Rule is commonly conceptualized with reference to the compliance it invokes. In this article, we propose a conception of rule via the practice of resistance instead. In contrast to liberal approaches, we stress the possibility of illegitimate rule, and, as opposed to critical approaches, the possibility of legitimate authority. In the international realm, forms of rule and the changes they undergo can thus be reconstructed in terms of the resistance they provoke. To this end, we (...) distinguish between two types of resistance—opposition and dissidence—in order to demonstrate how resistance and rule imply each other. We draw on two case studies of resistance in and to international institutions to illustrate the relationship between rule and resistance and close with a discussion of the normative implications of such a conceptualization. (shrink)

This paper explores the degree of privacy athletes can expect and demand in the era of genetic technology in sport. Detecting genetic enhancements in sport, and consequently doping violations, using genetic tests is problematic because testing requires access to athletes' genetic information, and accessing genetic information creates many potential privacy issues and concerns throughout the world. Whether it is morally acceptable to subject athletes to the tests used to detect genetic modifications in sport is taken up in this paper, and (...) I argue that the elite sport movement faces an ethical dilemma since rules prohibit athletes from utilising certain substances, methods and procedures, but the testing methods needed to ensure compliance with the rules are controversial and at odds with a reasonable expectation of privacy. (shrink)

Book 6 of Eusebius’ Church History contains a fascinating fragment of Porphyry’s Against the Christians in which the latter lambasts Origen’s allegorical reading of the Jewish Scriptures. Though many aspects of this text have received abundant scholarly attention, relatively little has been written on the theory underlying the critique, that is, why exactly Porphyry thought Christian allegories were illegitimate. Furthermore, among the few scholars who have treated this topic at any length, there is no consensus about the precise nature (...) of Porphyry’s objection. In this article I will argue that Porphyry denies the legitimacy of Christian allegories because he thinks the texts they exegete are clear and simple. They are not, for Porphyry, full of the mysteries and enigmas that indicate allegorical exegesis is appropriate. Consequently, Porphyry understands Christian allegories as an attempt to save a text that is plainly immoral rather than genuinely mysterious. (shrink)

This article considers a longstanding problem: what does the word τύραννος mean? And if it means ‘bad / tyrannical ruler’, why are good rulers called tyrants? The solution proposed here is that tyranny is not a fixed state of being, or not being, but instead a gradual process of development. To be called a tyrant, a ruler need not embody all the stereotypical traits of tyranny. If tyranny is, by definition, unconstitutional and illegitimate rule, then there may be (...) no clear moment at which one ceases to be a general or king and becomes a tyrant, only a process by which the tyrant gradually strengthens his rule and develops the negative attributes associated with absolute and illegitimate power. A strong trend in not only the political theory of Plato and Aristotle, but also Greek poetry and historiography in general, is to trace the decline of tyrannies from initially good and popular governments to ones that are despotic and unpopular: the tyrant’s progress. (shrink)

One of the fundamental problems of epistemology is to say when the evidence in an agent’s possession justifies the beliefs she holds. In this paper and its prequel, we defend the Bayesian solution to this problem by appealing to the following fundamental norm: Accuracy An epistemic agent ought to minimize the inaccuracy of her partial beliefs. In the prequel, we made this norm mathematically precise; in this paper, we derive its consequences. We show that the two core tenets of Bayesianism (...) follow from the norm, while the characteristic claim of the Objectivist Bayesian follows from the norm along with an extra assumption. Finally, we consider Richard Jeffrey’s proposed generalization of conditionalization. We show not only that his rule cannot be derived from the norm, unless the requirement of Rigidity is imposed from the start, but further that the norm reveals it to be illegitimate. We end by deriving an alternative updating rule for those cases in which Jeffrey’s is usually supposed to apply. (shrink)

A new solution to the liar paradox is developed using the insight that it is illegitimate to even suppose (let alone assert) that a liar sentence has a truth-status (true or not) on the grounds that supposing this sentence to be true/not-true essentially defeats the telos of supposition in a readily identifiable way. On that basis, the paradox is blocked by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sequent-calculus. The lesson of the liar is that (...) not all assumptions are for free. One merit of this proposal is that it is free from the revenge problem. (shrink)

In this short paper I note that a key metatheorem does not hold for the bilateralist inferential framework: harmony does not entail consistency. I conclude that the requirement of harmony will not suffice for a bilateralist to maintain a proof theoretic account of classical logic. I conclude that a proof theoretic account of meaning based on the bilateralist framework has no natural way of distinguishing legitimate definitional inference rules from illegitimate ones (such as those for tonk). Finally, as an (...) appendix to the main argument, I propose an alternative non-bilateral formal solution to the problem of providing a proof-theoretic account of classical logic. (shrink)

Landmark Supreme Court rulings determine American law by adjudicating among competing reasonable interpretations of basic political rights. Jeremy Waldron argues that this practice is democratically illegitimate because what determines the content of basic rights is a bare majority vote of an unelected, democratically unaccountable, elitist body of nine judges. I argue that Waldron's democratic critique of judicial review has implications for real-world reform, but not the implications he thinks it has. He argues that systems of legislative supremacy over the (...) judiciary are democratically preferable to the American one. I provide reasons why his argument is unsound and explain that, properly construed, Waldron's premises support implementing a system where ordinary citizens chosen by lottery participate in a deliberative mini-public to vote on which reasonable interpretation of a basic political right will become the law of the land. (shrink)

Most democratic theorists agree that concentrations of wealth and power tend to distort the functioning of democracy and ought to be countered wherever possible. Deliberative democrats are no exception: though not its only potential value, the capacity of deliberation to ‘neutralise power’ is often regarded as ‘fundamental’ to deliberative theory. Power may be neutralised, according to many deliberative democrats, if citizens can be induced to commit more fully to the deliberative resolution of common problems. If they do, they will be (...) unable to get away with inconsistencies and bad or private reasons, thereby mitigating the illegitimate influence of power. I argue, however, that the means by which power inflects political disagreement is far more subtle than this model suggests and cannot be countered so simply. As a wealth of recent research in political psychology demonstrates, human beings persistently exhibit ‘motivated reasoning’, meaning that even when we are sincerely committed to the deliberative resolution of common problems, and even when we are exposed to the same reasons and evidence, we still disagree strongly about what ‘fair cooperation’ entails. Motivated reasoning can be counteracted, but only under exceptional circumstances such as those that enable modern science, which cannot be reliably replicated in our society at large. My analysis suggests that in democratic politics – which rules out the kind of anti-democratic practices available to scientists – we should not expect deliberation to reliably neutralise power. (shrink)

Problem: The question of the moral and social effects of non-dualism has not yet been clarified to the necessary extent. The relation of truth claims, power and violence has been simplified; critical questions of non-dualist practises have not yet been addressed. Approach: By discussing relevant philosophy and political theory, this paper draws the attention of non-realists towards the issues of power, conflict and discourse rules and asks to rethink the issue of the pragmatic justification of non-realist epistemology. Findings: (1) Constructivists, (...) as well as the non-dualist Josef Mitterer, are critical of the discursive effects of truth claims. Yet, neither constructivism nor non-dualism solve the power issues that are ascribed to realism by constructivists and dualism by Mitterer. Even if participants abstained from truth claims in discourses, many of the power issues would still be prevalent. (2) The question arises of whether a practical difference between non-dualism and dualism exists. (3) There is a tendency in constructivist and non-dualist theory to regard any form of influence on others as illegitimate. This tendency is not sound. Instead, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power is necessary in non-dualism as well. Implications: Constructivist and non-dualist theory need to scrutinise statements about the moral implications of the respective theories and to emphasise power issues not solely by extrapolating from epistemology, but by acknowledging the social dynamics of discourses and conflicts. Non-dualist social scientists could contribute to the discussion through empirical analyses of the effects of the use and the debunking of truth claims. (shrink)

