It has often been found in the literature that guilt motivates reparative behavior and that shame elicits aggressive reactions. However, recent research suggests that it is not the experience of shame, but rather the experience of humiliation that triggers aggressive reactions. The present study focuses on the role of shame, guilt and humiliation appraisals in predicting the motivation to repair and be aggressive in four different countries, namely Argentina, Belgium, Finland and Portugal. Using multi-group structural equation modeling with (...) situational-level assessments of shame, guilt and humiliation appraisals, we found that guilt appraisals were indeed most likely to motivate reparation, although guilt also had a weak, but positive link to aggression via blaming others. Shame defined as negative self-evaluations had weak positive relations with both aggression and reparation. The experience of being humiliated clearly motivated aggression through blaming others and reduced reparation tendencies. These results were largely stable across the four cultural groups. The present study underlines the need to take humiliation into account when studying the links between guilt, shame and aggression. (shrink)

Islamist rhetoric about the humiliation of Islam and American rhetoric about national humiliation have been energized by disparate events in recent years, from the photographs of American soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia to the invasion of Iraq, the “Innocence of Muslims” video to the attacks on 9/11. At the same time, there’s been an explosion of scholarship on humiliation as a driver of international conflict and political violence in general, and in relation to the bodies and minds of (...) Muslims in particular. The link between humiliation and Muslims is thus a co-production between Islamists who continually invoke it and scholars from various disciplines and regions who regularly posit it. Yet there’s been very little analysis of humiliation in Islamist discourse; minimal effort to anatomize the ways in which this experience of humiliation is constructed to necessitate particular kinds of retaliatory action; and no attempt to theorize more broadly about patterns and discontinuities in how different rhetorics construct humiliation. This article takes up the following questions: What is the substantive content of humiliation in such rhetoric and analysis? Do these different rhetorics of humiliation articulate the same understanding of it, as an act and an experience? What does close analysis of Islamist discourse on humiliation in comparative perspective reveal about the political stakes and affective resonances articulated and energized by it in this particular moment in history? Finally, what do the answers to these questions say about the reach and limits of the dominant account of humiliation as the violated dignity or injured self-respect of a generic individual? (shrink)

National humiliation is increasingly being used as a way of explaining certain kinds of international conflict. In this paper, I argue that while such explanations are presented on the back of plausible assumptions about emotion, such assumptions also make it unlikely that humiliation can play the myriad of explanatory roles attributed to it, e.g., to explain the rise of Hitler, growing Chinese antagonism towards the West, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, etc. In response, I consider some other ways (...) class='Hi'>humiliation may play a role in international conflict and argue that what is likely to be most relevant are not humiliating experiences, felt by individuals or groups, but rather humiliation narratives, which are often used as a discursive mechanism to justify conflict. This is important because it means a nation’s willingness to engage in international conflict depends not on something which seems intractable (i.e., the emotions felt by its citizens), but something more malleable: the narratives it accepts as frames for historical events. (shrink)

If wars are so bad, why do we keep fighting? Drawing on philosophy, psychology, history, and literature to explain how political leaders exploit old resentments and injuries to fuel new conflicts, this book argues that feelings of political humiliation and promises of glory are central in the drive to war.

As a matter of justice children are entitled to many different things. In this paper we will argue that one of these things is positive self-relations (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem), and that this implies that they must not be humiliated. This allows us to criticize poverty as unjust and to conclude that it should be alleviated. We will defend this claim in three steps: (1) we will introduce and examine three types of positive self-relations (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem) and argue (...) that children are entitled to all of these; (2) we will move on to examine the concept of humiliation and argue that acts of humiliating are unjust even if the victims do not experience them as humiliating; (3) finally, we will provide five arguments as to why it is humiliating for children to live in poverty. The five arguments presented in the last section are: (a) poverty is connected to other forms of injustice; (b) poverty is undeserved and represents an arbitrary feature of affected children for which they cannot be held responsible; (c) poverty is widespread among children; (d) poverty is imposed on children because they are part of a larger social group; (e) poverty is an enduring humiliation and not just an occasional incident. (shrink)

