This paper deals with forms of communication aiming at a better informed public or publics. The main idea is that democratic societies are dependent on toleration of a plurality of publics, and simultaneously there is a need for communication between the different publics. The ethos underlying this assumption is that democracy requires a transcendence of subjective conditions in order for the public(s) to gain legitimacy and recognition of opinions. Validity of opinions presupposes a public aspect that is available through communication. (...) More specifically, the validity in question is obtained through its claim on universality – i.e. the transcendence of purely private subjective conditions. This kind of validity is found in reflective judgment or enlarged thinking, as displayed in Kant’s third critique. In the last part of the paper it is discussed how new information technologies and the internet may contribute positively to facilitate modes of communication that are associated with the particularity at work in reflective thinking. Storytelling technologies and virtual realities are of particular interest in envisaging how this might work. (shrink)

Philosophers speak—or, rather, they respond to various forms of speaking that are handed to them. This book by one of our most distinguished philosophers focuses on the communicative aspect of philosophical thought. Peperzak’s central focus is “addressing”: what distinguishes speaking or writing from rumination is their being directed by someone to someone. To be involved in philosophy is to be part of a tradition through which thinkers propose their findings to others, who respond by offering their own appropriations to their (...) interlocutors.After a critical sketch of the conception of modern philosophy, Peperzak presents a succinct analysis of speaking, insisting on the radical distinction between speaking about and speaking to. He enlarges this analysis to history and tries to answer the question whether philosophy also implies a certain form of listening and responding to words of God. Since philosophical speech about persons can neither honor nor reveal their full truth, speaking and thinking about God is even more problematic. Meditation about the archaic Word cannot reach the Speaker unless it turns into prayer, or—as Descartes wrote—into a contemplation that makes the thinker “consider, admire, and adore the beauty of God’s immense light, as much as the eyesight of my blinded mind can tolerate.”“ Thinking is a work of genuine and original scholarship which responds to the tradition of philosophical thinking with a critique of its language, style, focus, and scope.”—Catriona Hanley, Loyola College, Maryland. (shrink)

1st Gent.: Our deeds are fetters that we forge ourselves. 2d Gent.: Ay, truly: but I think it is the world that brings the iron. R. L. Scott once explained that the “environment is experienced as being rhetorical,” meaning anything within the milieu can participate in addressivity, that who or what addresses what and whom is variable and multiple. He stressed that human valuing determined participation, but he nonetheless anticipated a more robust, posthuman ecological view when he contended that “one (...) must not think of rhetorical attributes as exclusively the property of speakers, writers, or other message-senders”. Scott claimed an “enlarged concept of rhetoric” was necessary... (shrink)

Here is a thorough, vividly written introduction to contemporary philosophy and some of the most crucial questions of human existence: the nature of mind and knowledge, the status of moral claims, the existence of God, the role of science, and the mysteries of language, among them. In Thinking It Through, esteemed philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah shows us what it means to "do" philosophy in our time and why it should matter to anyone who wishes to live a more thoughtful (...) life. Opposing the common misconceptions that being a philosopher means espousing a set of philosophical beliefs, or being a follower of a particular thinker, Appiah argues that "the result of philosophical exploration is not the end of inquiry in a settled opinion, but a mind resting more comfortably among many possibilities, or else the reframing of the question, and a new inquiry." Thinking It Through is organized around eight central topics--mind, knowledge, language, science, morality, politics, law, and metaphysics. It traces how philosophers in the past have considered each subject (how Hobbes, Wittgenstein, and Frege, for example, approached the problem of language) and then explores some of the major questions that still engage philosophers today. More important, Appiah shows us not only what philosophers have thought but how they think, giving us examples we might use in our own attempts to navigate the complex issues that confront any reflective person in the 21st century. Filled with concrete examples of how philosophers work and written in the liveliest prose, Thinking It Through guides readers through the process of philosophical reflection and enlarges our understanding of the central questions of human life. (shrink)

Since the publication of the original edition in 1947, Richard McKeon's _Introduction to Aristotle _has become the standard text for a variety of courses in philosophy and the humanities. For this revised and enlarged edition, Professor McKeon has completely rewritten his General Introduction and his introductions to the particular works. He has also expanded the collection to include material from _On the Parts of Animals_ and the _Rhetoric_. Aristotle's contribution to Western civilization is enormous. Our language, our distinctions, our (...) ways of thinking, all are profoundly affected by his work. Since an understanding of Aristotle is indispensable for the understanding of our own culture, the ready availability of his work is crucial. This collection, for students and general readers alike, provides in one volume _Posterior Analytics_, _De Anima_, _Nicomachean Ethics_, and _Poetics_, complete and unabridged, together with generous selections from _Physics, On the Parts of Animals, Metaphysics, Politics, _and_ Rhetoric_. These works, together with Professor McKeon's revised introductions, provide a convenient and thorough exposure to the works of Aristotle and to the structural interrelations in the Aristotelian system of thought. (shrink)

James Tully’s scholarship has profoundly transformed the study of political thought by reconstructing the practice of political theory as a democratising and diversifying dialogue between scholars and citizens. Across his writings on topics ranging from the historical origins of property, constitutionalism in diverse societies, imperialism and globalisation, and global citizenship in an era of climate crisis, Tully has developed a participatory mode of political theorising and political change called public philosophy. This practice-oriented approach to political thought and its active role (...) in the struggles of citizens has posed fundamental challenges to modern political thought and launched new lines of inquiry in the study of constitutionalism, democracy and citizenship, settler colonialism, comparative political theory, nonviolence, and ecological sustainability. James Tully: To Think and Act Differently collects classic, contemporary, and previously unpublished writings from across Tully’s four decades of scholarship to shed new light on these dialogues of reciprocal elucidation with citizens, scholars, and the history of political thought, and the ways Tully has enlarged our understanding of democracy, diversity, and the task of political theory. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt has been one of empathy’s most formidable and influential critics among contemporary political theorists. In this article, I suggest that her argument against empathy is no argument at all. The line she draws between empathy and imagination is arbitrary, and imagination cannot – in and by itself – sustain the work of representative thinking, which Arendt assigns to it. With this critique of Arendt, and the introduction of an alternative view of empathy put forth by Karl Jaspers, (...) Arendt’s mentor and friend, I hope to open the way for a reconsideration of the distrust with which empathy is met among many political theorists. (shrink)