An outline of a utilitarian account of the justification of particular moral rules and principles. a distinction between 'cardinal' and 'ordinal' utilitarianism is suggested, and a method for distinguishing prima-facie legitimate from prima-facie illegitimate desires proposed. moral rules mostly have the function of identifying the latter and proscribing the corresponding actions.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.1 (2003) 81-96 [Access article in PDF] Pragmatism:The Unformulated Method of Bishop Berkeley Lesley Friedman 1. Introduction THOUGH WELL KNOWN AS A SCIENTIST, logician, and metaphysician, Charles Sanders Peirce is perhaps best remembered as the founder of Pragmatism. Surprisingly, Peirce attributes this way of thinking—often taken as a uniquely American contribution—to Bishop George Berkeley. According to Pierce, Berkeley should be regarded as the (...) author of that method of modern pragmatism (RFB, 96): 1 Pragmaticism is... a method of thinking.... Of those who have used this way of thinking Berkeley is the clearest example.... (CP, 8.206, c.1905) Berkeley on the whole has more right to be considered the introducer of pragmatism into philosophy than any other one man.... (1903 letter to William James)In a metaphysical Club, I used to preach this principle as a sort of logical gospel, representing the unformulated method followed by Berkeley, and in conversation about it I called it 'Pragmatism.' (CP, 6.482, 1908) [End Page 81]While it is acknowledged that Peirce believed Berkeley to be "a very distinguished master of the pragmatist mode of thinking," just why Peirce makes this claim is not altogether clear. In significant ways Berkeley blundered metaphysically, according to Peirce (MS, 322, c.1907). 2 He overlooked the reality of possibility (and thus realism about generals), misunderstood the nature of existence and the ordinary notion of matter, and had an inadequate view of perception. 3 In his early work, Peirce goes so far as to criticize what looks to be Berkeley's attempt at the pragmatic method: "A better rule [than Berkeley's] for avoiding the deceits of language is this: Do things fulfil the same function practically? Then let them be signified by the same word. Do they not? Then let them be distinguished" (CP, 8.33, 1871). Moreover, while Peirce cites the Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision as using the "medium of pragmatism," others have criticized Berkeley in this very work for drawing conclusions without any experimentation. 4 Since it is precisely the pivotal role of experience and experiment that distinguish the method of pragmatism, it is puzzling that Berkeley is chosen as worthy of the title that Peirce bestows on him. My hope in this paper is to shed some light on this question. I beginwith an explication of Peirce's pragmatism and then move on to offer an account ofhow Berkeley uses this method, though never formulates it. Next, I discuss the positions Peirce understood to be consequences of the view, including critical common-sensism, fallibilism, and scholastic realism. I suggest that, although he erred on several corollary positions, Berkeley foresaw the aims, purpose, and essential points of the methodological, though not the "metaphysical side" of pragmatism. 5 2. Peircean Pragmatism Pragmatism 6 is not a metaphysical doctrine: it does not aim to ascertain the truth of things; it does not attempt to throw any "positive light on any problem" (CP, 5.464, 1907). Rather, it offers a means of distinguishing legitimate from illegitimate [End Page 82] hypotheses, so that verbal disputes—those that so often arise simply because the disputants do not understand meanings in the same way—can be resolved. It is thus "only a method of thinking"(CP, 8.206, c.1905, emphasis added).... pragmatism proposes a certain maxim which, if sound, must render needless any further rule as to the admissibility of hypotheses to rank as hypotheses, that is to say, as explanations of phenomena held as hopeful suggestions; and furthermore, this is all that the [logical] maxim of pragmatism really pretends to do.... (CP, 5.195, 1903) Seeking to lay "the dust of pseudoproblems," pragmatism allows "us to discern what pertinent facts the phenomena may present. But this is a good half of the task of philosophy" (CP, 8.186, 1903). It is worth pausing to mention that philosophy, as Peirce understands it, does not stand apart from science in the way it does today, but rather is the second of the three sciences of discovery, all of which... (shrink)

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) has issued an illegitimate fatwa against smoking in mosques because it endangers the health of worshippers and interferes with the comfort of worshippers. This study aims to investigate smoking behaviour in mosques and violations of fatwas from ulama and governor regulations. This study follows a cross-sectional design conducted by interviewing 531 Muslims who have prayed in the mosque for the last 14 days and observed the compliance of the mosque in implementing a smoke-free policy (...) in 315 mosques. Frequency distribution and cross-tabulation were carried out using JASP 16 software using cross-tabulation. The results of this study indicate that the implementation of the smoke-free policy for mosques in Medan has been violated many times (57.8%), especially the violation regarding smoking in mosques (32.1%); cigarette butts were still found in the yard of the mosque (44.1%). Violations of the policy of fatwa smoke-free areas occurred in public mosques (61%) and muhammadiyah mosques (46.5%). Smoking behaviour in mosques was seen in the last 2 weeks, namely smoking behaviour carried out by worshippers (57.6%), smoking behaviour carried out by mosque administrators (39.2%), smoking behaviour carried out by community leaders in mosques (19.4%) and smoking behaviour that ulemas carried out in mosques (14.3%). Worshippers must comply with the rules against smoking in mosques because it can endanger the health of other worshippers. Cigarette smoke in the mosque will make other worshippers uncomfortable to worship so that it can damage the solemnity of the congregation to worship in the mosque. Contribution: This study is expected to explain smoking behaviour in mosques, violations of smoking behaviour in mosques that violate the ulama’s fatwa regarding smoking behaviour in mosques and the governor’s regulation on smoking behaviour in mosques. (shrink)

This is a three paper dissertation. ;for paper 1. Quine held that quantifying into modal contexts is illegitimate. It is sometimes thought that if he is right about this, then essentialist claims make no sense. Perhaps as a consequence of this thought together with the current prominence of essentialist views, there have been two good fairly recent attacks on Quine's argument against quantifying into modal contexts: Neale's revival of Smullyan's points and Kaplan's paper "Opacity". I first argue that Quine's (...) view is not refuted by Neale or Kaplan. I next explain that nonetheless, essentialists need not surrender in the face of Quine's injunction against quantifying in. Quine's work does not rule out the intelligibility of essentialist theses; it does however issue a challenge to explain the mysterious notion of metaphysical necessity. ;Abstract for paper 2. I examine the case that has been made for origin essentialism and find it wanting. I focus on the arguments of Salmon and Forbes. Like most origin essentialists, they have been concerned to respect the intuition that slight variation in the origin of an artifact or organism is possible. But, I argue, both of their arguments fail to respect this intuition. Salmon's argument depends on a sufficiency principle for crossworld identity, which should be rejected, if---as Salmon concedes---a given artifact might have been originally made from slightly different material. Similarly, Forbes's argument succeeds only if essentially the same argument can be used to establish a claim that---by his own admission---is too strong, namely that no variation, however slight, in an organism's origin is possible. ;Abstract for paper 3. Chisholm's Paradox suggests that origin essentialism is incompatible with the view that some variation in the origin of a given thing is possible. Since the latter view is strongly supported by intuition, origin essentialists have been eager to offer solutions to the paradox. In this paper I look at three allegedly different solutions to the paradox: Forbes's, Salmon's, and Lewis's. I give new criticisms of Forbes's view and offer new defenses of what I call the "Salmon-Lewis solution". (shrink)

