In this essay I argue that the mainstream ‘Standard Story’ of action – according to which actions are bodily motions with the right internal mental states as their causal triggers (e.g., ‘belief-desire-pairs’, ‘intentions’) – gives rise to a deeply problematic conception of inter-subjective action-understanding. For the Standard Story, since motivating reasons are internal mental states and bodily motions are not intrinsically intentional, an observer must ascribe internal states to others to make rational sense of their outwardly observable bodily motions. I (...) argue this is both phenomenologically distorted and requires, on pain of infinite regress, a deeper, non-inferential, practical-perceptual form of understanding: ‘knowledge-how’, in a broadly Rylean sense. Recognizing the irreducible role of practical-perceptual knowledge-how in inter-subjective understanding, I argue, undermines core assumptions of the Standard Story concerning what an agent can directly perceive in interacting with others, and how our everyday practices of explaining actions with reasons function – and this opens the space for a radically opposed alternative view of inter-subjective action understanding. (shrink)

The history of Credit Rating Agencies [CRAs], commonly called Rating Agencies, has a long and distinguished trajectory marked by influence, reputation and power. Due to the ability of this field to instigate significant changes in market regulations and actions of economic actors, this subject is extensively debated within the literature. In economic sociology, while some studies have focused on perceptions of performativity and market devices to understand how the calculability of its methods influences the economy, others, along relational lines of (...) sociology, aim to understand them through a more complex constructive process. In this study, we attempt to fill a gap by exploring the complementarity between two theoretical approaches to sociology: theory of fields and performativity. Thus, we mobilize theory of fields to understand the inter-field relationship between the State and CRAs. Specifically, this paper sets out to i) analyze the co-constitution of the state and market fields with the field of CRAs; ii) describe the existing regulation and situate the CRAs and their classification devices in the broader history of the State and the market; iii) analyze how the legitimation of the CRAs by the State generates broader social contexts that assist in the performative work of the CRAs. Based on historical documentary research, we analyze some of the main milestones and regulatory events in the field of CRAs. This research reaffirms the assumption that even after credibility crises, the State is the most significant predictor of legitimacy, power, and influence that CRAs hold to date. The legitimacy of this power and influence has yet to be exhausted because the reputation of CRAs is rooted in the reputation of the State itself. This happens because the State provides essential actions (such as regulations) for the existence of the financial market. Thus, results suggest that the State, through regulatory measures, can engage several other fields to promote the legitimacy of performative work of the CRAs, whose purpose is to provide calculation tools to shape markets. (shrink)

Novel varieties of interplay between humans, robots and software agents are on the rise. Computer-based artefacts are no longer mere tools but have become interaction partners. Distributed problem solving and social agency may be modelled by social computing systems based on multi-agent systems. MAS and agent-based modelling approaches focus on the simulation of complex interactions and relationships of human and/or non-human agents. MAS may be deployed both in virtual environments and cyber-physical systems. With regard to their impact on the physical (...) environment, such systems possess a virtual actuality in a testbed. They have a real actuality when they are employed in real time in order to govern processes in the natural world. Constellations of inter-agency and distributed agency materialize. This paper presents a multidimensional, gradual classification framework for individual and joint agency. Activity level, adaptivity, interaction and personification of others are essential dimensions. The framework allows constellations of distributed and collective agency in socio-technical systems to be analysed in detail. Scenarios where solely humans act can be compared to testbed simulations based on this classification scheme. (shrink)

Emerging adults (age 35 and below) are the majority of the African population. In South Africa, for example, emerging adults make 63.9% of its population. This age group seems to be marginalised in Christian congregations of the township of Soshanguve where this research was conducted. This research is a case study that interviewed 30 de-churched emerging adults from different denominations to make its conclusions. It is stressing how the church could see the emerging adults’ empowerment as its contribution to building (...) an inclusive society. It was found out that many people under the age of 35 years are leaving their local churches because they feel that their voices are undervalued, and they do not have fulfilling roles to play. It was concluded that some de-churched emerging adults are eager to exercise their agency in making their voices heard and playing fulfilling roles in a missional community structure outside their previous congregations. Many others just complained about the marginalisation they experienced in their previous congregations, but they did not exercise their agency to help build a church they would love to be part of. Marginalisation could, therefore, be an opportunity to create an inclusive community. It could also remain an eternal wound for other people who may just be finger-pointing perpetrators of marginalisation without demonstrating a different praxis.Contribution: This is a practical theology article that is strengthened by sources from political sciences and development studies to stress the need for the church to model inter-generational inclusiveness in how it operates. (shrink)

This article maintains that a new wave in the development of the productive forces of society triggered by the revolution in information and communication technologies is taking place. Production carried out by single organizations is increasingly replaced by forms of production that are based on close long-term collaboration between specialized firms. This transition reflects the increasing importance of research and development as well as collective learning in business competition. New information and communication technologies enable new forms of distributed and collaborative (...) knowledge creation and learning. The article explores an emerging new form of innovation-oriented inter-firm collaboration called co-configuration and the new kind of dualistic agency it seems to be calling for. In this form of collaboration the traditional boundary between producer and provider as well as the boundaries between product development, sales and maintenance within the provider organization become blurred. The article presents a case of the development of co-configuration work in the provision of optimization software for pulp production. The case shows some of the contradictions involved in this new form of collaboration and the development of a new kind of object-oriented collaborative agency mediated through a real-time information and communication technological platform and uniting two processes of continuous development. (shrink)

The article proposes a novel approach to mental agency that is inspired by Victoria McGeer’s work on self-regulation. The basic idea is that certain mental acts leave further work to be done for an agent to be considered an authoritative self-ascriber of corresponding dispositional mental states. First, we discuss Richard Moran’s account of avowals, which grounds first-person authority in deliberative, self-directed agency. Although this view is promising, we argue that it ultimately fails to confront the empirical gap between occurrent judgments (...) and dispositional beliefs. Second, we show how Victoria McGeer's account of self-regulation allows us to bridge this gap by emphasizing that avowals are only reliable and authoritative insofar as we take certain steps to live up to the commitments inherent in our self-ascriptions. Third, we address the question whether and to what extent self-regulation can be seen as a form of mental agency. Unlike the ‘pure’ deliberative form of mental agency advocated by Moran, which is direct, conscious and intra-personal, we follow McGeer and argue for a notion of mental agency as an indirect, unconscious and inter-personal process of self-regulation. (shrink)