In this paper, in answering the question why Kant didn’t think very highly of music, I argue that for Kant (i) music unlike other art forms, lends itself more easily to combination judgments involving judgments of sense, which increases the propensity to make aesthetic mistakes and is ill-suited as an activity for improving one’s taste; (ii) music expresses aesthetic ideas and presents rational ideas only by taking advantage of existing associations while other art forms do so by breaking with the (...) laws of association and creating new associations. I propose that (ii) constitutes the reason why music is not a rich source for reflection and thereby cannot stimulate the enlargement of the cognitive faculties. Given that the standard Kant uses in setting up the hierarchy of fine arts in terms of their cultivating role is the enlargement of cognitive faculties, this explains why music is placed at the bottom of his hierarchy. (shrink)

In the present context of intertwined and intensifying economic, environmental and climate challenges and crisis, we need to enlarge our thinking about food systems change. One way to do so is by considering intersections between our longstanding interdisciplinary interest in food and agriculture and new scholarship and practice centered on transitions to sustainability. The general idea of transition references change in a wide range of fields and contexts, and has gained prominence most recently as a way to discuss and (...) address sustainability challenges. To explore connections to food systems change, I highlight two broad approaches in the sustainability transitions research field. First is a multi-level perspective that examines sustainability innovation pathways and second is a social practices approach that illuminates the possibilities for shifts in normal everyday routines and practices. Taken together, these approaches offer different and useful ways to think about the dynamics, durability and significance of innovations in food and agriculture, and the part they play in transitions to sustainability. Numerous opportunities exist to forge more productive links between work on food systems change and the broad and growing sustainability transitions field. First, our research and practice insights about the importance of politics, governance, values and ethics in food and agriculture could help to strengthen the sustainability transitions field, which initially underplayed such questions. Second, the sustainability transitions field’s implicit systems sensibility and its futures orientation could help to widen the scope of inquiry and the contribution to policy and planning of research and practice on food systems change. (shrink)

_Listening to the Whispers_ gives voice to scholars in philosophy, medical anthropology, physical therapy, and nursing, helping readers re-think ethics across the disciplines in the context of today's healthcare system. Diverse voices, often unheard, challenge readers to enlarge the circle of their ethical concerns and look for hidden pathways toward new understandings of ethics. Essays range from a focus on the context of corporatization and managed care environments to a call for questioning the fundamental values of society as these values (...) silently affect many others in healthcare. Each chapter is followed by a brief essay that highlights issues useful for scholarly research and classroom discussion. The conversations of interpretive research in healthcare contained in this volume encourage readers to re-think ethics in ways that will help to create an ethical healthcare system with a future of new possibilities. Outstanding Academic Title, _Choice_ Magazine. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to six key concepts within philosophy: philosophy itself, language, knowledge, truth, being and the good. At the same time, it aims to initiate its readers into the processes of philosophical thinking. The book is addressed to students and lay persons, but also contains new ideas for specialists. It is written in a clear, accessible and engaging style. The German version appeared in eight editions and the second revised and updated English editon has the potential (...) to become a key textbook for an international audience. (shrink)

Rorty finds that my own appropriation of Spinoza toward a re-conception of ideology critique falls short, however, by (a) failing to “take Spinoza’s mind-body identity seriously” and by (b) advocating a “battle of ideas” rather than an enlargement of perspective. She presents an illuminating analysis of how, according to Spinoza, dichotomies serve as blunt provisional tools that become counterproductive once understanding is reached. She suggests that I preserve certain distinctions to the detriment of my own liberation project, such as the (...) distinction between the truth of an idea and its persuasive force. As part of criticism (a), she admonishes me for neglecting the importance of material conditions, and with criticism (b) she suggests that the imagery of battle misconstrues the project of becoming rational and the power of truth. Below I will try to show that we do not disagree about either the importance of material conditions for a project of political transformation or the identity of mind and body in substance. We do disagree, however, about the character of ideology critique. I will offer an example, in an attempt to demonstrate why it is neither a distortion of Spinoza nor strategically counterproductive to understand the project of thinking as an effort of what I call “resistant reconstruction” within the attribute of thought. (shrink)

Responsibility disappears into the background of private law as it deals with imputation of liability. Fitness to be held liable is determined by normative viewpoints different from moral ones, in particular by convictions on how society ought to be organized so as to avoid or end conflict between private citizens. Modes of discursive control are geared to making authoritative decisions in view of the same end, and corporate agency is created, restricted or enlarged to undercut or to impose individual (...) liability. (shrink)

Paleoanthropologists have long worked with the assumption that bipedism and brain enlargement evolved together in a cycle of cause and effect powered by the production of tools and instrumental manipulation. Rather, this paper argues, following the work of Paul Shepard, that discernments, or specific kinds of mentalities, arise from the relations that mammals and hominids form with their environments, other species and within their own social groupings.

Revisiting James Baldwin's under-engaged contribution to heated debates over Black (Christian)-(white) Jewish relations in New York City in the late 1960s, “Blacks Are Anti-Semitic Because They Are Anti-White,” in what follows I explore the surprising ways in which two European Jewish women political theorists, Emma Goldman and Hannah Arendt, otherwise celebrated for their rigorous sobriety, enacted the very blindness that framed their Jewishness as a form of whiteness worthy of Baldwin's criticism. I close by considering the ways of envisioning being (...) Jewish that we might build from Baldwin's reflections, ones that would, in enlarging the distance of Jewishness from whiteness, invite transformative brands of solidarity rather than specifically black forms of anti-Semitism. Ironically, this path would have entailed American Jews' becoming more fully themselves rather than indexing their advancement or flourishing through a white, Christian index. Put slightly differently, this essay turns backward to look forward, aiming to understand what I consider missed opportunities worth lamenting so we might proceed differently. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is threefold: (i) to trace the idea of deliberation back in the history of philosophy and establish the link to the Kantian concept of public reason; (ii) to pave the way for rhetoric as a constituent part of public deliberation; (iii) to undertake an applied ethical approach to worldwide deliberation online. The two former aims are treated in part one of the paper, whereas the applied analysis is undertaken in part two. One important task is (...) to demonstrate in what ways the internet as a new and powerful venue for deliberation both challenges the old theories of public deliberation, and also points in the direction of certain revisions of our basic ideas about deliberation. (shrink)

