In the 1980s, identity was a key concept in historical political debates in the Federal Republic of Germany. But this identity discourse comprised not only the publicly fought Historikerstreit and the discussion of plans by the federal government to establish two major history museums, but also the conflict with the,,new history movement“, which developed as a counterpoint to the field of history at the universities.

Ordinairement les manuels de biologie débutent par une exposition des caractéristiques qui distinguent la nature organique de la nature anorganique. En définissant et en limitant aussi exactement que possible son sujet, la biologie, le biologue ne fait pas autre chose que le mathématicien. La présente étude nous montre les obstacles presque insurmontables auxquels se heurtent le biologue et le mathématicien. A les bien considérer, les anciennes distinctions entre l'organisme d'une part et la matière non-organisée ou un système statique matériel, comme (...) la machine, d'autre part, se basant sur la nutrition, la respiration, les échanges vitaux et le mouvement ne tiennent plus debout. L'auteur allègue les expériences récentes de W. M. Stanley (Rockefeller Institute à Princeton) d'où il appert qu'il peut y avoir aussi génération dans les substances qui se secrètent sous la forme de cristaux (cristaux vivants), et s'en rapporte aux fameuses expériences de Driesch sur la régénération. Il y rattache les conceptions de Jordan (Utrecht) -- rapports entre les enchaînements des causes "d'après leur caractère amboceptor"; "le dessein des causes". Les vitalistes portent surtout leur attention sur "la totalité", les mécanistes sur "les parties". Le naturaliste qui se propose uniquement la recherche des causes physico-chimiques des phénomènes physico-chimiques serait parfaitement en droit de se contenter d'une conception mécaniste de la nature. Mais cette conception mécaniste ne suffirait pas à celui qui, comme l'auteur, aspire à comprendre l'organisme dans son ensemble. (shrink)

This book centers around a new translation of Aristotle’s small treatise, On Memory. It is preceded by three essays by Sorabji and is followed by a section of notes. The treatise treats of the distinction between memory and recollection and what each is. Memory is "the having of an image regarded as a copy of that which it is an image" and it belongs to "the primary perception part [of the soul] and that with which we perceive time." Here the (...) key ideas, finely modulated, are image as in itself and as copy, and time perception. Recollection is distinct from memory; it is the natural or habitual succession of given image: starting from one image and moving to something similar, opposite or neighboring, until the required image is present. Recollecting is "a sort of search" requiring deliberation and peculiar to men, whereas remembering is common to many higher animals. An interesting point regarding the act of remembering is, besides the succession of images, the attendant perception of proportioned time-lapses, so much so, that "when exercising his memory a person cannot think he is not doing so and fail to notice that he is doing so." The section of notes contains many illuminative remarks on the translator’s choice of words for all the major phrases as well as helpful explanations of the structure and meaning of the textual arguments. The three essays by Sorabji, on memory, mnemonic techniques and recollection, are critical accounts of Aristotle’s doctrine, taking into account the teachings of thinkers ranging from Plato and Berkeley to the Australian materialists and William James. Here Sorabji is most helpful in demonstrating the importance and relationship of the doctrines of On Memory to the larger Aristotelian teaching on thinking and on dialectical reasoning. The essay on recollection centers around Aristotle’s relationship to Plato on the same topic and on the systematic problem of association of ideas. All in all, Aristotle on Memory is an excellent little book, illuminating the larger context and satisfying in itself.—W. A. F. (shrink)

This book contains three essays: "The Mask and the Face: The Perception of Physiognomic Likeness in Life and Art" by Gombrich, the renowned art historian and critic; "The Representation of Things and People" by psychologist, Julian Hochberg; and "How Do Pictures Represent" by philosopher, Max Black. The book is based upon lectures delivered in the Johns Hopkins 1970 Thalheimer Lectures, where, taking off from the question "how there can be an underlying identity in the manifold and changing facial expression of (...) a single individual," there is an interdisciplinary attempt at clarifying the problem of representation. Gombrich’s central thesis is that the key to artistic representation is empathy and projection, which is guided by the interlocking display of the permanent and mobile features of the object represented. Perceptual activity and empathy rely more on the muscular imitation than on passive visual reception. He holds that what is singled out as the likeness-factor uniting the permanent and mobile features in, for example, the photograph of the four-year old Lord Russell and such factors in the ninety-year old Russell is the "general tonus, the melody of transition from given ranges of relaxations to forms of tenseness." Hochberg’s essay spells out the position that perception is purposive behavior, wherein the purpose is the information sought and behavior is the "succession of glances in different directions." Holding that perceptual activity is grounded in expectations, he lays aside Gombrich’s muscularity-thesis in favor of a learned expectation of feature characteristics. Black’s essay is a conceptual analysis of "depiction," or more precisely, of "P displays a subject S if and only if R, where R ‘will constitute the necessary and sufficient condition for P displaying S'." The essay, which proceeds in a Wittgensteinian Investigations-type fashion ends where the reader would hope it begin. He concludes that the problem can only be adequately answered by moving from logical investigation to the world of the artisan and art lover. To arrive at this conclusion he debunks six candidates that claim to meet the depiction conditions: causal history, selective information, intention, mimesis, resemblance, and "looking-like." At best, depiction may be considered a "cluster" concept of all six. Further determination, he holds, requires knowledge of the purpose of a particular depiction, and this takes us out of logic and into art; and so Black stops, unfortunately.—W. A. F. (shrink)