Considerable attention has focused on studying reviewer agreement via inter-rater reliability (IRR) as a way to assess the quality of the peer review process. Inspired by a recent study that reported an IRR of zero in the mock peer review of top-quality grant proposals, we use real data from a complete range of submissions to the National Institutes of Health and to the American Institute of Biological Sciences to bring awareness to two important issues with using IRR for assessing peer (...) review quality. First, we demonstrate that estimating local IRR from subsets of restricted-quality proposals will likely result in zero estimates under many scenarios. In both data sets, we find that zero local IRR estimates are more likely when subsets of top-quality proposals rather than bottom-quality proposals are considered. However, zero estimates from range-restricted data should not be interpreted as indicating arbitrariness in peer review. On the contrary, despite different scoring scales used by the two agencies, when complete ranges of proposals are considered, IRR estimates are above 0.6 which indicates good reviewer agreement. Furthermore, we demonstrate that, with a small number of reviewers per proposal, zero estimates of IRR are possible even when the true value is not zero. (shrink)

A Rural Sanctuary is defined as an area where farming activity creates habitats for a diverse assemblage of species that find a broad spectrum of resources along the season. A Rural Sanctuary is proposed as a new model of land management to protect nature inside a framework of cultural identity and agro-forestry sustainability. A Rural Sanctuary has a dual mission: to provide immaterial and material resources for people, and to guarantee living spaces to a large assemblage of species. A Rural (...) Sanctuary represents an ecosemiotic agency in which human eco-fields and animal eco-fields interact. This reflects a model that is rooted in the Mediterranean region, where for long time people and nature have harmoniously lived in strict contact and inter-dependence. An example of a Rural Sanctuary from this region is proposed to demonstrate the amazing diversity of living beings observed on only few hectares of farmland. A Rural Sanctuary offers possibilities to educate people about a more sustainable approach to nature, and it represents a unique place to investigate animal perception. Finally, between the different approach to certify the validity of a Rural Sanctuary, sound recording is suggested as one of the less invasive methods for ecological investigation and long-term monitoring. (shrink)

Investigating how a number of modern empires transform over the long century (1789-1914) as a consequence of their struggle for ascendancy in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, Foundations of Modernity: Human Agency and the Imperial State moves the study of the modern empire towards a comparative, trans-regional analysis of events along the Ottoman frontiers: Western Balkans, the Persian Gulf and Yemen. This inter-disciplinary approach of studying events at different ends of the Ottoman Empire challenges previous emphasis on Europe as (...) the only source of change and highlights the progression of modern imperial states.The book introduces an entirely new analytical approach to the study of modern state power and the social consequences to the interaction between long-ignored "historical agents" like pirates, smugglers, refugees, and the rural poor. In this respect, the roots of the most fundamental institutions and bureaucratic practices associated with the modern state prove to be the by-products of certain kinds of productive exchange long categorized in negative terms in post-colonial and mainstream scholarship. Such a challenge to conventional methods of historical and social scientific analysis is reinforced by the novel use of the work of Louis Althusser, Talal Asad, William Connolly and Frederick Cooper, whose challenges to scholarly conventions will prove helpful in changing how we understand the origins of our modern world and thus talk about Modernity. This book offers a methodological and historiographic intervention meant to challenge conventional studies of the modern era"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Brain–computer interfacing (BCI) aims at directly capturing brain activity in order to enable a user to drive an application such as a wheelchair without using peripheral neural or motor systems. Low signal to noise ratio’s, low processing speed, and huge intra- and inter-subject variability currently call for the addition of intelligence to the applications, in order to compensate for errors in the production and/or the decoding of brain signals. However, the combination of minds and machines through BCI’s and intelligent devices (...) (IDs) can affect a user’s sense of agency. Particularly confusing cases can arise when the behavioral control switches implicitly from user to ID. I will suggest that in such situations users may be insecure about the extent to which the resulting behavior, whether successful or unsuccessful, is genuinely their own. Hence, while performing an action, a user of a BCI–ID may be uncertain about being the agent of the act. Several cases will be examined and some implications for (legal) responsibility (e.g. establishing the presence of a ‘guilty mind’) are discussed. (shrink)

In normal observers, gazing at one’s own face in the mirror for a few minutes, at a low illumination level, triggers the perception of strange faces, a new visual illusion that has been named ‘strange-face in the mirror’. Individuals see huge distortions of their own faces, but they often see monstrous beings, archetypal faces, faces of relatives and deceased, and animals. In the experiment described here, strange-face illusions were perceived when two individuals, in a dimly lit room, gazed at each (...) other in the face. Inter-subjective gazing compared to mirror-gazing produced a higher number of different strange-faces. Inter-subjective strange-face illusions were always dissociative of the subject’s self and supported moderate feeling of their reality, indicating a temporary lost of self-agency. Unconscious synchronization of event-related responses to illusions was found between members in some pairs. Synchrony of illusions may indicate that unconscious response–coordination is caused by the illusion–conjunction of crossed dissociative strange-faces, which are perceived as projections into each other’s visual face of reciprocal embodied representations within the pair. Inter-subjective strange-face illusions may be explained by the subject’s embodied representations and the other’s visual face binding. Unconscious facial mimicry may promote inter-subjective illusion–conjunction, then unconscious joint-action and response–coordination. (shrink)

This dissertation may be conveniently divided into four principal parts. Following a brief overview of the dissertation as a whole , in the first part , I examine several fundamental problems that are peculiar to extant theories of autonomy and free agency. In the second part , I introduce and defend a basic version of the Theory of Middle Freedom---a unified, composite, acausal theory of free agency. I argue that this theory's virtues include its providing inter alia a method for (...) resolving the demarcation problem, a satisfactory solution to the problem of identification, a novel account of action control in an indeterminist framework, a plausible account of compatibilist free action, and a way of unifying within a single conceptual framework the three dominant theories of free agency that are found in the historical and contemporary philosophical literature, viz. simple indeterminism, agent-causal libertarianism, and compatibilism. In the third part , I outline the rudiments of a non-standard theory of counterpossibles by which the basic Theory of Middle Freedom may be extended. Then, in the fourth part , I apply both the basic theory and this extended theory to outstanding problems in philosophical theology involving the nature of divine freedom, the existence of evil, and the metaphysics of divine providential governance. I conclude by making some brief closing remarks. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOscar Larsson’s sympathetic critique of constructivist institutionalism calls for a clarification of my understanding of subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and their mutual interdependence. That interdependence lies at the heart of any genuinely constructivist approach, just as the interdependence of structure and agency lies at the heart of any genuinely institutionalist approach. As such, I reject the charge of subjectivism just as I would that of voluntarism. Building on the social ontology of Berger and Luckmann, we can distinguish between subjectivity and intra-subjectivity and (...) proceed to show how the latter implies a notion of inter-subjectivity. An example of the social construction of a political crisis shows that social facts are made and remade through a fusion of inter- and intra-subjectivities. (shrink)