In the literature on Hannah Arendt’s Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, two sorts of claim have been made by different interpreters. First, there is Beiner’s observation that there is a shift in Arendt’s thoughts on judgment, which has led to the idea that Arendt develops two distinct theories of judgment. The second sort of claim concerns Arendt’s use of Kant’s transcendental principles. At its core, it has led to the critique that Arendt detranscendentalizes — or empiricalizes — Kant, by linking (...) Kant’s judgments of taste to an empirical sociability. In this article, I argue against both of these claims. Early fragments of Arendt’s on judgment make clear that she develops only one theory of judgment. It is only that it is not until later in her life that she fully elaborates it. Nor does Arendt confuse Kant’s idea of enlarged thinking with an actual dialogue with others. In fact, Arendt introduces an interesting interdependence between judgment and speech, or communication. I develop my argument by first outlining the problems Arendt hoped to resolve via judgment. Through my reading of the Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, I show how Arendt interprets Kant’s Critique of Judgment not as his theory of aesthetic judgments, but as an answer to the more general question ‘How do I judge?’ I also clarify the difference Arendt draws between common sense and community sense. With community sense, Arendt uncovers a foundation not only for men as political beings but also for the idea of humanity. This finding is often overlooked in the literature. I conclude with another Arendtian distinction that is often overlooked, that between spectators and the solitary philosopher. (shrink)

To enlarge the discussion of scientific responsibility for research integrity, this paper offers two historico-philosophical observations. First, in the broad history of ideas, modern ethics replaces social role responsibility with appeals to abstract principles; by contrast, discussions within the scientific community of responsibility for research integrity constitute a rediscovery of the continuing vitality of role responsibility. This is a rediscovery from which philosophy itself may benefit. Second, within the context of scientists’ concerns, the idea of role responsibility has undergone significant (...) evolution from “collective responsibility” to the notion of responsibility resting with a “trans-scientific community.” Further challenges nevertheless remain in order to relate scientific role responsibility for scientific integrity to the relationship between science and society. To promote a notion of integrity not just in science but in the science-society relationship, it may be useful to think in terms of a “co-responsibility” for scientific integrity. (shrink)

Think of some environmentally unfriendly choices – taking the car instead of public transport or driving an SUV, just binning something recyclable, using lots of plastic bags, buying an enormous television, washing clothes in hot water, replacing something when you could make do with last year's model, heating rooms you don't use or leaving the heating high when you could put on another layer of clothing, flying for holidays, wasting food and water, eating a lot of beef, installing a patio (...) heater, maybe even, as some have said lately, owning a dog. Think about your own choices, instances in which you take an action which enlarges your carbon footprint when you might have done otherwise without much trouble. Is there consolation in the thought that it makes no difference what you do? (shrink)

Most of us think we can always enlarge our knowledge base by accepting things that are entailed by (or logically implied by) things we know. The set of things we know is closed under entailment (or under deduction or logical implication), which means that we know that a given claim is true upon recognizing, and accepting thereby, that it follows from what we know. However, some theorists deny that knowledge is closed under entailment, and the issue remains controversial. The arguments (...) against closure include the following. (shrink)

. This is thinking that is alive, always green.Ó ÑReview of Metaphysics ÒThis translation . . . enlarges our historical view of the probing advances in Heidegger's thought.Ó ÑInternational Studies in Philosophy This clear translation ...

This article aims to enlarge the conversation about religion and public education by inviting readers to think about the benefits to be gained in society by providing a comprehensive religious studies curriculum in our public schools. In such a program, students will develop knowledge and understanding about various religious traditions, forge greater respect for the religious (and nonreligious) other, and think through existential concerns that have interested human beings for thousands of years. While recognizing that such a program is deeply (...) contentious, we nevertheless reason that students, as participants in a democracy as well as members of a global community, must have the skills, tools, and knowledge to function in a religiously diverse world. (shrink)

Thepresentwork is arevisedand enlarged English versionofa book originally writtenin Spanish and published in late 1996, La rejlexion de DavidHume en lorno a /a religion. SinceDavidHume is arguablynot only the most important philosopherwhohaseverwrittenintheEnglishlanguage,butthemoststudiedand influential,itisonlynaturalthatsoonerthanlaterIwouldfeelthe urgencyto bring totheattentionofamuchwiderpublicaworkwhoseoutlook is, I think, signifi cantlydifferentfrom that ofother books which deal with the Scottish thinker's worksonreligionandnaturaltheology.Thisdesirewassostrongastoallowmeto overcome the all-too-natural fear that my wavering and uncertain command of English wouldmakethe few valuableinsights theworkmight containappearun clear,andmyphilosophicalerrors,evenmoreastonishing. This book is addressednot only to scholarswhomay beinterested in modem philosophy (...) in generalorHume'sphilosophyofreligion in particular,but also to themoreextensivecompassofreaderseitherintriguedortroubledby religion and themyriadofissuesandproblemsitposes,whichare, as it were, the primematter forphilosophicalanalysisandtheorizing.Inspiteofitsphilosophicaland linguistic limitations,forwhichIamentirelyresponsible,Iferventlyhopethatthisworkmay befoundtocontainsomethingofthatelusivetruthafterwhichHumestrove, andto whichheremainedconstantto theend, particularlyatatime whenthe priceto be paidforthepublicationofcontroversialphilosophicalandreligious views wascon siderablyhigherthanthatofbecominganeasytargetforuniversalridicule. Thecompletionofthisworkhasbeenmadepossible principally by asabbatical leavethattheUniversityofPuertoRico grantedme fortheyear 1999. This leave gavemethenecessarytimeto readandstudy thepertinentliterature,aswell asto writemostoftheEnglish manuscript.Italsoallowedmeto visit Edinburgh and spendmostofJuly andAugust 1999 attheNationalLibraryofScotlandand the EdinburghUniversityLibrary.Although Ihaveincorporatedinto thepresentwork onlyasmallpartofmyresearchatthose libraries,ifthis bookshows agreaterap preciation of the immediate social and religious context of Hume's thought than its Spanish predecessor, it is in no small measure due to the books, articles, and xi xii Preface manuscritsIwasabletoconsultatthe time. Inthis respect, Iwouldliketo thank Professor Peter Jones, Director of the Institute for Advanced Studies in the HumanitiesattheUniversityofEdinburgh, who was very instrumental in making myvisittoEdinburghareality,andgenerouslyputthefacilitiesoftheInstitute at mydisposal. Manythoughts andlinesofargumentcontained in this bookdatebackto my doctoraldissertation,andsomeearlierversionsofanumberofchaptersorsections ofchaptershavebeenpublished in differentphilosophyjournalsor anthologies. I oftheminthebibliographyundermy name. But sincemy previousworks listall onthe subjecthavebeenrevisedandmodifiedsomanytimes in the lightofnew fmdingsortomeetactualorpossiblecriticism,Ican saythatthey havebeeneffec tivelysupersededbythepresentwriting. (shrink)