This thesis is an investigation of the feasibility of a micropolitical analysis as an evaluative scheme for the analysis of property. The limitations of historical and normative frameworks are discussed. The ontological features of power as understood by Filmer and Locke are compared, and these, to a Foucauldian view of power. The Foucauldian view of power is a better tool of analysis since it reveals and explains more features of "property", including the way that a Lockean conception of property and (...) power, as a point of authority, affects the discourse of property itself. Using a personal and an historical example of the private/public distinction, I establish that these are relational terms built up by various rules of inclusion and exclusion, not upon any prior ground. In particular, I highlight how the production of knowledge functions as one of the conduits in or out of domains; that is, the public and the private are domains of expertise or authority on property. Individuals occupy subjectivities available within the discourse of property which position them, or allow them to position others, as having legitimate or illegitimate relations to property. I show how these subjectivities are the central functional feature of the possibility of normativity. That is to say, whether and how forms of property relations can be evaluated depends on the production of forms of judgment which a subject position makes possible, in form and in content. I ask how present subject positions within the domains of tangible and intangible property work to extend or delimit these domains as moral, political or economic ones. The possibilities of judgment and of freedom from judgment as formal strategies of 4 distinct regimes of power are enumerated, offering an evaluative framework. I ask what, in the domain of property, these 4 regimes offer as formal possibilities for freedom, fairness, and equality. Lastly, I explore Deleuze's concepts of the rhizome and the arborescent with a similar view to reading property as a question of one kind of line rather than another. Finally, I generate from this critical cartography, and bearing in mind the examples of pregnancy and potlatch, a number of responsible strategies one could make from the subject positions identified. (shrink)

Public reason liberals claim that legitimate rules must be justifiable to diverse perspectives. This Public Justification Principle threatens that failing to justify rules to reprehensible agents makes them illegitimate. Although public reason liberals have replies to this objection, they cannot avoid the challenge of powerful deceivers. Powerful deceivers trick people who are purportedly owed public justification into considering otherwise good rules unjustified. Avoiding this challenge requires discounting some failures of justification according to what caused people’s beliefs. I offer a (...) conception of public justification that accommodates these externalist considerations while positioning Public Reason Liberalism to provide insight into real cases of deception. (shrink)

In the 2005 Kitzmiller v Dover Area School Board case, a federal district court ruled that Intelligent Design creationism was not science, but a disguised religious view and that teaching it in public schools is unconstitutional. But creationists contend that it is illegitimate to distinguish science and religion, citing philosophers Quinn and especially Laudan, who had criticized a similar ruling in the 1981 McLean v. Arkansas creation-science case on the grounds that no necessary and sufficient demarcation criterion was possible (...) and that demarcation was a dead pseudo-problem. This article discusses problems with those conclusions and their application to the quite different reasoning between these two cases. Laudan focused too narrowly on the problem of demarcation as Popper defined it. Distinguishing science from religion was and remains an important conceptual issue with significant practical import, and philosophers who say there is no difference have lost touch with reality in a profound and perverse way. The Kitzmiller case did not rely on a strict demarcation criterion, but appealed only to a “ballpark” demarcation that identifies methodological naturalism as a “ground rule” of science. MN is shown to be a distinguishing feature of science both in explicit statements from scientific organizations and in actual practice. There is good reason to think that MN is shared as a tacit assumption among philosophers who emphasize other demarcation criteria and even by Laudan himself. (shrink)

This study proposes a conceptual model to explain persistent, accepted-as-normal corporate wrongdoing (hereafter banality of wrongdoing), particularly for high performance organizations. The model describes five explanatory variables: the culture of competition, ends-biased leadership, missionary zeal, legitimizing myth, and the corporate cocoon. Our thesis is that the nature of competition drives both legitimate and illegitimate goal-seeking to adopt an iconoclastic (rule-breaking) orientation. High performance organizations are favorable hosts for wrongdoing because high performance requires aggressive behavior at the ethical margins (...) of what is acceptable. The way leadership reacts to competition sets the stage for ethical or unethical cultures to develop. Ends-biased leadership will project strong vision, using ideology and legitimizing myth as tools to inspire and motivate. The resulting missionary zeal justifies using questionable means because of the perceived value of the end. One critical method for building strong culture is creating a sense of being separate and apart from the ordinary. This cocoon effect may create a self-referential value system that is significantly at odds with mainstream culture and in which wrongdoing is banal. We intend an empirical study of the variables described in this model. (shrink)

Anarchists standardly critique the state for being illegitimate, and for being dominating in some sense. Often these criticisms come as a bundle: the state is illegitimate because it is dominating. But there are various stories we might tell about the connection between the two; domination makes consent impossible, domination means that the state fails to meet its own justification for existing (or for claiming authority), and so on. I suggest that we should sidestep concerns about consent: in part (...) because it seems possible for people to genuinely consent to something which is nonetheless impermissible, but also because many anarchists offer views of political organisation which very clearly involve some coercion of rule-breakers – Malatesta, for example, explicitly endorses the exclusion of persistent non-compliers. Rather, I argue that the best way to understand why the state is illegitimate – and a way which is immanent in many anarchist critiques – is to combine something like a Pettitian analysis of domination with a requirement that genuine authorities (and authoritative imperatives) recognise us as agents and treat us accordingly. On this view, states are necessarily dominating in virtue of two key features: dominating in virtue of being able to exercise arbitrary power over agents, necessarily so because part of what it is to be a state is to be an institution which exercises (and refrains from exercising) power in virtue of morally arbitrary features. As a paradigm case, states must be able to exclude non-citizens, on pain of losing their successful claim to a monopoly on legitimate force. But to recognise somebody as an agent is inconsistent with denying them access to territory or services on the basis of something as arbitrary as their place of birth. This analysis also explains why it’s possible to hold that all states are illegitimate, but some are nonetheless “better” than others – depending on the structure of a state and the power held by its citizens, we may be more or less vulnerable to arbitrary interference, and hence be more or less dominated, in one state than another. (shrink)

In my presentation I understand anger as an emotion that, in addition to its relationship to time, is also subject to cultural rules and is therefore related to probability and predictability. With the use of selected references from the theory of emotions (ranging from antiquity to the present day) I identify several consistent fundamental assumptions about this emotion and reconstruct a discourse of “just” anger. Viewed from the perspective of such extra-literary concepts of anger (particularly Thomas Aquinas' ‘De passionibus animae’) (...) Willehalm's outbursts of anger at the French court can be seen not only as an “illegitimate”, universally condemned act, through which the margrave unnecessarily puts at risk his legitimate claim to the king's support; equally, the very forbearance and expressions of solidarity which he is successively shown after his intemperate behaviour in Munleun can also be reinterpreted in light of the Aristotelian-Thomistic model of anger. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In a recent issue of this journal, David Silver and Gerald Dworkin discuss the physicians' role in execution by lethal injection. Dworkin concludes that discussion by stating that, at that point, he is unable to think of an acceptable set of moral principles to support the view that it is illegitimate for physicians to participate in execution by lethal injection that would not rule out certain other plausible moral judgements, namely that euthanasia is under certain conditions legitimate (...) and that organ‐donation surgery is sometimes permissible. This article draws attention to some problems in the views of Silver and Dworkin and suggests moral principles which support the three moral views just mentioned. (shrink)