En la parte I de Self-Knowing Agents, Lucy O�Brien expone una teoría de la referencia de primera persona. En lo que sigue describo su teoría y luego planteo dudas en torno a sus logros. Como no estoy seguro de haberla entendido correctamente, tal vez esté yo erigiendo y atacando un muñeco de paja; en todo caso, lo único que espero es que lo que se dice aquí sobre la primera persona sea de interés por sí mismo.

In this paper I deal with Richard Moran's account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some shortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the account would seem to face problems of circularity or regress. And it looks also wanting concerning beliefs not formed in this way. I go on to suggest a diagnosis of these problems, according to which (...) they would arise out of a view of agents too strongly dependent on the will. /// Este trabajo se ocupa de la concepción del autoconocimiento en el libro de Richard Moran Authority and Estrangement. Tras presentar las líneas maestras de dicha concepción, sostengo que ésta, a pesar de su novedad e interés, podría adolecer de defectos importantes. Así, con respecto a las creencias formadas mediante la deliberación, la propuesta de Moran parece enfrentarse a problemas de circularidad o de regreso. Y parece también insatisfactoria acerca de creencias no formadas de ese modo. Finalmente, sugiero un diagnóstico de estos problemas, según el cual éstos surgirían de una concepción de los agentes excesivamente dependiente de la voluntad. (shrink)

Research on ethical dilemmas in health care has become increasingly salient during the last two decades resulting in confusion about the concept of moral distress. The aim of the present paper is to provide an overview and a comparative analysis of the theoretical understandings of moral distress and related concepts. The focus is on five concepts: moral distress, moral stress, stress of conscience, moral sensitivity and ethical climate. It is suggested that moral distress connects mainly to a psychological perspective; stress (...) of conscience more to a theological–philosophical standpoint; and moral stress mostly to a physiological perspective. Further analysis indicates that these thoughts can be linked to the concepts of moral sensitivity and ethical climate through a relationship to moral agency. Moral agency comprises a moral awareness of moral problems and moral responsibility for others. It is suggested that moral distress may serve as a positive catalyst in exercising moral agency. An interdisciplinary approach in research and practice broadens our understanding of moral distress and its impact on health care personnel and patient care. (shrink)

The sense of agency – the subjective feeling of being in control of our own actions – is one central aspect of the phenomenology of action. Computational models provided important contributions toward unveiling the mechanisms underlying the sense of agency in individual action. In particular, the sense of agency is believed to be related to the match between the actual and predicted consequences of our own actions (comparator model). In the study of joint action, models are even more necessary to (...) understand the mechanisms underlying the development of coordination strategies and how the subjective experiences of control emerge during the interaction. In a joint action, we not only need to predict the consequences of our own actions; we also need to predict the actions and intentions of our partner, and to integrate these predictions to infer their joint consequences. Understanding our partner and developing mutually satisfactory coordination strategies are key components of joint action and in the development of the sense of joint agency. Here we discuss a computational architecture which addresses the sense of agency during intentional, real-time joint action. We first reformulate previous accounts of the sense of agency in probabilistic terms, as the combination of prior beliefs about the action goals and constraints, and the likelihood of the predicted movement outcomes. To look at the sense of joint agency, we extend classical computational motor control concepts - optimal estimation and optimal control. Regarding estimation, we argue that in joint action the players not only need to predict the consequences of their own actions, but also need to predict partner’s actions and intentions (a ‘partner model’) and to integrate these predictions to infer their joint consequences. As regards action selection, we use differential game theory – in which actions develop in continuous space and time - to formulate the problem of establishing a stable form of coordination and as a natural extension of optimal control to joint action. The resulting model posits two concurrent observer-controller loops, accounting for ‘joint’ and ‘self’ action control. The two observers quantify the likelihoods of being in control alone or jointly. Combined with prior beliefs, they provide weighing signals which are used to modulate the ‘joint’ and ‘self’ motor commands. We argue that these signals can be interpreted as the subjective sense of joint and self agency. We demonstrate the model predictions by simulating a sensorimotor interactive task where two players are mechanically coupled and are instructed to perform planar movements to reach a shared final target by crossing two differently located intermediate targets. In particular, we explore the relation between self and joint agency and the information available to each player about their partner. The proposed model provides a coherent picture of the inter-relation of prediction, control, and the sense of agency in a broader range of joint actions. (shrink)

This paper will discuss interactive on-line artworks modelled on cellular automata that employ various types of agents, both algorithmic and human, to assist in the evolution of their databases. These works constitute what will here be referred to as “Collaborative Systems” systems that evolve through the practice of inter-authorship.

Whats human rights got to do with it? That is, whats human rights got to do with the June 2004 report of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Ethics Special Working Committee to the Inter-Agency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics. The disturbing answer is not enough. Certain key recommendations of the working committee, it is suggested, would unacceptably weaken the researchers legal and moral accountability to research participants. Those particular recommendations rely on misguided references to academic freedom and the nature (...) of the non-medical research context. In fact, universal human rights, and the legal instruments in which they are embodied ought to inform the research endeavor at every stage; from problem selection to analysis and conclusions. This will lead us closer to shared truths rather than simply to the academic elites vision of truth. Without sufficient regard for the human rights of research participants academic freedom itself is not possible. (shrink)