A selection of the writings of Wittgenstein in the philosophy of logic and mathematics written in the years 1937-1944. There is no concern with the foundations of mathematics in the sense of metamathematics nor in the sense of investigation of the possibility of providing secure axiomatic foundations for such notions as that of "set." Indeed, the original motives for these latter investigations are rejected; instead, a clarification of the grammar of mathematical propositions is sought. The author discusses the notions of (...) mathematical proof at length and attacks both the Russellian view that mathematics is an appendage of logic and Hilbert's program of proof-theory.--W. T. (shrink)

The volume consists of eleven of Löwith's essays on the philosophy of history, the history of philosophy, and the nature of the challenges faced by philosophy and the Christian faith in the twentieth century. Included are illuminating studies on Heidegger, Pascal and the early Marx. Appearing for the first time in translation are three noteworthy and challenging essays, "The Quest for the Meaning of History," "The Fate of Progress," and "Hegel and the Christian Religion." Löwith is concerned with the historical (...) origins of the intellectual problems facing modern man, but is critical of many modern attempts to view philosophy and faith from an exclusively historical perspective. Löwith's thinking is throughout stimulating and original.—A. W. W. (shrink)

This pair of lectures was given by Husserl in 1929 at the Sorbonne, and was later revised and expanded, resulting in the Cartesiansche Meditationen. By far the largest portion of the present volume consists of an introduction by the translator, the intention of which is to acquaint the Anglo-American philosopher with the fundamentals of Husserl's phenomenology. Biographical information on Husserl is also presented. The lectures themselves are less technical than the Cartesian Meditations, and are well suited as an introduction to (...) Husserl's thought.—A. W. W. (shrink)

The different distribution of "sexual strength" throughout the female and male life-span, and the resulting social backlogs of unsatisfaction in older women and young men, are cited as natural conditions having as final upshots the inferior social status ascribed to women and the permanent tendency toward war. To break the constellation of sexual adaptations which aggravates the tendencies toward war, the author suggests the introduction of "more generosity" into sex, i.e., the discarding of absolutist sex ideology.--E. W.

A densely-packed and comprehensive textbook of scholastic metaphysics. Metaphysics is understood as including "not only a general investigation of beings but also the study of knowledge and of the divine nature and attributes in the light of natural reason." Owens brings to this task the Gilsonian understanding of a Christian philosophy, his own considerable knowledge of Aristotle, Aquinas and scholastic philosophy generally, and a conviction that metaphysics is a knowledge of the universe and the things within it, founded on necessary (...) principles. Though intended as a college text, Owens' work might be better taken as a standard reference manual, much like the classic Latin text of Gredt.--W. G. E. (shrink)

This bibliography signals a monumental event in philosophical research and for the future of comparative philosophy, East and West. It is in effect the first volume of the proposed multi-volumed Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies which has been inaugurated with this research tool. The outline of the bibliography will constitute the table of contents for the subsequent volumes of the forthcoming encyclopedia, now being written by an international team of scholars. The entire enterprise is sponsored by the American Institute of Indian (...) Studies and is under their general supervision. The bibliography, which has taken five years to complete and consists of 9222 entries, will be revised periodically as more material is compiled from the Indian languages and as contemporary work continues. Since Indian thought systems do not clearly differentiate between religious and philosophical expression, the compiler limited his selections to the Indian darsanas and vyakaranas. Indian literature is included if it is philosophical throughout, theoretical in function, and expository in content. This excludes the more didactic literature such as religious scriptures and classics. Three general sections divide the work: Sanskrit texts with authors known; Sanskrit texts with authors unknown; secondary literature arranged according to the various philosophical schools. General sections on Jainism, the traditions of Buddhism, and Hinduism offer philosophical sources for the major Indian religions. The listings are chronological within a particular subject. This not only facilitates additions to the bibliography but also gives a focus to scholarly discussion on a particular point. The work ends with three indices: Index of Names of Persons; Index of Titles ; Index of Books and Articles. The final index should prove the most useful to the researcher and general scholar. The publishing of the bibliography, done in India and according to Indian standards, is inferior in binding and paper stock. The price, Rs.80., has been listed in American bookstores at various prices from $18.00 to $24.00 for those who do not wish to order directly from the Indian publisher. The American Institute of Indian Studies should be commended for directing this work and every effort should be made for the completion of the entire encyclopedia. In terms of Asian studies it is the most significant publishing venture since the appearance of Max Mueller’s Sacred Books of the East over a century ago. Mueller opened the world of Asian religions to Western investigation while this bibliography should expose the breadth of Indian philosophy both in its intrinsic value and its effect upon world philosophy.—W. C. C. (shrink)

This is essentially a textbook for an introductory course written in basic English of the primer type with a drastic simplification of exposition. The simplification often makes the exposition inaccurate and the readings confusing or misleading. The authors cover literally scores of positions and authors, some few major ones and many very minor ones, in almost every conceivable area of philosophy.--W. G. E.

