Tim Crane has put forward a theory of intentional objects (intentionalia), which has taken up again and expanded by Casey Woodling. Crane’s theory is articulated in three main theses: a) every intentional state, or thought, is about an intentional object; b) taken as such, whether or not it exists, an intentional object is a schematic object; c) taken as such, whether or not it exists, an intentional object is a phenomenological object. In this paper, I will try to show that (...) theses b) and c) can hardly be defended together, unless, in order to redirect and strengthen Crane’s theory two further claims are simultaneously defended. First, certain intentionalia may be the same as other such objects without being identical with them, and second, from a metaphysical point of view outside phenomenology, the particular intentionalia involved by this sui generis sameness relation of appearing as an aspectual alter-ego of weaker than identity are concrete objects. (shrink)

It is an ancient view, to be found even in Aristotle’s analysis of friendship, that the other is an alter ego, another myself. More recently, this conception has provoked spirited debate within and without the phenomenological tradition. It can be found in a wide variety of texts, from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations to Thomas Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat?” The basic position can be summarized as follows. Intentional experiences are subjective, first-person experiences, not objective, third-person experiences.

Christopher Rowe's new book is an ambitious attempt to walk the tightrope between, on the one hand, bone-headed neglect of Plato's use of dramatic form, and, on the other, obtuse blindness to the presence of a serious philosophical agenda. This locates Rowe on the cutting edge of current methodological controversies, but his book also has deep roots in the past. He harks back to the oft-maligned Paul Shorey to offer an updated, newly sophisticated "unitarian" reading of the dialogues, one that (...) depends heavily on equating Plato's own voice with that of his Socrates, who serves as "[Plato's] alter ego, his persona, his mask". This Socrates is not merely a mouthpiece for a developing Plato's changing views, but a coherent character who represents a consistent Platonic voice throughout the works in which he appears—and even those in which he doesn't. Among other things, this close identification of Plato with Socrates requires Rowe to apply the principle of charity not just to the author, but to his creation. Since Plato and Socrates are one, Plato is fully accountable for all the arguments he assigns to Socrates: there is no dramatic wiggle-room for him to assign the latter any truly bad arguments for his own authorial purposes. (shrink)

Often understood as a dissolution of the ego, mental illness implies a process of deconstruction where the psychotic faces the most frightening limits one can encounter: the limits of perception, the limits of understanding, the limits of vulnerability, and above all, the limits of intersubjectivity. The present paper aims to explore mental illness phenomenologically, taking it as both a limited and an unlimited experience of intersubjectivity. On the one hand, mental illness is widely regarded as a limited experience of intersubjectivity, (...) for it alters and hence limits access to the Other. But on the other hand, it can equally be taken as an unlimited experience of intersubjectivity, because it opens up a new world to the psychotic that can be transposed into and improved through artistic expression. The present article will bring together these two dimensions in order to reflect on the limits of experience in general. To do so, I will first address the clinical studies of the analyst Marguerite Sechehaye and of Rosemarie Samaritter. By retracing Marguerite Sechehaye’s deconstruction of the ego in a case of schizophrenia that she successfully treated, I attempt to circumscribe three distinctive experiential layers that have been disturbed by her patient’s mental illness: (1) the affective layer, (2) the symbolic layer, and (3) the kinesthetic layer, which is indicative of the fact that our spatial presence and body movements are constitutive elements of our sense of self and of our being in the world. Second, I will focus on the relationship between art and schizophrenia, and subsequently on the limits of experience that a psychotic transcends when undergoing his/her illness. (shrink)

In the first part of my paper, we will journey through the general structure of the first volume of Ideas, from which we will be able to deduce the position of Volume II. After carrying out a general analysis of the noesis/noema correlation structure in Section III and having provided, in Section IV, the basics of a phenomenology of reason, the second volume of Ideas should study the general fields in which the objects of transcendental experience appear: the world, the (...) animal being, and the spiritual or cultural being. The third, unwritten volume should have been devoted to the study of the superior products of culture, and science. Thus, the second part of this paper will show the place of Ideas’ second volume. The third part, the decisive one, will inquire into the position of the world and the place of the body and culture. Specifically, it will ask whether the experience of the body is understood to be an objective genitive or whether it is also understood, necessarily, as a subjective genitive. The same question will be asked about culture. An understanding of one as objective or subjective genitive radically alters the meaning of the pure ego. (shrink)

Failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms, one of the hallmarks of referential opacity, is standardly explained in terms of the presence of an expression (such as a verb of propositional attitude, a modal adverb or quotation marks) with opacity-inducing properties. It is thus assumed that any term in a complex expression for which substitutivity fails will be within the scope of an expression of one of these types, and that where there is an expression of one of these types there (...) will be failure of substitutivity for terms within its scope. I shall discuss a series of examples that have been thought to challenge this explanation by exhibiting failure of substitutivity of coreferential terms for positions not within the scope of any of the standard opacity-inducing expressions. If these examples are genuine, then the usual explanations of opacity are either incomplete – because there are sources of opacity other than those standardly identified, or completely mistaken – because the standardly identified expressions are not causes of opacity. I will argue, however, that the examples only exhibit failure of substitutivity of non-coreferential terms, and, hence, do not present a challenge to standard explanations of opacity. (shrink)

In his Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations (Mach 1885) the phenomenalist philosopher Ernst Mach confronts us with a difficulty: “If we regard the Ego as a real unity, we become involved in the following dilemma: either we must set over against the Ego a world of unknowable entities […] or we must regard the whole world, the Egos of other people included, as comprised in our own Ego.” (Mach 1885: 21) In other words, if we start from a (...) phenomenalist viewpoint, i.e., if we believe that the manifold of sensations we are confronted with is ontologically fundamental —as Mach clearly does: “For us, colors, sounds, spaces, times,… are the ultimate ele-ments” (Mach 1885: 23)—then we are in danger to end up in solipsism. Unless, that is, we assume that some underlying thing-in-itself substratum from which matter, we ourselves, and all the others emanate. The only other alter-native seems to be—and Mach advertises it vehemently for he denies any “mons-trous notion of a thing-in-itself” (Mach 1885: 6)1—that we get rid of the Ego. For, if there is no Self in the first place, then the question whether there are others dissolves. To put it the other way round, it is ok that the others do not exist because, really, I do not exist either. If the Ego is a Myth solipsism is not just wrong but nonsense. There are two questions this paper wishes to address: first, do we need independent additional support for the denial of the Self or is the avoidance of solipsism reason enough to assume the Ego’s non-existence? I will argue that we do need additional reasons and I will evaluate those that Mach indeed gives to prove that “the primary fact is not the I, the Ego, but the elements (sensations)” (Mach 1885: 19). Second, is the deconstruction of the I, even if further sufficient support can be found, really adequate to stop us from worrying about solipsism? The doubt I will put forward is that the illusion of a Self might conjure up enough of an Ego—just like feeling a pain is having a pain, even if it is located in a phantom limb—to start us wondering whether it also occurs elsewhere. (shrink)

This article sets out to show that Mary Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792) was translated by Félicité Brissot de Warville, the wife of the prominent Girondin leader, Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville, and annotated by both. The demonstration is carried out through a study of the works translated by them, together or singly, before 1792: the annotation of those earlier works is echoed by the themes of the notes in the later chapters of the Vindication. These notes reflect (...) J.-P. Brissot’s admiration for Quakers and for British intellectual figures such as Richard Price and Joseph Priestley (whom he knew), dislike of clergy and interest in education. Two long notes also express Félicité’s frustration at being confined to the role of mother and housewife, and can be paralleled with statements in her correspondence. To some extent, she appears as an alter ego of Wollstonecraft. (shrink)

Barba non facit philosophum. L'habit ne fait pas le moine. In those proverbs, Latin and French, we find the classical opposition between appearance and reality—between the accessory (the superficial, the beard, the clothing) and the essential (the profound, the philosopher, the monk), the latter being independent from and unchanged by the former. Berliner questions this dichotomy. As an anthropologist, he reviews many situations in which humans wear masks or use other techniques to cover their identities: cosplaying, puppy play, historical reenactments, (...) live-action role-playing, and the use of pseudonyms. Cosplayers, the subject of Berliner's first case study, impersonate characters from movies or video games. On the basis of lengthy interviews, he concludes that role-players change when they wear the costumes of their favorite heroes, behaving, for instance, with more self-confidence. A little psychological experiment not cited in this book suggests the same. In 2012, Hajo Adam and Adam Galinsky asked a group of students to perform a task demanding concentration. Those given a white medical coat to wear during the experiment performed better, probably because they were more prone to adopt traits and postures attributed to doctors—postures thought to enhance concentration. Berliner believes that, in the case of more immersive games, such changes are not necessarily temporary. They can persist after the acting is done. In other words, in some contexts at least, clothes can change the man.To impersonate a historical figure such as Napoleon, another case covered in Berliner's book, the reenactor must pay attention to minute details of the figure's life, habits, and social environment. The reenactor may then experience a moment de bascule, during which he is so much absorbed in his role that he forgets he is playing a character. As such, the activity of imitating is a way of learning some particular forms of paying attention to the individual serving as model. I regret that this aspect of disguise is not discussed when Berliner approaches animal role-playing. He affirms instead that identification with animals “rests upon our imagining what an animal is.” To imitate animals, however, we must first learn about, watch, and interact with them. Imitation is never fully based on the imagination; our imaginations are opened by prior, more or less proximate interactions with the beings that serve as models. It is far from easy to imagine, out of the blue, using our bodies in the ways that imitating animals requires.Despite the book's title, Becoming Other, Gilles Deleuze is barely mentioned in it, probably because he was very critical of the concept of imitation, which is omnipresent in Berliner's thought. Still, the way in which Berliner uses the concept is Deleuzian to a degree. Deleuze is skeptical of the concept of imitation because the success of an imitation is usually judged by whether the model and the imitation correspond in appearance—the imitation, in that case, does not bring any novelty to the world. In contrast to Deleuze, who proposes to abandon the concept of imitation, Berliner invites us to study it in new ways. Indeed, his book teaches us how creative imitation can be. What counts is not whether an imitation is successful but whether it is fruitful, and that we measure by whether it transforms us. The imitator does not become an alter ego of the model impersonated but a superego, an ego more aware of all its capacities. Even if it is never made explicit, the contrast between successful and fruitful—a contrast dear to Vinciane Despret—structures Berliner's analyses, which are a valuable contribution not only to anthropology but also to philosophy. (shrink)