One typically thinks of the relevance of Kant’s aesthetic theory to Western art in terms of Modernism, thanks in large part to the work of eminent critic and art historian Clement Greenberg. Yet, thinking of Kant’s legacy for contemporary art as inhering exclusively in “Kantian formalism” obscures a great deal of Kant’s aesthetic theory. In his last book, Arthur Danto suggested just this point, urging us to enlarge our appreciation of Kant’s aesthetic theory and its relevance to contemporary art, (...) because, for Danto, “Kant had two conceptions of art.” In this essay, I support and build on Danto’s claim that there are really two conceptions of art at work in Kant’s third Critique, and that the second conception offers a non-Modernist/formalist way that Kant’s aesthetic theory remains relevant to post 1960s art. My ultimate aim is to highlight another facet in the continuing relevance of Kant’s aesthetic theory to post-Expressionist contemporary art, namely, the explicit attention to the differential aesthetic values of nature and art respectively. I shall do this by putting it in dialogue with the art practice of Latvian-American artist, Vija Celmins whose illustrious career since 1960s has made her an ‘artist’s artist’ but who has also recently garnered much wider attention with a retrospective titled “To Fix the Image in Memory.” Celmins takes up artistically a problematic that is quite central philosophically to the concerns of the third Critique, and thus her work illustrates another way in which Kant’s aesthetic theory is of great continuing relevance to the artworld today. (shrink)

How do we go about weighing evidence, testing hypotheses, and making inferences? According to the model of _Inference to the Best Explanation_, we work out what to infer from the evidence by thinking about what would actually explain that evidence, and we take the ability of a hypothesis to explain the evidence as a sign that the hypothesis is correct. In _Inference to the Best Explanation_, Peter Lipton gives this important and influential idea the development and assessment it deserves. (...) The second edition has been substantially enlarged and reworked, with a new chapter on the relationship between explanation and Bayesianism, and an extension and defence of the account of contrastive explanation. It also includes an expanded defence of the claims that our inferences really are guided by diverse explanatory considerations, and that this pattern of inference can take us towards the truth. This edition of _Inference to the Best Explanation_ has also been updated throughout and includes a new bibliography. (shrink)

§1 According to the paradigmatic formula offered by Kant, the philosopher’s task consists of demonstrating “how we ought to think” as opposed to “how we do think” – that is, logical rules or norms must be separated from the functioning principles of the human mind or from psychological laws. As it is well-known, in the “Preface” to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, the German philosopher stands against “some moderns” who “have thought to enlarge” logic “interpolating psycholo...

In Critique and Disclosure, Nikolas Kompridis argues provocatively for a richer and more time-responsive critical theory. He calls for a shift in the normative and critical emphasis of critical theory from the narrow concern with rules and procedures of Jürgen Habermas's model to a change-enabling disclosure of possibility and the enlargement of meaning. Kompridis contrasts two visions of critical theory's role and purpose in the world: one that restricts itself to the normative clarification of the procedures by which moral and (...) political questions should be settled and an alternative rendering that conceives of itself as a possibility-disclosing practice. At the center of this resituation of critical theory is a normatively reformulated interpretation of Martin Heidegger's idea of "disclosure" or "world disclosure." In this regard Kompridis reconnects critical theory to its normative and conceptual sources in the German philosophical tradition and sets it within a romantic tradition of philosophical critique.Drawing not only on his sustained critical engagement with the thought of Habermas and Heidegger but also on the work of other philosophers including Wittgenstein, Cavell, Gadamer, and Benjamin, Kompridis argues that critical theory must, in light of modernity's time-consciousness, understand itself as fully situated in its time--in an ever-shifting and open-ended horizon of possibilities, to which it must respond by disclosing alternative ways of thinking and acting. His innovative and original argument will serve to move the debate over the future of critical studies forward--beyond simple antinomies to a consideration of, as he puts it, "what critical theory should be if it is to have a future worthy of its past.". (shrink)

I describe an ethic for business administration based on the social tradition of the Catholic Church. I find that much current thinking about business falters for its conceit of truth. Abstractions such as the shareholder-value model contain truth - namely, that business is an economic enterprise to manage for the wealth of its owners. But, as in all abstractions, this truth comes at the expense of falsehood -namely, that persons are assets to deploy on behalf of owners. This last (...) is "wrong" in both senses of the word - it is factually wrong in that persons are far more than business assets, they are supernatural beings, children of God; and it is morally wrong in that it is an injustice to treat them as the former when they are the latter. I draw upon the social tradition of the Catholic Church to recognize that the business of business is not business, but is instead the human person. Following Church teachings, I describe a person-centered ethic of business based upon eight social principles that both correct and enlarge the shareholder-centered ethic of much current business thinking. I discuss implications of this person-centered ethic for business administration. (shrink)

The basis of Muslim philosophy and science is the instruction embedded in the Quran. At an early date this tradition was enlarged and strengthened by the infiltration into Muslim culture of Greek philosophy and science through the translation of Greek classics by Muslims. The Indian tradition of thought also made its contribution. This book traces the development and interaction of these strands in Muslim thinking. The author is concerned to show both how philosophy and science are related to (...) specifically religious thought, and how they have made distinctive contributions to method and discovery. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Solving the Jigsaw PuzzlePeggy CadetIn my medical record, there is an enigmatic note. It was written as a consultation request from a pediatric endocrinologist to a plastic surgeon while I was hospitalized at age 13 (in the late 1960s) for mastectomy. The note reads:You have seen this unfortunate teenager with the feminizing testis [older name for androgen insensitivity] syndrome on several occasions in the past in reference to the (...) construction of a penis. Would appreciate your seeing him again to evaluate the problem. He is firmly fixed in the male gender role despite efforts on the part of his father to persuade him of the logic of a change.The surgeon’s response (also in my notes) was:The prospect of creating an acceptable penis in this patient seems to me very remote. There is nothing there except an enlarged clitoris. This could be mobilized and might project a few cm but cannot be made into a male organ of normal dimensions. The hair distribution and the perineum is also feminine which compounds the reconstruction problem.Since the decision has been made to go along with the male gender I suppose that mobilization of the penis–clitoris is reasonable. Urethral reconstruction will be possible only much later....I saw this note for the first time at age 21 but didn’t think it was particularly significant until many years later. At the time I had other, much more pressing concerns, as I had reached the conclusion by then that I had been mis–assigned as a boy and that the only way for me to have a reasonable and happy life would be for me to change to living as a girl. It was not a surprise that my doctors had been completely on the wrong track about my “gender”. I was also not about to bring this up with the endocrinologist, a person who had terrified me as a child and whom I still found a bit intimidating.I do remember the surgeon stopping by and examining me briefly without explaining who he was or why he was there. I had a somewhat longer, but equally uninformative (for me) visit from a child psychiatrist. The note requesting a consultation from the psychiatrist reads:Would you see while he is here recovering from his mastectomy? Since he began to show mammary growth 18 months ago his father has put him under considerable pressure to undergo another change in gender role. has resisted but he is quite depressed. We would appreciate any suggestions you may have.I actually have no recollection at all of anything like pressure from my father to change to living as a girl. What I actually experienced was more like 180 degrees away from that—the expectation that I should try to be more masculine. As I remember, my father was bothered by my having breasts and was the one who initiated the physician contacts that led to mastectomy. (My mother had died when I was five, leaving him to rear me as a single parent.)As my father recollected to me many years later, he had asked the pediatric endocrinologist to explain all of my treatment options and alternatives to me. I can only guess, but possibly the pediatric endocrinologist interpreted this as my father wanting me to change to living as a girl. As a young [End Page E1] adult, I got the impression that this particular doctor tended to mistake asking for information about possible treatments for requesting treatment. The idea of a patient gathering information and making informed decisions may not have figured prominently in his thinking. On the office visit when I was 21 and first mentioned to him that I might want to live as a girl, he told me that gender identity was “an unshakable conviction,” so perhaps his idea was that gender was just not something a person could make an ordinary decision about, weighing the pros and cons.My father knew—but at age 13 I didn’t—that the original decision for me to grow up as a boy had been made in a somewhat haphazard way. I had entered... (shrink)