In recent years, many philosophers of science have rejected the “value-free ideal” for science, arguing that non-epistemic values have a legitimate role to play in scientific inquiry. However, this philosophical position raises the question of how to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate influences of values in science. In this paper, we argue that those seeking to address this “new” demarcation problem can benefit by drawing lessons from the “old” demarcation problem, in which philosophers tried to find a way of (...) distinguishing between science and non-science. Many of those who worked on this problem ultimately found that efforts to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for defining science failed, and most concluded that the best solution to the problem was to characterize scientific hypotheses, theories, and research programs in terms of some common norms. We suggest that those seeking to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate value influences on science would do well to adopt a similar approach. Rather than attempting to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for identifying appropriate value influences, it will be more fruitful to evaluate scientific activities based on their adherence to a set of epistemic and ethical norms that can be implemented in scientific practice by means of rules, conventions, policies, and procedures. (shrink)

: The thesis put forth in this study is that, while coitus interruptus was known to the early Muslims, it was not practiced for reasons that were primarily theological. For ʿazl is in obvious conflict with the rule that prevailed until the third/ninth century, that of enjoining the believer to marry and procreate without trying to curb one’s fertility. A careful examination of the oldest traditions on the subject leads us to conclude that only about the end of the (...) first/seventh century some religious authorities spoke in favor of resorting to this contraceptive method, in a limited context – the relationship between a master and his slave girl. And it is probably during the same period that the controversy over coitus interruptus arose. This is why it is anachronistic to see traditions in favor of coitus interruptus as testimony on how long this type of birth control has been practiced in the Islamic world. In addition to relying on textual criticism, the study uses prosopographical information to show that the first Muslims often had many children with concubines. Some Muslim authorities encouraged believers to resort to coitus interruptus, not in order engage in «birth control» but because of the negative reputation of slave girls. To avoid having children with them was to avoid having «illegitimate» children – who were considered evil – and especially to avoid increasing their number so as not to hasten the end of the world. Later, when the rule that believers must marry and produce offspring ceased to be a dogma, allowing for celibacy to be an option, albeit for a tiny minority, coitus interruptus came to be permitted as a means of limiting births, but only if the purpose was religious in nature. Birth control for strictly economic reasons continued to be strictly forbidden. (shrink)

The text considers points of view of theoreticians of the radical pluralism : Connolly, Mouffe and Tully with regard to the status and the nature of concepts in the political discourse, as well as the consequences of these conceptual presumptions to understanding democracy. The three authors emphasize the essential contestability of political concepts, the paradox of liberal democracy and the need to revise standard rational consensus theories of democracy. Also, the three authors take over the specific interpretation of Vittgenstein to (...) the direction of political theory the centre of which consists of everyday contingent practices of politics as well as dissent about their assessment. The text analyzes the extent to which this reading is compatible to Wittgenstein's position. The author defends the opinion that the essential contestability does not imply agonism and denial of the significance of rules and tries to indicate to the points of illegitimate transition from antiessentialism to unconsensus rules. Also, the text underlines the flaws of dissent conception of democracy and social integration. U tekstu se razmatraju stanovista Konolija, Mufove i Tjulija u pogledu statusa i prirode pojmova u politickom diskursu, kao i posledice ovih konceptualnih pretpostavki na shvatanje demokratije. Sva tri autora isticu esencijalnu spornost politickih pojmova, paradoksalnosti liberalne demokratije i neophodnost revidiranja standardnih racionalno-konsenzusnih teorija demokratije. Takodje, sva tri autora preuzimaju specificno tumacenje Vitgenstajna u pravcu politicke teorije u cijem su sredistu svakodnevne kontingentne prakse politike, kao i disenzus oko njihovog razumevanja i vrednovanja. Autor brani stav da esencijalna spornost pojmova ne podrazumeva agonizam i negiranje znacaja pravila i pokusava da ukaze na tacke nelegitimog prelaza od antiesencijalizma ka nekonsenzusnosti pravila. Takodje, u tekstu se ukazuje na nedostatke radikalne-disenzusne koncepcije demokratije i drustvene integracije. (shrink)

It is argued that the rule-circular justification of induction proposed by David Papineau is illegitimate, that is, that it is not a genuine justification.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Theory of International Bioethics: The Negotiable and the Non-NegotiableRobert Baker (bio)AbstractThe preceding article in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal presents the argument that “moral fundamentalism,” the position that international bioethics rests on “basic” or “fundamental” moral principles that are universally accepted in all eras and cultures, collapses under a variety of multicultural and postmodern critiques. The present article looks to the contractarian tradition of (...) Hobbes and Locke—as reinterpreted by David Gauthier, Robert Nozick, and John Rawls—for an alternative justification for international bioethics. Drawing on the central themes of this tradition, it is argued that international bioethics can be rationally reconstructed as a negotiated moral order that respects culturally and individually defined areas of nonnegotiability. Further, the theory of a negotiated moral order is consistent with traditional ideals about human rights, is flexible enough to absorb the genuine insights of multiculturalism and postmodernism, and yet is strong enough to justify transcultural and transtemporal moral judgments, including the condemnation of the Nazi doctors at Nuremberg. This theory also is consistent with the history of the ethics of human subjects experimentation and offers insights into current controversies such as the controversy over changing the consent rule for experiments in emergency medicine and the controversy over exempting certain clinical trials of inexpensive treatments for preventing the perinatal transmission of AIDS from the ethical standards of the sponsoring country.The Preamble to the Council of Europe’s (1997) Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, the most recently ratified code of international bioethics, is noteworthy because it never mentions “principles,” the concept most frequently cited by the fundamentalists as basic to international bioethics. Instead it stresses rights, a concept that has been utterly ignored by the fundamentalist theorists of international bioethics. The Preamble exemplifies a conception of international [End Page 233] bioethics as an ethics of covenants and conventions grounded in human rights. In the full text of the Preamble, the term “rights” appears eight times and the expressions “convention” and “covenant” are used six times; the term “principle” does not appear at all. In this essay, I develop a theoretical framework for international bioethics based on conventions, covenants, and areas of “nonnegotiability”—a concept that serves as a functional analogue to the traditional notion of “human rights.” I also shall argue that, unlike the theory of basic principles central to moral fundamentalism, the theory of negotiated morality appears immune to the multicultural and postmodern critiques of international bioethics that were analyzed in the preceding article in this issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal (Baker 1998).Negotiated Moral Order: A Model for International BioethicsReconsidering ContractarianismThe linkage of “conventions” and “covenants” with human rights that is evident in the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine traces back directly to the moral and political theories of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Such philosophers as David Gauthier (1986), Robert Nozick (1974), and John Rawls (1971, 1993) recently have reinvigorated this classic contractarian line of analysis. In this section, I shall reconsider classical contractarian theory from a perspective informed by these more recent analyses.The most riveting feature of all forms of contractarian theory is the metaphor of the contract itself, particularly the legitimating role it accords to assent. Because contractarians look to the assent of those who would be bound by a moral norm as ultimately the sole source of a norm’s legitimacy, the most important corollary of contractarian moral theory is that moral norms are illegitimate insofar as agents either in principle could not, hypothetically would not, or actually will not rationally assent to be bound by them. Contractarians also argue that because legal norms are legitimated by acceptance of the authority of those who promulgate them, the authority of such norms is bounded by the actual or hypothetical assent of the governed. These features of contractarian analysis generate the correlative concepts of human rights and civil rights.Less often remarked, but nonetheless integral to the metaphor of the social contract, is the contractarian recognition that the interests of the [End Page 234] parties who contract to form civil society are naturally in conflict (or, as Hobbes put... (shrink)