Husserl’s lifelong interest in Kant eventually becomes a preoccupation in his later years when he finds his phenomenology in competition with Neokantianism for the title of transcendental philosophy. Some issues that Husserl is concerned with in Kant are bound up with the works of Lambert. Kant believed that the role played by principles of sensibility in metaphysics should be determined by a “general phenomenology” on which Lambert had written. Kant initially believed that man is capable only of symbolic cognition, not (...) intellectual intuition. Lambert saw an increasing need in mathematics for symbolic cognition as exemplified in his proofs of the irrationality of π and e. Kant takes from Leibniz and Lambert an unrestricted notion of construction, allowing him to view mathematics as constructing its concepts in intuition, while Lambert’s proofs convince him that all mathematical problems are eventually solvable. Husserl criticizes Kant’s intuitionism for its inadequate accommodation of meaning to intuition, which he redresses with his theory of categorial intuition. This may improve on Kant’s intuition of the axiom of parallels but not so clearly on his spatial intuition. Husserl opposes Kant’s view of space as the form of outer intuition with his own view of it as the form of things. Husserl’s exploration of the geometry of visual space, which involves his earliest uses of epoché and reduction, converges however with Hilbert’s logical analysis of Kantian spatial intuition in leading to Euclidean spatial judgments. Hilbert’s analysis leads him to affirm the solvability of all well posed mathematical problems, a thesis complicated by the outbreak of logical paradoxes. Untroubled by such paradoxes, Husserl develops a supramathematics of all possible deductive systems whose completeness implicitly would also provide solutions of all such problems. Husserl’s full transcendental turn coincides with his realization that in effecting his Copernican turn, Kant was really the first to detect the “secret longing” of modern philosophy for a phenomenological clarification of being. Husserl now finds that Kant’s transcendental deductions presuppose a pure ego not adequately analyzed by Kant that survives the phenomenological reduction. Husserl’s idealism leads him to develop his own intuitionism, which adds to Kant’s, a “method of clarification” of mathematical concepts intended to clarify difficult impossibility proofs, but neither Husserl nor Kant base arithmetic on time. Husserl’s critique of the room left in Kant’s idealism, for things in themselves, leads to his own monadological solution of the problem of intersubjectivity. Husserl’s final judgment on Kant is that his form of transcendental idealism did not enable him to achieve absolute subjectivity through a genuine transcendental reduction. (shrink)

Humans are a part of the complex system including both natural and cultural-technological environment. Evolution of this system included self-amplifying feedbacks that lead to the appearance of human conscious mind. We describe the current state of the understanding of human brain evolution that stresses neurohormonal and biochemical changes rather than simple increase of anatomical substrate for the mind. It follows that human brain is strongly influenced by the state of the body and may operate at various levels of consciousness depending (...) on its biochemical environment created by ingestion of various substances and by specific physical activities. Through the study of the widespread phenomenon of shamanism that uses mind-altering practices we argue that altered states of consciousness and non-local minds are not only real phenomena, but that they are products of natural evolution, valuable for human survival and development. Consideration of altered states of consciousness and broadening of the framework for understanding brain function beyond mechanistic interpretations is necessary to further develop human adaptations and provide a better way of fitting humans as parts of the interconnected system into the global and universal patterns. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 451-453 [Access article in PDF] Ernst Cassirer. The Logic of the Cultural Sciences: Five Studies. Translated by S. G. Lofts. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. Pp. xliii + 134. Cloth, $30.00. Paper, $15.00. This is a new translation of Cassirer's Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften: Fünf Studien. It replaces the earlier one by Clarence Smith Howe with the title The Logic (...) of the Humanities (Yale University Press, 1961) that has been out of print for many years. Howe's volume includes a translation of Cassirer's essay "Naturalistic and Humanistic Philosophies of Culture" which does not appear in the new volume.Considered as part of his system of symbolic forms, this volume is the counterpart to Cassirer's conception of mathematical and scientific thought of the third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. The pivotal study in Cassirer's five closely related analyses of the cultural sciences is that concerning "Naturbegriffe und Kulturbegriffe." [End Page 451] Cassirer contrasts the way in which concepts function in natural scientific thought with the way in which concepts function in cultural thought. In the natural sciences all of the individual "properties" of a thing can be reduced to numerical determinations. The particular can be subordinated to the universal. Thus gold as a specific metal is gold if and only if it exhibits specific numerically expressed properties, e.g., possesses a specific weight, electrical conductivity, coefficient of expansion, etc.Cultural concepts do not subordinate the particular to the universal in this determinate manner. Rather, they coordinate the particular with the universal. Thus it is possible to arrange the various figures of the Renaissance such as Leonardo da Vinci, Machiavelli, Michelangelo, and Cesare Borgia under Jakob Burckhardt's conception of "Man of the Renaissance," but each only approximates this standard. Although each is not given a determinate place in relation to the others, they all can be comprehended in a meaningful set of interrelationships.There is a problem of how to render Cassirer's key terms, Naturbegriffe and Kulturbegriffe. Howe expresses them literally as "nature-concepts" and "culture-concepts." Lofts states them as "concepts of nature" and "concepts of culture." Lofts's rendering has the difficulty of suggesting that Cassirer's discussion concerns a comparison or criticism of various concepts of nature and culture rather than a theory of concept-formation showing the type of thinking distinctive to the natural sciences in contrast to the cultural sciences.The last study in the volume concerns "The Tragedy of Culture" in which Cassirer criticizes Georg Simmel's conception of culture as alienation of the human spirit from itself. Against Simmel's negative view, Cassirer advances his view of culture as a positive achievement of the development of spirit (Geist) from life (Leben). Cassirer's position in this study forecasts his view as developed later in An Essay on Man (1944) that human culture as it arises through its various symbolic forms of myth and religion, language, art, history, and science is a process of "progressive self-liberation." Culture for Cassirer is not alienation, but self-knowledge.Central to this last study is Cassirer's discussion of how the "I" does not originally exist in a fixed state of separation between "I" and "world" and between "I" and other human beings. The Ich, Cassirer says, develops itself in relation to the Du in the formation of culture. The difference between the two is not simply given. Lofts follows Howe in translating Ich and Du as "I" and "you" (Howe, 188-90; Lofts, 107-8). Cassirer's use of the second person familiar (Du) is intended to emphasize the "I-thou" relationship, the sense in which the other in this development of the self is originally an alter ego, not an impersonal other (Sie). Cassirer's discussion here echoes his discussion of the "thou" in the chapter on the "Phenomenon of Expression" (Ausdrucksphänomen) in the third volume of the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. The translation of Du as "you" rather than "thou" which reflects the... (shrink)

Born into a poor, Muslim family at the end of the 19th century, Gama became World Champion wrestler by defeating the reigning Polish champion in London in 1910. By focusing on the life of Gama, the heroic representations of Gama that appear in the Hindi language literature, and the transformations in wrestling regimens that have occurred over the past several centuries, I locate the discourse and practice of wrestling within a context of intersecting concerns with nationalism, class identity and embodied (...) consciousness. To articulate the way in which subaltern identity is embodied in relation to nationalist ideas about masculine fitness, and in relation to the state as a political institution, I provide an analytic interpretation of the heroic body that focuses on themes of nervousness and obsession. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe present paper examines the Eckhartian motives in Derrida's critique of Levinas’ concept of the “Other”. The focus is put on the Husserlian concept of alter ego that is at the core of the debate between Levinas and Derrida. Against Levinas, Derrida argues that alter is not an epithet that expresses a mere accidental modification of the ego, but an indicator of radical exteriority. Interestingly enough, this position is virtually identical with Meister Eckhart's interpretation of the famous proposition (...) from Exodus 3:14 “I am who I am”. Eckhart claims that the pronoun ego denotes the absolutely simple substance of the uncreated intellect, which can, by definition, never receive any accidental determination whatsoever. The reduplication of the “I am” is by no means tautological, but expresses the intra-divine dynamic of the Father who engenders the Son as his perfect equal and alter ego. This transcendental conception of egoity also governs the relationships between human beings: the ethical encou.. (shrink)

Since 1923 the Sammlung Tusculum has published authoritative editions of Greek and Latin works together with a German translation. The original texts are comprehensively annotated, and feature an introductory chapter. In the new volumes, additional essays delve into specific aspects of the works, illuminating their historical context and reception to the present day. The high academic quality of the new editions together with clearly written essays and annotations make the Sammlung Tusculum essential reading for students who are discovering an ancient (...) author for the first time as well as professional scholars who would like to gain a deeper understanding of specific aspects of a given work. Moreover, the series is ideal for lay readers who would like to engage with antiquity through a reliable German translation. The series contains over 270 titles, available in print and eBook editions, making previously out-of-print titles and rarities available again for the first time. In order to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the series, De Gruyter is proud to present Tusculum Online, an eBook package which contains all titles that appeared between 1923 and 2013 - a fitting tribute to an important part of German publishing history. For more information, please see www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

Evaluation of other cultures is a strong force in a culture’s definition of itself. Cultures are formed in encounters that include domination, conflict, and dismissal as much as appreciation and smooth exchange. In this paper, the construction of cultural identity is discussed, with reference to a Scandinavian Theme Park proposal made in cooperation between American design consultants and a local Swedish team of planners and visionaries. The image production in this design proposal, which never came to be realised in architectural (...) production, shows that “Scandinavia” appears as a two-some dialogic construction that adopts stereotyped cultural identities, and that it was not brought to any wider public dialogue. In a semiotic account of this architectural decision-making, models of culture (Lotman. 1990.Universe of the mind: A semiotic theory of culture. London: Tauris.) are discussed in terms of the tripartition of culture into Ego-culture, Alter-culture and Alius-culture (Sonesson. 2000. Ego meets alter: The meaning of otherness in cultural semiotics.Semiotica128(3/4). 537–559.; Cabak Rédei, Anna. 2007.An inquiry into cultural semiotics: Germaine de Staël’s autobiographical travel accounts. Lund: Lund University Press.), considered as a basic abstracted backdrop of what is meant by cultural difference. In this paper it is suggested that this tripartite view on culture, can be further discussed in reflection of post-colonial studies, notably through terms such as “mimicry” (Bhabha. 1984. Of mimicry and man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse.October28. 125–133.) and “subalterity” (Spivak. 1988. Can the subaltern speak?. In Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg (eds.),Marxism and the interpretation of culture, 271–313. Urbana & Chicago: University of Illinois Press.). The model of culture can furthermore be discussed through Peirce’s distinction between different stages and carriers of representation, adding to the cultural model an understanding of what it means, over time, for a culture to relate to an admired as well as to a neglected other cultural actor. (shrink)