Reilly approaches his topic by presenting the spirit of science and the phases of scientific inquiry as Peirce saw it, keeping before the reader, at all times, Peirce’s overarching view of man and the universe. The two prevailing themes guiding Peirce’s thought are 1) that there is a special conformity of the human mind to nature and of nature to God, and 2) that there is an architectonic qualifying all the various types and levels of treatment which occupy the philosopher’s (...) interest. The first question examined is the nature of the scientific concern. For Peirce, the scientist’s spirit is marked by the pure love of knowledge. It is important to note the theoretical aspect because it explains the possibility of holding belief in abeyance while examining nature: the purity of motive allows that proper questions will be asked and errors will be readily corrected. The scientist’s purpose is the real truth of things; he begins with questions about the world. There are four stages of scientific method: 1) The scientist observes nature as a thinking, analytic inquirer. Observation presupposes that nature is intelligibly structured. 2) He formulates an explanatory hypothesis which is a process of bringing a manifold of characters to a unified whole. 3) By deduction, the inquirer gathers experiential consequents of the hypothesis. 4) By induction the question is put to nature and observed phenomena are matched to the predicted phenomena, resulting in either truth or a modified hypothesis. Peirce’s principle of the kinship of man’s mind to nature supports his dictum to follow instinct over reasoned likelihood in choosing hypotheses. Also important is the doctrine of moderate fallibilism which holds that there is a convergence upon the truth founded upon the regularity of nature, but that chance is a real factor due to nature’s evolution. Reilly’s book gives an adequate account of the aspects of Peirce’s scientific method sacrificing specific and detailed analysis to a more general approach wherein he shows the unity operative throughout Peirce’s thinking. A good index and copious notes are provided.—W. A. F. (shrink)

Lakoff is writing the history of an idea, and he writes very professionally. He begins by identifying three basic approaches to the concept, which he later equates with liberalism, conservatism, and socialism. A chapter on pre-Reformation thought deals too briefly with Plato and Aristotle, and too insensitively with the Medievals. Thereafter, the development proceeds smoothly to the expected conclusion that each approach might well benefit from the others. Lakoff's exegeses and criticisms are satisfactorily subtle, though his basic classification schema is (...) not.—W. L. M. (shrink)

The author of this study declares as his purpose "to demonstrate the continuity and identity of projects between ‘traditional philosophy’ and existentialism," as against the view commonly held that existentialism constitutes "a radical break from traditional philosophy." The "radical break" in modern philosophy occurred, according to the author, when Kant reoriented philosophy to man, giving rise to the man-centered, human-life-centered deliberations of Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and others in this line of descent. It is true, Solomon admits, that (...) "most of the writings of the authors we shall study are concerned with metaphysics rather than ethics," but their ontologies entail "very definite conceptions of man." The last three of the book’s seven chapters deal with Husserl, Heidegger, and the main French existentialists ; this choice "necessitated neglect of some excellent philosophers who might have been included." Each chapter is a monograph of extensive proportions, the one on French existentialists running to about 55,000 words. The pages are double-columned, and the type small. It is hard to keep in mind, in the forest of illuminating and well-integrated detail, the book’s stated purpose of showing that existentialism is continuous with traditional philosophy. Nevertheless, as an intelligible account of how existentialist thought evolved, the book requires one to admit at the end that the story has been told, and well told, in the idiom of traditional philosophy.—W. G. (shrink)

The author, who is highly sympathetic toward her subject, follows Bentham's career from his birth until 1792. She divides these years into the Benthamite categories of learning, knowing and doing. She clearly shows Bentham's debt to Bacon and the philosophes, the origins of his adherence to democracy, the development of his logical innovations out of his legal concerns, and the growing split between his popular writings and the more complex, often more philosophically sophisticated arcana.--W. L. M.

This is a collection of seventeen articles, beginning with the 1945 essay, "De la Justice." Repeatedly emphasized are Perelman's opposition to "the absolutist ideal" and his insistence on the importance of linguistic considerations in reasoning. The theme of the final article, "what a reflection on law can contribute to the philosopher" epitomizes the spirit of the volume as a whole. The better part of this collection, it should be noted, has been published in English under the title, The Idea of (...) Justice and the Problem of Argument.—W. L. M. (shrink)

C. I. Lewis and Hans Reichenbach are the contemporaries selected for special study to support the thesis that a carefully redrawn Kantianism is still viable in logic and philosophy of science. The synthetic a priori is reinterpreted as the assumption that conceptual systems can be used to organize the data of sensuous awareness. The doctrine of the Ding-an-sich is defended.--W. L. M.