That an intimate connection exists between the notion of human dignity and the notion of humiliation seems to be a commonplace among philosophers, who tend to assume that humiliation should be explained in terms of (violation of) human dignity. I believe, however, that this assumption leads to an understanding of humiliation that is too "philosophical" and too detached from psychological reality. The purpose of the paper is to modify the above connection and to offer a more "down (...) to earth" account of humiliation that does not depend on metaphysical or axiological questions concerning the unique dignity enjoyed by all human beings qua human beings. The paper argues for a subjective-psychological notion of self-respect in the explication of humiliation, instead of an objective-normative one. To be humiliated means to suffer an actual threat to or fall in one's self-respect. (shrink)

As a matter of justice children have several claims and are entitled to a range of goods. In this paper I will argue that one of these goods is positive self-relations. Since poverty during childhood distorts the proper development and experience of these three self-relations it violates children’s claims to justice. I will defend this argument in three steps: I will introduce and examine three types of positive self-relations and argue that children are entitled to all of these; I will (...) move on to examine the concept of humiliation and argue that acts of humiliating are unjust even if the victims do not experience them as humiliating; finally, I will provide six arguments as to why it is humiliating for children to live in poverty. The six arguments presented in the last section are: poverty is connected to other forms of injustice; poverty is undeserved and represents an arbitrary feature of affected children for which they cannot be held responsible; poverty is widespread among children; poverty is imposed on children because they are part of a larger social group; poverty is an enduring humiliation and not just an occasional incident; the humiliation caused by poverty targets the particular vulnerability of children as developing beings. Based on the humiliating nature of poverty, which violates children’s claims to the aforementioned types of positive self-relations, I can conclude that it is unjust for children to live in poverty. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIt has been widely believed that individuals transform high-intensity shame into anger because shame is unbearably painful. This phenomenon was first coined “humiliated fury,” and it has since received empirical support. The current research tests the novel hypothesis that shame-related anger is not universal, yet hinges on the cultural meanings of anger and shame. Two studies compared the occurrence of shame-related anger in North American cultural contexts to its occurrence in Japanese contexts. In a daily-diary study, participants rated anger and (...) shame feelings during shame situations that occurred over one week. In a vignette study, participants rated anger and shame in response to standardised shame vignettes that were generated in previous research by either U.S. or Japanese respondents. Across the two studies, and in line with previous research on humiliated fury, shame predicted anger for U.S. parti... (shrink)

We investigated the influence of humiliation on inter-group conflict in three studies of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza. We demonstrate that experienced humiliation produces an inertia effect; a tendency towards inaction that suppresses rebellious or violent action but which paradoxically also suppresses support for acts of inter-group compromise. In Study 1, Palestinians who felt more humiliated by the Israeli occupation were less likely to support suicide attacks against Israelis. In Study 2, priming Palestinians with a (...) humiliating experience caused fewer expressions of joy when subsequently hearing about suicide attacks. In Study 3, Palestinians who felt more humiliated by peace deals were less likely to support those deals, while Israeli symbolic compromises that decreased feelings of humiliation increased support for the same deals. While the experience of humiliation does not seem to contribute to political violence, it does seem to suppress support for conflict resolution. (shrink)

This volume explores contemporary social conflict, focusing on a sort of violence that rarely receives coverage in the evening news. This violence occurs when powerful institutions seek to manipulate the thoughts of marginalized people-manufacturing their feelings and fostering a sense of inferiority-for the purpose of disciplinary control. Many American institutions strategically orchestrate this psychic violence through tactics of systemic humiliation. This book reveals how certain counter-measures, based in a commitment to human dignity and respect for every person's inherent moral (...) worth, can combat this violence. Rothbart and other contributors showcase various examples of this tug-of-war in the US, including the politics of race and class in the 2016 presidential campaign, the dehumanizing treatment of people with mental disabilities, and destructive parenting styles that foster cycles of humiliation and emotional pain. (shrink)