"Most modern philosophers attempt to solve the problem of morality from within the epistemological assumptions that define the dominant cultural perspective of our age. Alan Gewirth's Reason and Morality is a major work in this ongoing enterprise. Gewirth develops, with patience and skill, what he calls a 'modified naturalism' in which morality is derived by logic alone from the concept of action.... I think that the publication of Reason and Morality is a major event in the history of moral philosophy. (...) It develops with great power a new and exciting position in ethical naturalism. No one, regardless of philosophical stance, can read this work without an enlargement of mind. It illuminates morality and agency for all."—E. M. Adams, The Review of Metaphysics "This is a fascinating study of an apparently intractable problem. Gewirth has provided plenty of material for further discussion, and his theory deserves serious consideration. He is always aware of possible rejoinders and argues in a rigorous manner, showing a firm grasp of the current state of moral and political philosophy."—Mind. (shrink)

“All experience is an arch wherethro’ gleams” an untravell'd world and through which come the joyous adventures of life and also grief and pain. Since all that we know and hope to know and think we know must come through this arch and since the primary task of science is the validation and enlargement of knowledge, science is vitally interested in this experience and its interpretation. This interest stems not from the philosopher's epistemology but it is strictly operational. We want (...) to know what kind of experience yields reliable knowledge when checked against other experience and applied in practical adjustment to things as they are and to prediction of the probable future course of events. In short, the field of natural science embraces everything that comes within the range of human experience. Its specific functions are to codify this mixed experience, to search out those uniformities which yield classification, verification and prediction, and from these observed uniformities to construct by sound reasoning verifiable laws, hypotheses and theories, that is, to find the meaning of the experiences had. First we want to know the facts, but what we are after in the upshot is the interpretation of the facts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern PhilosophyJean-Robert ArmogatheRiccardo Pozzo, editor. The Impact of Aristotelianism on Modern Philosophy. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004. Pp. xvi + 336. Cloth, $69.95.The status of a "great" philosopher is to stand out for centuries, asking questions in such a way that the answers can never be definitive. Not so many of them are able to stand such a severe (...) proof. Aristotle phrased some questions we are still groping to answer. It was a very good idea to ask thirteen scholars to deliver a lecture series at the Catholic University of America during the Fall 1999 about the reception of Aristotle's theory of intellectual virtues (Nich. Ethics VI). The speakers did not stick to this issue, and enlarged their purpose to a general approach of Aristotle's receptions in various moments of Western modern philosophy.Edward Mahoney complements Charles Schmitt's basic introduction to Aristotle and the Renaissance, with some very valuable pages about Cardinal Bessarion's contribution to the Byzantine debate aroused in 1439 by Plethon's comparison between Plato and Aristotle (in favor of the former). Along with Charles Schmitt, Antonino Poppi is the best specialist of the Paduan tradition, and wrote a very qualified paper about Zabarella (1533-89), who shaped Aristotelianism into the rigorous science of the schoolbooks: for centuries, Aristotle is read through Zabarella's glasses. Apart from a bird's view on recent Galilean studies (where Alistair Crombie is not mentioned), William A. Wallace makes his point about Aristotle's influence on Galilean logics, linking Galileo's 1640 letter to Liceti (where he states that, in matters of logic, he has been an Aristotelian all his life) to the scientist's deep knowledge as revealed by the logical questions in one of the juvenile treatises (ms 27 in Florence, more thoroughly studied in Wallace's book, Galileo's Logic of Discovery and Proof [Dordrecht, 1992]). John Doyle, a specialist of Late Scholastic Philosophy, figures out a [End Page 209] strange character, the French Jesuit André Semery (1630-1717), who taught for thirty years at the Collegium romanum. In a very anti-Aristotelian way, he holds a definite belief in metaphysical beings of reason. The boundary between what we can think and say is quietly stepped over, when Semery and other Jesuits begin to think about thinking, opening a very modern path which leads to Brentano and Quine. Christia Mercer states that Leibniz's combination of a Platonist epistemology with an Aristotelian conception of nature brings a very innovative view in ethics. A very forceful paper by Richard L. Velkley compares Rousseau's politics to Aristotle's view of man (the paper became a chapter of his 2002 impressive book Being after Rousseau), while Riccardo Pozzo gives a short presentation of Aristotle's reception in modern Germany, and an elaborate analysis of Kant's debt to Aristotle for the intellectual virtues. Hegel's appropriation of Aristotelian intellect is presented by Alfredo Ferrarin, while Michael Davis reconstructs Nietzsche's path from Aristotle to the tragedy and back, in a very convincing way. Husserl (Richard Cobb-Stevens), Heidegger (Stanley Rosen), Wittgenstein (Daniel Dahlstrom) and Gadamer (Enrico Berti) conclude brilliantly the series, showing how the thought of the Stagirite fertilized contemporary philosophers, in a permanent dialogue of disagreement or borrowing, never at rest, and never leaving anyone indifferent. The old Greek man remains a vivid debater for our age of anxiety.Jean-Robert ArmogatheThe University of Paris-SorbonneCopyright © 2005 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc.... (shrink)

