In July 1993, the Scottish Highlands Centre for Human Caring sponsored a conference with the title Exploring the Spirituality in Caring. The papers given at the conference and included in this volume are offered as a contribution to the debate that must take place in nursing and in the wider context of health care provision. Ann Bradshaw's paper puts the debate in context arguing that nursing is fundamentally a loving response to the human being created in the image of (...) God. (shrink)

Nurses have traditionally been regarded as clinicians that deliver compassionate, safe, and empathetic health care (Nurses again outpace other professions for honesty & ethics, 2018). Caring is a fundamental characteristic, expectation, and moral obligation of the nursing and caregiving professions (Nursing: Scope and standards of practice, American Nurses Association, Silver Spring, MD, 2015). Along with caring, nurses are expected to undertake ever‐expanding duties and complex tasks. In part because of the growing physical, intellectual and emotional demandingness, of nursing as (...) well as technological advances, artificial intelligence (AI) and AI care robots are rapidly changing the healthcare landscape. As technology becomes more advanced, efficient, and economical, opportunities and pressure to introduce AI into nursing care will only increase. In the first part of the article, we review recent and existing applications of AI in nursing and speculate on future use. Second, situate our project within the recent literature on the ethics of nursing and AI. Third, we explore three dominant theories of caring and the two paradigmatic expressions of caring (touch and presence) and conclude that AI—at least for the foreseeable future—is incapable of caring in the sense central to nursing and caregiving ethics. We conclude that for AI to be implemented ethically, it cannot transgress the core values of nursing, usurp aspects of caring that can only meaningfully be carried out by human beings, and it must support, open, or improve opportunities for nurses to provide the uniquely human aspects of care. (shrink)

Here is material for a complete introductory course in philosophy. The reader is presented with a comprehensive selection of the major classical texts, all accompained by explanatory commentary and criticism. Each work is placed in its historical context—from the pre-Socratic to the twentieth century—showing how each author marked a milestone in the history of Western thought. Where possible, complete texts have been used; longer works are covered by selections carefully made to illuminate central concepts. Explanation and criticism are couched in (...) straightforward language and technicalities within the texts are also clearly presented, making difficult arguments and ideas easily intelligible. (shrink)

Recently ethical implications of human resource management have intensified the focus on care perspectives in management and organization studies. Appeals have also been made for the concept of organizational care to be grounded in philosophies of care rather than business theories. Care perspectives see individuals, especially women, as primarily relational and view work as a means by which people can increase in self-esteem, self-develop and be fulfilled. The ethic of care has received attention in feminist (...) ethics and is often socially construed as a feminine ethic. Although well developed in the caring professions there remains no model or definition of the care ethic in management literature with little care research undertaken. This paper develops the concept of the care ethic using Heidegger’s philosophy, namely, care is fundamental to human being. To show Heideggerian care, an individual notices, pays attention to another and responds in ways to empower and enable. In a study which aimed to analyze women’s lived experience of career, we applied the philosophically grounded methodology hermeneutic phenomenology. Findings revealed the power of Heideggerian care, Sorge, as a key factor in creating meaning. From this, we propose that care has potential as a theoretical and philosophically based construct with strong practical implications. It provides a way of understanding the care ethic, lies at the heart of our being, and is essential to meaning in our grelationships and undertakings. Crucially, it can provide reprieve from the existential angst that trademarks our being. (shrink)

This article aims to respond to the long-lived perceived incompatibility between care and compassion and justice in organizational literature. It is argued that principles of care and compassion and principles of justice are compatible with each other and can be integrated in organizations in such a way that both will supplement each other. Previous researches tend to view concepts of care and compassion and justice either as competing or inheriting some fundamental trade-offs. This article argues that the (...) highlighted incompatibility between care and compassion and justice is mainly due to the limited understanding about the nature of organizational justice. Care and compassion carry elements of subjectivity and are dynamic in nature, whereas literature on organizational justice has described justice as an objective, static and linear construct due to which an incompatibility between these two very important phenomena is prevailing. This incompatibility can be removed by changing the way of looking at organizational justice and by exploring its dynamic nature. (shrink)

The Fundamentals of Ethics is a textbook that introduces students to the central ideas of moral philosophy in a thorough yet compact and engaging way. It contains several chapters each on The Good Life, Normative Ethics, and Metaethics. It has greater breadth and depth than Rachels' The Elements of Moral Philosophy, offering a substantial level of analysis while also keeping the student reader in mind. Writing in a lively style with many examples, the author reconstructs and carefully evaluates over (...) forty central arguments in moral philosophy, helping students to improve their critical thinking skills along the way. It is designed to be used on its own or in conjunction with The Ethical Life, the companion reader. (shrink)

Given the complexity of modern health care, there exists an urgent need to discover how best to resolve complex bioethical issues. Traditionally, principle based ethics provided the benchmark for guiding ethical decision-making. More recently, however, it has become apparent that this traditional approach is often inadequate in dealing with cur rent health care dilemmas. The notion of caring was advanced initially as an alternative to, then as a complement to, principle based ethics. In this article, caring is conceptual (...) ized as an attitude and is viewed as integral to the advancement of a coherent and inte grated moral approach to ethical decision-making. First, a brief historical description of bioethics is presented. Next, an evolutionary account of caring within bioethics is described. Four fundamental problems associated with the use of caring within bioethics are then outlined. Finally, caring as an attitude is delineated and a case study is used to illustrate the proposed conceptualization of caring. The case study demonstrates that a caring attitude provides for relationship and context, which are elements often neglected by traditional approaches. (shrink)

The development of nursing ethics as a field of inquiry has largely relied on theories of medical ethics that use autonomy, beneficence, and/or justice as foundational ethical principles. Such theories espouse a masculine approach to moral decision-making and ethical analysis. This paper challenges the presumption of medical ethics and its associated system of moral justification as an appropriate model for nursing ethics. It argues that the value foundations of nursing ethics are located within the existential phenomenon of human caring within (...) the nurse/patient relationship instead of in models of patient good or rights-based notions of autonomy as articulated in prominent theories of medical ethics. Models of caring are analyzed and a moral-point-of-view (MPV) theory with caring as a fundamental value is proposed for the development of a theory of nursing ethics. This type of theory is supportive to feminist medical ethics because it focuses on the subscription to, and not merely the acceptance of, a particular view of morality. (shrink)