Carlston looks at the problem of nationalization of industries as a problem in organization arising with the increasing interdependence of national economies. He uses this as a "hard case" through which to study the structure of world society, the motivating values of action in world society, and the role of law as an organizing process in that society. By exploring this "hard case" Carlston hopes to clarify basic concepts, justify a new theoretical approach to international law, and point out the (...) basic deficiencies of legal positivism as a philosophy of international law. This book should prove a landmark in the philosophy of international law.--W. G. E. (shrink)

L'ordre du discours is the inaugural lecture read by Foucault when he became the successor of J. Hyppolite at the Collège de France. The booklet is a good introduction to the work of the author. It gives a summary of his key ideas, with here and there a couple of suggestive examples. At the end we find an outline of the work the author hopes to fulfill in the future. Foucault sees human history and human civilization as a big effort (...) of discourse-creation. To engage in a discourse though, is a dangerous activity. This danger might be avoided by diminishing the quality of the discourse. It is, however, tricky to escape discourse itself. Foucault now, analyzes the mechanisms by which civilization tries to maintain the quality of the discourse while at the same time protecting the individual against the dangers of it. The author mentions three series of mechanisms: 1) Exclusion: Not every thing can be said. Things are prohibited of entering the discourse. Societies also exclude persons such as the fools from human discourse. Finally, human talk is divided between true and false talk, of which only true talk is to be taken seriously. 2) Appropriation of the unknown: Certain forms of discourse have been given priority, such as commentaries, pieces written by known authors and pieces fulfilling the formal characteristics of a discipline. 3) Limitation of speakers: Not everybody is allowed to use all forms of discourse. Rituals make sure that only appropriate persons talk. The existence of societies protecting a monopoly on certain forms of discourse or the attempt of doctrinal groups to impose orthodoxy are two further examples of the attempt to limit the possible speakers. This being the case, Foucault claims that his philosophical method will not try to find the truth of a discourse, but rather he will in the future show that there is a discontinuous variety of discourses; that a discourse is essentially a violation of the world of things and that we cannot hope to understand the inner meaning of a discourse. The two most provocative ideas put forward in this booklet are that truth is not in the first place an act of intelligence but an act of the will. Foucault talks of a will to truth. The second provocative idea is that all discourse is a violation of the world of the things. To sacrifice the search of truth for the search of the structure of discourse is the essence of structuralism, of which Foucault is the philosophical standard-bearer.—W. V. E. (shrink)

The first volume of a projected trilogy on the problem of value, this essay advances two main theses: that liberty is the necessary precondition for all value, and that values arise out of intersubjective relationships. In these relationships there is a dialectical movement enabling values to transcend their original subjective natures and become progressively objectified. --W. S. L.

This little volume, by the Director of the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies at the University of California is a splendid work. Lynn White, who considers himself a Christian and a humanist, has written an important book linking together cultural changes in the modern world with those events in earlier periods which precipitated the changes. His major thesis is that the alienation of the humanist from technology is unfortunate, and that a rapprochement between the two is possible if one (...) reads history accurately. Technology developed, White argues, in the fertile cultural and intellectual soul of the Christian middle ages. It was the Christian view of reality that allowed man to take nature seriously and to permit him to think in terms of measuring and analyzing it. The Christian saw the world as a manifestation of the working of the mind of God, and his science was an attempt to decipher God's thought by exploring the nature of his handiwork. The technological innovations of the Middle Ages were possible because of the Christian's conviction that God had given man power and dominion over all creation: "The men who worshiped the Virgin also developed water wheels to perform all kinds of tasks that previously had been done by hand." To medieval man, the machine came from God. What White seems to be saying is that the Christian view of reality is one which produces a full-blown humanism, one in which man is free to develop his natural capacities, in a world which has been created by God for man to enjoy and in which man can best fulfill himself as a human. "Christianity, in absolute contrast to ancient paganism and Asia's religions, not only established a dualism of man and nature but insisted that it is God's will that man exploit nature for his proper ends."--W. A. J. (shrink)

Writing in French, the author points to Arnold Geulincx to explain the historical shift in the concepts of philosophic method and first principles. Geulincx' Methodus made use of the synthetic or expositive method, which Descartes had regarded as inferior to his own analytic one, but which he had employed, upon request, in Reply to Objections II. Spinoza, presumably inspired by Geulincx' example, was later to claim demonstrativeness for the mos geometricus.--W. L. M.