Since 1923 the Sammlung Tusculum has published authoritative editions of Greek and Latin works together with a German translation. The original texts are comprehensively annotated, and feature an introductory chapter. In the new volumes, additional essays delve into specific aspects of the works, illuminating their historical context and reception to the present day. The high academic quality of the new editions together with clearly written essays and annotations make the Sammlung Tusculum essential reading for students who are discovering an ancient (...) author for the first time as well as professional scholars who would like to gain a deeper understanding of specific aspects of a given work. Moreover, the series is ideal for lay readers who would like to engage with antiquity through a reliable German translation. The series contains over 270 titles, available in print and eBook editions, making previously out-of-print titles and rarities available again for the first time. In order to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the series, De Gruyter is proud to present Tusculum Online, an eBook package which contains all titles that appeared between 1923 and 2013 - a fitting tribute to an important part of German publishing history. For more information, please see www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

Since 1923 the Sammlung Tusculum has published authoritative editions of Greek and Latin works together with a German translation. The original texts are comprehensively annotated, and feature an introductory chapter. In the new volumes, additional essays delve into specific aspects of the works, illuminating their historical context and reception to the present day. The high academic quality of the new editions together with clearly written essays and annotations make the Sammlung Tusculum essential reading for students who are discovering an ancient (...) author for the first time as well as professional scholars who would like to gain a deeper understanding of specific aspects of a given work. Moreover, the series is ideal for lay readers who would like to engage with antiquity through a reliable German translation. The series contains over 270 titles, available in print and eBook editions, making previously out-of-print titles and rarities available again for the first time. In order to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the series, De Gruyter is proud to present Tusculum Online, an eBook package which contains all titles that appeared between 1923 and 2013 - a fitting tribute to an important part of German publishing history. For more information, please see www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

Since 1923 the Sammlung Tusculum has published authoritative editions of Greek and Latin works together with a German translation. The original texts are comprehensively annotated, and feature an introductory chapter. In the new volumes, additional essays delve into specific aspects of the works, illuminating their historical context and reception to the present day. The high academic quality of the new editions together with clearly written essays and annotations make the Sammlung Tusculum essential reading for students who are discovering an ancient (...) author for the first time as well as professional scholars who would like to gain a deeper understanding of specific aspects of a given work. Moreover, the series is ideal for lay readers who would like to engage with antiquity through a reliable German translation. The series contains over 270 titles, available in print and eBook editions, making previously out-of-print titles and rarities available again for the first time. In order to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the series, De Gruyter is proud to present Tusculum Online, an eBook package which contains all titles that appeared between 1923 and 2013 - a fitting tribute to an important part of German publishing history. For more information, please see www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

Since 1923 the Sammlung Tusculum has published authoritative editions of Greek and Latin works together with a German translation. The original texts are comprehensively annotated, and feature an introductory chapter. In the new volumes, additional essays delve into specific aspects of the works, illuminating their historical context and reception to the present day. The high academic quality of the new editions together with clearly written essays and annotations make the Sammlung Tusculum essential reading for students who are discovering an ancient (...) author for the first time as well as professional scholars who would like to gain a deeper understanding of specific aspects of a given work. Moreover, the series is ideal for lay readers who would like to engage with antiquity through a reliable German translation. The series contains over 270 titles, available in print and eBook editions, making previously out-of-print titles and rarities available again for the first time. In order to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the series, De Gruyter is proud to present Tusculum Online, an eBook package which contains all titles that appeared between 1923 and 2013 - a fitting tribute to an important part of German publishing history. For more information, please see www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

Since 1923 the Sammlung Tusculum has published authoritative editions of Greek and Latin works together with a German translation. The original texts are comprehensively annotated, and feature an introductory chapter. In the new volumes, additional essays delve into specific aspects of the works, illuminating their historical context and reception to the present day. The high academic quality of the new editions together with clearly written essays and annotations make the Sammlung Tusculum essential reading for students who are discovering an ancient (...) author for the first time as well as professional scholars who would like to gain a deeper understanding of specific aspects of a given work. Moreover, the series is ideal for lay readers who would like to engage with antiquity through a reliable German translation. The series contains over 270 titles, available in print and eBook editions, making previously out-of-print titles and rarities available again for the first time. In order to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the series, De Gruyter is proud to present Tusculum Online, an eBook package which contains all titles that appeared between 1923 and 2013 - a fitting tribute to an important part of German publishing history. For more information, please see www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

Since 1923 the Sammlung Tusculum has published authoritative editions of Greek and Latin works together with a German translation. The original texts are comprehensively annotated, and feature an introductory chapter. In the new volumes, additional essays delve into specific aspects of the works, illuminating their historical context and reception to the present day. The high academic quality of the new editions together with clearly written essays and annotations make the Sammlung Tusculum essential reading for students who are discovering an ancient (...) author for the first time as well as professional scholars who would like to gain a deeper understanding of specific aspects of a given work. Moreover, the series is ideal for lay readers who would like to engage with antiquity through a reliable German translation. The series contains over 270 titles, available in print and eBook editions, making previously out-of-print titles and rarities available again for the first time. In order to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the series, De Gruyter is proud to present Tusculum Online, an eBook package which contains all titles that appeared between 1923 and 2013 - a fitting tribute to an important part of German publishing history. For more information, please see www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reading Style In DickensRobert AlterIt is a sad symptom of the devolution of literary studies and of our culture’s relation to language that it should at all be necessary to explain that style is crucial to the experience of reading. As the language of literature has been variously designated a mask for ideology, an expression of the “poetics of culture,” or a medium of communication not different in kind (...) from menus and graffiti, the academic study of literature in many cases seems to have lost the essential sense that style has its unique enchantments, and that those enchantments can often be a privileged vehicle of insight, even of vision. As someone who is temperamentally a rationalist, I do not want to sound mystical, but I find it an empirical fact as a reader that great writers are able in a variety of surprising ways to tap into occult connections between words and social, historical, psychological, or moral realities. Saul Bellow has aptly stated this commingling of uncanny insight and deep satisfaction that style can give its readers:A small clue will suffice to remind us that when we hear certain words—“all is but toys,” “absent thee from felicity,” “a wilderness of monkeys,” “green pastures,” “still waters,” or even the single word “relume”—they revive for us moments of emotional completeness and overflowing comprehension, they unearth buried essences. 1A novel is a whole world reconstituted through words. Style in a novel is that world’s very air which we breath (I shall presently cite a rather literal illustration of this principle in Dickens), the rhythm of relation [End Page 130] of the represented objects and personages, the depth of field in which they are seen. When we read style in Dickens, or in any other novelist, we of course are reading all sorts of other things at the same time—plot, character, moral dilemma, historical predicament, and so forth—but we can see all these in their full complexity only if we attend to the illuminating play of style.Despite the great length of his major novels, Dickens deserves to be read slowly, with delectation, with occasional pauses to reread a choice passage, because he is one of the most inventive and vigorous stylists in the whole range of English literature. Style, as we know, has many facets, and Dickens’s powerful rhythms, his supple patterns of alliteration, the hammer-blows of the anaphoric insistence he often favors, the cunning interplay of different linguistic registers he sometimes introduces, are all worthy of attention. But he is above all the great master of figurative language in English after Shakespeare, and what I want to concentrate on here is how I focus as a reader on Dickens’s use of figurative language, and what it reveals to me about the world of his novels.Dickens is one of those novelists who is preeminently a rhetorical performer, and so there is a good deal of self-conscious display of virtuosity, sheer exuberant verbal high jinks, in his writing. The high jinks are there for the reader to enjoy—in historical context, to keep the reader’s interest from one monthly serial to the next—but as Dickens grows in mastery and gravity, they are more and more a means of what Bellow calls unearthing buried essences. Let me glance quickly at the operation of style in a passage from Dombey and Son (1848), an approximate midpoint in Dickens career, and then consider more closely the visionary power of his prose at two moments in his last completed novel, Our Mutual Friend (1861). Here is the description in chapter thirteen of the company office of Dombey and Son as its august proprietor enters:The wit of the Counting-House became in a moment as mute as the row of leathern fire-buckets hanging up behind him. Such vapid and flat daylight as filtered through the ground-glass windows and skylights, leaving a black sediment upon the panes, showed the books and papers, and the figures bending over them, enveloped in a studious gloom, and as much abstracted in appearance, from the world without, as if they were assembled at the... (shrink)

Since 1923 the Sammlung Tusculum has published authoritative editions of Greek and Latin works together with a German translation. The original texts are comprehensively annotated, and feature an introductory chapter. In the new volumes, additional essays delve into specific aspects of the works, illuminating their historical context and reception to the present day. The high academic quality of the new editions together with clearly written essays and annotations make the Sammlung Tusculum essential reading for students who are discovering an ancient (...) author for the first time as well as professional scholars who would like to gain a deeper understanding of specific aspects of a given work. Moreover, the series is ideal for lay readers who would like to engage with antiquity through a reliable German translation. The series contains over 270 titles, available in print and eBook editions, making previously out-of-print titles and rarities available again for the first time. In order to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the series, De Gruyter is proud to present Tusculum Online, an eBook package which contains all titles that appeared between 1923 and 2013 - a fitting tribute to an important part of German publishing history. For more information, please see www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