My paper focuses on the theme of visibility by teasing out some paradoxes of invisibility. In the ordinary social world, what is said to be invisible is generally what is here, right before our eyes, but to which we pay no attention. Care is invisible because it goes on without us seeing it. By suddenly making visible what is ordinarily invisible, the COVID pandemic has been a strange pedagogical moment, making visible the people who take care of “us”, (...) and revealing our entire society’s ignorance of what allows it to live—whether in the context of everyday life or in the urgency of the risk of death. The grammar of care has thus imposed itself on everyone, because care is never so visible as in those situations where a form of life is shaken. Care work has been revealed as invisible work that keeps everyone going. “Invisible” does not refer to a difficulty in perceiving but rather a refusal to see. A refusal to see something that is not hidden, but which we do not see precisely because it is right before our eyes. Invisibility is thus denial, in both the social and the theoretical realms, especially when care work is envisioned in the terms of the further invisibilization of care work when it is done for the benefit of women as in the “care drain” from poor to rich countries. The asymmetry in the relations between North and South is part of the invisibility of what sustains societies. The invisible chains of care reveal the extent to which the question of service is the fundamental question of social invisibility. (shrink)

In the nursing literature, a number of qualities are associated with loving care. Reference is made to, among other things, humility, attentiveness, responsibility and duty, compassion, and tenderness. The author attempts to show that charm, in the Marcelian sense, also plays a central role. It is argued that the moral foundation of charm is a unity of agape and eros. An impartial giving of the self for others is clearly of fundamental importance in an ethic of care. Including (...) charm in the discussion points to the fact that eros also plays a crucial role. Eros produces a passion for people and for life. It is a physical and spiritual energy that animates a person in all facets of her life, including her caring work. (shrink)

The ethics of care and Confucian care ethics are both characterised by relations-based moral reasoning and decision-making. Acknowledging this similarity, this article compares and contrasts these two ethics, highlighting Western and Eastern moral concerns. One of the main differences between the two ethical theories is their different focus on vulnerability and inequality as factors in achieving equality in the ethics of care; another is the reciprocity, rather than equality, dimension in Confucian ethics. Both theories enshrine the view (...) that the characteristics of care offer scope for developing the capacity for judgement. However, a fundamental difference is revealed when considering that Confucian ethics emphasises care as a virtue in the cultivation of one's moral agency, whereas the ethics of care sees care as both a disposition and practice, and the caring relationship to be a primary means of moral evaluation. For the care ethicists, the practice of care embraces communicative morality, within fluid, dynamic interpersonal relationships - in sharp contrast to Confucian care practices, which are constructed within formal standards and fixed, role-based relationships. (shrink)

Feminist reflections on the sexual division of labour have given rise to a body of knowledge on the ethics of care from different disciplines, including philosophy, in which outstanding contributions to the topic have been formulated. This approach is applicable to the analysis of any phenomenon and particularly that of disasters. As various investigations have highlighted, the consequences on the population throughout all of a disaster’s phases (prevention, emergency, and reconstruction) require an analysis of differentiated vulnerabilities based on gender (...) and other identity categories, such as social class, ethnicity, age, disability, sexual identity, etc. The interrelation between all these variables gives rise to differentiated impacts that cannot be ignored in catastrophic contexts, where survival and sustaining life are at stake, so care becomes a central issue. Research on the topic has also identified that, along with the analysis of social vulnerability, we must consider the capacity for agency, both individual and collective, where care is once again of vital importance. Considering the gender approach and its multiple intersections is thus a fundamental theoretical-practical proposal for the study of disasters from philosophy, as it implies an unavoidable epistemic, ontological, and ethical reflection in the face of risk reduction. (shrink)

This paper explores the potential for an international political theory of care as an alternative to liberalism in the context of contemporary global politics. It argues that relationality and interdependence, and the responsibilities for and practices of care that arise therewith, are fundamental aspects of moral life and sites of political contestation that have been systematically denied and obfuscated under liberalism. A political theory of care brings into view the responsibilities and practices of care that sustain (...) not just ‘bare life’ but all social life, from nuclear and extended families to local, national and transnational communities. It disrupts and challenges the individualism of liberalism, and the associated valorization of ‘freedom’, ‘autonomy’, and ‘toleration’. Instead, it emphasizes an ontology of relationality and interdependence that accepts the existence of vulnerability without reifying particular individuals, groups or states as ‘victims’ or ‘guardians’. Furthermore, by demonstrating the gendered and raced nature of caring in the contemporary world—from the household to the transnational level—an international political theory of care challenges our received assumptions about ‘dependence’ in world politics, and opens up space to interrogate politically not only gender but race and other aspects of inequality in the global political economy. (shrink)

This historical study aims to explain how the transition from student nurse service to fully qualified “graduate nurse” service in the United States in the 20th century affected assumptions about fundamental patient care in hospital wards and provide historical context for current apprenticeship programs. Through analysis of documents from 1920 when student nurse service, a nurse apprentice model, was the norm to 1960 when the nurse apprentice model was waning in favor of registered nurse service, this study found that (...) the replacement of student nurses with registered nurses led to weakened standardization of fundamental bedside care and the introduction of large numbers of unlicensed nursing assistants. While student nurses could perform all the functions of fully qualified graduate nurses, nursing assistants could not, resulting in a separation of fundamental nursing care from the professional nurse role and changes in assumptions and attitudes toward fundamental care. These changes had a negative effect on fundamental nursing care. New apprenticeship programs provide opportunities for improvement. (shrink)

Studies of creative industries typically contend that creative work is profoundly precarious, taking place on a freelance basis in highly competitive, individualized and contingent labour markets. Such studies depict creative workers as correspondingly self-enterprising, self-reliant, self-interested and calculative agents who valorise care-free independence. In contrast, we adopt the ‘ethics of care’ approach to explore, recognize and appreciate the communitarian, relational and moral considerations as well as interpersonal connectedness and interdependencies that underpin creative work. Drawing on in-depth interviews with (...) creative workers in a range of marginal socio-cultural contexts, we argue that creative workers cultivate and sustain a diverse array of practices of care arising from an affective concern with the well-being of others. Far from being merely individualistic and crudely competitive actors, creative workers enact practical ethical responsibilities and affectivities towards a range of human and non-human others, including families, local communities and neighbourhoods, colleagues, artistic scenes and their adjacent genres, and surrounding national and linguistic cultures. In emphasizing the fundamental and structuring role of care in contingent labour markets our approach accords with recent trends in the social sciences that ‘affirmatively’—as opposed to ‘negatively’ and ‘suspiciously’—recognize that mutuality, solidarity and affectivity are powerful drivers of action on a par with or even exceeding market-driven self-centredness. (shrink)