The ethical experience and lessons of China’s and the world's response to COVID-19 will be debated for many years to come. But one feature of the Chinese authoritarian response that should not be overlooked is its practice of silencing and humiliating the whistle-blowers who told the truth about the epidemic. In this article, we document the humiliation of Dr Li Wenliang, the most prominent whistle-blower in the Chinese COVID-19 epidemic. Engaging with the thought of Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit, who (...) argues that humiliation constitutes an injury to a person’s self-respect, we discuss his contention that a decent society is one that abolishes conditions which constitute a justification for its dependents to consider themselves humiliated. We explore the ways that institutions humiliate whistle-blowers in Western countries as well as in China. (shrink)

A pioneering work in the field of political and moral theory, this volume explores the complex and varied meanings, contexts, forms, and languages of humiliation within an interdisciplinary framework.

ABSTRACTHumiliation lacks an empirically derived definition, sometimes simply being equated with shame. We approached the conceptualisation of humiliation from a prototype perspective, identifying 61 features of humiliation, some of which are more central to humiliation than others. Prototypical humiliation involved feeling powerless, small, and inferior in a situation in which one was brought down and in which an audience was present, leading the person to appraise the situation as unfair and resulting in a mix of emotions, (...) most notably disappointment, anger, and shame. Some of the features overlapped with those of shame whereas other features overlapped with those of anger. Which specific features are present may determine whether the humiliation experience becomes more shame- or anger-like. (shrink)

This article addresses and rebuts the claim that the purpose of the Socratic method is to humiliate, shame, and perplex participants. It clarifies pedagogical and exegetical confusions surrounding the Socratic method, what the Socratic method is, what its epistemological ambitions are, and how the historical Socrates likely viewed it. First, this article explains the Socratic method; second, it clarifies a misunderstanding regarding Socrates' role in intentionally perplexing his interlocutors; third, it discusses two different types of perplexity and relates these to (...) philosophical inquiry and dialectical pedagogy; finally, it refutes the claim that those who use the Socratic method intentionally attempt to shame and humiliate students. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 121.2 (2000) 179-211 [Access article in PDF] Gifts of Humiliation: Charis and Tragic Experience In Alcestis Mark Padilla Charis is always what bears charis. (Soph. Aj. 522) Not for many does charis breed charis. (Anaxandrides fr. 69 PCG II) A gift that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction. --Mary Douglas on Marcel Mauss Whether or not in the spring of 438 B.C.E. (...) Euripides anticipated that his festival audience would find his production of Alcestis to be a thought-provoking pro-satyr play, its twentieth-century "readerly audiences" most certainly have. The play has prompted a steady stream of critical studies on a broad range of themes and issues. The trends in the most recent century's approaches to Alcestis are not necessarily tidy, but one critic has summarized them as having three movements: interest prior to World War I in the play's lighter, comic elements; emphasis on Euripides' use of folktale elements, beginning in the 1920s; and exploration of the play's more sinister elements since World War II. 1My analysis here references this scholarly tradition in the service of an ethical-sociological reading focused on the issue of "charis," a theme interwoven in the play's complex narrative levels of irony and fairy tale, tragedy and satyr drama, and dark and light characterization. I argue that it is possible to view Alcestis' offer to die for Admetus as a kind of gift, a gift that in turn effectively devalues the kinds of gifts Admetus [End Page 179] is able to give. In his attempts to restore the efficacy of his own level of traditional aristocratic gift giving, he is driven to extremes. He offers not to remarry; misleads Heracles about the death of his wife; and renounces his father. These acts, however, further lower his standing. Admetus' attendance at the funeral and homecoming then lead to an experience of tragic understanding, an anagnorisis that offers him perspective on the relative merits of his honor code and complicates the reconciliation scene at the play's end.Charis and Gift Giving Charis has a root meaning of "something which delights" (cf. khairo). In usage, charis more typically conveys two ideas: a "favor" that one does for another, and a feeling of "gratitude" that one has for receiving a favor. 2 The term thus lends itself to a sociological inquiry involving the cultural logic of "gift giving." For example, as part of a study of violent social relations in the context of honor/shame societies, William Miller has discussed the problem of "requiting the unwanted gift." Another member of the recipient's society may have chosen to give him such a gift not in the spirit of generosity but, on the contrary, as a way to shame him, providing him, as it were, with a "gift of humiliation." 3The notion of gift giving as a sociological institution was pioneered by Marcel Mauss. Working within a framework formulated by Emile Durkheim, Mauss posited the idea that gift giving is not identified with "charity," for it typically implies the expectation by both giver and recipient of a return gift; more importantly, gifts belong to a larger dynamic that establishes social rank and assigns identity. 4 The sociologist [End Page 180] Pierre Bourdieu has argued that in gift-exchange cultures, individuals who offer gifts think simultaneously on two levels of engagement: they give in a fashion that serves to exploit and dominate the recipient, yet their words and posture can convey altruism and concern. Bourdieu has been criticized for universalizing observations made during fieldwork among the Kabyle in Africa; but his principle that primitive honor societies lack institutional means for economic relationships, and that individuals thus employ elaborate schemes of manipulating codes of honor to further their needs and ambitions, 5 speaks to the heart of the social logic which Euripides' Alcestis thematizes and renders theatrical. 6 [End Page 181]This reading of the play thus follows the work of other classical scholars who have analyzed the dynamics of gift exchange in Greek society... (shrink)