The best that has been thought and said in the analytical tradition since 1950 is here enshrined in a monumental testament to an idea. The naked sense of the idea is that the deepest problems encountered by man in understanding himself and his world will yield more readily to rapier-sharp conceptual analysis than to bold, creative, oracular, synoptic Anschauungen [[sic]] which are hard to get a handle on empirically. Although this beguiling idea, this analytical imperative, is itself only heuristic and (...) not substantive, its application has led to the accumulation of a staggeringly rich and brilliant treasury of philosophical illumination. Sixty-eight selections by giants of contemporary thought, from Ayer to Ziff, are deployed here under eight captions: reference and descriptions; analyticity and necessity; truth and meaning; problems of knowledge; the mental and physical; induction, laws, and causation; logic and ontology; and free will. Included are five selections each by Chisholm and Quine; four by Carnap; three each by Feigl, Pap, Sellars, and Strawson; two each by Austin, Bergmann, Cornman, Firth, and Rescher; and one each by 32 others. Some of the most famous philosophical papers of our century are represented here, such as Strawson’s "On Referring," Quine’s "On What There Is," Carnap’s "Meaning and Necessity," and Austin’s "Ifs and Cans." An index of 209 names and a knowledgeably prepared subject index bring this truly regal work to a close. It is a more-than-worthy successor to the uncommonly valuable Readings in Philosophical Analysis, edited by Feigl and Sellars and published in 1949.—W. G. (shrink)

The title of this book is an unusually honest assessment of its contents. The initial conjunction accurately depicts an external relationship between the domains discussed, and the subtitle clearly predicts the level of exposition. The title does not promise, and the author does not give, an independent account of any real relationship between psychology and religion. What we are given is a fairly exhaustive, if sketchy and reportorial, exposition of a variety of psychological views of a variety of religious phenomena. (...) The honesty and directness of the title mirrors the honesty and directness of the exposition. Need we also point out that the obviousness of the title also mirrors the obviousness of the exposition?—W. G. E. (shrink)

Some stalwarts are included in any and every collection of readings for students on political and social thought. Among these reliable standbys are Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Bentham, Mill, Hegel, Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse-tung. They are all here, marshaled and arrayed in judicious selections, well introduced. But something new has been added in this anthology. You will find in it selections from William F. Buckley, Jr., and Eldridge Cleaver, from Michael Harrington and Frantz Fanon, from Herbert (...) Marcuse and Martin Luther King, Jr., from H. L. A. Hart and Gregory Vlastos, and from others who were or are alive in the latter half of our century. The quality of the material presented is excellent. The final selection, for example, is a first-rate analysis of the notion of a "just war" by Donald A. Wells. The editors, in their general introduction, discuss such questions as what the foundation of political obligation is, how social and political institutions are or may be evaluated, how the ideals of a society are systematized, and what the nature and justification of social change are. A bibliography, a topical syllabus, and an index are usefully provided. This book of readings can confidently be recommended for use as the basic text of a historical or analytical course in political and social philosophy.—W. G. (shrink)

Time's man at Vatican Council II has produced an informed and intriguing account of the men, trends and events before and during the first session of Vatican Council II. The book is not as detailed as Xavier Rynne's Letters from the Vatican, and is certainly more argumentative. But the things being argued for are well worth study. Kaiser does bring out some details not found in Rynne's book, notably the undercurrent of problems related to anti-semitism. Unfortunately, Kaiser does not share (...) the tolerance and charity of either Pope John or Rynne toward the person and motives of his conservative antagonists. The book is somewhat repetitive and structurally confused.--W. G. E. (shrink)

Pearson points to the radical questioning of the traditional Greek ethic, which is found in the classical dramatic literature of fifth century Athens, as an example of popular ethics. The philosophic discussion of the Socratic-Platonic tradition supplanted this popular ethics in the fourth century. Many of the problems discussed in the philosophic literature were taken over as developed and articulated by the classical dramatists. Thus, three ethical traditions are described and related in this book: the "traditional" ethics coming from Homer, (...) Hesiod, and Solon, the "popular" ethics of the classical dramatists, and the technical "philosophic" ethics of Plato. The main effort of the book is to discuss the popular ethics as related to both the traditional and philosophic ethics The student of the Platonic dialogues will find the book of great value in identifying the various positions represented by the dramatis personae of the dialogues.--W. G. E. (shrink)

Aristotle and Huey P. Newton, Confucius and Abbie Hoffman, Gandhi and Eldridge Cleaver, and Plato and Noam Chomsky are some of the contrasts to be found in the groupings of selections in this unusual book of readings. The editors insist that in choosing "relevant" readings, they are using the same criterion of relevance as applies in logical argumentation, but they explain as follows a special application of this concept: "The material for the readings in this book has been primarily chosen (...) for its emphasis on relevant issues that are outside the traditional area of philosophy." Five topics are covered—education, protest, technology, national liberation, and the good life. The longest section is the one on protest, which includes passages from the writings of Sophocles, Plato, the New Testament, Thoreau, Bobby Seale, and nine others. Authors in the section on the good life range from al-Farabi to Bakunin, Aldous Huxley, Erich Fromm, and Jerry Rubin. Teachers of philosophy, if considering this book as a textbook, may be staggered by the high proportion of radical viewpoints presented in it. Nevertheless, the volume has a number of important merits. The topics treated are at the center of student interest, and the philosophical roots of the topics are displayed, at least in outline, in the range of selections. The readings are spicy, but they agitate the elements of genuinely profound problems.—W. G. (shrink)