Exposure to delayed sensory feedback changes perceived simultaneity between action and feedback [temporal recalibration ] and even modulates the sense of agency over the feedback. To date, however, it is not clear whether the modulation of SoA by TR is caused by a change in perceptual sensitivity or decision criterion of self-agency. This experimental research aimed to tease apart these two by applying the signal detection theory to the agency judgment over auditory feedback after voluntary action. Participants heard a short (...) sequence of tone pips with equal inter-onset intervals, and they reproduced it by pressing a computer mouse. The delay of each tone pip after the mouse press was manipulated as 80 or 180 ms. Subsequently, the participants reproduced it, in which the delay was fixed at 80 ms and there was a 50% chance that the computer took over the control of the tone pips from the participants. The participants’ task was to discriminate who controlled the tone pips and to judge synchrony between tone pips and mouse presses. Results showed that the modulation of the SoA by the TR is caused by a shift in the decision criterion but not in the perceptual sensitivity of agency. (shrink)

I consider two inter-related problems in the philosophy of action. One concerns the role of the agent in the determination of action, and I call it the problem of agential authority. The other concerns the relation between motivating desire and the agent's normative deliberation, and I call it the problem of subjective normative authority. In part by way of discussion of work of Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard, I argue that we make progress with these problems by appeal to certain (...) kinds of higher-order policies and to their role in the cross-temporal organization of the deliberation and action of temporally persisting agents like us. (shrink)

Paul Smeyers’ keynote address to the PESA 2007 Conference, ‘The Entrepreneurial Self and Informal Education: On government intervention and the discourse of experts’ provides a timely call for questioning the governing of the family. This paper draws upon Smeyers’ key concerns to explore both historical and contemporary trends in clustering government agencies, under the guidance of child development experts. The guidance of two expert groups is problematised, with particular attention to an absence of commitment to Māori perspectives of education and (...) child‐rearing. Such an absence reflects, in New Zealand, a dangerous undermining of the historic treaty between the British and Māori. The paper then challenges, with brief reference to Jacques Derrida's discussions on autobiography and Freud's Legacy, the identity of expert groups advocating early intervention in the lives of families measured as a burden on economic and social progress. The paper posits that perhaps it is the developmental expert that requires some form of early intervention. (shrink)

Protecting children from abuse has never been more central to our welfare system than it is now. Schools, and the people who work there, are vital to the government's vision for child protection. New laws, guidance and standards all set out what educational establishments must provide in order to meet their legal obligations. This book brings all these sources together to provide detailed and practical advice to help the busy teacher or school manager. Based on years of direct experience in (...) advising schools, the author offers a realistic and informed account of the inter-agency system and of the particular contribution of schools within it, including: information on the legal and procedural frameworks responding to concerns about children's welfare meeting inspection standards for effective governance promoting inter-agency communication managing allegations against education staff wider issues of child safety, including bullying and child employment. _Protecting Children_ provides a guide through the minefield, balancing the needs of parents, professionals and pupils. It will be essential reading for all designated and newly-qualified teachers, school managers, governors and LEA officers. (shrink)

Since 2001 there has been a proliferation of commercially-available devices that observe children, track their movements and gather data about the routine choices that they make. At the same time, a growing number of databases in education, social care, health and youth justice store detailed information about children and facilitate its sharing between agencies. Some of this data is derived from in-depth personal assessment tools that are believed to ‘predict’ poor life outcomes such as criminality or social exclusion. These developments (...) are often presented as a means of keeping children safe or of intervening to deal with problems promptly, but they leave children with little privacy and create a new set of ethical and practical difficulties. There are dangers that overloading an already stretched social care service with low-level concerns will damage effective child protection work, while any insecurity in the systems potentially puts all children at increased risk of harm. Issues around consent to data-sharing have not been adequately addressed, but the reduction in confidentiality brought about by routine inter-agency information-sharing may deter children and their families from accessing services at all. We risk habituating children to a very high level of surveillance, and yet the possible effect of such widespread data-gathering on their personal development and future lives has not been considered. This paper lists some of the systems now in use or being planned, and outlines the potential risks that they pose to children’s safety and development. (shrink)

This paper will set out the key planning considerations regarding the establishment of a dedicated online portal for Gaeltacht and Irish-medium schools at post-primary level as detailed in the Policy on Gaeltacht Education 2017-2022 (PGE). The research topic is intrinsically linked with action points highlighted within strategy and policy papers concerning the improvement of online supports for teachers in recent years by the Department of Education (DE) in Ireland. The Digital Strategy for Schools 2015-2020 refers to the objective of establishing (...) digital communities of practice and the PGE highlights the need for a ‘dedicated online portal’ for Irish-medium schools. Embracing a problem-solving spirit, forging coalitions, building inter-agency collaboration, and ensuring teacher buy-in from the outset are all critical factors in the necessary planning process. Through the adoption of a mixed-methods approach, questionnaire and focus group respondents verified the most important thematic issues for L1 (Irish-medium) post-primary teachers respecting the establishment of what has the capacity to become a flourishing online community of practice (OCoP). The research process cast a spotlight upon how best to serve the teachers’ professional needs, confirmed the need for a collaborative approach that prioritised the significance of the collective, ascertained the existence of greater teacher openness to systemic change, and the centrality of transformative digital solutions in the L1 educational sphere. (shrink)

The sexual exploitation of children in Indonesia is a serious crime that threatens the fundamental rights of children and their physical, emotional, and mental development. Cases of child sexual exploitation continue to rise, whether in the form of human trafficking, pornography, or sexual abuse, yet the response remains far from optimal. Although regulations and prevention programs are in place, the lack of coordination among law enforcement agencies and the low level of public awareness are major obstacles to resolving these cases.This (...) study employs a qualitative approach using a normative-empirical method, involving an analysis of the legal framework as well as in-depth interviews with legal practitioners and relevant stakeholders. The results indicate that although there is a strong legal foundation, policy implementation is often hindered by bureaucracy, limited human resources, and low legal awareness in society. Additionally, social stigma against victims exacerbates the situation, especially in rural areas.The study recommends an interconnected approach involving substantive law, legal structure, and legal culture as an effective solution to address the escalation of child sexual exploitation. These findings imply the need for improved inter-agency coordination, law enforcement training, and more extensive public awareness campaigns. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, we will highlight the correspondences between the Socially Engaged Buddhism movement, especially as defined in the practice of the late Thich Nhat Hanh, and the core principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence originally adopted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. These principles also underpin the neutral, impartial and independent approach to humanitarian action, used by agencies working under the auspices of the United Nations’ Inter-Agency Standing Committee and Office for the Coordination of (...) Humanitarian Affairs, along with those who have signed the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations in Disaster Relief. We hope this paper is a modest but useful contribution to create better understanding and to generate dialogue among different stakeholders in the humanitarian field, particularly in the context of armed conflict. (shrink)