In this paper, we reflect upon shame and humiliation as threats to personal and professional integrity and moral agency within contemporary health care. A personal narrative, written by a nurse about a particular shift in a British National Health Service Accident and Emergency Department, is provided as a case study. This is critically reflected and commented upon in dialogue with insights into the nature of shame and humiliation. It is suggested that Accident and Emergency is a locus that (...) is latently prone to dynamics of shame and humiliation, a potential exacerbated within a culture subject to externally‐determined time targets that are enforced by a top‐down system of surveillance and management. The result is that nurses may lose their sense of professional competence and responsibility, moral agency, and integrity, to their own personal detriment, as well as to the detriment of patients with whom they work. Insofar as examining a small part of a whole may suggest insights into the operation and ethos of a very large system, this very particular case study narrative/reflection has some important implications and lessons for the wider organization and provision of health care in Britain and beyond. (shrink)

The global social, political and cultural cataclysms of the twentieth century have shown themselves primarily to devalue or deny the deep foundations of Western or European civilization. And since Christianity is considered to be its basic basis, it gave an opportunity to emphasize its crisis, because Christianity, they say, has ceased to answer the questions and problems of modern man with its cult of utilitarian rationality under new conditions.

My objective in this paper is to write a pharmacology of the university by thinking about its relationship to systemic stupidity, intelligence, and the possibility of becoming. Starting with an exploration of the contemporary dystopia of drive-based stupidity imagined by the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler, which I seek to capture through the idea of the humiliation of thought, I look to deepen his response to this situation by suggesting a return to the work of two of his key sources, (...) Martin Heidegger and Gilles Deleuze. My objective here is to use their work in relation to Stiegler’s in order to suggest a utopia of educational becoming. Following my exploration of Stiegler’s dystopia, in the second part of the article I read Heidegger’s philosophy in order to formulate a utopian theory of education becoming, which is sensitive to the possibility of authoritarianism contained in his catastrophic decision to become a member of the Nazi party. Against the dystopic humiliation of thought Heidegg... (shrink)

This article seeks both to challenge common understandings of Kant's moral project and to use that reading to reconceptualize the aims of political theory. The paper argues that while Kant's moral work is widely praised or criticized for its formalism and its defense of the autonomous subject, an interpretation that takes seriously Kant's remarks about humiliation in the Critique of Practical Reason challenges both these commonplaces. An examination both of the practical role that humiliation plays in Kant's moral (...) system and of the affective and historical traces it relies upon shows that Kant's moral project understands the importance of ethical cultivation and is thus far more political than is often appreciated. The article therefore concludes by suggesting that this rereading of Kant should encourage us to critically examine certain modes of political theorization and adopt a more overtly political stance towards the construction of moral projects in political theory and philosophy alike. Key Words: autonomy • communitarianism • cultivation • culture • humiliation • Hegel • Kant • liberalism • monasticism • respect. (shrink)