This purports to be a case study in the retreat of theory before the demands of practice. The case is conclusively made. Perhaps the single most significant result of the historical development traced by Lapenna is the vindication, in Soviet legal philosophy, of the maxim ubi societas, ibi jus. Massive documentation, selected from a wide range of authors, is unquestionably the volume's most impressive feature.--W. L. M.

In this preface to his recent Critique de La Raison Dialectique, Sartre poses, and outlines an answer to, the question of the Critique, "Do we have today the means to constitute a structural, historical anthropology?" Distinguishing between "true" Marxism and that of Garaudy, Lefebvre, Lukacs and others, he accuses his contemporaries of explaining historical events by a rationalistic and fatalistic scientism in which the concrete existing subject gets lost. This un-Marxian "sclerosis" of Marxist concepts, says Sartre, is what accounts for (...) the prominence of existentialism; once Marxist anthropology recovers its "human foundation" in the comprehension of existence, existentialism will be re-absorbed within the sought-for method. Convinced that "true" Marxism does not consider human existence to be merely an economic-historical event, Sartre is not aware that the envisioned anthropology may transform Marxism more than existentialism.--W. H. C. (shrink)

This closing volume of Tillich's Systematic Theology is devoted to the domain of the Spirit, the domain of social reality, culture, history, and tradition. Tillich's existential, ex-static concept of faith, his qualitative concept of God, and his symbolic concept of the Christ lead him to see the ambiguity, fragmentariness and repeated failures of the church as an empirical reality. But they offer insufficient tools for an analysis of the positive nature and functions of the community of the Faithful. The Protestant (...) Principle becomes a principle of the ultimate inadequacy of all finite systems of thought and action, and is offered as the universally valid resolution of existential estrangement. As such, one wonders if it can also be a principle of faith for a community of believers. This ambiguity creates a number of difficulties throughout the book. Many of the themes of this volume are central to Tillich's thought and the general approach parallels and completes the earlier volumes. And for such a passionately committed theologian as Tillich, this last volume must be of first importance.—W. G. E. (shrink)

Pelikan argues, in this little book dealing with Luther's understanding of the Church, that the Reformer developed a reliance on some sort of "structure for the Spirit." The early Luther must be distinguished from the later Luther in terms of the conception of the relationship between the Holy Spirit and the institutional structures of the Church. The radical Reformer in the 1520s came announcing "the counsel I have learned under the Spirit's guidance"; but by the 1530s he was searching for (...) some sort of ecclesiastical certainty: "this is the reason why our theology is certain; it snatches us away from ourselves and places us outside ourselves." Pelikan adds still another insight to the massive literature on Luther. And his insights are usually profound. Luther is of two minds regarding institutions; on the one hand, the younger Luther can only reject those structures of the Roman Church: monasticism, the papacy. The older Luther knew from personal introspection and self-examination that those structures of the Church through which the unmerited goodness of God was communicated were means of grace. What seems to underline Pelikan's analysis of Luther is his reading of contemporary sociology of religion which makes the claim that all religious organizations develop greater and more severe institutional structures as time goes by. Weber and Troeltsch helped us with that observation a long time ago. It is good to have Pelikan do it again and to do it in connection with a thorough reading of Luther. One of the most helpful chapters in the book deals with Luther's conception of the Eucharist.--W. A. J. (shrink)

In its original form this was Bonhoeffer's first work, presented as a theological dissertation when the author was only twenty-one. It has been very influential on proponents of "religionless Christianity" among the Continental theologians. The argument is compressed and often elliptical, exceedingly difficult to grasp. Bonhoeffer follows Tonnies' distinction between society and community, holding that the religious community is a community of will which admits no end outside itself, but whose telos, God, is its boundary. It is a structure of (...) meaning rather than a structure of purpose, uniting persons in an I-Thou relationship in which they assume the relative independence of a Leibnitzian monad. The book is magnificent; the translation unobtrusive and long overdue.—W. G. E. (shrink)

Three very urbane men talk to us about literature and criticism and how these are and are not related to Christianity. Connolly very adroitly sets out the problems and obstacles facing the very possibility of a Christian theory of literature, and as adroitly gets around and through them to argue for the necessity of some such all-encompassing Christian theory. D'Arcy and Ulanov have to get down to the more particular work of showing forth the details of "Literature as Christian Comedy," (...) and "The Rhetoric of Christian Comedy." Before them all looms the advice of the new critic, that the poem is its own end; the elaborate moves required to say otherwise and still be respectably academic are a sheer delight for the logically minded reader.--W. G. E. (shrink)

