Results for 'Value monism'

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  1. Epistemic Value Monism and the Swamping Problem.Scott Stapleford - 2016 - Ratio 29 (3):283-297.
    Many deontologists explain the epistemic value of justification in terms of its instrumental role in promoting truth – the original source of value in the epistemic domain. The swamping problem for truth monism appears to make this position indefensible, at least for those monists who maintain the superiority of knowledge to merely true belief. I propose a new solution to the swamping problem that allows monists to maintain the greater epistemic value of knowledge over merely true (...)
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  2. Epistemic Value Monism, or How I Learned to Stop Caring About Truth.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press.
     
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  3.  46
    Value Monism, Value Pluralism, and Music Education: Sparshott as Fox.Philip Alperson - 1997 - The Journal of Aesthetic Education 31 (2):19.
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  4. Value Monism, Richness, And Environmental Ethics.Chris Kelly - 2014 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 9 (2):110-129.
    The intuitions at the core of environmental ethics and of other neglected value realms put pressure on traditional anthropocentric ethics based on monistic value theories. Such pressure is so severe that it has led many to give up on the idea of monistic value theories altogether. I argue that value monism is still preferable to value pluralism and that, indeed, these new challenges are opportunities to vastly improve impoverished traditional theories. I suggest an alternative (...)
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  5.  13
    Monotheism and Value Monism.Martin Jakobsen - 2024 - Philosophia Christi 26 (1):75-89.
    This article addresses the following metaethical questions: how many intrinsic values are there? Robert Adams holds the view that there is only one intrinsic value, a view called “intrinsic value monism,” but does not present any arguments in favor of this view. This paper makes the case that there are good reasons for upholding value monism. I argue that our ability to weigh different values against each other supports value monism and that monotheistic (...)
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  6. In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):19-40.
    Recently, veritistic value monism, i.e. the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, has come under attack by pluralist philosophers arguing that it cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value. However, the relevant arguments fail to establish any such thing. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of (...)
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  7. Epistemic Value Monism.Linda Zagzebski - 2004 - In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 190–198.
    This chapter contains section titled: The Value Problem Sosa's Solution Epistemically Valuable False Beliefs Organic Unities Gettier.
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  8. Nietzsche's Value Monism: Saying Yes to Everything.John Richardson - 2015 - In Manuel Dries & P. J. E. Kail (eds.), Nietzsche on Mind and Nature. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 89-119.
     
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  9. ``Epistemic Value Monism".Linda Zagzebski - 2004 - In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 190-198.
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  10.  40
    Value Pluralism versus Value Monism.Christian Blum - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (4):627-652.
    Value pluralism is the metaphysical thesis that there is a plurality of values at the fundamental level of the evaluative domain. Value monism, on the other hand, is the claim that there is just one fundamental value. Pluralists, it is commonly argued, have an edge over monists when it comes to accounting for the conspicuous heterogeneity of the evaluative domain and the rationality of regretting well-justified decisions. Monists, in turn, seem to provide a far more plausible (...)
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  11.  77
    An Argument for Intrinsic Value Monism.Ole Martin Moen - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1375-1385.
    In this paper I argue that there is only one intrinsic value. I start by examining three aspects of values that are often taken to count against this suggestion: that values seem heterogeneous, that values are sometimes incommensurable, and that we sometimes experience so-called “rational regret” after having forsaken a smaller value for a greater one. These aspects, I argue, are in fact compatible with both monism and pluralism about intrinsic value. I then examine a fourth (...)
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  12. Monism and Pluralism about Value.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 136-157.
    This essay discusses monism and pluralism about two related evaluative notions: welfare, or what makes people better off, and value simpliciter, or what makes the world better. These are stipulatively referred to as 'axiological value'. Axiological value property monists hold that one of these notions is reducible to the other (or else eliminable), while axiological value property pluralists deny this. Substantive monists about axiological value hold that there is just one basic kind of thing (...)
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  13.  23
    What the Victims of Tyranny Owe Each Other: On Judith Shklar’s Value Monism.Allyn Fives - 2020 - Res Publica 26 (4):505-521.
    What do the victims of tyranny owe each other? In this paper, I examine whether they can be condemned for betraying their friends, and I do so through a novel interpretation of Judith Shklar’s political thought. Shklar is a widely acknowledged and significant influence on non-ideal theory and political realism. However, there is also a previously unnoticed transformation between her early and mature work, for although she remains a sceptic her approach to moral conflict changes from value pluralism to (...)