Critiques of development aid from its recipient’s sometimes draw our attention to the perception of paternalism on the part of ‘development industry’ actors. Even within participatory project designs, critical voices recount experiences of clear power divides and informal hierarchies determining the content and form of ‘cooperation’. While neoliberal as well as neo-Marxist scholars base their critiques on a distributive scheme of global justice, post-development theory emphasizes respect and recognition as the central aspect of justice Indeed, post-development theorists continue to complain (...) of neo-colonial power structures between nations as well as on a micro-level between the ‘experts’ and local people. The latter feel misrecognized in being judged according to the parameters of Western actors within the international community. This article explores how charges of misrecognition within development cooperation challenge the assumption by many liberal political theorists that more global justice could be achieved through more aid. (shrink)

Pourquoi revenir sur un livre, un témoignage fictionnel, sorti il y a vingt ans? Parce que ce livre est un écho grinçant au document publié dans ce même numéro sur le mouvement des prostituées de 1975. Ulla a été une de ses porte-parole. On l'a vue alors sur les écrans, on l'a entendue à la radio et lue dans les journaux. Peu de temps après, elle avait publié Amour amer, livre qui relatait son rôle de leader dans le mouvement des (...) prostituées de 1975. Dans L'humiliation, Ulla revient s... (shrink)

Modern human rights instruments ground human rights in the concept of human dignity, without providing an underlying theory of human dignity. This paper examines the central importance of human dignity, understood as not humiliating people, in traditional Jewish ethics. It employs this conception of human dignity to examine and criticize U.S. use of humiliation tactics and torture in the interrogation of terrorism suspects.

The needs principle—that certain goods should be distributed according to need—has been central to much socialist and egalitarian thought. It is the principle which Marx famously takes to be that which is to govern the distribution of goods in the higher phase of communism. The principle is one that Marx himself took from the Blanquists. It had wider currency in the radical traditions of the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century it remained central to the mutualist form of socialism defended (...) by Tawney and Titmuss. The principle underlay the development and justification of the modern welfare state—thus the National Health Service is still founded upon the idea that the distribution of medical resources should be determined by medical need, not by ability to pay. One source of the power of the needs principle lies in the fact that it appears to be both a principle of justice and a principle of community or social solidarity. As a principle of justice it is offered as a corrective to the particular forms of unequal distributions of goods that can result from market transactions, and as a principle of community or social solidarity as a corrective to the possessive individualism taken to be the corollary of a market order. (shrink)

This essay provides an account of humiliation as a manifestation of the relationship one has to oneself. This account elucidates two important insights: first, that all sexual violence and not only public gang rape humiliates and, second, that appeals to the neoliberal notion of resilience undermine feminist efforts to counter sexual violence. The first part of the essay provides an overview of the idea of a relation of self to self and its significance, presents humiliation specifically as a (...) manifestation of the self‐relation, and then turns to feminist analyses of sexual violence and its effects in order to illustrate how sexual violence against women humiliates. The second part of the essay illustrates that, given the nature and function of humiliation, neoliberal discourse generally and that of resilience more specifically reproduce the individuation and exclusion that characterize humiliation and are thus detrimental to feminist efforts toward countering sexual violence against women. I conclude by encouraging feminist anti‐sexual violence efforts that at least counter individuation and at best promote collective and inclusive solidarity. (shrink)

Resumen: En la discusión filosófica acerca de la justicia, Amartya Sen, pero también, por ejemplo, Garzón Valdés y el mismo Villoro, sostienen que resulta más urgente alejarnos de la injusticia que concentrarnos en “lo justo”. En este contexto, aquí sostengo que la humillación de la dignidad es precisamente un criterio al que debemos voltear a ver cuando hablamos de lo inaceptable, que es donde se inicia la vía negativa hacia la justicia. Para ello, exploro los argumentos de Luis Villoro, Amartya (...) Sen y Martha Nussbaum. Más adelante clarifico el vínculo entre la humillación y la exclusión, para sugerir que en ciertos contextos, y en específico el de la injusticia, el uso del concepto humillación resulta más útil que el de exclusión.: Among those who discuss about the concept of Justice, Amartya Sen, but also Garzón Valdés and Villoro, claim that it is more urgent to walk away from injustice, than to concentrate our efforts in finding the meaning of Justice. Here I argue that the humiliation of dignity is a good yardstick to use when we talk about the unacceptable, where the negative way towards Justice begins. For that purpose I explore the arguments of Villoro, Sen, and Nussbaum. Finally, I make clear the link between humiliation and exclusion to suggest that in some contexts, and specifically in that of injustice, the use of the concept of humiliation can result more useful than that of exclusion. (shrink)