In the paper, the touchstone points of the project “Towards an agency-based philosophy of (advanced) technology” are outlined. The main plot of this elaboration concerns human-machine interactions and appropriate interpretation of reciprocal aligning, adapting within involved into such interactions agents; as well as the status as such of being an agent. Into the theoretical and historical background of the project such spheres as Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Technology, Philosophy of Engineering and Design Technological Actions, STS (Science and Technology Studies), (...) Applied Ethics etc. could be invited. To treat agency as technology, reestablish the role of agency in technology is the most ambitious goal of the project: ‘activity as technology’ focuses on activities through technologies. The terms «agency» and «activity» are used in this paper synonymously with the basic Aristotelian meaning of agent’s potential capacity to act. The proposed by the author theory of action and agency (and correspondently defended in 2016 dissertation of Doctor of Philosophical Science) is to be applied into philosophical reflections about various problems of dealing with currently continually appearing flourishing fields of artificial intelligence, machine learning (including deep learning methods and simulation methods), inventing computers and codes, numerically controlled machines and robots, computer-chip equipped devices, smart objects etc. (shrink)

This thesis argues for a radical understanding of personal autonomy as constitutively social-relational. Standard conceptualisations in liberalism construe autonomy broadly in line with Frankfurt and Dworkin’s accounts, which rely on the idea of an inner self as the authenticator of personal commitments. These conceptualisations suffer from serious theoretical limitations including problems of regress, manipulation and authority. I argue that attempts to address these problems from within the standard paradigm, for example by building in conditions of procedural independence to prevent commitments (...) from being manipulated, help to an extent. However, they remain reliant on an insufficiently explained idea of an inner self as the source of an autonomous agent’s motives, so they do not go far enough to capture what we want from autonomy: that it explains how a person can have the power to shape her life. I explore two sets of criticisms of the standard paradigm, from communitarianism and feminism; both argue that standard autonomy is excessively individualistic and fails to pay enough attention to the role of social factors. I enter the debate about how far, if at all, autonomy might be either causally (weakly) or constitutively (strongly) social-relational. I show that the liberal can accommodate the idea that autonomy is enabled by social relations, but is severely challenged by more strongly relational, constitutive claims. I make the original point that standard views cannot explain how individuals can be sure which of their motives are authentic and which should be endorsed. This is a significant gap in autonomy theory. I propose a methodological shift from analysing autonomous actions to analysing autonomous agency. Drawing on dialogical accounts of critical reflection, Axel Honneth’s inter-subjectivity, and Bernard Williams’ notion of ‘trustful conversation’ I contribute a constitutively social-relational condition for autonomous agency. From this I argue for a constitutive condition for autonomous actions. (PhD, 2014. Supervisors: Miranda Fricker and Susan James.). (shrink)

The paper attempts to explicate and justify the position I call `Agency Incompatibilism'- that is to say, the view that agency itself is incompatible with determinism. The most important part of this task is the characterisation of the conception of agency on which the position depends; for unless this is understood, the rationale for the position is likely to be missed. The paper accordingly proceeds by setting out the orthodox philosophical position concerning what it takes for agency to exist, before (...) going on to explain why and how that orthodoxy should be challenged. The relations between my own views and those of others writing on the issues of free will and moral responsibility, in three crucial and inter-connected areas are then explored. These are (1) the question how animals should figure in the philosophy of action; (2) the question what the lesson is of `Frankfurt-style' examples; and (3) the distinction between so-called `leeway' incompatibilism and `source' incompatibilism. The paper moves on to consider and respond to various objections to Agency Incompatibilism, including the claim that to embrace the conception of agency that makes incompatibilism plausible is to beg the question against the compatibilist, and also the worry that determinism is an empirical thesis which ought not to be straightforwardly falsifiable by such a priori reasoning as Agency Incompatibilism appears to involve. I also try to rebut the worry that Agency Incompatibilism is committed to the existence of an unintelligible and/or naturalistically impossible variety of irreducible agent causation. (shrink)

While Latour criticises the tautologies of the ‘sociologists of the social’ as an intellectual shortcut, here sociology in the broadest sense is reconsidered as informed by unrecognised theological ideas, inter alia. Durkheim’s classic account of religion, wherein ‘society is God’ is taken as a starting point to explore the intersection of sociology and theology. Thereafter the article examines three social theorists, Elias, Giddens and Boltanski, each of whom attempt a re-casting of sociology, yet rearticulate theological models. In particular, this includes (...) an ontological conception of society, structure or system in terms of over-arching and invisible forces which is derived – inter alia – from religious models of divine will and providential order, which incorporates human choice – or agency in contemporary parlance. Accompanying this ontology is an epistemology of deciphering ‘deeper’ or ‘structural’ or ‘transcendent’ aspects of society by observing trends, cases or culture, akin to divining the providential will by observing its manifestations, which can be conducted in a more critical or forgiving manner. By examining these theological strands which persist in sociology, this aim is not to critically repudiate them, but to recognise the productive contribution of these models of thinking to imagining the ‘social’. (shrink)

Cases of modest sociality are cases of small scale shared intentional agency in the absence of asymmetric authority relations. I seek a conceptual framework that adequately supports our theorizing about such modest sociality. I want to understand what in the world constitutes such modest sociality. I seek an understanding of the kinds of normativity that are central to modest sociality. And throughout we need to keep track of the relations—conceptual, metaphysical, normative—between individual agency and modest sociality. In pursuit of these (...) theoretical aims, I propose that a central phenomenon is shared intention. I argue that an adequate understanding of the distinctiveness of the intentions of individuals allows us to provide a construction of attitudes of the participants, and of relevant inter-relations and contexts that constitutes shared intention. I explain how shared intention, so understood, differs from a simple equilibrium within common knowledge. And I briefly contrast my views with aspects of views of John Searle and Margaret Gilbert. (shrink)