Since 1923 the Sammlung Tusculum has published authoritative editions of Greek and Latin works together with a German translation. The original texts are comprehensively annotated, and feature an introductory chapter. In the new volumes, additional essays delve into specific aspects of the works, illuminating their historical context and reception to the present day. The high academic quality of the new editions together with clearly written essays and annotations make the Sammlung Tusculum essential reading for students who are discovering an ancient (...) author for the first time as well as professional scholars who would like to gain a deeper understanding of specific aspects of a given work. Moreover, the series is ideal for lay readers who would like to engage with antiquity through a reliable German translation. The series contains over 270 titles, available in print and eBook editions, making previously out-of-print titles and rarities available again for the first time. In order to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the series, De Gruyter is proud to present Tusculum Online, an eBook package which contains all titles that appeared between 1923 and 2013 - a fitting tribute to an important part of German publishing history. For more information, please see www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

Since 1923 the Sammlung Tusculum has published authoritative editions of Greek and Latin works together with a German translation. The original texts are comprehensively annotated, and feature an introductory chapter. In the new volumes, additional essays delve into specific aspects of the works, illuminating their historical context and reception to the present day. The high academic quality of the new editions together with clearly written essays and annotations make the Sammlung Tusculum essential reading for students who are discovering an ancient (...) author for the first time as well as professional scholars who would like to gain a deeper understanding of specific aspects of a given work. Moreover, the series is ideal for lay readers who would like to engage with antiquity through a reliable German translation. The series contains over 270 titles, available in print and eBook editions, making previously out-of-print titles and rarities available again for the first time. In order to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the series, De Gruyter is proud to present Tusculum Online, an eBook package which contains all titles that appeared between 1923 and 2013 - a fitting tribute to an important part of German publishing history. For more information, please see www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

The phenomenologist Gerda Walther posits the possibility of a new social act, which she terms telepathy. It is marked by an intimate in-terpersonal union in which ego and alter ego become capable of sharing in the identical lived experience, though distant from one another. Here, there is no fusion or collective identi????ication; rather, in-dividuals, though they live the experience and mind of the other, never lose or transcend their own individuation. Unlike the act of empathy, there is no analogical (...) transfer. This article defends the possibility of a restricted sense telepathy. The author argues that four conditions must be ful????illed for telepathy to occur: recognition of a social drive; a partially willed act of mind that results in the assump-tion of a certain stance, but it also comes upon us as an experience; constitution of subjects as persons marked by a “fundamental es-sence”; and I-splitting. (shrink)

In Great Expectations, Charles Dickens gives us an account of Mrs. Gargery going into a rage that is as remarkable for its brevity as for its insight. ‘I must remark of my sister,’ says Pip, ‘that passion was no excuse for her, because it is undeniable that instead of lapsing into passion, she consciously and deliberately took extraordinary pains to force herself into it, and became blindly furious by regular stages.’1 What is remarkable about this passage is its descriptive richness, (...) that way it shows how many of our emotional reactions involve something more than spontaneity in their actual performance. All this we glean readily and grasp as true from being with others; the genius of Dickens is to carry what is so close to us unto the page. I suspect that in his own wry manner, Husserl too would have liked this passage. He held out for a method of describing concrete lived phenomena that would neither underinterpret nor over-interpret. Such a description would avoid the twin and complementary sins of stripping meaning away from the appearances and putting strangeness into them. Presupposing too little is just as erroneous as too much, and Husserl was acutely aware that ‘in the apprehension of a man very much is already included.’2 When the descriptive imperative is to the fore, Husserl’s studies of the other are notable for their rejection of psychophysical dualism. But when the Cartesian exclusion of contingent certainty triumphs, he adopts a methodological dualism that decomposes the ordinary and unitary experience of the Other. The criticisms of his Cartesian derivation the Other are by now quite familiar, and I will only rehearse them where they intersect with the main theses of this paper. What I would first like to establish is that Husserl’s Cartesian approach to the Other - beginning in Logical Investigations and culminating in the derivation of the alter ego from the monadic sphere of ownness - clashes with the account of bracketing and reduction in Ideas I.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ad UnguemArmand J. D'Angour vos, oPompilius sanguis, carmen reprehendite, quod nonmulta dies et multa litura coercuit atquepraesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem.(Horace Ars Poetica 291–94) You, OSons of Pompilius, condemn that poem whichmany a day and many an erasure has not pruned andwhittled down and chastened tenfold to the nail."Censure a poem," Brink paraphrases, "which has not been reduced to right proportions and (when it has been reduced) has (...) not been tested to a nicety."1 Tested, that is, by its author, whose action Horace has been thought here to be likening to the way a sculptor examines a completed work for flaws. Translations of the final line commonly expand the phrase ad unguem to specify such a connotation, often taking praesectum to qualify unguem as in "to meet the test of the well–pared nail."2 But Brink has advanced convincing arguments against the supposition that praesectum qualifies unguem.3 Moreover, praesectum is positioned for emphasis and followed directly by deciens: the words must elaborate the process described by the foregoing coercuit.4Praesectum [End Page 411] thus picks up carmen, and no reference to the artisan's manicure should be supposed.5Ad unguem remains as a self–contained expression, to be understood in its own right.The image introduced in the following lines has been thought to present a deliberate point of contrast in the matter of the sculptor's fingernails:ingenium misera quia fortunatius artecredit et excludit sanos Helicone poetasDemocritus, bona pars non ungues ponere curat,non barbam, secreta petit loca, balnea vitat.(AP 295–98)Because Democritus believes that it's luckier to possess talentthan mere skill, and denies a place on Helicon to sane poets,a good number of artists make a point of not cutting their nailsor trimming their beards, but head for secret haunts and avoid baths.Despite the verbal echo, the change of tone and context at this point rules out any straightforward association of the unguem in line 294 with the ungues in line 297.6 Horace's humorous sketch of those "artistic types" who model their insalubrious habits on a superficial view of Democritean inspiration initiates a new section of the poem.7 It looks forward to a fuller consideration of the relative value of ars and ingenium, about which in due course Horace gives his opinion as follows:natura fieret laudabile carmen an artequaesitum est. ego nec studium sine divite venanec rude quid possit video ingenium; alterius sicaltera poscit opem res et coniurat amice.(AP 408–11) [End Page 412]The question is: Is good poetry due to nature or art?I myself fail to see what artistry can achieve without a rich vein of natural ability,or raw talent without application, to such a degree does the one attributedraw upon the other and make common cause with it.The only other instance of ad unguem in Horace is in Satires 1.5, where the phrase similarly appears tout court, conjoined to a past participle in a construction which parallels praesectum... ad unguem as construed above: interea Maecenas advenit atqueCocceius Capitoque simul Fonteius, ad unguemfactus homo, Antoni non ut magis alter amicus.(Sat. 1.5.31–33) Meanwhile Maecenas arrives andCocceius, and with them Fonteius Capito, a manof such consummate charm that Antony holds none dearer.Whether ad unguem here refers to physical or intellectual refinement (or both), the connotation "to perfection" is evident. Commentators ancient and modern have generally supposed that the metaphor is best explained by the image which Persius, writing around a century later, developed in his First Satire:quis populi sermo est? quis enim, nisi carmina mollinunc demum numero fluere, ut per leve severoseffundat iunctura ungues?(Sat. 1.63–65)"What's the word from the general public? "What else, but thatnow at last there are verses so fluent that no join jars criticalfingernails as they glide across the smooth surface.In commenting on AP 294, Ps.–Acro adduced this precisely evocative idea of "critical fingernails" for Horace's use of ad unguem:"ad unguem": tractum a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE BODY AND THE BLOOD: SACRIFICIAL EXPULSION IN A UREVOIR LES ENFANTS Diana Culbertson Kent State University In Scene 6 ofthe screenplay ofAu Revoir Les Enfants the students are at morning Mass and Father Jean is reading the Gospel: "Truly, truly, I say unto you, unless you eat the flesh ofthe Son ofMan and drink his blood, you will have no life in you." A student with the curiously (...) ironic name of Boulanger ("baker") faints. François comments to his younger brother Julien, "There's nothing to eat... we can't have breakfast before communion." In the back of chapel sit three new students—Bonnet and two other Jewish boys disguised as Christians, protected from the Gestapo by the monks, but prohibited because of their religious identity from Eucharistie communion. Food as scarcity, as plenitude, and as life functions as the signifier ofvalue and of every victim in Louis Malle's unforgettable portrayal of the loss of innocence in the occupied France ofhis childhood. Access to food was access to life in community—both religious and political—and the exchange offood, for what could not be consumed, plunges the small school society into its death. The cause ofthe dissolution of the school society is a failed sacrifice. The farewell to childhood which the title ofthe film suggests is Julien's entry into the world ofviolence and victims, ofmimetic rivalry, ofsacrificial expulsion, and societal destruction. The angle ofperception (Julien Quentin is Malle's quasi-autobiographical alter-ego) lures viewers out their own innocence and shocks theater audiences once again with the implications of all Final Solutions. Three concentric levels identify the communities in dissolution represented in Malle's portrayal: France under the occupying military force, the school administrators and staff, and the pupils in their charge. At each level the Diana Culbertson47 mimetic conflict is at a different state ofsocietal crisis. At the highest level, the German occupation troops and their collaborators represent a moment of Violence Triumphant, a Monstrous divinity who can impose control over the group by terrorizing everyone. This persecutory violence, which has co-opted the judicial system, drives the community of French people into (at least outward) submission and passivity. When the Monster requires victims, the community must consent to offer them. The persecutor's need for victims in this film has its own demonic rationale: "... to rid France of strangers, of Jews," says Müller, the Gestapo officer in one of the final scenes. When persecutory violence is resisted, however, when someone refuses to offer the designatedvictim for expulsion, the unity ofthe submissive society dissolves. Those who will not conform may suffer the violence of those who find their private well being in an alliance with public persecution. Father Jean, director ofthe school where Malle's scenario takes place, is one ofthe instruments ofresistance. Only the other instructors and staff are aware ofhis activities in the French underground. The audience is admitted to his dangerous secret, even as it observes the contrasting immaturity of the students, especially Julien, who cannot bear to leave his mother and is still wetting his bed. When he asks his older brother, "What is a Jew?" he is given the alimentary explanation: "Someone who doesn't eat pork." In this cultural situation, the Jew is more frequently someone who doesn't eat. Quentin's half truth is only one side ofa more ominous reality. Father Jean, aware of that reality, first appears in the film to introduce Bonnet, the "new classmate" and to show the boy his dormitory bed. As the director leaves, the schoolboys display their own societal dynamics, resuming their customary internecine, frenzied battles and rivalries. They throw pillows; they mock the outsider, focusing their ridicule on his name. Later in a classroom scene, they will hiss, "Dubo, Dubon, Dubonnet...."—an apt thematic detail with its allusion to wine and its liturgical translation into blood. In the morning Boulanger leads the attack against the stranger, slipping an icicle behind Bonnet's shirt collar. At recess games disintegrate into private quarrels. Their small brutal society is a microcosm of the larger world of which the schoolboys are apparently innocent but which they are grooming themselves to live in without remorse... (shrink)