This article explores the boundaries of the commitment of deliberative democrats to communication and persuasion over threats and intimidation through examining the hard cases of civil disobedience and terrorism. The case of civil disobedience is challenging as deliberative democrats typically support this tactic under certain conditions, yet such a move threatens to blur the Habermasian distinction between instrumental and communicative action that informs many accounts of deliberative democracy. However, noting that civil disobedience is deemed acceptable to many deliberative democrats so (...) long as it remains 'relevantly tied to the objective of communicative action', Allen holds that certain kinds of terrorism cannot be ruled out either. Whilst acknowledging that the deliberative democrat cannot really justify taking life as a tactic to induce deliberation, as 'dead people cannot deliberate', Allen notes that this does not rule out terrorism per se, the object of which is not death so much as generating overwhelming fear. Further, while a permanent condition of fear would set limits on deliberation, limited and temporary physical harm to persons need not. This implies that deliberative democrats must explain why intentionally causing some physical harm to property or persons is always an illegitimate form of communication. (shrink)

My dissertation traces the consequences following for social science from an analysis of the nature of its object domain, which I call "socio-historical reality." In particular, I hope thereby to dissolve many misconceptions about the character of social science. ;Influenced by Dilthey, I propose an "individualist" account that analyzes socio-historical reality as nothing but interrelated everyday lives, which themselves consist in series of actions that are governed by practical intelligibility and performed in interconnected settings. This analysis differs from traditional versions (...) of individualist social ontology because in elaborating Heidegger's idea that action is governed by practical intelligibility, and in emphasizing the role of setting in ongoing action, it offers a novel account of the ingredients out of which socio-historical reality consists. These ingredients are: actions, the entities found in settings, a broad range of factors such as rules, paradigms, ideas, goals, and normal practices, which are articulated by entities in settings and determine what it makes sense to people to do, and concrete relations between these phenomena, for example, chains of actions and commonalities in the factors mentioned under . An important consequence of my account is that socio-historical reality does not contain unexperienceable types of entities. ;This analysis of the object domain of social science has implications for the constitution of overarching social formations , the nature of social causality, and the character of social science. I maintain, for example, that all social science should be verstehende, though not necessarily interpretive; that it is unlikely that social science will discover laws governing what happens in socio-historical reality; that much of contemporary social science unknowingly and illegitimately uses fictions in its accounts; and that explanation in social science refers ultimately to individual actions and does not rest on laws or generalizations. (shrink)

Abstract“Reason of state” is a concept that is rarely used in contemporary legal and political philosophy, compared to everyday parlance; “public reason,” in contrast, is ubiquitous, especially in liberal philosophy, as a legitimacy‐conferring device. In this article it is argued that the unpopularity of the notion of “reason of state” is partly due to its notorious ambiguity. Three different usages of the notion can be identified: a “thin” usage (where “reason of state” is equivalent to the common good); an “ironical” (...) usage (where it is used pejoratively to denounce it as a pretext for application of illegitimate or illegal means); and a “pre‐emptive” usage (where “reason of state” functions as a legitimate second‐order exclusionary reason used to override otherwise mandatory first‐order rules of action). It is argued that only the “thin” usage is helpful in a by‐and‐large liberal‐democratic context. The article then discusses the main dilemmas related to the concept of public reason, especially in its most influential, Rawlsian interpretation, and defends the concept against common critiques. Finally, the two concepts of “reason of state” and public reason are compared, and it is argued that a “thin” usage of “reason of state” is functionally equivalent to public reason, and that both resonate with the theory of “input democracy” (focusing, as it does, on the legitimacy of reasons—or motivations—for applying coercive rules to individuals). The article also identifies a problematic feature of “reason of state”: its emphasis on the state as a privileged interpreter of such reasons and/or as identifying the pool of actors within which the “constituency” of public reason is ascertained. There are good reasons to resist both of these consequences: the former because of its potentially authoritarian consequences, the latter because of reasons provided by cosmopolitan political conceptions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IS THERE A PRUSSIAN HUME? or How Far Is It from Könisberg to Edinburgh! Lewis White Beck has recently argued that Hume, in spite of his empiricist commitment, implicitly recognized the limitations of that position when he incorporated in his thinking ideas that are essentially Kantian and incompatible with his official empiricism. Beck is not, of course, the first so to argue; Robert Paul Wolff made a 2 similar (...) claim some years ago in a well-known paper. Wolff's case has, however, been challenged, and it is the aim of the present paper to challenge Beck's somev.'hat different case. 4 Beck argues that Hume has two causal principles: (1)Every event has a cause (2)Same cause, same effect the second of which he claims Hume defends, and the first of which he claims Hume does not defend. He then turns to the case of perception, where we observe an object once intermittently and once continuously. The result is a gappy series of impressions in the first case, and a non-gappy one in the second. The existence of the gap falsifies principles (1) and (2). In order to save principle (2), Beck argues, Hume relies on principle (1). The latter enables Hume to "feign" unobserved events to fill the gap. But (1) is also falsified by the empirical data, that is, the existence of the gap. So this appeal to (1) is illegitimate. At least it is illegitimate if the only support we are permitted to use is observational data. And that is all that the official Hume, committed to empiricism, is permitted to use. However, Hume does use (1), contrary to what his official position allows. This suggests that he recognizes, what Kant explicitly argued, that there are non-empirical reasons justifying the acceptance of (1). And it is here that we see the Prussian aspects of the Scots sceptic. Beck's case depends upon three points: (a)He must separate principles (1) and (2). (b)He must argue that gappy series of impressions are filled by appealing to (1). (c)He must argue that gappy series of impressions falsify (1), rendering its use to fill those gaps illegitimately. In what follows it is argued that the distance from Königsberg to Edinburgh cannot thus be bridged. Specifically, it is argued, first, that (a) is false, or, more specifically that for Hume (2) entails (1) ; second, that, when (1) and (2) are so understood, then (b) is partially correct; and third, that, when (1) and (2) are taken as Hume takes them, then (c) is incorrect: the gaps do not falsify (1), its use remains legitimate. Let us begin with principle (2), the "same cause, same effect" principle. This principle is Rule 4 of Hume's rules by which to judge of causes and effects. He states it as The same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises hut from the same cause. (T173) Rules 1-3 give the analysis of the causal relation insofar as it is an ob8 jective relation among things. Rule 4 then makes a claim about events and causes. Rule 4 is followed by four rules which are the best statement of Mill's Methods of eliminative induction prior to Herschell's Preliminary Discourse. When one of these methods is used, the data eliminate all possible hypotheses but one, and the conclusion is that this uneliminated hypothesis must be true, correctly describing the relevant causal relation. Hume carefully points out that we draw this conclusion not from the data alone, but 3. also from the "same cause, same effect" principle. Thus, when Hume states Rule 5, the method of agreement, he writes There is another principle, which hangs upon this [i.e., upon Rule 4, "same cause, same effect"], viz. that where several different objects produce the same effect, it must be by means of some quality, which we discover to be common amongst them. For as_ like effects imply like causes, we must always ascribe the causation to the circumstance, wherein we discover the resemblance. (T174, italics added) We can bring out the logic of the situation if we translate this into the... (shrink)