We argue, primarily by appeal to phenomenological considerations related to the experiential aspects of agency, that belief fixation is broadly agentive; although it is rarely voluntary, nonetheless, it is phenomenologically agentive because of its significant phenomenological similarities to voluntary-agency experience. An important consequence is that epistemic rationality, as a central feature of belief fixation, is an agentive notion. This enables us to introduce and develop a distinction between core and ancillary epistemic virtues. Core epistemic virtues involve several inter-related kinds of (...) epistemic rationality in belief fixation. Other “habits of mind” pertinent to belief fixation constitute ancillary epistemic virtues. Finally, we discuss the relationship between both kinds of virtues, offering a unified account of epistemic virtuousness. (shrink)

Background: While there have been studies exploring moral habitability and its impact on the work environments of nurses in Western countries, little is known about the moral habitability of the work environments of nurses and midwives in resource-constrained settings. Research objective: The purpose of this research was to examine the moral habitability of the work environment of nurses and midwives in Ghana and its influence on their moral agency using the philosophical works of Margaret Urban Walker. Research design and participants: (...) A critical moral ethnography was conducted through the analysis of interviews with 30 nurses and midwives, along with observation, and documentary materials. Ethical considerations: After receiving ethics approval, signed informed consent was obtained from participants before data collection. Results: Five themes were identified: (1) holding onto the values, identities, and responsibilities of being a midwife/nurse; (2) scarcity of resources as limiting capacity to meet caring responsibilities; (3) gender and socio-economic inequities shaping the moral-social context of practice; (4) working with incoherent moral understandings and damaged identities in the context of inter- and intra-professional relationships; and (5) surviving through adversity with renewed commitment and courage. Discussion: The nurses and midwives were found to work in an environment that was morally uninhabitable and dominated by the scarcity of resources, overwhelming and incoherent moral responsibilities, oppressive conditions, and workplace violence. These situations constrained their moral agency and provoked suffering and distress. The nurses and midwives negotiated their practice and navigated through morally uninhabitable work environment by holding onto their moral values and commitments to childbearing women. Conclusion: Creating morally habitable workplaces through the provision of adequate resources and instituting interprofessional practice guidelines and workplace violence prevention policies may promote safe and ethical nursing and midwifery practice. (shrink)

Decision theory explains weakness of will as the result of a conflict of incentives between different transient agents. In this framework, self-control can only be achieved by the I-now altering the incentives or choice-sets of future selves. There is no role for an extended agency over time. However, it is possible to extend game theory to allow multiple levels of agency. At the inter-personal level, theories of team reasoning allow teams to be agents, as well as individuals. I apply team (...) reasoning at the intra-personal level, taking the self as a team of transient agents over time. This allows agents to ask, not just “what should I-now do?’, but also ‘What should I, the person over time do?’, which may enable agents to achieve self-control. The resulting account is Aristotelian in flavour, as it involves reasoning schemata and perception, and it is compatible with some of the psychological findings about self-control. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose that economic sustainability is seen in terms of (inter-temporal and inter-national) value creation. We claim that value appropriation (or capture), can become a constraint to economic sustainability. We propose that for sustainable value creation to be fostered, corporate governance needs to be aligned to public and supra-national governance. In order to achieve this, a hierarchically layered set of ‘agencies’, needs to be diagnosed and the issue of incentive alignment addressed. Enlightened self-interest, pluralism and diversity, as (...) well as a representative supra-national organisation for world-wide economic sustainability can serve as a new, more ‘ethically correct’ governance for economic sustainability, but not a panacea. (shrink)

A feminist phenomenological analysis of voice, rooted in both the feminist understanding of the role of voice in identity, agency, and the creation of meaning, and the phenomenological thematization and theorization of phenomenal, lived experience, leads to a deeper understanding of the importance of the materiality of the voices with which we speak, and their role in both subjective and intersubjective experience. Starting from an analysis of the intertwined associations and imageries of the feminine, voice, and embodiment, I discuss the (...) denaturalization and abstraction of voice in standard narratives of voice and voice metaphorization, and the corresponding forgetting of the living, bodily voice. In looking to recall a re-naturalized and immanent corporeality and retrieve the material voice through an account of embodied vocality, I consider examples of the power and immediacy of the corporeal voice in the female operatic voice, and in contrast, the compromised agency and attenuated (inter)subjectivity which attends the impaired or lost physical voice. These vocal counterpoints of presence and absence are often separated by corporeal disturbance or limitation, underscoring the importance of corporeality and the material voice as intermediary between the individual and the social world. This sets the contours of a phenomenology of embodied voice and vocality, holding implications for accounts of identity and intersubjectivity, gendered vocality and expressive agency, and an intercorporeality mediated by the living material voice. (shrink)

Protecting the people we experiment on --"Inside the black box" : becoming and being IRB members -- Weighing risks and benefits and undue inducement -- Defining research and how good it needs to be -- What to tell subjects : battles over consent forms -- From "nitpicky" to "user-friendly" : inter-IRB variations and their causes -- Federal agencies vs. local IRBs -- The roles of industry -- The local ecologies of institutions -- Trusting vs. policing researchers -- Bad behavior: research (...) integrity -- Researchers abroad : studies in the developing world -- Changing national policies -- Conclusions : other changes. (shrink)

Kant’s justification of possession appears to beg the question (petitio principii) by assuming rather than proving the legitimacy of possession. The apparent question-begging in Kant’s argument has been recapitulated or exacerbated but not resolved in the secondary literature. A detailed terminological, textual, and logical analysis of Kant’s argument reveals that he provides a sound justification of limited rights to possess and use things (qualified choses in possession), not of private property rights. Kant’s argument is not purely a priori; it is (...) in Kant’s Critical sense ‘metaphysical’ because it applies the pure a priori ‘Universal Principles of Right’ to the concept of finite rational human agency. The application of this principle implicitly involves a ‘Contradiction in Conception’ test. I explicate this test in detail and show, inter alia, how Kant’s argument relates to the modern natural law tradition. I further argue that Kant’s ‘Universal Principle of Right’ is justified by appeal to a fundamental principle of justification, the Principle of Mutual Acceptability. This justification also suggests that the debate between Kantians and Utilitarians about whether human ‘dignity’ is an incommensurable value is moot because Kant’s test of the Categorical Imperative need not appeal to ‘dignity’. Finally, I show that the limited rights to possession and use justified by Kant’s argument suffice for his social contract argument for the legitimacy of the state. (shrink)