Choosing to interact with others in an online forum provides an opportunity for exploring one’s own identity. With each new group joined, a person must make decisions about self-presentation and react to an audience. Such decisions continue as social interactions occur and relationships develop. This paper discusses how bloggers who have affiliated with each other to form a loosely knit community develop largely pseudonymous identities along with norms surrounding the development and performance of identity. The study is ethnographic and longitudinal, (...) examining a community of academics who blog and comment alongside each other in a diaristic manner. Focal areas include blog elements through which identity may be expressed, namely (1) Name and blog title; (2) Profiles; (3) Post content; (4) Voice; (5) Affiliations; and (6) Visual design; the effect of pseudonyms on blog authors and readers; and how issues of privacy and trust are manifest in the community. (shrink)

Since 1923 the Sammlung Tusculum has published authoritative editions of Greek and Latin works together with a German translation. The original texts are comprehensively annotated, and feature an introductory chapter. In the new volumes, additional essays delve into specific aspects of the works, illuminating their historical context and reception to the present day. The high academic quality of the new editions together with clearly written essays and annotations make the Sammlung Tusculum essential reading for students who are discovering an ancient (...) author for the first time as well as professional scholars who would like to gain a deeper understanding of specific aspects of a given work. Moreover, the series is ideal for lay readers who would like to engage with antiquity through a reliable German translation. The series contains over 270 titles, available in print and eBook editions, making previously out-of-print titles and rarities available again for the first time. In order to celebrate the 90th anniversary of the series, De Gruyter is proud to present Tusculum Online, an eBook package which contains all titles that appeared between 1923 and 2013 - a fitting tribute to an important part of German publishing history. For more information, please see www.degruyter.com/tusculum. (shrink)

This article intends to develop an analysis of the concept of anonymity or anonymous life, as it appears in Merleau-Pontyʼs philosophy, in the context of a wider interrogation about the experiencie of us in contemporary societies. Our hypothesis is that Merleau-Ponty reppresents a decisive break in the phaenomenological philosophies of existence, as he moves the attention on the individual and its openness to the world, towards us, as a contidion for this openness. From that point, we analyse how this us (...) can be thinked: firstly, how the question of intersubjectivity is reformulated out of the structure Ego-Alter Ego; secondly, the figures that make the anonymity thinkable as a dimension of subjectivity; thirdly, the consequences of this reformulation on the «omnipotent fantasy of Modernity». Finally, we outline some ideas about a philosophical praxis centered on exploring the experience of us in our contemporary society, caracterized by the privatization of existence. (shrink)

In this paper an "unconscious" structure common to such altered psychological states as dreaming, schizophrenic disintegration, out-of body experiences, and creative acts is described. This description is accomplished by setting psychoanalytic, clinical, and empirical studies zuithin a phenomenological framework. Phenomenological self-reflection is first made a party to discussions which focus on memories and the experience of the lived body. The configurations of "unconsciousness" then take precedence in describing relationships between the "I" of waking consciousness and a transformative body image . (...) A unique experience of the self-as undergoing a process of ego "duplication" and body "doubling"-is highlighted. (shrink)