Nursing policy and healthcare reform are focusing on two, interconnected areas: person‐centred care and fundamental care. Each initiative emphasises a positive nurse–patient relationship. For these initiatives to work, nurses require guidance for how they can best develop and maintain relationships with their patients in practice. Although empirical evidence on the nurse–patient relationship is increasing, findings derived from this research are not readily or easily transferable to the complexities and diversities of nursing practice. This study describes a novel methodological (...) approach, called holistic interpretive synthesis (HIS), for interpreting empirical research findings to create practice‐relevant recommendations for nurses. Using HIS, umbrella review findings on the nurse–patient relationship are interpreted through the lens of the Fundamentals of Care Framework. The recommendations for the nurse–patient relationship created through this approach can be used by nurses to establish, maintain and evaluate therapeutic relationships with patients to deliver person‐centred fundamental care. Future research should evaluate the validity and impact of these recommendations and test the feasibility of using HIS for other areas of nursing practice and further refine the approach. (shrink)

When critical thinking occurs in a collective context such as a Philosophy for Children workshop, it cannot be considered simply as an intellectual exercise, insofar as it depends on social interactions in the philosophical dialogue. This is why, in line with the works of Matthew Lipman, critical thinking should be taught and practiced as an exercise based on the development of caring thinking among children. Furthermore, open-mindedness, defined as the ability of the child to welcome intellectually and ethically divergent ideas, (...) may constitute the very fundamental precondition for critical thinking as it permits the meticulous, analytic and authentic discovery of the idea. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to re-examine an ethic of care as the main ethical approach to nursing practice in light of past and present developments in nursing ethics, and to briefly speculate whether or not it will survive within nursing in the future. Overall, it is maintained throughout that the terms ?caring?, ?nursing? and an ?ethic of care? are inextricably linked. This is because, it is argued, professionally focused nursing practices are based predominantly on a well-recognised (...) moral commitment to deliver expert care, and that a care-based ethic is the major factor in the construction and maintenance of these practices. Subsequently, the influences and developments of a caring ethic in nursing are firstly re-examined, and the discussion is supported by evidence from more recent nursing research and theoretical developments. Consideration is given to the philosophical underpinnings of both care theory and caring ethics, and the fundamental importance of caring in nursing, as an interpersonal relationship and as an appropriate ethical response, is made transparent. Finally, an outline of the future possibilities that may affect an ethic of care in nursing is offered. (shrink)

Care, I suspect, is initiated with an appeal. Something appeals to me which becomes a matter of concern. In accordance with this concern, I develop a volition: I want that which promotes the thriving—even to the smallest extent—of that which has appealed to us, regardless of how I may establish what that entails. Eventually I take practical action: I act according to my volition. Immediately after this has taken effect, as the case may be, I release the source of (...) the appeal from my care.The phenomenology of care seems to us to be of eminent importance for health care ethics. To denote professional caring, the term nursing is used. The professional care-giver purposefully exposes him/herself to an appeal, making him/herself receptive to such an appeal and reliably allowing the appeal to become a concern. A fundamental principle of nursing ethics thus appears to us to be: to make known one’s receptiveness to an appeal—in a particular situation at a particular time—and to process this appeal reliably such that it becomes a concern. This encompasses the professionalism of care at its initiation.I believe that a precise phenomenology of care will provide a definition of the professional care that is nursing and an ethics of nursing for the care-giving professions. (shrink)

During public health crises including the COVID-19 pandemic, resource scarcity and contagion risks may require health systems to shift—to some degree—from a usual clinical ethic, focused on the well-being of individual patients, to a public health ethic, focused on population health. Many triage policies exist that fall under the legal protections afforded by “crisis standards of care,” but they have key differences. We critically appraise one of the most fundamental differences among policies, namely the use of criteria to categorically (...) exclude certain patients from eligibility for otherwise standard medical services. We examine these categorical exclusion criteria from ethical, legal, disability, and implementation perspectives. Focusing our analysis on the most common type of exclusion criteria, which are disease-specific, we conclude that optimal policies for critical care resource allocation and the use of cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) should not use categorical exclusions. We argue that the avoidance of categorical exclusions is often practically feasible, consistent with public health norms, and mitigates discrimination against persons with disabilities. (shrink)

Drawing on previous empirical research, we provide an exemplary narrative to illustrate how patients have experienced hospital care organized according to evidence‐based fast‐track programmes. The aim of this paper was to analyse and discuss if and how it is possible to include patients’ individual perspectives in an evidence‐based practice as seen from the point of view of nursing theory. The paper highlights two conflicting courses of development. One is a course of standardization founded on evidence‐based recommendations, which specify a (...) set of rules that the patient must follow rigorously. The other is a course of democratization based on patients’ involvement in care. Referring to the analysis of the narrative, we argue that, in the current implementation of evidence‐based practice, the proposed involvement of patients resembles empty rhetoric. We argue that the principles and values from evidence‐based medicine are being lost in the transformation into the current evidence‐based hospital culture which potentially leads to a McDonaldization of nursing practice reflected as ‘one best way’. We argue for reviving ethics of care perspectives in today's evidence practice as the fundamental values of nursing may potentially bridge conflicts between evidence‐based practice and the ideals of patient participation thus preventing a practice of ‘McNursing’. (shrink)

The adoption of personalisation as the principle on which policy and practices for social care in England should be developed has been hailed as marking a fundamental transformation in the nature of social care and the experiences of service users. This article examines both the discourse of personalisation and the practices that are being adopted to implement this from an ethic of care perspective. It adopts an approach based on Sevenhuijsen's ‘Trace’ analysis to trace the normative frameworks (...) in key policy documents (in particular Putting People First), noting that critics of care have largely succeeded in relegating care to a marginal position within policy discourse and that a relational sensibility is largely absent within this. The article considers the practices associated with personalisation in relation to the moral principles of an ethic of care and conceptions of the ‘individual’ within these. It addresses the implications of this approach for broader political and policy issues: the universality of provision, collective responsibility for welfare and well-being, and broader issues of social justice in conditions of vulnerability. (shrink)

Our response to Sara Fry's paper focuses on the difficulty of understanding her insistence on the fundamental character of caring in a theory of nursing ethics. We discuss a number of problems her text throws in the way of making sense of this idea, and outline our own proposal for how caring's role may be reasonably understood: not as an alternative object of value, competing with autonomy or patient good, but rather as an alternative way of responding toward that which (...) is of value. (shrink)

Anti-abortion proponents argue that a fetus holds the status of a person akin to healthy adult human beings. The fetus possesses inherent dignity and a fundamental right to life, which must be resp...