In the literature on social ontology, two perspectives on collective agency have been developed. The first is the internal perspective, the second the external one. The internal perspective takes the point of view of the members as its point of departure and appeals, inter alia, to the joint intentions they form. The idea is that collective agents perform joint actions such as dancing the tango, organizing prayer meetings, or performing symphonies. Such actions are generated by joint intentions, a topic which (...) has been investigated extensively in recent decades.1 The external perspective takes the point of view of outsiders as its point of departure. Here the idea is that outsiders ascribe certain properties to collections of individuals that thereby acquire a new status. An example that is discussed in some detail below is provided by universities that, at least initially, had to be recognized by the pope in order to perform the actions that are characteristic of universities, in particular the awarding of academic degrees. This perspective has received considerably less attention.2 In this paper I present and defend a new account of collective agents from the external perspective. I call it ‘the status account’. At the heart of this account lies the idea just mentioned. A collective agent can come into existence by outsiders granting a collection of individuals some kind of status. I call a collective agent for which this holds a ‘corporate agent’, because such an agent is or has been, in a sense to be explained, incorporated. I develop this idea by distinguishing between two kinds of rules: status rules and constitutive rules. Status rules explicate the normative attributes that are characteristic of a particular kind of corporate agent. Constitutive rules specify the conditions that have to be met for a certain collection of individuals to have those attributes. The status account shares some important features with John Searle’s social ontology.3 The advantages that my account has over Searle’s are discussed in section 2.2, immediately after the account has been introduced in section 2.1. Before doing that, however, I shall discuss the internal perspective.. (shrink)

This thesis shows morality to be broader and more diverse than its human instantiation. It uses the idea of machine morality to argue for this position. Specifically, it contrasts the possibilities open to humans with those open to machines to meaningfully engage with the moral domain. -/- This contrast identifies distinctive characteristics of human morality, which are not fundamental to morality itself, but constrain our thinking about morality and its possibilities. It also highlights the inherent potential of machine morality to (...) be radically different from its human counterpart and the implications this has for the moral significance of machines. -/- My argument is particularly focussed on moral theory, which is the study of the observable and hypothetical conceptual structures of morality. By identifying structures that are recognisably moral in nature but which sit outside the boundaries of human realisation, we have tangible proof that a meaningful distinction exists between human morality and the wider moral domain. -/- This is achieved by showing that certain essentially human limits restrict the conceptual possibilities open to human realisation. The tight coupling between these limits and the existing conceptual structures of human morality also explains why it is unjustifiable to assume that the same structures would be suitable for machines. They do not share these same limits with us, which leads me to conclude that many conceptual structures are quite distinctive to human morality and that the structures of machine morality would be significantly different. Four examples illustrate these conclusions concretely. -/- The first, supererogation, is an example of a moral concept that doesn't easily extend to machines. Human limits dictate what it is reasonable to expect from one another and restrict our ability to pursue aspirational moral goals. I show that machine supererogation, if it is at all possible, would require a very different justificatory basis to be coherent. -/- The second, agency, is an example of a concept whose structures extend beyond the bounds of human realisation. The greater flexibility of artificial identity allows machines to experiment with novel forms of inter- and intra-agency. In comparison, human agency structures are limited by their tight coupling with human conceptions of identity. -/- The third, moral aspiration, is a concept with a distinctive function in human morality. Certain aspirational ends are peculiar in that they are obviously unrealisable and even undesirable, yet their pursuit is instrumentally justifiable. This justification depends on cognitive limits that aren't shared by machines, which leads me to conclude that the role of moral aspiration in machine morality, if there is any, would necessarily differ from its human counterpart. -/- The fourth, moral responsibility, is an example of a concept whose existing practices don't translate over to machines. We don't understand machine agency well enough to be able to judge a machine's culpability or effectively blame it. Consequently, I suggest that a responsibility conception prioritising understanding over blame is a more promising avenue for a shared conception suitable for both humans and machines. -/- This thesis does not speculate about the existence of moral machines. This remains an open question, and one that is largely irrelevant for my conclusions as the idea alone is enough to advance our thinking. It does this by helping us identify the boundaries of human morality, and then, to think beyond them by recognising the possibilities of machine morality. (shrink)

A sense of agency over wilful actions is thought to be dependent on the level of choice and the nature of the outcome. In a preregistered study, we manipulated choice and valence of outcome to assess the relationship between SoA across the depression and psychosis continuum. Participants completed a Libet Clock task, in which they had either a free or forced choice to press one of two buttons and received either a rewarding or punishing outcome. Participants also completed questionnaires on (...) depressive and psychosis-like traits. Rewarding outcomes increased intentional binding. The evidence favoured no effect of choice on average, but this was influenced by inter-individual differences. Individuals reporting more depressive traits had less of a difference in intentional binding between free and forced choice conditions. We show that implicit SoA is sensitive to outcome valence and the effect of choice differs across the depression continuum. (shrink)

This paper draws on research conducted in Manchester, UK, examining service responses to African, African-Caribbean, Irish, Jewish and South Asian women experiencing domestic violence (Batsleer et al., 2002). Popular discourses of domestic violence, which also feature in services, are underpinned by ‘victim-blaming’ together with an assumption that women only show agency and control when they leave violent relationships, and/or what are constructed as oppressive minority cultures. Contrary to these perceptions, firstly, I note competing notions ascribed to ‘independence’. Secondly, I highlight (...) the strategies of resistance used by minoritized women whether they stay, or leave, abusive relationships, and examine the inter-relationships between gender, class and culture. Thirdly, I outline the level and type of support on offer, including key barriers and dilemmas to accessing sensitive and relevant services that respond to women's positions of minoritization, focusing particularly on refuge or shelter provision as they offer one of the key points of transition for women using domestic violence services. Lastly, I indicate some positive steps that can be taken by helping agencies to respond more appropriately to minoritized women facing domestic violence. (shrink)

