technology transform and extend the mind and our mental powers? In a widely discussed 1998 paper titled “The Extended Mind”, Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that mind and cognition can extend outside the head and can include items and processes in the world. In their thought experiment, Otto has alzheimer’s syndrome but does not lose his ability to function because he records information he learns in a notebook that he always carries. (...) Thus, C&C claim, Otto continues to have beliefs. The notebooks function as his memory. C&C propose a "parity principle": a part of the world is part of a cognitive process if it "functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing [it] as part of the cognitive process .... Cognitive processes ain't (all) in the head!" (in Menary p. 29, original emphasis). (shrink)