The purpose of this paper is not to provide an overall picture of care ethics, but, rather, to reflect upon the concept of care, which has gained significance in particular scientific contexts. Undoubtedly, the importance of the subject of care represents a challenge on the level of fundamental philosophical positions and a diversified look into the occurring forms of the psychological and social suffering, dependency, and vulnerability. I will shed light on tenets that are considered central to (...) the care ethics and that have led to the setting up of the relationship between care and democracy. By introducing the basic aspects of Carol Gilligan’s and Joan Tronto’s theories, I will emphasize their vocation to be politically relevant. A discussion on the relationship between care and justice on the one hand, and needs and rights on the other, will follow. Can hearing voices of care make democracy more just? How can care ethics provide a concrete support for democracy? On the political level, care ethics builds on the assumptions of the necessary relatedness and equality between individuals who are decisive in the light of the welfare state perspective. Upon closer examination, one may see that the setting up of these relationships is not new to the liberal perspective. Liberalism is historically rooted in the fundamental interconnection between freedom and equality. Virtues such as care and meekness can be formulated in the language of politics, but they still remain unpolitical. On the one hand, engaging in a critical reflection upon such virtues might be an indispensable measuring instrument for distinguishing a good democracy from a bad one. On the other hand, care ethics does not prove to be a real alternative to the ethics of justice. In this regard, care ethics seems to show its feet of clay. (shrink)

Background The COVID-19 pandemic has forced rapid and widespread change to standards of patient care and nursing practice, inevitably leading to unprecedented shifts in the moral conditions of nursing work. Less is known about how these challenges have affected nurses’ capacity to meet their ethical responsibilities and what has helped to sustain their efforts to continue to care. Research objectives 1) To explore nurses’ experiences of striving to fulfill their ethical responsibilities of care during the COVID-19 pandemic (...) and 2) to explore what has fostered nurses’ capacity to fulfill these responsibilities. Research Design A generic qualitative approach was used incorporating concepts coming from fundamental features of care. Participants Twenty-four Canadian Registered Nurses from a variety of practice settings were interviewed. Ethical Considerations After receiving ethics approval, signed informed consent was obtained before participants were interviewed. Findings Four themes were identified. 1) Challenges providing good care in response to sudden changes in practice. 2) Tensions in juggling the responsibility to prevent COVID-19 infections with other competing moral responsibilities. 3) Supports to foster nurses’ capacity to meet their caring responsibilities. 4) The preservation of nurses’ moral identity through expressions of gratitude and health improvement. Discussion Infection control measures and priorities set in response to the pandemic made at distant population and organizational levels impacted nurses who continued to try to meet the ideals of care in close proximity to patients and their families. Despite the challenges that nurses encountered, the care they received themselves enabled them to continue to care for others. Nurses benefited most from the moral communities they had with their colleagues and occasionally nurse leaders, especially when they were supported in a face-to-face manner. Conclusion: Moral community can only be sustained if nurses are afforded the working conditions that make it possible for them to support each other. (shrink)

Different ethical frameworks have been proposed as appropriate for integrating into crisis management strategies. This study examines an ethic of care approach to crisis management analysing the case of Northern Rock bank which was at the centre of the recent financial crisis in the UK. The development and maintenance of relationships is fundamental to an ethic of care approach and the research recognises this by examining the bank–stakeholder relationship both before and after the crisis. Considerable anger was directed (...) at the bank post-crisis and, subsequently, the management team resigned. An important contention is that because an ethic of care approach had not been followed external parties judged that management should have foreseen the crisis and the harm caused was deemed intentional, even though predicting the crisis would have been difficult and it is improbable any harm was intended. Additionally, this negative reaction was heightened due to three facets of Northern Rock’s history: (i) its previous existence as a building society, (ii) the ‘local’ nature of the bank and (iii) the creation of The Northern Rock Foundation. These historical factors caused local stakeholders to presume a ‘caring’ relationship between themselves, and the bank had continued to exist post-demutualisation. The events of the crisis compelled stakeholders to re-appraise this presumption, amplifying the post-crisis anger. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a neo-Humean response to the problem of moral inclusion by bringing Humean moral philosophy into deep and serious dialogue with Latin American philosophy. Our argument for achieving this two-fold aim unfolds as follows. In section one, we elucidate Mia Sosa-Provencio’s conception of a mestiza ethics of care. We begin by highlighting its fundamental elements, especially its concern with what we refer to as the cultural embeddedness both of moral agents and of moral patients. We (...) then explain how this aspect of the mestiza ethic poses a distinctive challenge for Humean moral philosophy. In section two, we develop a neo-Humean response to this challenge. We begin by highlighting the strengths and limits of trying to develop a response by appealing to Hume’s conceptions of sympathy and humanity. We then present what we take to be the most plausible way for a neo-Humean conception of moral philosophy to offer a satisfactory reply to the challenge posed by the mestiza ethics of care, by appealing to two key concepts from outside the system of Hume’s moral philosophy: namely, sympathetic understanding and relational humility. (shrink)

Primary healthcare plays a fundamental role in advancing public health, and the evaluation of its effectiveness is crucial part for ongoing enhancement and evolution. The escalating prevalence of non-communicable diseases is placing significant burden on the healthcare resources of both developed and developing countries. The aim of this study is to evaluate the financial efficiency and quality of care provided through telemedicine in virtual clinics compared to traditional clinical visits for chronic patients attending Primary Healthcare Centers (PHCs) in Makkah, (...) Saudi Arabia. This research is using an analytical cross-sectional study design, and it included all adults registered in the HIS for 2023 with DM or HTN. The researcher compared in-person and virtual visit costs and some of the health outcomes. The study included 106,828 participants, with 392,441 visits to Primary Health Centers. The distribution was 52.12% male and 47.88% female, with 53.89% having DM and 46.11% HTN. Education level significantly influences visit preferences (p = 0.003), with higher educated participans evenly splitting between in-person and virtual visits, while those with no literacy favored in-person visits. Significant cost differences were observed between in-person and virtual visits (p <.001), with in-person visits incurring higher lab test counts and costs. In conclusion, our findings show that virtual visits and telehealth services have lower costs compared to the in-person consultations, with almost identical health outcomes for both groups. Which indicates that the virtual and in-person consultations have comparable quality. (shrink)

This paper extends the discourse on the importance of the relationship between practitioner and young person as a defining tenet of effective youth work practice, recognising the privileged position occupied by Youth Workers in the social ecology of the young people with whom they work. Reflecting the ethical obligations inherent in this relationship, particularly its focus on enhancing young people’s agency and developmental outcomes, the paper outlines how youth work practice infused with professional love aligns with conceptualizations of an ethic (...) of care. Reporting on interviews conducted with Youth Workers practicing in different settings across one local authority area in the UK, the paper articulates how practitioners’ ethic of care shapes their work with young people, and the extent to which love features as an element of their professional practice. Practitioners describe their motivation to express care that extends beyond legalistic interpretations of their ‘duty of care’ towards young people, using the language of care, love and nurture almost interchangeably. The paper demonstrates the importance of inclusion and reciprocity as fundamental elements of ethical practice, as well as the need to infuse practice with hope, suggesting the value of an affirmative ethic to complement a focus on love and care. (shrink)