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  14.  3
    ‘Bitch is Not a Term of Endearment’: A Metaethical Reflection on the Presumed Value Monism of Trash TV.Stefan Kosak & Claudia Paganini - 2025 - Journal of Media Ethics 40 (1):2-10.
    Trash TV is generally regarded as an inferior genre that showcases the depths of human behavior for the sake of high viewership ratings. In this sense, the prevailing prejudice suggests that the moral orientation of the participants in trash TV is at best characterized by the (questionable) values of success and pleasure. Confronting this prejudice, the article aims to discuss the value orientation in trash TV, using examples from such show formats as Sommerhaus der Stars, Promis unter Palmen, and (...)
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  15.  48
    Why Monist Critiques Feed Value Pluralism.Avery Plaw - 2004 - Social Theory and Practice 30 (1):105-126.
  16. Meno and the Monist.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):157-170.
    Recent critiques of veritistic value monism, or the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, typically invoke a claim about the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief, in turn traced back to Plato's Meno. However, to the extent Plato at all defends a surplus claim in the Meno, it differs from that figuring in contemporary discussions with respect to both its scope and the kind of value at issue, (...)
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  17.  36
    The unnoticed monism of Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear.Allyn Fives - 2020 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 46 (1):45-63.
    Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear, a political and philosophical standpoint that emerges in her mature work, has ostensibly two defining characteristics. It is a sceptical approach that puts cruelty first among the vices. For that reason, it is considered to be both set apart from mainstream liberalism, in particular the liberalism of J. S. Mill and John Rawls, but also an important source of influence for political realists and nonideal theorists. However, I argue here that, in putting cruelty first among (...)
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  18. Monism and the Ontology of Logic.Samuel Elgin - forthcoming - Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
    Monism is the claim that only one object exists. While few contemporary philosophers endorse monism, it has an illustrious history – stretching back to Bradley, Spinoza and Parmenides. In this paper, I show that plausible assumptions about the higher-order logic of property identity entail that monism is true. Given the higher-order framework I operate in, this argument generalizes: it is also possible to establish that there is a single property, proposition, relation, etc. I then show why this (...)
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  19. Accuracy Monism and Doxastic Dominance: Reply to Steinberger.Matt Hewson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):450-456.
    Given the standard dominance conditions used in accuracy theories for outright belief, epistemologists must invoke epistemic conservatism if they are to avoid licensing belief in both a proposition and its negation. Florian Steinberger (2019) charges the committed accuracy monist — the theorist who thinks that the only epistemic value is accuracy — with being unable to motivate this conservatism. I show that the accuracy monist can avoid Steinberger’s charge by moving to a subtly different set of dominance conditions. Having (...)
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  20. Monism and Pluralism.Eden Lin - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge. pp. 331-41.
    I argue that the distinction between monism and pluralism about well-being should be understood in terms of explanation: the monist affirms (but the pluralist denies) that whenever two particular things are basically good for you, the explanation of their basic goodness for you is the same. I then consider a number of arguments for monism and a number of arguments for pluralism.
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  21. Epistemic Value, Duty, and Virtue.Guy Axtell - 2021 - In Brian C. Barnett (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community.
    This chapter introduces some central issues in Epistemology, and, like others in the open textbook series Introduction to Philosophy, is set up for rewarding college classroom use, with discussion/reflection questions matched to clearly-stated learning objectives,, a brief glossary of the introduced/bolded terms/concepts, links to further open source readings as a next step, and a readily-accessible outline of the classic between William Clifford and William James over the "ethics of belief." The chapter introduces questions of epistemic value through Plato's famous (...)
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  22. Value Pluralism.Ruth Chang - 2001 - In James Wright (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition). Elsevier. pp. 21-26.
    Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value (...), for example, hedonistic utilitarianism, is mistaken. The plurality of values is also thought to raise problems for rational choice. If two irreducibly distinct values conflict, it seems that there is no common ground that justifies choosing one over the other. The metaphysical plurality of values does not, however, have the implications for rational choice that many have supposed. A charitable interpretation of value pluralist writings suggests a ‘nonreductive’ form of value pluralism. Nonreductive value pluralism maintains that in the context of practical choice, there are differences between values—whether or not those values reduce to a single supervalue—that have important implications for rational choice. This article examines the main arguments for metaphysical value pluralism, argues that metaphysical value pluralism does not have certain implications that it is widely thought to have, and outlines three forms of nonreductive value pluralism. (shrink)
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  23. The Special Value of Experience.Christopher Ranalli - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind 1:130-167.