This paper examines the problem of vituperative feedback from peer reviewers. We argue that such feedback is morally unacceptable, insofar as it humiliates authors and damages their dignity. We draw from social-psychological research to explore those aspects of the peer-review process in general and the anonymity of blind reviewing in particular that contribute to reviewers’ humiliating comments. We then apply Iris Murdoch's ideas about a virtuous consciousness and humility to make the case that peer referees have a moral obligation not (...) to humiliate the authors whose work they review. (shrink)

Suetonius says that court jesters put slippers on Claudius’ hands while he napped during Caligula's dinner parties so that he would rub his face with them when he awoke. Since touching someone with the sole of a shoe was an insult, the joke is that Claudius insulted himself when he unwittingly rubbed his own face with the slippers.

ABSTRACT Since the United Kingdom’s referendum on European Union (EU) membership in 2016, a new political cleavage of Remainers and Leavers has developed (Kelley, N. [2019]. British social attitudes survey: Britain’s shifting identities and attitudes. (36). National Centre for Research). This paper explores how five pro-Brexit newspapers discursively construct political division in Britain in relation to two key events in the final year of Britain’s EU membership: the extension of the withdrawal process past the original date of March, and the (...) introduction of the Benn Act in September. The paper reveals two primary discursive constructions of division in Britain: a divide between incompetent and arrogant political officials and an innocent, suffering public, and an identity cleavage between pro-Remain ‘elites’ and ‘ordinary’ Leave-voting citizens. The study argues that the construction of these divisions threatens a collective national identity in Britain at a time when it is most required. It concludes that by apportioning blame for socio-political divisions, the newspapers obfuscate their role in contributing to disunity in the UK. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore and examine the implied commitment to the premises of recognition in Rawls’s account of redistributive justice. It attempts to find out whether or not recognition relations that produce humiliation and cultural injustice can be followed to their logical conclusion in his theory of redistribution. This paper makes two claims. Firstly, although Rawls does not disregard the harms of misrecognition as demonstrated in his notion of self-respect being the most important primary good, he cannot liberally (...) accommodate the idea of humiliation as a case of injustice without compromising the basic premises of his theory. Secondly, while resource distribution produces indirect side effects that can impact upon cultural injustice, addressing recognition issues through the prism of redistribution can inadvertently result in further misrecognition. The paper concludes that in the final analysis Rawls wrongly takes redistribution as the overarching principle of justice to which recognition is but a subservient principle. (shrink)

A student written poem, alongside responses from 2nd and 6th graders on the poem's philosophy.

In this essay, we examine one of our perennial favorites, the story of “The Sneetches” as an exposition and condemnation of the role of shame and humiliation in maintaining oppressive social systems. We argue that Seuss’s Sneetches vividly demonstrate how we contribute to the unjustified oppression of a disadvantaged group when we allow our shaming behaviors to be guided by stereotypical presumptions about aperson’s moral character based on non-voluntary personal characteristics, rather than by evaluations of character based on the (...) evidence of voluntary behavior. (shrink)