The Fundamentals of Care Framework is an evidence‐based, theory‐informed framework that conceptualises high‐quality fundamental care. The Framework places the nurse–patient relationship at the centre of care provision and outlines the nurse behaviours required for relationship development. Numerous instruments exist to measure behavioural aspects of the nurse–patient relationship; however, the literature offers little guidance on which instruments are psychometrically sound and best measure the core relationship elements of the Fundamentals of Care Framework. This study evaluated (...) the quality of nurse–patient relationship instruments by (1) assessing their content development and measurement properties (e.g. dimensionality, targeting, reliability, validity) and (2) mapping instrument content to the Framework's core relationship elements: trust, focus, anticipate, know, and evaluate. Twenty‐seven instruments were evaluated. Findings demonstrated that patients and nurses were rarely involved in item development. Most instruments exhibited poor measurement properties, with only one instrument having complete information on all quality indicators. Instrument content focused primarily on nurses getting to know patients and earning their trust, with only 54, 18, and 1 item(s), respectively, measuring ‘focus’, ‘anticipate’ and ‘evaluate’. Hence, there does not appear to be a robust instrument measuring behavioural aspects of nurse–patient relationships, nor one capturing the relationship elements of the Fundamentals of Care Framework. (shrink)

The paper studies two fundamentally different forms in which the concept of care makes its comeback in twentieth-century thought. We make use of a distinction made by Peter Sloterdijk, who argues that the ancient and medieval ‘ascetic’ ideal of self-enhancement through practice has re-emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly in the form of a rehabilitation of the Hellenistic notion of self-care (epimeleia heautou) in Michel Foucault’s late ethics. Sloterdijk contrasts this return of self-care with Martin (...) Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world as ‘total care’ (Sorge), an utterly ‘secularized’ understanding of the human being as irreducibly world-embedded that rejects the classical ascetic ideal of world-secession. We examine further the historical roots and emergence of these contrasting contemporary reappropriations of care in the Western tradition of thought and show them to be rooted in two different ontologies and ethics of the self as either world-secluded or world-immersed, autonomous or constitutively relational. The historical point of divergence of these two approaches to care, we argue, can be found in the Christian transformation of Hellenistic ethics. (shrink)

Care, we suspect, is initiated with an appeal. Something appeals to us which becomes a matter of concern. In accordance with this concern, we develop a volition: we want that which promotes the thriving – even to the smallest extent – of that which has appealed to us, regardless of how we may establish what that entails. Eventually we take practical action: we act according to our volition. Immediately after this has taken effect, as the case may be, we (...) release the source of the appeal from our care. As far as we can see, this quartet – appeal, concern, volition and practice – covers the four constitutive moments of care, although these moments are only theoretically separable from one another. The practice, as we have said, follows the volition. The volition, however, has arisen because we wanted to foster the wellbeing, however we may have recognised this, of the subject from which the initial appeal came. We have thus placed our volition in the service of this wellbeing, that is to say: we have subjected ourselves to an ought which we instantiated ourselves with the acceptance of the appeal. This seems to us to be the decisive point: in the act of caring, we instantiate an ought, a regulative element, which we then willingly follow. In the process of caring, we thus bring forth an ought, from our own being as it were – and as short-lived as this may be – to which we subject ourselves: in the process of caring, normativity only appears at all because we produce a will in the interest of the subject of the initial appeal to which we then dedicate ourselves, as if this were not our own will. Normativity is thus, as we further suspect, to be understood as a descriptive term of a phenomenology of care, or indeed a phenomenology of normativity. The phenomenon of caring provides the first indication that the ought arises directly from the practical experience of our lives. The phenomenology of care seems to us to be of eminent importance for health care ethics. To denote professional caring, we use the term nursing. The professional caregiver purposefully exposes him/herself to appeals, making him/herself receptive to such an appeal and reliably allowing the appeal to become a concern. The first fundamental principle of nursing ethics thus appears to us to be: to make known one’s receptiveness to an appeal – in a particular situation at a particular time – and to process this appeal reliably such that it becomes a concern. This encompasses the professionalism of care at its initiation. We believe that a precise phenomenology of care will provide, on the one hand, an exact understanding of the genesis of normativity, and on the other hand, in its practical application, a definition of the professional care that is nursing and an ethics of nursing for the care-giving professions. (shrink)

Our aim was to employ a critical analytic lens to explicate the role of nursing research in supporting the notion of caring realities. To do this, we used case exemplars to illustrate the infusion of such discourses. The first exemplar examines the fundamental concept of caring: using Florence Nightingale's Notes on Nursing, the case study surfaces caring as originally grounded in ritualized practice and subsequently describes its transmutation, via competing discourses, to a more holistic concept. It is argued that in (...) the many and varied attempts to define the dynamic concept of care, caring has now become paradoxically, a more fragmented concept despite attempts to render it more holistic and inclusive. In the second exemplar, one of the authors draws on her personal experience of the gap between theory and practice, so pronounced that it pushed the author to revisit the concept of evidence‐based practice and nursing education. In our third and final exemplar, we refer to the absence of knowledge and practice generated through natural enquiry and curiosity, an absence which has led to production of corporate led rhetoric. Drawing together the central arguments of the three exemplars, we reflect on the influential role of nursing research in enabling the deconstruction of taken for granted assumptions such as caring, evidence‐based practice and empowerment; assumptions which have been generated by discourses riddled with confusion and alienation from the reality of practice and the natural spirit of professional enquiry. (shrink)