    Why think that conscious experience of reality is any more epistemically valuable than testimony about it? I argue that conscious experience of reality is epistemically valuable because it provides cognitive contact with reality. Cognitive contact with reality is a goal of experiential inquiry which does not reduce to the goal of getting true beliefs or propositional knowledge. Such inquiry has awareness of the truth-makers of one’s true beliefs as its proper goal. As such, one reason why conscious experience of reality (...)
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  24. The Values of the Virtual.Rami Ali - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (2):231-245.
    How do we assign values to virtual items, which include virtual objects, properties, events, subjects, worlds, environments, and experiences? In this article, I offer a framework for answering this question. After considering different value theses in the literature, I argue that whether we think these theses mutually exclusive or not turns on our view about the number of value-salient kinds virtual items belong to. Virtual monism is the view that virtual Xs belong to only one value-salient (...)
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  25.  29
    Value Pluralism and Public Ethics.Derek Edyvane & Demetris Tillyris - 2019 - Theoria 66 (160):1-8.
    ‘The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing’. -Archilochus quoted in Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 22The fragment from the Greek poet Archilochus, quoted in Isaiah Berlin’s essay ‘The Hedgehog and the Fox’, serves as a metaphor for the long-standing contrast and rivalry between two radically different approaches to public ethics, each of which is couched in a radically different vision of the structure of moral value. On the one hand, the way of the (...)
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    A Value Pluralist Defense of Toleration.Allyn Fives - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):235-254.
    In situations where we ought to tolerate what we morally disapprove of we are faced with the following moral conflict: we ought to interfere with X, we ought to tolerate X, we can do either, but we cannot do both. And the aim of this paper is to clarify the relationship between toleration as a value commitment and value pluralist and value monist approaches to moral conflict. Firstly, value monists side-step the moral conflict at the heart (...)
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  27. Monism, racial hygiene, and national socialism.Heiner Fangerau - 2012 - In Todd H. Weir (ed.), Monism: science, philosophy, religion, and the history of a worldview. New York, N.Y.: Palgrave-Macmillan.
     
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  28.  68
    “The Intrinsic Value of Nature,” The Monist. [REVIEW]Ned Hettinger - 1996 - Environmental Ethics 18 (1):99-104.
  29.  21
    The Problem of Value Pluralism: Isaiah Berlin and Beyond.George Crowder - 2019 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    Value pluralism is the idea, most prominently endorsed by Isaiah Berlin, that fundamental human values are universal, plural, conflicting, and incommensurable with one another. Incommensurability is the key component of pluralism, undermining familiar monist philosophies such as utilitarianism. But if values are incommensurable, how do we decide between them when they conflict? George Crowder assesses a range of responses to this problem proposed by Berlin and developed by his successors. Three broad approaches are especially important: universalism, contextualism, and conceptualism. (...)
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  30. Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.
    In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming (...)
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  31.  8
    Monism, Pluralism, and Conflict.Michael Stocker - 1989 - In Plural and conflicting values. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Examines the proposal that value conflict generally requires plural values, and finds that it is correct, but only about a kind of rational conflict, which is rational conflict restricted to practicable options. The focus is on kinds of conflict and whether monism is apt to handle them. The discussion lays out the intricacies of conflict, and its relation to time, agency, and differential care. It is concluded that only pluralism can allow for the lack and loss involved in (...)
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  32. Truth monism without teleology.Kurt Sylvan - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (3):161-163.
    Some say the swamping problem confronts all who believe that true belief is the sole fundamental epistemic value. This, I say, is mistaken. The problem only confronts T-Monists if they grant two teleological claims: that all derived epistemic value is instrumental, and that it is the state of believing truly rather than the standard of truth in belief that is fundamentally epistemically valuable. T-Monists should reject and, and appeal to a non-teleological form of value derivation I call (...)
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  33.  16
    Reassessing the Clash Between Isaiah Berlin’s Value Pluralism and Ronald Dworkin’s Monism.Mateus Matos Tormin - 2023 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 25 (1):140-156.
    Resumo Este artigo reexamina o debate entre o pluralismo de valores de Isaiah Berlin (PV) e o monismo de Ronald Dworkin, sua “unidade do valor” (UV). Em primeiro lugar, o debate entre ambos é reconstruído por meio de duas proposições: de acordo com a proposição descritiva p, “é possível integrar nossos valores em um todo coerente”; de acordo com a proposição normativa Pn, “a melhor interpretação de nossos valores mostra que eles estão integrados em um todo coerente”. Enquanto PV nega (...)