This book presents humiliation as a key harm of sexual violence against women, showing that humiliation manifests within the relation of self to itself, and that Foucault's critique of subjectivity provides resources for feminist conceptualization and countering of sexual violence and humiliation. Within feminist philosophy and theory, rape and sexual assault are often described as humiliating to victims, yet relatively few in-depth feminist philosophical accounts and analyses exist of humiliation as a harm of sexual violence against (...) women. This book provides such an account and analysis of both humiliation generally and sexual humiliation resulting from sexual violence more specifically. The book's elucidation of possibilities for countering sexual violence and humiliation, moreover, breaks with standard feminist approaches by critiquing rather than appealing to subjectivity. Through analysing specific instances of anti-sexual violence protest, it shows that cultivation of alternative modes of self-relation furthers rather than undermines feminist efforts to combat sexual violence. Throughout, the book draws upon concrete, recent and contemporary instance of sexual violence against women and feminist anti-sexual violence protest to illustrate and support its arguments. This will become a key text for feminist scholars and Foucault scholars in the humanities and social sciences, and for graduate and advanced undergraduate students. It will also be of interest to feminist anti-sexual violence activists. (shrink)

Biometric technologies are at the forefront of organizational innovation, surveillance, and control. In many instances, the use of physiological and behavioral biometrics enhances individual and organizational performance. However, they also have the potential to hinder human wellbeing. In particular, recent generations of biometrics are capable of extracting deeper insights into human behavior, enabling organizational surveillance practices, but may also constrain individual rights and freedoms. While biometric technologies have been evidenced to infringe upon privacy and lead to discriminatory practices, little research (...) has examined the impact of biometrics on dignity, an important ethical construct related to human wellbeing. In this conceptual paper, we draw from the theory of affordances to identify and delineate six affordances of biometric technologies, categorized into inhibiting and augmenting biometric affordances. We propose a framework in which inhibiting and augmenting biometric affordances may simultaneously support and humiliate dignity. This separation offers a theoretical base for future empirical research to explore the increasingly pervasive relationship between biometric adoption and human dignity. Moreover, we explain six paradoxical tensions across three forms of dignity—inherent, behavioral, and meritocratic—in the proposed framework. Finally, we discuss why firms should be responsible for addressing the tensions across dignity forms when they adopt biometric technologies to balance the trade-off between wealth creation and human wellbeing. This offers guidance for practitioners on how to integrate biometric technologies without hindering human dignity. (shrink)

For Avishai Margalit, the normative ideal of a decent society is one in which institutions do not humiliate those who are party to them. The relevant sort of humiliation is centrally one in which human beings are ‘rejected from the Family of Man’ or treated as inhuman, where the opposite of humiliation consists of respecting (something about) human nature. In the course of richly expounding this ideal, Margalit provides an account of what justifies respect or, relatedly, forbids (...) class='Hi'>humiliation (Part II) and then thoughtfully specifies revealing instances of humiliation in a variety of social, economic, and political institutions that render a society indecent (Parts III and IV). About his position, I intend to make two claims. One is that I believe there are logical gaps between Margalit’s account of what it is about human beings that warrants respect and of why it is wrong to humiliate them, on the one hand, and many of his examples of humiliation, on the other. The latter ought to be informed by the former, but I will argue that it often appears that what it is that entitles us to non-humiliation on Margalit’s view (roughly our capacities to repent and to suffer) does not, and cannot plausibly, ground what intuitively counts as humiliation for him and for many readers. My second claim will be that a certain alternative conception of what it is about human nature that warrants non-humiliating or respectful treatment can close this gap. Drawing on relational values salient in the Global South, and particularly the African philosophical tradition, I advance the view that human dignity inheres in the capacity to be party to relationships of harmony or friendliness, and then show that it is plausibly this capacity that is degraded by the various forms of humiliation that Margalit discusses. (shrink)

Humiliation, as dealt with under different legal jurisdictions, poses a question about how these systems perceive and respond to humiliation. Are the laws' definitions, approach, and punishment appropriately determined? And if there are challenges to implementation, what are they?