During the current financial crisis, the need for an alternative to a laissez-faire ethics of capitalism (the Milton Friedman view) becomes clear. I argue that we need an order ethics which employs economics as a key theoretical resource and which focuses on institutions for implementing moral norms. -/- I will point to some aspects of order ethics which highlight the importance of rules, e.g. global rules for the financial markets. In this regard, order ethics (“Ordnungsethik”) is the complement of the (...) German conception of “Ordnungspolitik” which also stresses the importance of a regulatory framework. This framework is needed not to tame the market, but to make it more profitable in the long run. -/- The conception of order ethics relies heavily on contractarianism, especially on James Buchanan’s work. Unlike many other conceptions of ethics, it does not start with an aim to achieve, but rather with an account of what the social world – in which ethical norms have to be implemented – is like. Our social world is different from the pre-modern one. Pre-modern societies played zero-sum games in which people could only gain significantly at the expense of others. And the types of ethics that we are still used to today have been developed within these pre-modern societies. -/- Modern societies, by contrast, can be characterised – by economists and other social theorists alike – as societies with continuous growth. This growth has only been made possible by the modern competitive market economy which enables everyone to pursue his own interests within a carefully devised institutional system. In this system, positive sum games are played, which makes it in principle possible to improve the position of every individual at the same time. Most kinds of ethics, however, resulting from the conditions of pre-modern societies, ignore the possibility of win-win-situations and instead require us to be moderate, to share, to sacrifice, as this would have been functional in zero-sum games. These conceptions distinguish – in more or less strict ways – between self-interest and altruistic motivation. Self-interest, more often than not, is ultimately seen as something evil. -/- Such an ethics cannot be functional in modern societies. Ethical concepts lag behind. Within zero-sum games, it was necessary to call for temperance, for moderate profits, or for a condemnation of lending money at interest. Within positive-sum games, however, the morally desired result of a social process cannot be brought about by changes in motivation, by switching from ‘egoistic’ to ‘altruistic’ motivation. The second theoretical element introduced by order ethics is the distinction between actions and rules, which was already mentioned. Traditional ethics concerns actions: It calls directly for changes in behaviour. This is a consequence of pre-modern conditions as reconstructed before: People in the pre-modern world were only able to control their actions, not so much however the conditions of their actions. In particular, rules like laws, constitutions, social structures, the market order, and also ethical norms have remained stable for centuries. In modern societies, this situation has changed entirely. The rules governing our actions have increasingly come under our control. -/- In this situation, ethics has to focus on rules. Morality must be incorporated in incentive-compatible rules. Direct calls for changes in behaviour without changes in the rules lead only to an erosion of compliance with moral norms. Individuals that continue to behave ‘morally’ will be singled out, because the incentives have not been changed. Moral norms which are to be justified cannot require people to abstain from pursuing their own advantage. People abstain from taking ‘immoral’ advantages only if adherence to ethical norms yields greater benefits over the planned sequence of actions than defection in the single case. Thus ‘abstaining’ is not abstaining in the long run, it is rather an investment in expectations of long-term benefits. By adhering to ethical norms, I become a reliable partner for interactions. The norms do indeed constrain my actions, but they simultaneously expand my options in interactions. And people consent to rules only if these rules hold greater advantages for them, at least in the long run. -/- In general, ethics cannot require people to abandon their individual calculation of advantages. However, it may suggest improving one’s calculation, by calculating in the long run rather than in the short run, and by taking into account the interests of our fellows, as we depend on their acceptance for reaching an optimal level of well-being, especially in a globalized world full of interdependence. -/- The problem of implementation can now be placed at the beginning of a conception of order ethics, justified with reference to the conditions of modern societies I have sketched. Under the conditions of pre-modern societies, an ethics of temperance had evolved that posed simultaneously the problems of implementation and justification. The implementation of well-justified norms or standards could then be regarded as unproblematic, because the social structures allowed for a direct face-to-face enforcement of norms. Pre-modern societies not only favored an ethics of temperance, they also had the instrument of face-to-face-sanctions within their smaller and non-anonymous communities. This instrument is no longer functional in modern anonymous societies, and so we have to face up to the problem of implementation right at the start of our ethical conception. Simultaneously, an order ethics relies on the implementation of sanctions for enforcing incentive-compatible rules. In modern societies, rules and institutions, to a large extent, must fulfil the tasks that were, in pre-modern times, fulfilled by moral norms, which in turn were sanctioned by face-to-face sanctions. Norm implementation in modern societies thus works by setting adequate incentives in order to prevent the erosion of moral norms, which would happen if ‘moral’ actors were systematically threatened with exploitation by other, less ‘moral’ actors. -/- This conception of order ethics is then elaborated further in the area of business ethics. -/- . (shrink)

According to Frantz Fanon, the psychological and social-political are deeply intertwined in the colonial context. Psychologically, the colonizers perceive the colonized as inferior and the colonized internalize this in an inferiority complex. This psychological reality is co-constitutive of and by material relations of power—the imaginary of inferiority both creates and is created by colonial relations of power. It is also in this context that violence takes on significant political import: violence deployed by the colonized to rebel against these colonial relations (...) and enact a different world will also be violent in its fundamental disruption of this imaginary. The ethics of care, on the other hand, does not seem to sit well with violence, and thus Fanon’s political theory more generally. Care ethics is concerned with everything we do to maintain and repair our worlds as well as reasonably possible. Violence, which ruptures our psycho-affective, material, and social-political realities, seems antithetical to this task. This article seeks to reconsider this apparent antinomy between violence and care via a dialogue between Fanon and the ethics of care. In so doing, this article mobilizes a relational conceptualization of violence that allows for the possibility that certain violences may, in fact, be justifiable from a care ethics perspective. At the same time, I contend that violence in any form will also eventually demand a caring response. Ultimately, this productive reading of Fanon’s political theory and the ethics of care encourages both postcolonial philosophers and care ethicists alike to examine critically the relation between violence and care, and the ways in which we cannot a priori draw lines between the two. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Biomedicine: Convention on Human Rights and BiomedicineCouncil of EuropePreambleThe Member States of the Council of Europe, the other States and the European Community signatories hereto,Bearing in mind the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 December 1948;Bearing in mind the (...) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950;Bearing in mind the European Social Charter of 18 October 1961;Bearing in mind the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966;Bearing in mind the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data of 28 January 1981;Bearing also in mind the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989;Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of a greater unity between its members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the maintenance and further realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms;Conscious of the accelerating developments in biology and medicine;Convinced of the need to respect the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human species and recognising the importance of ensuring the dignity of the human being; [End Page 277]Conscious that the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endangering human dignity;Affirming that progress in biology and medicine should be used for the benefit of present and future generations;Stressing the need for international co-operation so that all humanity may enjoy the benefits of biology and medicine;Recognising the importance of promoting a public debate on the questions posed by the application of biology and medicine and the responses to be given thereto;Wishing to remind all members of society of their rights and responsibilities;Taking account of the work of the Parliamentary Assembly in this field, including Recommendation 1160 (1991) on the preparation of a Convention on bioethics;Resolving to take such measures as are necessary to safeguard human dignity and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual with regard to the application of biology and medicine;Have agreed as follows:Chapter IGeneral provisionsArticle 1. (Purpose and object)Parties to this Convention shall protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine.Each Party shall take in its internal law the necessary measures to give effect to the provisions of this Convention.Article 2. (Primacy of the human being)The interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science.Article 3. (Equitable access to health care)Parties, taking into account health needs and available resources, shall take appropriate measures with a view to providing, within their jurisdiction, equitable access to health care of appropriate quality. [End Page 278]Article 4. (Professional standards)Any intervention in the health field, including research, must be carried out in accordance with relevant professional obligations and standards.Chapter IIConsentArticle 5. (General rule)An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to it.This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its consequences and risks.The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time.Article 6. (Protection of persons not able to consent)1. Subject to Articles 17 and 20 below, an intervention may only be carried out on a person who does not have the capacity to consent, for his or her direct benefit.2. Where, according to law, a minor does not have the capacity to consent to an intervention, the intervention may only be carried out with the authorisation of his or her representative or an authority or a person or... (shrink)