continent. 1.2 (2011): 141-144. This January, while preparing a new course, Robert Seydel was struck and killed by an unexpected heart attack. He was a critically under-appreciated artist and one of the most beloved and admired professors at Hampshire College. At the time of his passing, Seydel was on the brink of a major artistic and career milestone. His Book of Ruth was being prepared for publication by Siglio Press. His publisher describes the book as: “an alchemical assemblage that composes (...) the life of his alter ego, Ruth Greisman— spinster, Sunday painter, and friend to Joseph Cornell and Marcel Duchamp. Through collages, drawings, and journal entries from Ruth’s imagined life, Seydel invokes her interior world in novelistic rhythms.” This convergence of his professional triumph with the tragedy of his death makes now a particularly appropriate time to think about Robert Seydel and his work. This feature contains a selection of excerpts from Book of Ruth (courtesy of Siglio Press) alongside a pair of texts remembering him and giving critical and biographical insights into his art and his person. These texts, from a former student and a colleague respectively, were originally prepared for Seydel's memorial at Hampshire College and have since been revised for publication in continent. For more information on Book of Ruth, please visit the book's page at the Siglio Press website. —Ben Segal draughty R. * Lauren van Haaften-Schick 2011 “The most apt way to order Smithson's library is with the conjunction 'and'; science and religion; modernism and mass culture; what is present and what is missing.” —Alexander Alberro, 248 Robert Seydel's classes on collage and collecting immersed his students in a curious world of cabinets, oddities, exhaustive archives and obscure histories, explored always with critical rigor and a sincere eye for wonder. His office was a compendium of the ancient, mythic, potential and unworldy, where seemingly unrelated references were endlessly pulled, piled and fused in an ecstatic dance of hyper-annotation. The small room and all its contents overflowed with notes tucked in every margin and corner. Books coated the walls like a switchboard, anxious and humming, waiting for infinite links to be activated. William Blake's books of Job and Urizen summoned Greek mythology and the animal as metaphor, leading to 19th century cryptozoology and the cave paintings at Lascaux, Gaston Bachelard's description of the bird in his garden and Robert Rauschenberg's Canyon . Tracking archetypes and following tangential threads, new revelations and ancient narratives were compiled and ordered to form a new text, a bibliography as assemblage, portrait and poem. Robert's library—one of his many collections—is a portrait, an “artifact, collage of time, a token and remnant” (Seydel, 2007) He is humming with it still. The imagination of this room—of Robert—breathes through the pages of Book of Ruth, as every decision and detail unfolds to a cosmos. Allegory, invention, personal and art histories are entangled and leveled, rendering lived, perceived and absorbed experiences indistinguishable. Anonymous scraps discovered on the street or studio floor, careful clippings and drawn figures are chosen and animated through serendipitous destruction and whimsical, delicate positioning. A precise vocabulary of characters and terms erupts and collapses as personas and passers-by wave and whisper, “Every figure reveals aspects of the total form, which is open and green” (Seydel, 2007). The initials R.S. repeat, a nod to Robert's true family tree and further complicating identification. Robt, Robert's sometimes alter-ego, appears in myriad forms as a trickster “half-wit,” mercurial and skittish, or soft and worn thin. Saul is a solemn tinkerer, parsing the world and sometimes blind. Ruth, the speaker of the book, records and translates all, her voice wavering between poetic verse and a cryptic half-speech as complex as it is sparse. The rhythm of frayed edges sets time - the weight of the world and the lightness of paper. Robert wrote of his process, “Material is essential; scuffings carry history, which wanders throughout” (Seydel, 2007). Collectors, assemblers, sway between careful movements of selection and placement as they pull from the found world, mediating calculated and unconscious association to form a lexicon of gestures, symbols and allusion, the “artifacts of a life... the refuse and rejecta of days” (Seydel, 2007). These assembled fragments shift and chatter, at home in their homelessness, actors performing in their own lives, populating an invented world of similar orphans. Such accumulated, severed parts carry the injury of their cutting and retain the evidence of their source, binding loss to creation in a symbiosis of trauma and repair. Mourning and remembrance are deeply embedded in the histories and acts of such practices. Grievance, acceptance, and the fragility of life are conveyed in the 18th century allegorical arrangements of fetal specimens by Frederik Ruysch. A certain melancholy reverence colors Joseph Cornell's intimately tactile assemblages rendering the universe tangible in miniature, or made in devotion to unrequited loves. Preserved in stasis, these ghosts and idols are kept in a purgatory where fact and fiction, past and present are irrelevant distinctions. Catalogued and contained, the subject of loss is transferred to an artifact. Every thread, scrap and letter may be glued, gathered and placed in a museum, a tomb, a box, a page, ripe and open for possession. Holding on to grief and reveling in disrepair, we opt to be haunted. Forever unbalanced and in flux, the sublime of collage is its resolve to irresolution. For Robert, “Art, as creation and as sign of primary Imagination, is not objects but a state, a kind of fluid” (Seydel, 2007) Reflecting on his work, life, and death, I am drawn to my library and the myriad titles acquired through his inspiration. There is Daniel Spoerri's An Anecdoted Topography of Chance , Susan Stewart's On Longing , various Borges, Barthes, Perec, and especially Life: A User's Manual , which concludes that the perfect puzzle will have no solution. I think of the drawers of miscellaneous swallowed objects at the Mutter Museum, Ray Johnson coding the every day in riddles, Wallace Berman twisting tongues, and Susan Hiller laying every detail to bear. Collectors and makers working in endless cycles of observation, ingestion and display. Every gesture informs and is defined by others, every space is shaped by that which surrounds and fills it, the knot has an inner logic, the gigantic is not so different from the miniature, there is a world in every detail, and “All art is collage” (Seydel, 2011) These thoughts have molded my life, my art, and all the minutia that keep the two so profoundly intertwined; There is no difference between life and what we do with our time. “I write my life. I make me up.” What a gift to share this secret way of knowing the world, and to leave this knowledge for us to do with what we please. “Art begins in admiration” (Seydel, 2011) Lauren van Haaften-Schick is a curator, writer and artist based in New York. Upcoming curatorial projects include "Cancelled" at the Center for Book Arts, and "The Spirit of the Signal" at Nicole Klagsbrun Gallery, New York. Recent activities include the workshops "Market, Alternative" and "Alternative Art Economies" at Trade School and Momenta Art, and the e-flux Time/Store, New York. She is the founding director of two arts spaces in Northampton, MA and Philadelphia, PA. She received a BA in Art History and Studio Art from Hampshire college in 2006. Sura Levine on Robert Seydel If early on in his time at Hampshire College I was officially his “mentor,” Robert Seydel quickly became one of my great teachers. Over the years we talked about everything, from art, music, collage, and poetry, to campus politics, this latter far too often. It was always a sublime pleasure, if all too rarely done, to enter his apartment to look at his work in progress, to peruse his bookshelves where, inevitably, there were always new treats to examine. And, while he was working on his Book of Ruth , I was given the opportunity over the course of many meals at the Korean and other restaurants, to talk with him about image and poem ordering. To see how he thought through each comma, each juxtaposition across the gutters of the Book, was to watch a brilliant curator at work. Each day, I walk past his wonderful collaged portrait of Ruth, purchased, after much haggling, as a birthday present, a couple of years ago. And each day, I think how lucky I am to have known Robert as he produced this magnum opus. One of my greatest pleasures in 24 years at the College was to teach “The Collector” with Robert. One of my greatest regrets is that the magic we created together in the classroom will not, and cannot, be duplicated. Its various incarnations, its utter intelligence and magic, were all so deeply Robert’s. His was a mind that put poetry, philosophy, history of science, and history together with art, and art together with music. His intellect and eye were unparalleled. He introduced us to so many artists. He shared his fascination with the cabinets of curiosity of Aldrovandi, of Seba, and Peter the Great’s collection of fetal anomalies, as well as the Museum of Jurassic Technology in Los Angeles. Robert knew them all and so many more. He was a walking encyclopedia, his home a great archive. Arcane knowledge, perhaps, but oh so important for another of Robert’s heroes, the mid-20th century Belgian artist Marcel Broodthaers, whose name he invariably mispronounced as “Broadthayers.” In speaking his name, Robert would always look in my direction in a panic, and then he go on and maul it. I absolutely loved his various mispronunciations of French names and terms! “The Collector” was always filled with talented young artists, art historians, philosophers and writers who all came to understand the wondrous obsessions of the figure of the collector. Students in this course created dazzling projects each term. He always moved while looking and speaking. He read deeply, and commented on everyone’s work with wonderful generosity. Robert always found something to praise even in the least developed of projects. Robert inspired and mentored all of his students into making work that far exceeded their expectations—and ours. For those of you who were lucky enough to have been touched by or to have had an evaluation written by Robert, savor it, keep it, reread it, and share it. He loved working with you all; it is somehow fitting that he died while prepping yet another new course. Robert, it’s almost impossible to speak of you in the past tense, even though you left us a month ago. No doubt, if you knew about our gatherings and celebrations of you, you would be embarrassed that we are making a fuss over you; you always placed the focus on others rather than on yourself. This trait is exactly why so many people miss you now. We’re here to love you publicly as we all did privately for the eleven years you were among us. Robert, my very dear friend, you were an extraordinary artist—you were my brother of choice. My heart broke when yours did. I miss you profoundly. —Sura Levine, February 26, 2011 Sura Levine is a professor of art history at Hampshire College. Her field of specialty is 19th century Belgian and French art, particularly realism and impressionism. Having worked in museums for a number of years both prior to coming to the College, and, as guest curator and co-author of exhibition catalogues, she became particularly interested in the history of museum and trends in collecting. It was because of their shared interests that she and Robert Seydel developed their course, The Collector, which they co-taught for many years. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Our Original Barbarism":Man vs. Nature in Thomas Jefferson's Moral ExperienceMaurizio ValsaniaJefferson, perhaps more than any other early democratic theorist, recognized that the development of social institutions and government could not be left to chance or to the "Laws of Nature."1One of the most fundamental fact about Thomas Jefferson—maybe the fundamental fact about Thomas Jefferson—is that he was a white man, and a landholding white man at that. Scholars of (...) ethnicity in the last thirty years have spent an enormous amount of time analyzing what it has meant to be Indian, or African American, or Mexican American, or Asian American, but scholars of "mainstream" history have spent almost no time analyzing what it means to be "white"; whiteness, on the contrary, simply remains the norm by which the difference of the non whites is gauged. We are just beginning our exploration of whiteness, as a culturally and politically constructed phenomenon.2This paper presents Thomas Jefferson's moral attitudes from a particular point of view.3 The thesis I defend can be stated in a very schematic way. (1) In order to secure the new-born Republic the American "leader," according to [End Page 627] Jefferson, must struggle against enemies, against circumstances but mainly against nature. Nature is perhaps the most powerful symbol of the disorder white Americans have to conquer. (2) This struggle against nature reveals a deep ethical commitment. White men are praiseworthy to the extent that they keep fighting against disorder, nature, and circumstances. (3) Jefferson's optimism, or better, "meliorism," was aimed at promoting moral behavior, i.e., to incite his alter egos to struggle against adverse conditions. As to whether or not he was confident about the course of American history, I have staked no claims in this paper.4 (4) Jefferson's case for the struggle against nature is ethically coherent and leads to some interesting reflections on Jefferson's ideas about human nature and white Americans in particular.The notion of "human nature" in this paper refers to white Americans, namely, to the moral character, temperament, and ambitions of those leaders whose main burden, in Jefferson's opinion, should be to construct nineteenth-century America. This examination takes for granted that Jefferson neither worked out a systematic theory of human nature nor elaborated a specific theory of the essence of white Americans.5 Nevertheless, it is too much to say that Jefferson "did not work out his ideas in a logical way."6 His anthropological views were fairly coherent even though very difficult to disentangle. Jefferson, for instance, was neither an optimist nor a pessimist. Furthermore, he was not satisfied with a philosophical, simply "general," and a priori definition of a universal human nature. Jefferson placed human beings outside a metaphysical frame of reference. He placed them "within the sphere of nature, and in so doing [he] was a true exponent of the Enlightenment."7 Humans are merged into geographical, social, religious, economic, in short positive contexts and conditions. They appear as conditioned beings. On the other hand Jefferson was not exclusively involved in the examination of a physical or a posteriori anthropology in which humans are considered solely in the unique particularity of their races and habits.8Thomas Jefferson stood in the middle between the quest for a philosophical theory of human nature and a scientific examination of it. One thing is clear: he was not content with sweeping statements. Merle Curti noted, for example, "Jefferson's feelings about human nature's plasticity."9 This sense of "plasticity" suggests Jefferson's realism and complexity of vision. A philosopher and an [End Page 628] anthropologist, Jefferson was neither satisfied by a general definition nor by an optimistic portrait of human nature. He was against idealization, in particular when white Americans are at stake. Thus, this paper considers the terms in which Jefferson "questioned the cheery view of human nature that some enlightened thinkers celebrated."10 Must white Americans be celebrated? Must nature be celebrated?I. Thomas Jefferson was a strong supporter of social improvement. His involvement in educational, agrarian, commercial, scientific, geographic, and political projects shows several instances of his being an Enlightenment modernizer who... (shrink)

The subjective effects and therapeutic potential of the shamanic practice of journeying is well known. However, previous research has neglected to provide a comprehensive assessment of the subjective effects of shamanic-like journeying techniques on non-shamans. Shamanic-like techniques are those that demonstrate some similarity to shamanic practices and yet deviate from what may genuinely be considered shamanism. Furthermore, the personality traits that influence individual susceptibility to shamanic-like techniques are unclear. The aim of the present study was, thus, to investigate experimentally the (...) effect of shamanic-like techniques and a personality trait referred to as "ego boundaries" on subjective experience including mood disturbance. Forty-three non-shamans were administered a composite questionnaire consisting of demographic items and a measure of ego boundaries (i.e., the Short Boundary Questionnaire; BQ-Sh). Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: listening to monotonous drumming for 15 minutes coupled with one of two sets of journeying instructions; or sitting quietly with eyes closed for 15 minutes. Participants' subjective experience and mood disturbance were retrospectively assessed using the Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) and the Profile of Mood States-Short Form, respectively. The results indicated that there was a statistically significant difference between conditions with regard to the PCI major dimensions of visual imagery, attention and rationality, and minor dimensions of imagery amount and absorption. However, the shamanic-like conditions were not associated with a major reorganization of the pattern of subjective experience compared to the sitting quietly condition, suggesting that what is typically referred to as an altered state of consciousness effect was not evident. One shamanic-like condition and the BQ-Sh subscales need for order, childlikeness, and sensitivity were statistically significant predictors of total mood disturbance. Implications of the findings for the anthropology of consciousness are also considered. (shrink)

The alterity of children seems to raise some peculiar problems for empathy: the child is an _alter ego_ whose difference is often regarded as abnormality or deficiency, and whose relation to adults is ineluctably asymmetric. Accordingly, two related threats endanger the respect and the acknowledgment of the child’s particular otherness: the denial of her subjectivity, as well as domination and violence. The paroxystic expression of these interconnected threats can be found in child abuse situations, which deserve special consideration from the (...) standpoint of a phenomenology of intersubjectivity, embodiment and intercorporeality. At the same time, questions can be raised not only about the child abuse perpetrator’s lack of empathy for the child victim, but also about his or her own call for empathy. Combining a phenomenological approach inspired mostly by Husserl and a feminist approach that makes use of Foucault, the paper first attempts to show that the specific alterity of children and their subjectivity can and must be acknowledged in spite of the variations in embodiment between adults and children. The second moment of the inquiry defines the response of adults to the children’s peculiar otherness in terms of responsibility and care, and analyzes the potentialities for domination and abuse implied by the power of adults over children. Finally, the third and last part of the paper deals with the limits of empathy in front of the moral alterity of child abuse perpetrators, relying on Neige Sinno’s reflexive endeavor in _Triste Tigre_. (shrink)