Structuralism, in so far as its essence can be pinned down, seems to be the view that the surface aspects of social phenomena are best explained in terms of complex, elusive, below-the-surface "structures," patterns, or model systems. Examples of such underlying structures are the unconscious motivation schemes of individuals, a taken-for-granted economic order, customs of social strata, ingrained moral philosophies, and religious institutions. The De Georges’ pioneer sourcebook [[sic]] presents selections, infused with the structuralist viewpoint, from the writings of Marx, (...) Freud, and the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, who are structuralism’s patriarchs; Claude Lévi-Strauss, its present high priest; Roman Jakobson, teacher of structural linguistics at Harvard and M.I.T.; Louis Althusser, who rejects affiliation with structuralism; and four others. Some of these selections include extremely difficult passages, in which the authors seem to be striving to squeeze a deep disclosure out of a surface act or function. Other selections are clearer, somewhat smoother, and more convincing. A well-made index concludes the volume.—W. G. (shrink)

West takes his title from Camus, and quotes Camus' definition of absurdity: "the division between the mind that desires and the world that disappoints." The essays, which originally appeared in periodicals, discuss Yeats, Lawrence, Sartre, Camus, Simon Weil, Graham Greene, Santayana, and other modern writers. There is no analysis, either philosophical or literary; West attempts overall estimates of each writer's contribution to the problem of absurdity, but succeeds in providing neither insights for those already familiar with the problem nor useful (...) introductions for the uninitiated. Nor, despite the expectations aroused by the preface, do we get a very strong impression of an individual's encounter with the thinkers from whom he has learned most. In vino vacuitas.—W. B. K. (shrink)

The author is a student of the renowned German medievalist, Josef Koch. Having himself worked for more than ten years on medieval commentaries on Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics, Zimmermann wishes to make the result of his researches available to others. To reduce his mass of material to tractable dimensions, he follows the pattern of F. Stegmüller's Repertorium of commentaries on Lombard's Sentences, giving first a description of the manuscripts examined, then a transliteration of the titles of all questions treated in (...) the respective commentaries, together with the folio at which each question begins, and grouping the works of identified authors before the anonymous works in each category. The first volume is limited to manuscripts contained in collections at Munich, Innsbruck, Cambridge, Oxford, London, Paris, and Cambrai; a second volume, with wider coverage, is promised shortly. The majority of the authors reported on in the first volume are anonymous, but those identified include Adam of Bocfeld, Augustine Triumphus of Ancona, Boethius of Dacia, Geoffrey of Aspall, John of Wacfeld, Peter of Alvernia, Radulfus Brito, Siger of Brabant, Simon of Faversham, William Bonkys, William of Chelvestun, and William of Clifford. This, like Stegmüller's, is clearly a reference work for scholars, and its principal merit lies in that it provides an accurate list of physical and metaphysical topics being discussed at centers of learning in England and on the Continent from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth centuries. It was during this period, of course, that Aristotle was having his greatest impact on Latin Christendom. The questions listed by Zimmermann have their intrinsic interest, but even more they provide historians of science and of philosophy with considerable material for investigation, for analysis, and, hopefully, for the dating and identification of the works listed as anonymous. Zimmermann makes no attempt at completeness of reference, supplying only a few citations in his notes; on Geoffrey of Aspall, for instance, he refers only to Emden's Biographical Register, missing Enya MacRae's Geoffrey of Aspall's Commentaries on Aristotle, Medieval and Renaissance Studies 6. Regrettably the volume has neither a subject index nor a register of names, deficiencies that seriously impair its usefulness--W. A. W. (shrink)