Inspired by interviews conducted with scientists who primarily use participatory research forms, the article develops the concept of epistemic caring as a proposal for a participatory research practice that is sensitive for epistemological difference and the associated consequences. Based on the observation that participatory research has so far hardly been able to produce an equal co-constitution of knowledge, the article points out epistemological pitfalls that exist in it and analyses two specific concepts as examples of the risk of problematic epistemological (...) and hegemonic tendencies sneaking into this kind of research practice with harmful consequences for the non-academic participants, that is: empowerment and participation/co-production. Following the recent debate on care in the Environmental Humanities and Karen Barad’s methodological thoughts on diffraction, the article reconceptualizes participatory research as a matter of care consisting of multiple care relations in order to be able to grasp the complex epistemic entaglements and intra-dependencies contained within it. Conceiving these relationships between academic and non-academic participants as an ecology of care themself helps to understand that they are fundamentally precarious and transformative and thus inherently ethical. (shrink)

The treatment of the control group in externally sponsored clinical trials is the issue of one of the most heated debates in international research ethics. The paradigmatic cases are the mother-to-child HIV-transmission trials that took place in 16 developing countries in 1997, where the control group received a placebo while proven treatment was available in industrialized countries. From this circumstance results the controversy as to whether the sponsor and researchers of externally sponsored trials have to supply a treatment that is (...) usually not available in the host country. From the beginning of the debate the controversial level of treatment has been called “standard of care”. However, besides the disagreement about the quality of the care that has to be supplied, there is as yet no widely accepted clear meaning of this concept. This article examines the fundamental ambiguity of the term and its formal function as an ethical criterion including suggestions on its further use. (shrink)

The long-running discourse on respect for human dignity and autonomy in the physician-patient relationship pertaining to persons with dementia (PwDs) is explored deeply in this paper through the use of a real-life case, to highlight the complex interplay between autonomy and best interest when it comes to a PwD's experiential and critical interests. Many scenarios and perspectives are described and applies to the case. However, there are a few perspectives, which are touched upon that could do with further scrutiny. Firstly, (...) it has been argued that rigid adherence to the advance directives of PwDs means that PwDs will be the only people who are not allowed to ever change their minds. This withdrawal of a fundamental freedom hardly accords with respect for human dignity, or for any residual autonomy that these individuals may still enjoy. Secondly, viewing this case through the lens of care ethics, and incorporating the recently proposed conceptual framework of anthropological vulnerability, may reveal valuable insights regarding care provision and caring physician-patient relationships. These perspectives would analyse the role of relational ontology, particularly in relation to significant others, significant communities, and caregivers. (shrink)

The ethic of care provides not only a basis for understanding relationships of care at the micro level but also a potent form of political ethics, relevant to the development of welfare services. Williams (2001), for example, argues that the concept of care has the capacity to be a central referent in social policy?a point at which social and cultural transformations meet with the changing relations of welfare (Williams 2001, p. 470). English social care services are (...) currently in another period of change precipitated by the ?personalisation agenda?. This agenda is seen as having the potential to revolutionise social care, to create the conditions needed to tailor services to individual needs, and to give service users greater choice and control, including, where possible, control over their own service budgets or direct possession and management of care funds. These developments are inextricably linked to broader economic and social trends, key amongst which are the ageing of the population and changing economic conditions affecting both the labour market and the market for care services. This article applies the feminist ethic of care to an analysis of the personalisation agenda in the context of care for dependent older people. It highlights fundamental political questions posed concerning the nature and extent of older people's need for care, responsibility for meeting these needs and the associated costs. It questions whether the personalisation agenda could potentially offer a more responsive form of care, by placing more power and control in older people's hands. Key points considered are the individualisation of care and the ways in which control is conceptualised. The article concludes with an assessment of the feminist ethic of care as a basis for policy evaluation. (shrink)

My discussion will focus on Simester’s overall analysis of the “general part” of criminal law theory, setting aside the book’s rich and careful analyses of many specific topics. Quite rightly, in my view, Simester wishes to emphasize criminal law’s prohibitions, and their moral as well as legal importance. My criticism is that Simester runs together moral and legal categories in a way that distorts both. Simester grounds lawful punishment in a specific notion of moral culpability. In my view, this moralized (...) interpretation of the general part places the wrong sort of focus on defendants and edges victims from view. We make better sense of criminal responsibility if we focus on the state’s duty to uphold rights and to insist that no one get their way by force or fraud. This implies a more indirect concern with the moral failings that lead people to violate others’ rights. It also reminds us of an inherent danger of criminal law, one that has unfortunate echoes in the theoretical framing of the “general part”: how often it fails to do justice to victims. (shrink)

Background: The health professionals are involved in the paths of care for patients with different medical conditions. Their life is frequently characterized by psychopathological outcomes so that it is possible to identify consistent burdens. Besides the possibility to develop pathological outcomes, some protective factors such as resilience play a fundamental role in facilitating the adaptation process and the management of maladaptive patterns. Personal characteristics and specific indexes such as burdens and resilience are essential variables useful to study in-depth ongoing (...) conditions and possible interventions. The study was aimed at highlighting the presence and the relations among factors as personal variables, burdens, and resilience, to understand health professionals' specific structure and functions.Methods: The observation group was composed of 210 participants, 55 males, and 155 females, aged from 18 to 30 years old with a mean age of 25.92 years old. The study considered personal characteristics of the subjects, such as age, gender, years of study, days of work per week, hours of work per week, and years of work. Our study had been conducted with the use of measures related to burdens and resilience.Results: The performed analyses consisted of descriptive statistics, correlations, and regressions among the considered variables. Several significant correlations emerged among personal characteristics, CBI, and RSA variables. Specifically, age and work commitment indexes appeared to be significantly related to the development of burdens, differently from the years of study. Significant correlations emerged among personal and RSA variables, indicating precise directions for both domains. Age and gender were identified as predictors to perform multivariate regression analyses concerning CBI factors. Significant dependence relations emerged with reference to all CBI variables.Conclusion: Pathological outcomes and resilience factors represent two sides of the health professionals' experiences, also known as “invisible patients.” Greater knowledge about present conditions and future possibilities is a well-known need in literature so that the current analyses considered fundamental factors. In line with state of the art, future studies are needed in order to deepen elusive phenomena underlying maladjustment. (shrink)