This paper provides an examination of some problems caused by the concentration of influence in the capital markets of developed countries. In particular, I argue that large asset managers exercise quasi-political power that is not democratically legitimate. In section two, I will examine the economic driver behind the size and power of the big asset managers: the passive investing revolution. I will discuss several respects in which this revolution has fundamentally changed capital markets, most notably by making a large share (...) of investors universal owners. In the third section, I argue for my central analytical conjecture: asset managers exercise quasi-political power. They use their influence to shape the rules of the game in public capital markets in order to implement social and environmental policies that have traditionally been the exclusive purview of states. “Asset manager capitalism” is a recent term coined to refer to the contemporary system of corporate governance that succeeded the Berle and Means corporation with its dispersed ownership; the argument of this section is that asset manager capitalism is also a new political-economic regime. In the fourth section I defend my central normative claim: asset manager capitalism is an untenable and illegitimate political-economic arrangement, for at least two reasons. First, the power of asset managers is not checked by any institutional constraints, and is not rendered legitimate by any democratic process. More fundamental than this procedural critique is an argument that the interests of asset managers could not be aligned with the public interest, given the fact that the distribution of capital is highly unequal. I conclude by discussing several proposals to reform asset manager capitalism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Jeffrey Friedman’s Power Without Knowledge builds a critical epistemology of technocracy, rather than a democratic argument against it. For its democratic critics, technocracy is illegitimate because it amounts to the rule of cognitive elites, violating principles of mutual respect and collective self-determination. For its proponents, technocracy’s legitimacy depends on its ability to use reliable knowledge to solve social and economic problems. But Friedman demonstrates that to meet the proponents' “internal,” epistemic standard of legitimacy, technocrats would have to (...) reckon with the heterogeneity of people’s ideas, which he presents as one of two aspects of a political anthropology of ideational beings. The other aspect is ideational determinism: the shaping of our conscious actions by our interpretations, and of our interpretations by “ideational exposures”. For the most part, our symposiasts agree with this anthropology or leave it uncontested, but they fall back on democratic theory to point toward alternatives to technocracy. This raises the question, which Friedman does not ask, of whether his political anthropology undermines a certain brand of democratic theory: the liberal brand that attaches respect to people’s opinions as products of “free reflection,” i.e., as underdetermined. (shrink)

Of the triple criticism that Claude Lefort claimed to find in Machiavelli – against tyranny, bourgeois conservatism and democratic idealism – little attention is usually paid to the last one. In this article, we will demonstrate that the greatest work of the French philosopher, Le Travail de l'œuvre, Machiavel (1972), in addition to a critique of tyranny and oligarchic rule, constitutes above all a long demonstration of the way in which democracy ends up finding her most potent enemy in (...) the idealized image of itself. Following in the footsteps of Lefort's Machiavelli, we will see the character of the conspirator emerge to the foreground, who will bring to the scene the proposition of the inevitability of the imposture of power and the defense of the indispensability and legitimacy of the illegal act undertaken against illegitimate legality. (shrink)

It is argued that, although in the Many-Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics there is no ``probability'' for an outcome of a quantum experiment in the usual sense, we can understand why we have an illusion of probability. The explanation involves: a). A ``sleeping pill'' gedanken experiment which makes correspondence between an illegitimate question: ``What is the probability of an outcome of a quantum measurement?'' with a legitimate question: ``What is the probability that ``I'' am in the world corresponding to (...) that outcome?''; b). A gedanken experiment which splits the world into several worlds which are identical according to some symmetry condition; and c). Relativistic causality, which together with explain the Born rule of standard quantum mechanics. The Quantum Sleeping Beauty controversy and ``caring measure'' replacing probability measure are discussed. (shrink)

I Choose the word metrical rather than prosodical, to make it plain at the outset that I am not concerned with the rule in Priscian—not of Priscian, for its irrelevance is sufficient proof of that—G.L.K. II p. 82 7–9 ‘gnus quoque uel gna uel gnum terminantia longam habent uocalem paenultimam, ut regnum stagnum benignus malignus abiegnus priuignus Pelignus’, still less with the illegitimate inference sometimes drawn from it, that this pair of consonants, like ns and nf, lengthened a (...) short vowel whenever they followed it. The present dispute is not about vowels but about syllables; the power of gn to make position, as they say, like st or x, and so to impede the flow of verse. (shrink)

The IOC and WADA have announced their ambition to develop control program in order to detect athletes' illegitimate use of genetic technology for enhancing performance. Although it is far from clear what such uses should be counted as illegitimate, as well as to what extent the idea of control programs for such things is a feasible idea, I will assume that such programs will concern so-called somatic genetic modifications that aims at altering the athlete's initial bodily biochemistry in (...) a way that may enhance performance without the presence of any medical reason for undertaking such modifications. This means that the envisioned control-program will have to make use of the method of genetic testing in order to detect the possible presence (or non-presence) of various genetic variants within the athlete. As a consequence of this, several ethical issues familiar within the field of genetic testing for health purposes are suddenly actualised within the area of doping control. These issues concern primarily how to handle and communicate the information about the athlete that is uncovered by such testing. However, due to the ways in which gene doping may be performed, in the case of atheletic control programs, issues of medical safety and the question of what hardships it is reasonable to require of athletes to endure also become paramount. As a consequence, one may ask whether or not sporting ethics will have to consider applying the rule of informed consent in connection to testing programs of the kind here discussed. (shrink)

What role do science and scientists play in the transition between food regimes? Scientific communities are integral to understanding political struggle during food regime transitions in part due to the broader scientization of politics since the late 1800s. While social movements contest the rules of the game in explicitly value-laden terms, scientific communities make claims to the truth based on boundary work, or efforts to mark some science and scientists as legitimate while marking others as illegitimate. In doing so, (...) scientific communities attempt to establish and maintain the privileged position of science in contests over policy. In this paper, we situate scientific boundary work within its world historical context in order to ask two key questions: (1) how does scientific boundary work vary across food regimes; and, in turn, (2) what role does scientific boundary work play in the political contestation that drives transitions between food regimes? We explore these questions through the case of one scientific community—the AOAC (Association of Official Analytical Communities)—involved in food safety regulation across the British, US, and corporate food regimes. We argue that scientific boundary work is shaped by historically specific patterns of social conflict within food regimes and, in particular, the double-movement dynamics that Polanyi (The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our times. Boston: Beacon, 1957[1944]) theorizes. Moreover, as scientific communities reconstruct their internal rules, norms, and procedures to claim their own legitimacy in relation to prevailing forms of social conflict, they also reshape who sets scientific agendas and thus the knowledge available for making new rules within periods of food regime transition. To elaborate this argument in theoretical terms, we build on recent efforts to integrate a neo-Polanyian perspective into food regime analysis and link this to research on scientific boundary work by scholars in science and technology studies. (shrink)