Over the past 50 years the diversity of higher education faculty in the mathematical, physical, computer, and engineering sciences has advanced very little at 4-year universities in the United States. This is despite laws and policies such as affirmative action, interventions by universities, and enormous financial investment by federal agencies to diversify science, technology, mathematics, and engineering career pathways into academia. Data comparing the fraction of underrepresented minority postdoctoral scholars to the fraction of faculty at these institutions offer a straightforward (...) empirical explanation for this state of affairs. URM postdoc appointments lag significantly behind progress in terms of both undergraduate and Ph.D.-level STEM student populations. Indeed, URM postdoc appointments lag well-behind faculty diversity itself in the MPCES fields, most of which draw their faculty heavily from the postdoctoral ranks, particularly at research-intensive universities. Thus, a sea-change in how postdocs are recruited, how their careers are developed, and how they are identified as potential faculty is required in order to diversify the nation’s faculty, and particularly the R1 MPCES professoriate. Our research shows that both Ph.D. students and postdocs benefit from intentional structure at various levels of their respective “apprentice” experiences, a factor that we believe has been neglected. Several key structural approaches are highly effective in these regards: A collaborative approach in which leading research universities collectively identify outstanding URM candidates; Faculty engagement in recruiting and supporting these postdocs; Inter-institutional exchange programs to heighten the visibility and broaden the professional experiences of these postdocs; Community-building activities that create a sense of belonging and encourage continuing in academia for each cohort; and Continuing research based on outcomes and new experimental approaches. The California Alliance, consisting of UC Berkeley, UCLA, Caltech, and Stanford, has been engaged in such a program for almost a decade now, with most of the California Alliance URM postdocs now in tenure track positions or on the path toward careers as faculty at research intensive institutions. If this approach was brought to scale by involving the top 25 or so URM Ph.D.-producing R1 institutions in the MPCES fields, about 40% of the national URM postdoctoral population in these fields could be affected. Although this impact would fall short of bringing URM MPCES faculty ranks up to full representation of the United States population as a whole, it would vastly improve the outlook for URM students and their aspirations to take on leadership roles as scientists and engineers. (shrink)

The role of state in the contemporary global system is greatly shaped by its inner or domestic strength that include economic resilience, socio-political harmony and a stable constitutional political order. These attributes cannot be achieved by a state unless it assigns the highest priority to human and societal development and promotion of egalitarian socio-economic arrangements that provide equal opportunities to all citizens irrespective of ethnicity, language, religion, caste, region or gender. The focus is on transforming human resources into human capital (...) through education, learning of technology and skills, and health care. There is now a greater emphasis on good governance and a fair and transparent political management and delivery of basic services to the society. This covers policy making and implementation regarding a host of key issues. It is also important to ensure that the fruits of economic growth are fairly distributed in the society. The state must work towards removing socio-economic inequities and disparities among people and regions. This paper examines the major factors responsible for the growing emphasis in state policy on human and social development as well as the historical evolution of this change. It is argued that the political developments in the 1990s and later contributed most in creating a global awareness about human and societal developments. These include, inter alia, the end of the Cold War, the collapse of some states, the rise of religious and cultural extremism and terrorism and the efforts of the various organs and agencies of the United Nations to promote human development and social stability. The paper also identifies the major obstacles in the developing countries, especially in Pakistan, to socio-economic development and distributive justice. (shrink)

This paper discusses three inter-related themes in Barbara Herman's Moral Literacy norm-constituted power completes’ practical reason or rational agency.

This essay investigates the rôle of the North Atlantic as a silent actant in the dramatic economy of Shakespeare’s Hamlet. It takes the series of actions of Hamlet’s deportation by sea, his nocturnal transformation on board and his surprise return with the pirate ship as the axis around which the play turns. It examines the movement of deterritorialization and mimesis in the constitution of sovereignty by the ceaseless transference of piracy and inter-imperial rivalries and passages. Interpreting Hamlet as being not (...) just a play of nothingness and nihilism, born of and residing in the interstice of disjointed historical time, this essay argues that Hamlet is a play that inherits and inhabits the cranny of fractured historical space from Elizabethan to Jacobean England when the English isle became what Carl Schmitt called the “agency of the spatial turn to a new nomos of the earth.” The old nomos of the earth, terra firma in the Greco-Roman and feudal senses, was challenged by the new freedom of the sea which demanded a separate and distinct global order. This essay poses the question whether the dramatic economy of Hamlet as split by and revolving around the physical presence and symbolic charges of the North Atlantic in fact constitutes the irrhythm and mis-punctuation of this spatial turn toward a maritime modernity. (shrink)

Let Rhoda Speak Again: Identity, Uncertainty, and Authority in Virginia Woolf's The Waves Performing a rereading of Virginia Woolf's 1931 experimental modernist masterpiece of The Waves, in this article I focus on the elusive and conflicted character of Rhoda, whose significance has been either overlooked or marginalized in the available criticism of the narrative. By pointing out a number of problems in the existing scholarship devoted to Rhoda, I propose to define her as a transgressive figure of uncertainty through which (...) Woolf develops a critique of the unitary self. My point of departure for the following essay is Toril Moi's perspective on Woolf's oeuvre as openly feminist and deconstructive. Consequently, I begin with Moi's emphasis on Woolf's commitment to the problematization of the Western male humanism's underlying concept of the unitary self. Drawing from a number of critical and philosophical perspectives, I turn to Kim L. Worthington's idea of subjectivity as a sustained process of interpersonal narrativization in order to offer a more nuanced account of Rhoda's identity as compound and implicated in the dynamics of inter-subjective processes. I also consider Rhoda's much criticized rejection of identity vis-à-vis Woolf's strategy of impersonality, and, contrasting it with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological concepts of the flesh and anonymous existence, I contend that Rhoda renounces the unitary selfhood, which corroborates Moi's critique of Woolf. Through a close analysis of Rhoda's position versus the other characters, as well as by examining how Rhoda's ego boundaries are delineated in the narrative, I demonstrate that Woolf's conflicted heroine emerges as an astute critic of gendered reality, since she is the one who most acutely feels the dualistic nature of selfhood and it is chiefly through her that Woolf points to the need to overcome this dualism. Shannon Sullivan's feminist revision of the Merleau-Pontian perspective on the anonymity and the body as well as the Deweyan notion of transactionality further helps to elucidate the ways in which Rhoda's experimental and subversive discourse engages in a polemic with the Cartesian conceptualization of identity presupposed on the dualism of mind and body simultaneously inquiring about a possibility of a non-dualistic and non-unitary conception of subjectivity. As a consequence, Rhoda gains authority and agency through uncertainty which prompts her to adopt an uncompromisingly and insistently questioning stance. Finally, I suggest reconsidering Rhoda's suicide as a metaphorical act of ‘distancing,’ as discussed by Zygmunt Bauman, via Adorno, in his 2006 Liquid Fear, another context for approaching Rhoda's uncertainty. (shrink)