In 2012, chief nursing officers (CNO) in England published a policy on compassion in response to serious criticisms of patients’ care. Because their objective is fundamentally to shape nursing, this study argues, following Popper, that the policy should be analysed. An appraisal tool, developed from Popper, Gadamer, Jauss and Thiselton, is the framework for this analysis. The CNO policy document identified six values and behaviours, termed ‘6Cs’, required by all nurses, midwives and care staff. The document contains no (...) data, references or acknowledgements, but is similar to the 6Cs defined by the Canadian nursing nun, Sister M. Simone Roach, in her theory of caring published 30 years earlier. Roach considered caring and the components of it, including compassion, to be moral virtues, an inner motivation to care. This study suggests that without explicit reference to Roach's ideas, and her underlying theoretical base, the CNO requirement has the effect of turning virtues into commodities and a form of external control, described by Ritzer as a McDonaldized dehumanization. This study, which has international relevance beyond England and the UK, suggests that the CNO revise their policy by acknowledging Roach's 6Cs and openly discuss the implications of her work for their policy. (shrink)

Recent research points to the fact that new medical technological innovations are just as relevant in the context of long‐term care or chronic care as they are in the context of acute care. In the spirit of the Nuffield Foundation recommendations, this paper explores the possibilities of using robotic aides in long‐term care and identifies the tensions that must be considered and addressed if robotics is to be introduced successfully in nursing homes. Our examination is two‐pronged. (...) First, we delve into a fundamental issue surrounding AI, namely that of consciousness. We argue that automation will always have only a limited use in caregiving since caregiving as an activity requires the use of human‐type, that is, organic, consciousness. We support the thesis that the emergence and formation of human‐type consciousness require feelings such as empathy and the sense of touch, which, in turn, create the sense of kinship with fellow human beings. And second, we examine the benefits as well as risks of using robotic aides such as ZORA and PARO in long‐term care facilities. More specifically, we look at ZORA's use in a group setting, and PARO's use in an individual setting. We emphasize that long‐term care is one‐on‐one care, including but not limited to intimate care. Crucially, we argue that touch is at the heart of this type of care. We argue that some of the tensions with the use of robotic aides are generated precisely because of the lack of human touch. (shrink)

Agricultural technologies are non-neutral and ethical challenges are posed by these technologies themselves. The technologies we use or endorse are embedded with values and norms and reflect the shape of our moral character. They can literally make us better or worse consumers and/or people. Looking back, when the world’s developed nations welcomed and steadily embraced industrialization as the dominant paradigm for agriculture a half century or so ago, they inadvertently championed a philosophy of technology that promotes an insular human-centricism, despite (...) its laudable intent to ensure food security and advance human flourishing. The dominant philosophy of technology has also seeded particular ethical consequences that plague the well-being of human beings, the planet, and farmed animals. After revisiting some fundamental questions regarding the complex ways in which technology as agent shapes our lives and choices and relegates food and farmed constituents into technological artifacts or commodities, I argue that we should accord an environmental virtue ethic of care—understood as caretaking—a central place in developing a more conscientious philosophy of technology that aims at sustainability, fairness, and humaneness in animal agriculture. While technology shapes society, it also is socially shaped and an environmental virtue ethic of care (EVEC) as an alternative design philosophy has the tools to help us take a much overdue inventory of ourselves and our relationships with the nonhuman world. It can help us to expose the ways in which technology hinders critical reflection of its capacity to alter communities and values, to come to terms with why we may be, in general, disengaged from critical ethical analysis of contemporary agriculture and to consider the moral shape and trajectory and the sustainability of our food production systems going into the future. I end by outlining particular virtues associated with the ethic of care discussed here and consider some likely implications for consumers and industry technocrats as they relate to farming animals. (shrink)

This text, serving as an introduction to Aristotelian, symbolic, inductive, and practical logic, presents the techniques of these approaches to logic, some of the philosophical problems of logic, and some of the attempts to solve philosophical problems by means of various logical techniques. It discusses the problem of universals and null classes; briefly introduces the theory of types; and presents Lukasiewicz's formalization of Aristotelian syllogistic logic as an example of a formal system. Classical logic and propositional logic are carefully and (...) fully presented. The text, however, is weak in its presentation of quantificational logic. After a correct, but brief and very inadequate introduction to quantificational logic, the readers are referred to Quine, Methods of Logic, or to Copi, Symbolic Logic, for a more adequate development. The chapter on inductive logic discusses the uses and dangers of generalizations and introduces the probability calculus; the chapter on informal logic discusses criteria of rationality and presents the usual informal fallacies. There are problems and exercises after many of the sections, and answers in the back of the book.—R. L. S. (shrink)

The association of women with caring dispositions and thinking has become a persistent theme in recent feminist writing. There are a number of reasons for this. One reason is the impetus that has been provided by the empirical work of Carol Gilligan on women’s moral development. The fact that this association is not merely an ideologically or philosophically postulated one, but is argued for on empirical grounds, tends to add to its credibility. Another reason for the resilience of the association (...) is the existence of an increasingly prominent theme in feminist thought and action that focuses on the importance of women’s difference from men, both as a fact and as a goal. Within this theme, there are various views on what the relevant differences are between women and men, and why the differences ought to be emphasized and properly respected. Women’s caring, as will be seen, turns out to have a firm presence in all of these views, and as a result, many women argue that caring should form the basis of a distinctive feminist ethic. On these views, women’s approaches to understanding moral situations, defining selfconceptions, choosing goals and roles, and guiding behaviour, should all be informed by and based upon dispositions of caring. However, if this idea of a feminist ethic of care is to be plausible, it will need to be reconciled with another strong theme in feminism, according to which in fundamental moral respects women ought not be considered or treated differently from men. We will examine the standing of a feminist ethic of care in the context of this tension between the difference theme and the sameness theme in feminism. The discussion begins by re-characterizing the justice and care debate in terms of impartialist and partialist ethical perspectives, and it then goes on to indicate the various ways in which women’s presumed disposition to caring and partialism finds prominence within the difference theme. The central focus of the discussion, however, will be the question of how to reconcile the conflict that exists between impartialist, justice-based moral thinking, and a partialist, caring approach to morality.. (shrink)