This dissertation develops a conception of reasonableness that can adequately respond to agonistic critiques of this concept. As an aspect of practical reason, reasonableness refers to the moral capacity of citizens to cooperate politically, especially in pluralistic societies. More specifically, the principles or rules of political association governing society ought to be acceptable to all reasonable members of that society. This relates, furthermore, to the idea of justification: the acceptability of fundamental political principles refers to their justifiability. Justification, in turn, (...) requires ideas of public reason and political deliberation: political deliberation, for example, facilitates the ability of citizens to determine what political principles are justifiable. The explication of justifiability in terms of universal acceptability (acceptable to all reasonable persons, for example) is indicative of a central concern of proponents of reasonableness (and public reason), namely, that politics at least at a fundamental level ought to be governed by consensus. However, this conception of reasonableness has been the target of critique by agonistic theories of democracy. These theorists deny that politics ought to be governed by such a consensus. Most importantly, this orientation toward consensus ignores, or at least underestimates, the antagonistic and hegemonic nature of the political. That is, the consensus orientation of proponents of reasonableness and public reason suggests that society can be given a non-hegemonic and rational foundation. This goal, in turn, leads to the suppression or exclusion of dissensus. Nonetheless, this dissertation affirms the importance of reasonableness to democratic theory and identifies an implicit commitment to reasonableness within agonistic democratic theory. This commitment is evident, for example, in the claim that that political participants must adhere to the basic principles and institutions of liberal democracy. Given this implicit commitment, this dissertation will formulate a middle ground between prominent proponents of reasonableness and their agonistic critics. The primary goal will be to construct an agonistic conception of reasonableness, or reasonable agonism, in light of agonistic critiques of this concept. The agonistic conception of reasonableness developed in this dissertation is understood primarily in terms of the deliberative relationships citizens form and maintain. This opposes accounts of reasonableness and justification that privilege the universal acceptability of political principles and related idealizations of practical reason (understood in terms of its capacity for determining universally acceptable reasons). The defining feature of an agonistic conception of reasonableness is not the universal acceptability of political principles or of the reasons offered in political deliberation, but rather the maintenance of adversarial deliberative relationships. This approach to reasonableness does not require a consensus orientation and it is more sensitive to the antagonistic nature of the political. That is, political participants are able to adhere (at one level) to a particular, partisan conception of justice, as long as (at another level) they remain committed to maintaining deliberative relationships with their political rivals. In this way, an agonistic conception of reasonableness combines the best features of reasonableness and agonism, while addressing the shortcomings involved in theories of both concepts. Additionally, this account of reasonableness has a related critical function, namely, the contestation of prevailing normative orders that can be viewed as illegitimate or unjustifiable by those excluded from such orders. (shrink)

Ever since its inception, democracy has been subjected to the objection that ordinary citizens are not fit to rule. I discuss and criticize the most influential contemporary version of this argument, due to Jason Brennan, according to which democracy is illegitimate because voters are incompetent. I accept two core premises of Brennan’s argument – that legitimacy requires competence, and that voters are incompetent (in the sense of competence Brennan accepts) – but reject the conclusion that representative democracy is (...) illegitimate. I show that the argument can be interpreted as making two different claims: (1) That the democratic policymaking process as a whole is incompetent, and democratic policies therefore illegitimate; (2) that only democratic elections are incompetent, which either (a) makes democratic policies illegitimate or (b) makes elections themselves illegitimate. Each of these claims is false: (1) is false because voter incompetence does not taint the policymaking process sufficiently; (2a) is false because incompetent elections do not imply that policies made post-election are illegitimate; and (2b) is false because electoral decisions are not the kinds of things that can be illegitimate in the appropriate way. Finally, I address three potential criticisms of my defense of democracy: (i) that I set the bar for voters’ performance too low, (ii) that the representative democracy I defend is not really democratic, and (iii) that Brennan’s argument is an argument for replacing democracy with epistocracy, rather than for the illegitimacy of representative democracy. (shrink)

The present considerations discuss the systematic opposition between a practice of nonviolence to experienced social injustice and violent relationships. At the point, we see existential decisions about war and violence, there are signs of misconduct of responsibility waiver form – the Security Council unable to act, the protective effect for the affected people lapsed, the effectiveness of international law too weak. What emerges in this starting position, especially for the present considerations as a problem, is nothing less than the question (...) of a meaningful rule between legitimate power and illegitimate violence, hence a question that has a historical and a fundamental anthropological side. In the present case should be explicitly asked for the meaning of criteria of modern violence ability. The modern power capability opens up a complex and challenging task field. The historical origin and existential explosiveness are often overlooked. (shrink)

Considering biblical, political, and literary intertexts (Las Casas, Shakespeare, Marino/Brockes, Schiller) with regard to the ideological correlation of sex, rule, and salvation, the paper reads Kleist’s Erdbeben in Chili as a subversive Passion narrative and salvation history following the Marian matrix of Chile’s colonial toponymy: St. Jago after the first visionary of Mary, St. Jacob, La Concepción according to the immaculate conception of Mary, and Valparaíso, Kleist’s »Tal von Eden« in the illusive utopian spirit of the Holy and the (...) whole human family. Starting from this toponomastic key inspiration of the novella, the paper tries to take the colonial setting literally in order to contour more sharply, against the background of Chile’s colonial history, the social and political conflicts around the tutor’s liaison with his pupil, their prosecution, the earthquake, the utopian communitarisation, and the lynchings. Located within the colonial power tussle between the archbishop, the vice-king, the local gentry, and the Spanish bourgeoisie, and staged according to iconographic models, Kleist’s salvation history features Josephe Asteron who, as a novice, incarnates the Body of Christ in an illegitimate child, and, after the earthquake, advances from a femina sacra to a (sexually attractive) Marian nursing mother. The massacre by the ruled, that she finally falls victim to, mimetically inverts, in René Girard’s terms, the colonial rulers’ force without giving up their ideological framework, Christian eschatology. As radical a subversion as it may be, Kleist’s novella itself proves fueled by the persuasive energies of the Christian promise of salvation. (shrink)

This paper critically engages the legal and political framework for responding to democracy and rule of law backsliding in the EU. I develop a new and original critique of Article 7 TEU based on it being democratically illegitimate and normatively incoherent qua itself in conflict with EU fundamental values. Other more incremental and scaleable responses are desirable, and the paper moves on to assess the legitimacy of economic sanctions such as tying access to EU funds to performance on (...) democratic and rule of law indicators or imposing fines on backsliding states. I hold such sanctions to be a priori legitimate, and argue that in some cases economic sanctions are even normatively required, given that EU material support of backsliding member states can amount to material complicity in their backsliding. However, an economic conditionality mechanism would need to be designed to minimize unjust and counterproductive effects. One way to pursue this could be to complement sanctions against the backsliding government with investment for prodemocratic actors in that state. (shrink)