The purpose of this book is to examine and explicate a definition given in Philosophical Investigations. The definition of the meaning of a word is that "the meaning of a word is its use in the language." Hallett understands this as a definition in the strict sense of the word. In Chapter I, the author looks to the Tractatus for its treatment of the picture theory of meaning and the Bedeutung/sinn distinction. The conclusion which he pulls from the early work (...) is that, for Wittgenstein, meaning was already in a proposition by way of the meaning of names. Yet, only in the use or application, i.e., in a proposition with sense is meaning revealed. Although the Tractatus is far from saying that meaning is use, certain guiding themes are elaborated and carried into later works; namely, the search for meaning, the impossibility of meaning outside use, and meaning as revealed by use. Chapter II, III, and especially IV bear the brunt of establishing Hallett’s thesis that Wittgenstein presented a significant and sound definition. He begins by showing what Wittgenstein proved meaning not to be: meaning is not images, objects, mental referents, nor feelings. All of these theories have convincing confirmation in certain respects, yet analysis, i.e., observation of the actual working of language, shows each to be too narrow. In making his transition to the true definition, the author shows Wittgenstein elaborating the theses that meaning is to be found in the system or context of language. These are elaborated only to be cast aside as were the previous suggestions. The pattern elicited from these examinations is that meaning is use and, hence, defined as such. To explicate the definition, Hallett presents and examines seven characteristics of use: complexity, regularity and utility, abstraction, openness, vagueness, variety, and family resemblances. The book concludes with a consideration of the major objections to Wittgenstein’s definition. There are too many objections presented to be handled justly. For the most part, the argument is superficial, usually presuming a familiarity with the issue, and with but an indication of how the objection could be handled. The strength of the book is that it gives an organization to Wittgenstein’s later thinking, especially by way of the above-mentioned seven characteristics. In identifying and elucidating them, Hallett does Wittgenstein students a great service. Its chief weakness, although pale in regard to the overall worth, is that the main thesis is not firmly established. To say that a precise and complete definition is given is contrary to what is maintained throughout the Investigations, and perhaps a serious misreading of the German word, erklaren, as the precise English phrase, "to define." There are extensive notes and an adequate index.—W. A. F. (shrink)

Das »Richtige und das Gute« (1930), das ethische Hauptwerk W. D. Ross’, enthält eine Vielzahl wichtiger moralphilosophischer Thesen und Argumente, die bis in die Gegenwart kontrovers diskutiert werden. Im Mittelpunkt steht seine pluralistische Deontologie, der zufolge sich die richtige Handlung aus einer Abwägung der in der jeweiligen Situation relevanten und unableitbaren Prima-facie-Pflichten ergibt, von denen nur ein Teil auf die Optimierung der Handlungsfolgen bezogen ist. Diese Deontologie wurde zu einem modernen Klassiker unter den normativen ethischen Theorien. Darüber hinaus stellt Ross’ (...) These, dass moralische Intuitionen eine Quelle selbstevidenten Wissens sein können, einen wichtigen Referenzpunkt in Debatten um den erkenntnistheoretischen Fundamentalismus dar. Auch für die Handlungstheorie liefert Ross einflussreiche Argumente, wenn er die Ansicht vertritt, dass Pflichten nie ein bestimmtes Motiv des Handelnden zum Gegenstand haben können. Eine zentrale Stellung nimmt für Ross die Güterlehre ein, in welcher er von vier Grundgütern, Tugend, Wissen, Lust und Gerechtigkeit, ausgeht. Wurde Ross in den ersten Jahrzehnten des 20. Jahrhunderts im damaligen Großbritannien als ein herausragender Ethiker – einer der bedeutendsten des Jahrhunderts, auf Augenhöhe mit G.E. Moore – angesehen, wandelte sich das Meinungsbild in den folgenden Jahrzehnten unter dem Einfluss besonders des Logischen Positivismus und der Philosophie Wittgensteins. In den letzten Jahrzehnten ist jedoch wieder ein wachsendes Interesse an Ross’ Ethik festzustellen. Dabei wird »Das Richtige und das Gute« bisweilen sogar mit der »Nikomachischen Ethik«, Kants »Grundlegung« und Humes »Untersuchung über die Prinzipien der Moral« verglichen. (shrink)

In einem Brief nennt Adorno die "Negative Dialektik" kurz nach ihrem Erscheinen unter seinen Schriften "das philosophische Hauptwerk, wenn ich so sagen darf“. Dieser herausgehobenen Bedeutung, die das Werk für Adorno hatte, entspricht nicht nur die lange Zeit, die er mit der Abfassung des Buchs beschäftigt war, sondern auch die lange Geschichte, die ihre zentralen Motive in seinem Denken haben. Philosophische Begriffsklärung, die Arbeit an "Begriff und Kategorien“ einer negativen Dialektik, versteht Adorno dabei als dialektischen Übergang in inhaltliches Denken – (...) und so betreibt er sie auch hier. Das hat Konsequenzen für die Form des kooperativen Kommentars, der in diesem Band versucht wird. Adornos "Negative Dialektik" zu kommentieren, kann nur in dem Bewußtsein der unüberbrückbaren Kluft gelingen, die den Kommentar von diesem Text trennt. (shrink)

The paper „F. W. Bessel and Russian science by K. K. Lavrinovich published in NTM-Schriftenreihe contains several errors coming mainly from re-translations of German names and texts from Russian into German. The correct spelling of names and original texts are given here. Beside this, some additional information from sources not mentioned by the author is presented, and the kind of relationship between Bessel and W. Struve is discussed on the basis of their correspondence.

The following is the transcript of a lecture taken in shorthand by Hans-Georg Backhaus. The transcript was originally published as an appendix in Hans-Georg Backhaus, Dialektik der Wertform. Untersuchungen zur marxschen Ökonomiekritik, a complete translation of which is forthcoming in the Historical Materialism book series.