Many human beings have considered the powers and the limits of human knowledge, but few have wondered about the power that the idea of knowledge has over us. Steven Connor's The Madness of Knowledge is the first book to investigate this emotional inner life of knowledge - the lusts, fantasies, dreams, and fears that the idea of knowing provokes. There are in-depth discussions of the imperious will to know, of Freud's epistemophilia (or love of knowledge), and the curiously insistent links (...) between madness, magical thinking, and the desire for knowledge. Connor also probes secrets and revelations, quarreling and the history of quizzes and "general knowledge," charlatanry and pretension, both the violent disdain and the sanctification of the stupid, as well as the emotional investment in the spaces and places of knowledge, from the study to the library. In an age of artificial intelligence, alternative facts, and mistrust of truth, The Madness of Knowledge offers an opulent, enlarging, and sometimes unnerving psychopathology of intellectual life. -- From Publisher, page 2 of cover. (shrink)

In this paper, I compare aspects of Heidegger’s and Dewey’s thoughts and argue that such a comparison is educationally promising. I make this argument primarily by comparing their understandings of art, which show striking similarities. Both Dewey and Heidegger, indeed, framed art as a favorite noetic experience; both conceived of art as something that not only completes thinking but that is even necessary for thinking to happen. Both philosophers conceived of art as a means of enlarging experience, thereby (...) overcoming the hallmark of Cartesian epistemology, namely, the subject/object distinction. I wish to also argue that, through the lens of art, we can reframe and better understand some aspects of their... (shrink)

It was in the year of Nietzsche’s death that Bergson published Laughter, but he had been thinking about the subject while Nietzsche was alive and active. In 1884 he delivered a lecture, “Le rire: de quoi rit-on? Pourquoi rit-on?”; the book Le Rire grew from that lecture and enlarged its inquiry into what one laughs at and why, even if the book still does not probe deeply enough into who that “one” is who’s laughing.

Today, as so often in the past, there is much ado about morality. Theologians, psychologists, social scientists, journalists, novelists, students, drop-outs, women's libbers, and people on the street are all asking pointed questions about it. Some are for de-moralizing society and the individual, asking either whether an individual should try to be moral or to assume a morality if he has it not, and if so why; or even whether our society should have a morality at all or has any (...) right to have one - asking in short, whether we should not “kick” the moral habit we have cultivated for so long. For those who reply that we should, there is the further question what is to take the place of morality, and the answers range from love, through religion, sincerity, authenticity, and doing one's own thing, to selfishness, an enlarged system of law and order, or just nothing at all. Those who think we should keep morality, on the other hand, often argue for a “new morality,” looking for a new moral wine and even for new bottles to put it in. Non-moralism and new-moralism are in the air, along with more than the usual intimations of immorality, and it is with them, and only indirectly with the immorality, that I am now concerned. (shrink)

Arendt was famously dismissive of the work of psychologists, claiming that they did nothing more than reveal the pervasive ugliness and monotony of the psyche. If we want to know who people are, she argued, we should observe what they do and say rather than delving into the turmoil of their inner lives; if we want to understand humanity, we would be better off reading Oedipus Rex than hearing about someone’s Oedipus complex. The rejection has a certain coherence in the (...) context of her understanding of public life as the realm of appearance and opinion, but examining it through the specific question of ugliness complicates that understanding. While beauty invites us to contemplate the world and admire it, ugliness repels our attention and sows the seed of a worry that the world might not want to be known. Working with Eichmann in Jerusalem, The Life of the Mind: Thinking, the Kant lectures and a striking Denktagebuch entry in which she reacts with revulsion to Matisse’s Heads of Jeannette, I argue that Arendt’s response to the ugly psyche requires a re-examination of the sensus communis. If the psyche does not want to be known, and if not all points of view are open to imaginative occupation, the ideal and practice of enlarged mentality must reckon with a right to opacity. (shrink)

The philosopher and author of How Should We Live? presents “a clear and provocative discussion of issues such as boredom, hypocrisy, evil, and innocence”. In this book, John Kekes draws on anthropology, history, and literature to offer practical insights into the common predicaments we all face in our daily lives. Each chapter offers new ways of thinking about a common, fundamental problem, such as facing difficult choices, uncontrollable contingencies, complex evaluations, the failures of justice, the miasma of boredom, and (...) the inescapable hypocrisies of social life. In each case, Kekes discusses how others in different times and cultures have approached similar issues. Kekes examines what is good, bad, instructive, and dangerous in the Hindu caste system, Balinese role-morality, the sexually charged politics of the Shilluk, the religious passion of Cortes and Simone Weil, the fate of Colonel Hiromichi Yahara during and after the battle for Okinawa, the ritual human sacrifices of the Aztecs, and the tragedies to which innocence may lead. In doing so, he enlarges our understanding of the possibilities available to us as we struggle with the common obstacles of modern life. (shrink)

The author deals with the operational core oflogic, i.e. its diverse procedures ofinference, in order to show that logicallyfalse inferences may in fact be right because –in contrast to logical rationality – theyactually enlarge our knowledge of the world.This does not only mean that logically trueinferences say nothing about the world, butalso that all our inferences are inventedhypotheses the adequacy of which cannot beproved within logic but only pragmatically. Inconclusion the author demonstrates, through therelationship between rule-following andrationality, that it is (...) most irrational to wantto exclude the irrational: it may, at times, bemost rational to think and infer irrationally.Focussing on the operational aspects of knowingas inferring does away with the hiatus betweenlogic and life, cognition and the world(reality) – or whatever other dualism one wantsto invoke –: knowing means inferring, inferringmeans rule-governed interpreting, interpretingis a constructive, synthetic act, and aconstruction that proves adequate (viable) inthe ``world of experience'', in life, in thepraxis of living, is, to the constructivistmind, knowledge. It is the practice of livingwhich provides the orienting standards forconstructivist thinking and its judgments ofviability. The question of truth is replaced bythe question of viability, and viabilitydepends on the (right) kind of experiential fit. (shrink)

Centramos la atención en la noción de crítica del pensamiento de Arturo Andrés Roig. El problema se aborda partiendo del vínculo que se establece entre la crítica y la noción de vigilancia epistemológica de Gastón Bachelard. Consideramos a continuación la crítica como ejercicio de la sospecha. Finalmente, se analiza el aspecto social de la crítica, esto permite relacionar la producción teórica de Roig con la teoría crítica, especialmente con el pensamiento de Max Horkheimer. En este sentido, enfatizamos la indagación sobre (...) la función social de la filosofía ya que implica una ampliación de la crítica. We focus our attention on the concept "criticism" thinking by Arturo Andrés Roig. We tackle this question starting from the link between "criticism" and "epistemological vigilance" of Gaston Bachelard. We then consider the criticism like suspicion. Finally, we analize the social aspect of the criticism, that allow to link the theoretical production of Arturo Roig whit the critical theory, especially whit Horkheimer´s thinking. In this respect, we emphasize the inquiry about the social function of the philosophy, because that involves an enlargement of criticism. (shrink)