Despite the advances made in understanding the effects of humiliation, no univocal position regarding its meaning exists. Indeed, so indiscreet is its meaning, the emotion is commonly conflated with other related emotions such as shame, embarrassment, and anger. Employing a scoping review design, this review aimed to scope the empirical literature concerning the meaning of humiliation from the perspective of two definitional parameters: i) status, subsuming the values descriptive and prescriptive, and ii) format, subsuming the values intension and (...) extension. CINAHL, EMBASE, EMCare, MEDLINE, PsycINFO, and PubMed were searched for eligible studies. In total, twelve studies were synthesized in this review. Vis-à-vis status, seven studies were found to define humiliation prescriptively, and five, descriptively. Vis-à-vis format, seven studies defined humiliation intensionally, and five, extensionally. Accordingly, the meaning of humiliation varies in the literature. If further progress is to be made in humiliation studies, it is vital for researchers to be cognizant of the different meanings ascribed to humiliation. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to show that the natural idea that humiliation is harmful calls explanation and to argue that the most straightforward ways of responding to this explanatory demand fall short in important ways. I end by considering a line of response which I take to be promising, which appeals to our need, as social animals, for interpersonal connection.

Many legal jurisdictions permit victims of targeted hate speech to sue for damages in civil courts. In the US plaintiffs may sue for damages using the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Indeed, back in 1982 Richard Delgado proposed the introduction of a new tort of racial insult to handle such cases. In South Africa plaintiffs can use the delict of injuria. Although there have been some successful lawsuits, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress has been an (...) unreliable means of recovering damages for psychological harms caused by targeted hate speech. One major obstacle to recovery in the US has been the tendency of courts to view the use of racial insults, for instance, as too ordinary or commonplace to count as ‘extreme and outrageous conduct’. Even Delgado’s tort of racial insult would not recognise as a cause of action the mere use of a racial insult; the insult must demean. But once again this opens up significant leeway for courts to treat many commonplace racial insults as non-demeaning. In South Africa the courts have interpreted the delict of injuria using the abstract test of whether the speech ‘impaired the plaintiff’s dignity’. The open-textured nature of this test has led courts to diverge in their understanding of the dignitary threat posed by almost identical forms of hate speech. In this article I argue that these two torts and one delict should be comprehensively rethought. At the level of theory, we should think of them as protecting people’s fundamental rights to human dignity and the expression of human dignity as well as people’s fundamental rights to civic dignity and confidence in their civic dignity. And, at the level of practice, courts should adopt what I am proposing as two new legal tests for degradation and humiliation as a way of interpreting and operationalising these two torts and one delict in cases of targeted hate speech. (shrink)

Avishai Margalit, The Decent Society (translated by Naomi Goldblum).

This paper presents a new reading of Kant's moral feeling: in lieu of highlighting a positive feeling of respect, I am interested in a thorough phenomenological interpretation of a negative feeling of humiliation. The paper's tone is set by underscoring that human moral Gesinnung is that which is necessarily cultivated, which entails that the striving moral agent, among other things, learns to identify and confront inclinations. It is argued, then, that one's mindfulness of the various kinds of pain of (...) humiliated inclinations presupposes the agent's aesthetic attunement to the law of duty. To this end, two phenomenological interpretations are offered. First, general humiliation Kant caters for in the Critique of Practical Reason. Second, specific humiliation Kant alludes to in the Metaphysics of Morals. On the whole, the paper's findings ascertain the epistemic weight of humiliation, which to date has been undervalued. (shrink)

Traditional sacral function of religion in the modern globalized and secular era is undergoing increasing transformation, that research in this article the following issues shows: human dignity as the highest value – anthropocentric and theistic dimension; development of secular Europe: Catholic and Orthodox opinion; the conception of permanent worlds’ development and «ecological spirituality» instead of theology of individual salvation.

Several recent analyses of torture focus on the humiliation torture inflicts on the victim as the principal evil inherent in torture. This paper challenges this focus by arguing that the connection between torture and humiliation is not a necessary one. Though it is true that most contemporary usages of torture humiliate, it is shown that this is dependent on both the context of the torture and the specific means of torture applied. It is demonstrated that, in certain circumstances, (...) torture is feasible without inflicting the humiliation contemporary accounts of torture identify. At a theoretical level, it may even be possible to use torture as a way of explicitly expressing respect. The paper, therefore, warns against hinging the entire case against torture on humiliation and argues that we should scrutinize other ways in which torture may violate dignity, too. (shrink)