Can recognition theories distinguish legitimate from illegitimate claims to recognition put forward by social movements? This paper identifies an under-theorised problem of recognition theories: in viewing struggles for recognition as a force for social progress in the mould of the New Social Movements of the 1960s and 1970s, existing accounts have trouble identifying and ruling out illegitimate claims to recognition as formulated by contemporary counter-movements like white supremacists or men’s rights activists. I refer to this issue as the (...) symmetry problem of recognition since it amounts to difficulties in identifying grounds for excluding illegitimate claims to recognition that do not also symmetrically justify the exclusion of legitimate ones (and vice versa). I argue that criteria for telling apart legitimate from illegitimate claims to recognition need to include interpretation issues as a dimension of analysis, which consequently requires incorporating democratic deliberation as a necessary component of recognition theory. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Historiography of Philosophy by Michael FredeClaude PanaccioMichael Frede. The Historiography of Philosophy. Edited by Katerina Ierodiakonou, with a postface by Jonathan Barnes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. 256. Hardback, $80.00.From the 1970s until his tragic death in 2007, Michael Frede was one of the most prominent scholars in ancient Greek philosophy, with landmark contributions to the study of Aristotle and of Hellenistic thought in particular. This (...) volume contains his theoretical reflections on the work of historians of philosophy. The main part of the book reproduces with minor corrections the previously unpublished text of the Nellie Wallace Lectures that Frede gave in 1989–90 in Oxford (1–135). Then come three papers that he published on pretty much the same topic between 1987 and 1992 (137–88). Jonathan Barnes's postface, finally, launches an exciting discussion of Frede's proposals by raising a number of questions and critical remarks about them (189–230).Frede's main claim throughout the book is that there is, and should be, a distinctively historical approach to the history of philosophy that has not yet been sufficiently recognized as such in the academic world. This is not to say that he considers more philosophical approaches to be illegitimate. His point is that we have to be clear about the distinction and what it involves in terms of requirements and methods. What Frede calls the "historical history of philosophy" is thus contrasted by him with two varieties of philosophical approaches. One of them he identifies as the "philosophical history of philosophy." It consists in retrospectively studying the past of philosophy as a kind of maturation toward some more recent doctrinal stage, as Aristotle or Hegel saliently did with their respective predecessors. Frede takes this to be "a perfectly intelligible and legitimate, though perhaps not particularly interesting or fruitful, enterprise" (41). Most of the time, he thinks, it would be led by its own philosophical presuppositions to be too selective and to provide a badly distorted picture of past philosophy.Frede is much more sympathetic to the other philosophical approach to the history of philosophy he acknowledges, the one he calls "doxography." This is the study of past philosophers with the aim of finding something of interest in them for ongoing philosophical discussions—a familiar practice, indeed, in the philosophical discipline as we know it. There is an inevitable amount of anachronism in such endeavors, according to Frede, insofar as the commentators will have to reformulate the old views in contemporary terms to a certain extent and to look at them in connection with the questions that are currently debated in the field. But Frede deems this kind of anachronism acceptable as long as sufficient care is taken to correctly identify the views of the past we are interested in and to report them in the best available way. He strongly insists, however, that there are inherent risks of distortion in this approach. This might not be a problem if we are prepared to deal, as philosophers, with views that were not exactly those of the past; but we then run the risk of leaving out something of great philosophical interest, even to us, since "as a rule the philosopher subjected to doxographical treatment was a much better philosopher than the doxographer" (34). If we turn to the past for philosophical inspiration, we should also do it seriously, and this presupposes a historical study of past authors that is pursued for its own sake. [End Page 317]The latter is what Frede is really interested in, and he wants this historical approach to be "as independent as possible from philosophy and not just an ancilla to philosophy" (60). Its practitioners must have a strong philosophical training, of course, in order to understand the views they study and the arguments that were adduced in support of them, but Frede insists that they nevertheless are historians first and foremost: they strive to provide a correct account of "the actual, historical evolution of these views and positions" (14) and of how new doctrines actually grew out of previous ones given the historical context. Insofar as this is what they are doing, historians of... (shrink)

This article investigates the nature of Aristotelian syllogistics and shows that the categorical syllogism is fundamentally about showing the connection, in the premises of the syllogism, between the major and minor terms as stated in the conclusion. It discusses how this is important for the use of the syllogism in scientific demonstration. The article then examines modern deductive logic with an eye to they way in which it contrasts with Aristotelian syllogistics. It shows howmodern logic is about making necessary connections (...) between each proposition by means of external or second order rules. In the syllogism, on the other hand, the necessity between the premises as a whole unit and the conclusion is based on the internal middle term. The article concludes with a discussion of Günther Patzig’s claim that Aristotelian syllogisms are best thought of as tautological propositions. If this were the case, then the differences asserted to exist between syllogistic and modern logic would not hold. However, it is shown that Patzig’s assimilation of syllogistics to modern deductive logic is illegitimate. (shrink)

This article has three main aims. First, it argues that the question of the inclusion of “non‐Western” thought in philosophy cannot be resolved by appealing to definitions of philosophy, as such definitions are an integral part of the epistemically hegemonic practices responsible for the exclusion of non‐Western thought in the first place. Second, it argues that philosophy is structurally Eurocentric. It makes this argument first by looking at metaphilosophy. It argues that metaphilosophy is primarily performative and that its performativity is (...) a form of boundary work that is engaged in hegemonic practices of the epistemic type. It then argues that philosophy as a whole is inescapably engaged in boundary work and hegemonic practices, some of which partake in structural Eurocentrism. Finally, it promotes sociometaphilosophy, an approach that draws from the new sociology of knowledge to identify illegitimate mechanisms of exclusion inscribed in the rules that codify philosophical practice. (shrink)

A reductive theory of collective intentionality would imply that the ‘official’ intentions of an oppressive political authority cannot be constructed from the intentions of individuals when they follow the authority's rules. This makes it difficult to explain the unraveling of official group plans through time in a seemingly consistent fashion, and the corresponding source of coercion. A non-reductive theory, on the other hand, cannot capture whether the actions of individuals in an oppressive society are free or coerced, so long as (...) a manifest institutional structure and rules are in place. I put forward a hybrid account of group intentionality that is capable of articulating why oppressive political power is illegitimate, which comes down to the official and individual intentions in joint group actions diverging in such a way that individuals are not governed on the basis of dependent reasons. (shrink)

This article provides an exploration of the relationships between a procedural account of epistemic democracy, illegitimate laws and judicial review. I first explain how there can be illegitimate laws within a procedural account of democracy. I argue that even if democratic legitimacy is conceived procedurally, it does not imply that democracy could legitimately undermine itself or adopt grossly unjust laws. I then turn to the legitimacy of judicial review with regard to these illegitimate laws. I maintain that (...) courts do not have a moral privilege on the overthrow of illegitimate laws; in this respect the refusal of royal assent has the same status. I also explain how the rule of the clear mistake fails to restrict the action of courts to only illegitimate laws. Finally, I argue for the positive epistemic inputs of weak judicial review. (shrink)

There are various proposals for a general characterization of holism1. In this paper I propose the following: a variety of holism is the view that every X of an appropriate kind, which is part of a relevant whole W, cannot be legitimately separated or taken in isolation from W. Then, I distinguish two general kinds of holism, depending on two different reasons which can debar us from taking X in isolation from W. One reason can be that separating X from (...) W always amounts to transforming X into something else. Correspondingly, a strong holism is the view that if the whole W is modified anywhere, X ceases to be X and becomes something else. Another reason why it may be illegitimate to consider X in isolation from W can be that if we separate X from W, nothing that we know entitles us to exclude that X might be transformed into something else. Correspondingly, virtual holism is the view that if the whole W is modified anywhere, we can never rule out that X ceases to be X and becomes something else. (shrink)

Is international judicial human rights review anti-democratic and therefore illegitimate, and objectionably epistocratic to boot? Or is such review compatible with—and even a recommended component of—an epistemic account of democracy? This article defends the latter position, laying out the case for the legitimacy, possibly democratic legitimacy of such judicial review of democratically enacted legislation and policy-making. The article first offers a brief conceptual sketch of the kind of epistemic democracy and the kind of international human rights courts of concern—in (...) particular the European Court of Human Rights. The article goes on to develop some of the relevant aspects of democratic theory: components of an epistemic justification for democratic majority rule, namely to determine whether proposed policy and legislation bundles are just, and providing assurance thereof. Several critical premises and scope conditions are noted. The article goes on to consider the case for international judicial review, arguing that such review helps secure those premises and scope conditions. The article finally considers the scope such review should have—and some objections to such an account. (shrink)