As we settle further into the era of digital media and globalized visual culture, it might be tempting to think that photography holds no more than historical interest. Yet it continues to feature in debates with considerable significance for the present.1 The terms by which it was negotiated in the twentieth century – the print, the negative and the mechanical-optical apparatus, the affective experience of a moment stilled, and any truth that its rendering promises – have been technically and culturally (...) displaced and expanded. New instabilities have become familiar and have distanced us from how photography was understood, even in the fairly recent past. The current historical conjuncture is marked by a widespread suspicion that existing theories – including those that turned, in the 1970s, to Marxism, feminist critique, semiotics or psychoanalysis so as to politicize and contest mainstream photographic culture – might no longer be adequate to photography’s contemporary situation. That photography still matters, however, can be evidenced, prosaically and contingently, by noting the increasing number of new scholarly journals and exhibitions devoted to its past, present and future in recent years.2 There is, in this – as Fred Ritchin is only the latest to note – a sense that the undoing of photography’s prior certainties constitutes an ending and an enlargement. The fate of photography provides an ‘expansive filter’ through which to chart the ‘chaos of possibilities that emerge and recede, back up and move forward, crisscrossing each other.’3 Expectations of the new and the old, the obsolete and as yet only anticipated, are thrown into temporal disarray as its openness to reformation gives the photographic past a futural slant. (shrink)

The philosopher David Lewis is credited by many social scientists, including mainstream economists, with having founded the modern (game-theoretical) approach to conventions, viewed as solutions to recurrent coordination problems. Yet it is generally ignored that he revised his approach, soon after the publication of his well-known book. I suggest that this revision has deep implications (probably not perceived by Lewis himself) on the analytical links between coordination, uncertainty and rationality. Thinking anew about these issues leads me to map out (...) an alternative social scientific research programme. The traditional ontological equipment of methodological individualism should be reinforced in order to admit the existence of an “intersubjective” world beside the two familiar worlds: the “objective” world of observable things, and the “subjective” world of expectations and individual beliefs. In particular, language becomes necessary to understand coordination via conventions, rather than the other way round. That has led a group of institutionalist economists and pragmatist sociologists to develop an enlarged model of rationality, no longer isolated from questions of coordination and values. This model is the basis for the “Economics of Conventions”. (shrink)

A possible worlds treatment of the normal alethic modalities was, after classical model theory, logic’s most significant semantic achievement in the century just past.[1] Kripke’s groundbreaking paper appeared in 1959 and, in the scant few succeeding years, its principal analytical tool, possible worlds, was adapted to serve a range of quite different-seeming purposes – from nonnormal logics,[2] to epistemic and doxastic logics[3], deontic[4] and temporal logics[5] and, not much later, the logic of counterfactual conditionals.[6] In short order, possible worlds acquired (...) a twofold reputation which has steadily enlarged to the present day. They were celebrated for both their mathematical power and their sheer versatility. This sets the stage for what I want to do here. I wish to explore the extent to which the supposed versatility of a possible worlds semantics is justified. In so doing, I shall confine my attention to its role in (1) logics of counterfactual conditionals, and (2) logics of belief. The question I pose is, why and on what grounds should we think that the device of possible worlds turns the semantic trick for these logics? My answer is that they do not turn the trick for them. Whereupon a further question presses for attention. If possible worlds semantics don’t work there, why does virtually everyone think that they do? Answering this second question is risky. Who am I to say why virtually everyone thinks that the possible worlds approach is more successful than I do? Who has vouchsafed me these powers? I shall try to mitigate the riskiness of my answer by contextualizing the evaluation of this approach in the following ways. First, the triumph of possible worlds occurred in the midst of a powerful general trend in logical theory, especially, in the past 60 years. In that period, logical theory became aggressively and widely pluralistic. Second, the versatility – the sheer ubiquity – of possible worlds as a tool of semantic and philosophical analysis, gives to possible worlds a kind of hegemonic standing.. (shrink)

There has been much recent debate about the nature of the omnivoyant image that introduces Nicholas of Cusa’s De visione Dei. In this paper, I argue that Cusa’s concept of contraction and his ‘radical perspectivism’ lead us toward stretching the concept of omnivoyance beyond a simple dichotomy between a phenomenology of the image and a phenomenology of the icon. Instead of putting such emphasis on what is seen by the omnivoyant, we should think an omnivoyant optics starting from the material (...) milieu from which it sees. To this end, I define the concept of omnivoyance through the concept of the elemental. Using both the concept of an element derived from Presocratic Ionian philosophy and recent French and American continental philosophy, I put these discourses into conversation with Cusa in several ways: the way omnivoyance functions as a substratum of contracted seeing rather than as a transcendence, its operation as a pure frontality without objectifiable aspects, and the way in which omnivoyance implies not only a gaze that sees ‘all and each’ but also a plurality of modes of vision. To help us understand this enlarged concept of omnivoyance, I use the example of animal vision, particularly the gaze of the whale. With respect to cetacean vision, I deploy Melville’s metaphysical speculations in Moby Dick as our primary guide. (shrink)

A volume in Contemporary Human Resource Management: Issues, Challenges, and Opportunities Series Editor Ronald R. Sims, College of William and Mary The primary purpose of this book is to stimulate dialogue and discussion about the most effective ways of teaching ethics. Contributors to the book focus on approaches and methodologies and lessons learned that are having an impact in leading students to confront with accountability and understanding the bases of their ethical thinking, the responsibilities they have to an (...) class='Hi'>enlarged base of stakeholders (whose needs and interests often are conflicting), and their stewardship to use their talents responsibility not only in fulfilling an enterprise's economic goals but also to recognize the impact of their actions on both individuals and larger society. The primary audiences for the book are those individuals responsible for teaching management, especially those with responsibilities for teaching business ethics. But the book is also designed for practicing managers, for these managers have among their most important responsibilities the development of people in their organizations who have the integrity, values, and competences to be effective managers of economic resources while at the same time to recognize the roles of their enterprise in shaping society. (shrink)