Usually a novel’s subject is the individual in action. That individual must confront a set of social expectations and norms which define and limit him. In such novels the revelation of social expectations constitutes a central element in the artist’s depiction. The degree to which society limits the hero’s action, of course, varies widely. We can imagine a continuum along which the influence of society is arranged. Sociological/naturalistic novels, in which a social order is depicted as destructive, define one extreme (...) of that continuum. The protagonists in their suffering reveal this society’s destructive force. At the opposite extreme, society’s values and norms may be important in guiding and evaluating a protagonist’s movement toward his fate without society itself becoming an obstacle to his progress. We think, for instance, of Jane Austen’s novels. In the broad middle range of the continuum, protagonists struggle to realize their potential within social limitations, and their successes are usually partial. In assessing their triumphs, we must evaluate the obstacles they have encountered both in their own natures and in the natures of their social milieu.To make society the protagonist of a novel upsets the expectations of readers, first because the novel as a genre usually depicts the growth or change of protagonists moving from complications to stability, and second because the novel customarily concludes in some alteration of the protagonist’s external state and in some expansion of his understanding. With society as his protagonist, a writer commits himself to engaging our primary interest in the life of an abstraction or set of principles. Here, too, action is crucial. This kind of novel differs from a utopian novel, however, which focuses on ideas about society and whose principal end is to criticize or espouse a particular social order, not to engage us in working out instabilities through action. In novels in which society is protagonist, we are involved with the fate of an entire social order, and it is one about which we are made to care. The principal purpose is to present a society moving from a state of instability toward a qualitatively defined fate analogous to the movement of an individual hero.To achieve this end, characters become agents through which a social order realizes its fate. This function of character entails no simple inversion of the usual relationships between individuals and society, because characters can never be reduced to a backdrop the way society can, and society cannot easily achieve the particularity of definition and identity the way a character can. In attempting to discover narrative terms for realizing the fate of a society, a novelist faces an enormous technical challenge. He must make us care as much about a social order as he would about a particular individual, and yet he cannot write directly about ideas—he must record the actions of humans. Because his plot will focus on no single individual but on abstract processes and social hopes, he must constantly minimize individual fates and aspirations and make them clearly a function of society’s larger turmoil. Our empathy must rest firmly with the social principles being threatened rather than with any single character. With this end in view, a clearly defined, circumscribed arena for action becomes necessary. Literal battles, or scenes in which battles operate as a principal metaphor, frequently appear in such novels. By bringing many of the major characters together, defining and creating allegiances, and pitting opposing social principles, such battles provide an important context for measuring the progress of those values with which we empathize. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the phenomenological significance of schizophrenics' auditory hallucinations and begins with the face-to-face relationship in order to describe the schizophrenic experience. Following European psychiatrists like Blackenburg and Tatossian, the authors compare the bracketing of reality in the Husserlian phenomenological reduction with that of the hallucinatory experience. "Hallucinatory epoché" is used to refer to the schizophrenic way to experiencing auditory hallucinations. The problem of intentionality is then discussed, in addition to that of dialogue, internal time, living body, and (...) intersubjectivity. In this way, "voices" appear as a modification of the own inner voice of the hallucinating person. The "other, " at the origin of the "voices, " is described in terms of transparence, the quality of being univocal, and the quality of being a priori in the perfect tense. This other is not an alter ego, "it" is an alius. Descriptions of hallucinatory voices at several levels of experience, that is, at the transcendental and empirical levels along with descriptions at the level of the life-world, may be at the basis of certain modern empirical theories of "voices. " Results obtained from the European phenomenological point of view and Hoffman's findings in the cognitive field are then compared. The authors finally discuss a case of "speech therapy" and argue that a possible avenue for phenomenological research on schizophrenia is to explore narrativity on the basis of single case studies. One of the goals of phenomenological psychiatry is to assist empirical research in finding new relationships between the stories told by the hallucinator-relationships that are presupposed in clinical experience. (shrink)

This article explores the formation of a tranimal, hippopotamus alter-ego. Confronting transgender with transpecies, the author claims that his hippopotamus “identity” allowed him to escape, all at once, several sets of categorization that govern human bodies. He starts with an account of how his metaphorical hippo-self is collectively produced and performed, distinguishing the subjective, the intersubjective and the social. The article then investigates the politics of equating transgender and transpecies, critically examining the question of the inclusion of “xenogenders” in (...) the trans political movement. Finally, the author returns to the magical power of metaphors, arguing that metaphors do materialize insofar as the flesh does not remain unchanged by them. Analogizing his hippo-self to a “cut” as theorized by Eva Hayward – a regeneration of the boundaries of the self – he offers a final crossing to the world of fiction by showing how the His Dark Materials trilogy outlines an aesthetics of porosity, which suggests that the self is, as much as a novel, a work of fiction. (shrink)

The I in the reflectively revealed "I think" has had, as we all know, a rather checkered career. For Descartes, it was a "thinking substance". For Kant it was a "transcendental unity of apperception," an empty, formal unifying function whose occupation was a priori synthesis, and which was sharply distinguished from anything which might be called a "soul." With Husserl the pure I was again an empty, formal source of all intentionalities, a pure transparency devoid of depth; at least this (...) was Husserl at the epoch of the Ideen I, although the Cartesian Meditations altered the matter in fundamental respects. But there has always been an opposing body of philosophers, empiricists, and now existentialists, for whom there is no I at all within consciousness; the Cartesian cogito ergo sum demonstrates, they maintain, only that "there is thinking," an impersonal stream of conscious acts which need no I as their source or support. And finally, there is a third group which holds that while there is most certainly an I, it is not formal, nor empty nor even fully transparent to itself; it has certain depths which are not accessible to its own direct reflection but can be "felt" or "touched" in certain experiences which engage the ego in its totality, or which shatter its own thin picture of itself. Jaspers and Marcel belong to this group. And so, while we began with a certitude, I think, we find at last that both the existence and character of this most certain of all things are questionable, or at least have been questioned. I propose then to reexamine the question, first briefly to ascertain that there is indeed an I or thinking subject; and then more extensively to follow certain clues as to its character in depth. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Figurative Language and the “Face” in Levinas’s PhilosophyDiane PerpichThe value of images for philosophy lies in their position between two times and their ambiguity.—Levinas, "Reality and Its Shadow"Imagery... occupies the place of theory's impossible.—Le Doeuff, The Philosophical ImaginaryFor many readers, and perhaps above all for Levinas himself, there is something deeply dissatisfying about the account of the "face of the other" in Totality and Infinity and yet the importance (...) of this figure for the major ethical claims of the book can hardly be overstated. The fundamental thesis broached through the notion of the face is the difference between the way in which things are given to consciousness (the order of ontology) and the way in which human beings are encountered (the order of ethics). Whereas things are given to consciousness in sensible experience through the mediation of forms or concepts, the face is present, according to Levinas, in its "refusal to be contained" in a form (Levinas 1969, 194). A passage early in Totality and Infinity defines the face as follows: "The way in which the other presents himself, exceeding the idea of the other in me, we here name face. This mode does not consist in figuring as a theme under my gaze, in spreading itself forth as a set of qualities forming an image. The face of the Other at each moment destroys and overflows the plastic image it leaves me" (50–51, italics in original). A face is thus a very peculiar sort of "phenomenon." In effect, it is non-phenomenal; it does not appear as such and remains exterior to concepts.1 Rhetorically, the face is an image that represents the inadequacy of every image for representing alterity. That is, it represents the impossibility of its own representation and so the problems begin. [End Page 103]In "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida suggests that Levinas's claim that the absolute alterity of the other refuses conceptualization is undermined from the outset since in order to have meaning as an other, to be recognized and respected as an other, the other must first of all appear: "it is impossible to encounter the alter ego..., impossible to respect it in experience and in language, if this other, in its alterity, does not appear for an ego (in general). One could neither speak, nor have any sense of the totally other, if there was not a phenomenon of the totally other, or evidence of the totally other as such" (Derrida 1978, 123). In what sense can we think or represent absolute alterity if, strictly speaking, it is unthinkable and unrepresentable? And, further, what are we to make of the performative contradiction insofar as Levinas's discourse doesprecisely what it says it is impossible to do? As Derrida notes, even if one cannot thematize the other, "this impossibility and this imperative themselves can be thematized" (123). The difficulty here is that if there "is" an alterity of the type that interests Levinas, then there is no way to represent or speak about it literally—in which case the question arises, in what sense is it? And if one can speak about it, then it is not unrepresentable and thus is not absolute in the sense Levinas says it is.A further contradiction in the notion of the absolute alterity of the face arises owing to the fact that insofar as Levinas's notion of an absolute other forbids us from assigning to the other any determinate predicate, it seems as if all unique, singular faces are the same. As Jean-Luc Marion formulates this problem: "how can one assign an identity to the origin of the appeal such that one can specify which face is involved each time, but without thereby reducing it to a visible phenomenon in the mode of a spectacle?" (Marion 2000, 226). Marion makes a virtue of this feature of Levinas's account, suggesting that "it belongs to the very sense of the appeal that it remain essentially anonymous, and not by default but by excess—the excess of alterity over what it alters" (240). Anonymity, on this view, belongs to the formal structure of interpellation and Marion therein... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Work of Alterity: Bataille and LacanJean Dragon (bio)The topic of alterity may appear at first to be beyond the scope of Bataille’s work, but it is from such questioning that his practice of writing takes its full contours and questions the renewal of literary textuality.Strangely, Bataille fights against writing, an attitude that shows a will to disappear in order to reach sovereignty. Writing, in such a context, supports (...) not only certain useful figures for his particularly heterogeneous works but also the presence of alterity. Feminine imagos, set as the literary equivalent of the eradication of meaning and words, act as levers from which a character produces itself or rather disarticulates and vanishes.Bataille’s fight against writing shows strong similarities to some Lacanian notions: the subject, pleasure (“jouissance”), and, of course, woman. Before trying to map out this perilous comparison—there is no possible perfect transition between the two—we must first extract the significant elements that make it possible. To this end, we propose some reflections on Bataille’s concepts of Oedipus and castration. In so doing, we will be in a better situation to link Lacan and Bataille’s works but also to understand where Lacan has been inspired by Bataille and how Lacan distinguishes himself in his interpretation of the imaginary, the symbolic, the Law, and feminine imagos—especially in the way Lacan, contrary to Bataille, “eradicates” alterity.These questions are necessary steps in opening up a reflection inspired by the work of Bataille and in our desire to actualize purposes yet also extend unresolved polemic effects which this paper can only partially address. To present the necessity of such polemical reflections fits Bataille’s thought as well, which refuses to conclude and takes its meaning from throwing away all possible speech.Feminine imagos are an essential leitmotif in Bataille’s narratives and, more importantly, a cohesion factor for his thought that transcends all domains of writing to give a foundation to the works. 1 With themes such as transgression, subversion, and the [End Page 31] renewal of the Law, we reach an aporia not only of Bataille’s text but also, as Susan Rubin-Suleiman puts it, of literary modernity:What does appear to me certain is that there will be no genuine renewal, either in a theory of the avant-garde or in its practices, as long as every drama, whether textual or sexual, continues to be envisaged—as in Bataille’s pornography and in Harold Bloom’s theory of poetry—in terms of a confrontation between an all-powerful father and a traumatized son, a confrontation staged across and over the body of the mother.[86–87] 2Indeed, if we look at the autofictional purposes and the literary production of Bataille, we must underline an “aporia” in the subversive nature of his texts. This challenge to Bataille generally focuses on his literary works without considering his theoretical works beyond some “canonical” titles. Nevertheless, the lesser-known texts may offer another reading of Bataille’s eroticism and defuse criticism strictly centered on the supposedly pornographic and phallocentric content of novels like L’histoire de l’oeil and Madame Edwarda.Before branding the works of Bataille as “sexist,” we must consider that he was one of the first male authors of his generation to denounce the “castration” dominating society and individuals. Mario Perniola, discussing a text of Georges Bataille, 3 emphasizes his condemnation of imperialism behind the use of many terms: “the imperialist image of the eagle, even when it presents itself with the attributes of revolution, unsuccessfully hides its Promethean and Icarian pretensions.” 4 This interpretation finds an echo in another text of Bataille, “L’oeil pinéal,” where Bataille directly links the castration to the myth of Prometheus: “the legend of Prometheus is linked to the castration complex,” 5 says Bataille. Perniola’s words point directly to the patriarchal order upon which this imperialism lies, disguising itself as revolution; they show Bataille’s profound disagreement with such a social and individual foundation.It is also difficult to affirm the predominance of a phallocentric stance in Bataille. The oedipal figures, for example, are much too paradoxical in their modes... (shrink)