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  34.  24
    The Avoidance Approach to Plural Value.Luke Brunning - 2019 - Theoria 66 (160):53-70.
    Value monists and value pluralists disagree deeply. Pluralists want to explain why moral life feels frustrating; monists want clear action guidance. If pluralism is true, our actions may be unable to honour irredeemably clashing values. This possibility could prompt pessimism, but the ‘avoidance approach’ to pluralism holds that although values may conflict inherently, we can take pre-emptive action to avoid situations where they would conflict in practice, rather like a child pirouetting to avoid the cracks on a pavement. (...)
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  35.  10
    Virtues and Values, Without Disproportion or Dysfunction.Simon Burgess - 2022 - Australasian Philosophical Review 6 (2):172-179.
    ABSTRACT Pettigrove advances a persuasive case against the proportionality principle. In my view, the moral respect that his modus operandi account of virtue affords to each person’s ‘characteristic way of being’ is also to be applauded. While various philosophers have come to believe in the proportionality principle, it is something that presupposes a monistic account of value. Moreover, it is readily arguable that the kind of abstraction that this involves provides nothing more than an illusion of understanding, and that (...)
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  36.  30
    Is Hegelian Monism One of the Sources of Pantheism and Impersonalism?Piama P. Gaidenko - 1999 - Russian Studies in Philosophy 38 (1):28-41.
    Monism is a doctrine that claims to deduce the entire system of knowledge from one first principle. It must be a system of a mutually connected propositions that are obtained by a methodologically reliable unfolding of one original proposition accepted as self-evident and unquestionable. Modern philosophy in its rationalist version, beginning with Descartes, tends precisely to this kind of monistic construction of the system of knowledge from a first principle. The striving toward monism is demonstrated most clearly in (...)
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  37. On Some Arguments for Epistemic Value Pluralism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):77-96.
    Epistemic Value Monism is the view that there is only one kind of thing of basic, final epistemic value. Perhaps the most plausible version of Epistemic Value Monism is Truth Value Monism, the view that only true beliefs are of basic, final epistemic value. Several authors—notably Jonathan Kvanvig and Michael DePaul—have criticized Truth Value Monism by appealing to the epistemic value of things other than knowledge. Such arguments, if successful, (...)
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  38. The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock.
    The value problem -- Unpacking the value problem -- The swamping problem -- fundamental and non-fundamental epistemic goods -- The relevance of epistemic value monism -- Responding to the swamping problem I : the practical response -- Responding to the swamping problem II : the monistic response -- Responding to the swamping problem III : the pluralist response -- Robust virtue epistemology -- Knowledge and achievement -- Interlude : is robust virtue epistemology a reductive theory of (...)
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  39. Modeling Value Disagreement.Erich Rast - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):853-880.
    In this article, monist values are expressed as preferences like in economics and decision making. On the basis of this formalization, various ways of defining value disagreement of agents within a group are investigated. Twelve notions of categorical value disagreement are laid out. Since these are too coarse-grained for many purposes, known distance-based approaches like Kendall’s Tau and Spearman’s footrule are generalized from linear orders to preorders and position-sensitive variants are developed. The account is further generalized to allow (...)
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  40.  23
    5. The engaged view and the reality of value.Arto Laitinen - 2008 - In Strong Evaluation Without Moral Sources. On Charles Taylor’s Philosophical Anthropology and Ethics. De Gruyter. pp. 161-216.
    In this Chapter (ch 5 of Strong Evaluation without Moral Sources), as well the following chapters, I defend a hermeneutical but nevertheless non-relativistic moral theory, taking Charles Taylor’s writings on this topic as my guide. Taylor is a realist concerning natural sciences, the ontology of persons and the ontology of goods (or meanings, significances or values). Yet, his realisms in these three areas differ significantly from one another, and therefore one has to be careful not to presuppose too rigid views (...)
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  41.  45
    Kelsen on Monism and Dualism.Torben Spaak - 2013 - In Marko Novakovic (ed.), Basic Concepts of Public International Law: Monism and Dualism.
    Kelsen defends monism, that is, the view that international law and the various state legal systems taken together constitute a unified normative system, and the primacy of international law over state law within the monistic framework. He argues in support of the -claim that only monism is compatible with the epistemological postulate, according to which cognition requires the unity of the object of cognition, that the norm conflicts that are said by the critics of monism to undermine (...)
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  42.  10
    Ethics, Value & Reality.Aurel Kolnai & Bernard Williams - 2008 - Routledge.