Two welcome extensions of evolutionary thinking have come to prominence over the last thirty years: the so-called ’extended evolutionary synthesis’ (EES) and debate about biological kinds and individuals. These two agendas have, however, remained orthogonal to one another. The EES has mostly restricted itself to widening the explanations of adaptation offered by the preceding ’modern evolutionary synthesis’ by including additional mechanisms of inheritance and variation; while discussion of biological kinds has turned toward philosophical questions of essential vs. contingent properties (...) of life forms and realist vs. epistemological approaches to categorization and classification. Here we attempt to broaden the explanatory scope of evolutionary theory by linking these two agendas. We expand on the mechanistic orientation of the EES, using new understandings of networked systems of components in order to engage the distinct intellectual challenge of the origination of “historical kinds”. With this phrase we designate a subset of natural kinds that acquires, through evolutionary processes, a quasi-independent lineage-history. Such kinds emerge in both biology and culture, and we enlarge the limited number of historical kinds that have thus far been recognized in evolutionary biology in a series of paradigmatic exemplars, from genes and cell types to rituals and music. For each exemplar we discern specific mechanisms by which it arose and persists; comparing these, we suggest a general unity in the ways in which diverse historical kinds originate. (shrink)

Phenomenology and the Kyoto School implement an interaction among cultures1 that is not limited to illustrating Western philosophy wxith exotic similes. Insofar as my position is concerned, I will start out with phenomenology in order to study Nishida's work, trying on the one hand to understand the meaning that he gives to nothingness in relation to the Merleau-Pontian concept of creux in order, on the other hand, to enlarge reason and philosophy.To achieve this, I shall establish a comparison of the (...) two thinkers that will help to shed light on their conceptions, while at the same time demonstrating the efficacy of thinking the unthoughts or negativities indicating a... (shrink)

Recent conversations with friends and students about Emerson’s essay on friendship lead me to suspect that at least some of you will find Emerson’s views so strange or radical as not to be about friendship at all. Others will be struck by his anticipations of Nietzsche, whose name I introduce here because like Nietzsche, who read him carefully, Emerson is a genealogist and refashioner of morals. When Emerson criticizes our normal friendships by writing that we mostly “descend to meet,” he (...) is recording the possibility, indeed with the word “mostly,” the actuality, of something better than what normally passes for friendship. If Emerson finds our friendships disappointing, that is because he thinks that friendship is a high, demanding virtue. In its best actualizations, it carries “the world for me,” as he puts it, “to new and noble depths, and enlarge[s] the meaning of all my thoughts.” It has the capacity to break down the barriers between people, canceling “the thick walls of individual character, relation, age, sex, circumstance.” Friendship is thus a great unifier, a servant of what Emerson calls the “Over-Soul” or “Unity” (CW 2:115). But, as Emerson says in his essay on “Montaigne: or the Skeptic,” “there are doubts.” These doubts about friendships are my main subject in the following essay. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:PRZYWARA AND VON BALTHASAR ON ANALOGY ERICK PRZYWARA'S major work is entitled Analogia Entis: Metaphysil:,, Ur-Struktur und All-Rhythmus.1 As we will explain, it is especially the subtitle, " Basicstructure and Overall-rhythm", which is important in understanding the type of metaphysics he proposes. An explicit treatment of analogy by Hans Urs von Balthasar may be found in a se:des of two articles, " Analogie und Dialektik " and " Analogie (...) und Natur ", both of which carry the subtitle, " A clarification of the theological principles of Karl Barth " (1944-1945).2 They later become the basis of two important sections of Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung Seiner Theologie.3 The first becomes part of Balthasar's demonstration on Barth's "turn to analogy ".4 The second becomes part of presentation of Catholic" thought-form": "The concept of nature in Catholic theology". This context, the dialogue with Barth and Catholic theology in relationship to Barth, is essential for understanding Balthas,ar's views on analogy-as well as his relationship to Erich Przywara, anotheT dialogue partner of Barth. The "one concrete order of salvation", as 1 Anafogia En-tis. (AE) Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1962. Second edition. The first edition (Munich: Koesel & Pustet, 1932), however, lacks this subtitle. It is called: Analogia Entis. JJfetaphysik. I. Prinzip. The new subtitle is a response to a "misunderstanding" (e.g., Barth's accusation) that analogia entis was only a metaphysical principle. Przywara also clarifies the sense in which analogy can be called a "principle" in the new forward to the second edition (p. 5), as well as in a new ending on p. 210. 2Both in Divus Thomas: the first in #22 (1944), 171-216; the second in # 23 (1945)' 3-56. 3 Cologne: Jakob Hegner Verlag, 1951. 4Cf. "Die Wendung zur.Analogie", 93-123; as well as "Die Vollgestalt der Analogie", 124-180. Balthasar acknowledges his indebtedness to Przywara in the enlarged treatment of analogy in Barth: cf. p. 10 ancl p. 404 n.3 (for the section on the" concept of nature in Catholic theology.") 473 474 JAMES V. ZEITZ, S.J. the place where analogy thinking must begin and end, is typical of both Przywarn and Balthasar-and reflects undoubtedly the influence of Barth on bot1h of these Catholic and (at the time) Jesuit theologians. To start at an earlier stage, however, the real issue of analogy, in both Przywa;ra and Balthasar's writings is the God question. How can we maintain God's transcendence as a true ' other ' in relation to immanence-the one concrete order where Jesus Christ is already present? This is first of all a prroblem for any theological method. The starting point and language which proceeds from this starting point must allow for transcendence within immanence. Thus Balthasar's aibove-mentioned work on analogy discusses the problem using the rubric of the time, a " concept of nacbure " in relationship to Ubernatur. His question is: what concept of nature is able bo relate to Ubernatur, while remaining truly a creaturely concept of nature? His thesis is that nature cannot be abstract or "pure " in an 18th century, secularized philosophical sense (e.g. Baius), but-in conformity with the whole tradition of the Ohurch Fathers, where nature means the whole human condition-the concept of nature is always already analogous, since ' rnan ' as creature can never stand aside from his already given, concrete nature within the order of salvation.5 Przywara had already prepared the way for this by insisting on a creaturely metaphysics leading to a theological metaphysics, where analogy is the adequate method. Besides the theological method, however, there is the problem of transcendence within one's understanding of Christ and the biblical revelation of the New Testament. Is there really a place for what can only be revealed and received? Or, to state the question in Balthasar's terms: how is the "one, concrete order", where Jesus Christ is already pa,rt of our history, 5 Cf. "Der Begriff der Natur in der Theologie ". Eine Diskussion zwischen Hans Urs von Balthasar und Engelbert Gutwenger. ZKTh vol. 75, 1953. 452461. In this debate, Balthasar further clarifies what he had said in Durstellung, in response to Gutwenger... (shrink)