For phenomenology, the study of appearances and the ways they come together to present a world, the question of the ego presents special difficulties. The ego, itself, is not an appearance; it is the subject to whom appearances appear. As such, it cannot appear. As the neo-Kantian, Paul Natorp expresses this:“The ego is the subjective center of relation for all contents in my consciousness.... It cannot itself be a content and resembles nothing that could be a content ofconsciousness.” Husserl will (...) wrestle throughout the whole of his career with the issue of how to handle phenomenologically an ego that cannot be considered asa content of consciousness. In this article, I will outline the stages of his journey toward resolving this question. (shrink)

The Sāṃkhya Kārikā’s “mahat-buddhi” appears to be riddled with obscurity. Standard realist interpreters struggle to explain its cumbersome, textually unsupported bivalence, namely, how the mahat-buddhi can represent both a cosmological entity and a psychological capacity. Idealist readings, meanwhile, neglect the historically deep ontological meaning of this tattva by reducing it to a power of the transcendental ego. This paper moves beyond the impasse of the realism-idealism framework for interpreting the Sāṃkhya Kārikā and examines the mahat-buddhi through the existential phenomenology of (...) José Ortega y Gasset. It begins by re-framing classical Sāṃkhya metaphysics as an existential phenomenology of life, whereby life—as lived reality, not an external physical world or a field of mental experience—conveys the meaning of vyaktaprakṛti. From this, the paper then argues that the mahat-buddhi represents “the great awakening of life,” which is characterized by 5 key features: (1) purposive procreativity; (2) a power of illuminating discernment; (3) a principle of disclosure; (4) an existentially unitary, concentrated vitality; and (5) a capacity to take other-beings-as. (shrink)

In this paper we present an exploratory study on the understanding of reality among scientists. The nature of reality has been a conundrum for generations of theologians, philosophers, and scientists as well as the lay public. It also appears as a scientific problem in various disciplines, from physics to psychiatry and neuroscience. For the purpose of our study, we employed Chamber REST (Restricted Environmental Stimulation), which has been known to produce substantial perceptual effects such as visual or auditory pseudo-hallucinations. We (...) hypothesized that such experiences could alter basic underlying metaphysical beliefs which our subject-scientists hold about reality. We conclude that the technique showed the potential to induce such changes, but the outcome is also probably dependent on their pre-existing views gained through previous experiences, such as for example altered states of consciousness. Also, the effects of Chamber REST seem to be in this respect comparable to psychedelic sessions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Giving an Account of OneselfChris LundbergGiving an Account of Oneself. Judith Butler. New York: Fordham University Press, 2005. Pp. x + 149. $18.95, softcover.Giving an Account of Oneself, Judith Butler's recent foray into moral philosophy, is a lucid interrogation of the problem of responsibility in the wake of contemporary critiques of the subject. In it, Butler moves beyond her concern with the conditions of subjectivity and its performances (...) towards a fuller consideration of life with others. Butler proffers an answer to the problem of post-subjective responsibility that resonates with the best elements of the rhetorical traditions, [End Page 329] though perhaps Butler's project might also benefit from a more thorough engagement with the problem of rhetoric in its specificity.Though works such as Gender Trouble earned a reputation (perhaps unfairly) for being theoretically dense to the point of obscurity, Giving an Account of Oneself is clearly and elegantly argued. Butler's argument is that moral philosophy relies on the ability of subjects to give an account of themselves and their actions. Such an account seems difficult in the face of blistering critiques of an autonomous, self-possessed, transparent, and naturally given subject of intention. How can one affirm responsibility in the post-subjective moment? As Butler puts it: "does the postulation of a subject who is not self-grounding … whose conditions of emergence can never fully be accounted for, undermine the possibility of responsibility and, in particular, of giving an account of oneself" (19)? What are the assumptions latent in critiques of the humanist subject that might deny the possibility of giving an account of oneself? Inspired by Foucault's interrogation of a naturalized truth of the subject, Lacan's account of a subject produced and dispossessed by the Symbolic Order, and Derrida's critique of presence, such critiques locate the subject as an effect of the operations of discourse, conceived broadly. Despite the force of these critiques, Butler claims that a view of the subject nested in and dispossessed by discourse provides possibilities for ethics. Butler's reframing of ethics draws on two assumptions that underwrite "post" accounts of the subject: that the subject is both an effect of discourse and of differential relation to others.The first assumption is that a subject produced within discourse is also a subject that is dependent on and interpenetrated by others. Drawing on her continuing engagement with Hegel, the work of Adriana Cavarero, Levinas's conception of alterity and Laplanche's theory of seduction, Butler argues that the subject is endowed with a "fundamental sociality" (33). The markers of fundamental sociality differ for each of these theorists: Hegel relies on the concept of recognition; Cavarero appropriates Arendt's space of appearance; Levinas argues for the priority of an ethical relation to the other over ontology; and Laplanche conceives of the emergence of subjectivity as a primal seduction of a child by the adult world. But each of these framings of the subject is united by a basic commitment that subjects are produced in relation to others both as a generative point and as a horizon.The second assumption is that when a subject dependent on other subjects attempts to give an account of itself, it does so within a structure of address. A subject makes a claim for itself only in the presence of others—an account of oneself both aims at the self but also simultaneously aims at presenting the self to another. On this reading, accounts of oneself are not transparent descriptions [End Page 330] of a subject's interiority: rather, an account of oneself must be a narrative, a discursive gathering of the self that can never fully recover the conditions of its emergence. Narrative is not simply a mode of communicating the content and intentions of a self to the other. Narrative is simultaneously the precondition for a subject naming and providing retroactive order to its own subjectivity. But where there are narratives, there is always the risk of narrative closure, or that the narrative is repeated without interruption. Put in terms of Butler's concern with ethics, is there not always a risk that a narrative becomes a self... (shrink)

Psychogenic depersonalization is an altered mental state consisting of an unusual discontinuity in the phenomenological perception of personal being; the individual is engulfed by feelings of unreality, self-detachment and unfamiliarity in which the self is felt to lack subjective perspective and the intuitive feeling of personal embodiment. A new sub-feature of depersonalization is delineated. 'Prosthesis' consists in the thought that the thinker is a 'mere thing'. It is a subjectively realized sense of the specific and objective 'thingness' of the particular (...) object thought about. I show that prosthesis is an important cognitive feature of depersonalization, and may be psychologically connected with the tendency of depersonalized individuals to report 'philosophical' types of thinking. Indeed, several philosophical issues concerning the identity of the self appear to have been enhanced by prosthesis experiences. Thus, far more efficient than William James's experimental attempts to uncover philosophical truths under the influence of nitrous oxide intoxication, prosthesis may be a safe and recommended experience for philosophers. The history of depersonalization theories is presented from Krishaber to Freud, and the main approaches to prosthesis criticized. Finally, a fresh approach to psychogenic depersonalization is outlined on the basis of certain cognitive similarities with visual agnosia. This paper may be understood as continuing the Jamesian tradition 'experimental abnormal psychology', that is, of examining extraordinary mental states with an eye to their philosophical implications. (shrink)

First published in France in 1936 as a journal article, The Transcendence of the Ego was one of Jean-Paul Sartre's earliest philosophical publications. When it appeared, Sartre was still largely unknown, working as a school teacher in provincial France and struggling to find a publisher for his most famous fictional work, Nausea . The Transcendence of the Ego is the outcome of Sartre's intense engagement with the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology. Here, as in many subsequent writings, (...) Sartre embraces Husserl's vision of phenomenology as the proper method for philosophy. But he argues that Husserl's conception of the self as an inner entity, 'behind' conscious experience is mistaken and phenomenologically unfounded. The Transcendence of the Ego offers a brilliant diagnosis of where Husserl went wrong, and a radical alternative account of the self as a product of consciousness, situated in the world. This essay introduces many of the themes central to Sartre's major work, Being and Nothingness : the nature of consciousness, the problem of self-knowledge, other minds, anguish. It demonstrates their presence and importance in Sartre's thinking from the very outset of his career. This fresh translation makes this classic work available again to students of Sartre, phenomenology, existentialism, and twentieth century philosophy. It includes a thorough and illuminating introduction by Sarah Richmond, placing Sartre's essay in its philosophical and historical context. (shrink)