    Ethics, Value, and Reality is a collection of essays written after Kolnai settled in England in 1955. These essays from Kolnai's mature years sit atop a remarkable gestation of moral and political thinking. At the heart of his thought is the special role of privilege in a good social order. Kolnai relies heavily on the work of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century value theorists such as Alexius Meinong, Nicolai Hartmann, and Max Scheler. He blends this continental tradition of (...)
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  43. Value Pluralism, Realism and Pessimism.Kei Hiruta - 2020 - Res Publica 26 (4):523-540.
    Value pluralists see themselves as philosophical grown-ups. They profess to face reality as it is and accept resultant pessimism, while criticising their monist rivals for holding on to the naïve idea that the right, the good and the beautiful are ultimately harmonisable with each other. The aim of this essay is to challenge this self-image of value pluralists. Notwithstanding its usefulness as a means of subverting monist dominance, I argue that the self-image has the downside of obscuring various (...)
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  44.  38
    Ethical guidelines for the use of artificial intelligence and the challenges from value conflicts.Thomas Søbirk Petersen - 2021 - Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 1:25-40.
    The aim of this article is to articulate and critically discuss different answers to the following question: How should decision-makers deal with conflicts that arise when the values usually entailed in ethical guidelines – such as accuracy, privacy, non-discrimination and transparency – for the use of Artificial Intelligence clash with one another? To begin with, I focus on clarifying some of the general advantages of using such guidelines in an ethical analysis of the use of AI. Some disadvantages will also (...)
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  45. Opinion Paper: Pluralism about the Value of Privacy.William Bülow - 2011 - International Review of Information Ethics 16:85-88.
    This paper responds to two counterexamples to the view that privacy is valuable because of its connection to personal autonomy. It is argued that these counterexamples fail to establish that personal autonomy is not relevant for the value of privacy, but only the cautious claim that respect for personal autonomy alone is not the only reason for which privacy ought to be respected. Based on the response to the counterexamples a distinction between value-monistic and value-pluralistic accounts about (...)
     
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  46.  92
    Berlin, value pluralism and the common good: A reply to Brian Trainor.George Crowder - 2008 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 34 (8):925-939.
    Brian Trainor argues that the current hostility of political theorists towards the idea of the common good is in part due to the influence of Isaiah Berlin's concept of `value pluralism', or the incommensurability of basic human values. I agree with Trainor's opposition to the `agonistic' interpretation of pluralism, associated with thinkers like Chantal Mouffe. However, it is not the case that the only alternative to the pluralism— agonism thesis is the monist defence of a thick common good advocated (...)
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  47.  51
    Human Values in Management.R. K. Dasgupta - 1997 - Journal of Human Values 3 (2):145-160.
    The essay begins by the author's recollections of his younger days when people were seldom worried about moral decline in society. Today, however, it has become a real concern. Literature, philosophy, spiritual works are all essentially a celebration of human values. The paper examines the issue of scale of graded values as against that of absolutist universal values. A scrutiny of English literature reveals that some key literary figures in eighteenth-nineteenth century England drew attention to the decline of human values (...)
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  48. The impossibility of incommensurable values.Chris Kelly - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):369 - 382.
    Many recent attacks on consequentialism and several defenses of pluralism have relied on arguments for the incommensurability of value. Such arguments have, generally, turned on empirical appeals to aspects of our everyday experience of value conflict. My intention, largely, is to bypass these arguments and turn instead to a discussion of the conceptual apparatus needed to make the claim that values are incommensurable. After delineating what it would mean for values to be incommensurable, I give an a priori (...)
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  49. The trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. Or how I learned to stop caring about truth.Berit Brogaard - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, color expressions, future contingents, and conditionals. But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemic goal. I will call the argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. After formulating the argument, I will look at three possible (...)
     
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  50. Plato's "Side Suns" : Beauty, Symmetry and Truth. Comments Concerning Semantic Monism and Pluralism of the "Good" in the "Philebus".Rafael Ferber - 2010 - Elenchos 31 (1):51-76.
    Under semantic monism I understand the thesis “The Good is said in one way” and under semantic pluralism the antithesis “The Good is said in many ways”. Plato’s Socrates seems to defend a “semantic monism”. As only one sun exists, so the “Good” has for Socrates and Plato only one reference. Nevertheless, Socrates defends in the Philebus a semantic pluralism, more exactly trialism, of “beauty, symmetry and truth” . Therefore, metaphorically speaking, there seem to exist not only one (...)
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