Over 80% of the genes in the E. coli chromosome express fewer than a hundred copies each of their protein products per cell. It is argued here that transcription of these genes is neither constitutive nor regulated by protein factors, but rather, induced by the act of replication. The utility of such replication‐induced (RI) transcription to the temporal regulation of synthesis of determinate quantities of low copy number (LCN) proteins is described. It is suggested that RI transcription may be necessitated, (...) as well as facilitated, by the folding of the bacterial chromosome into a compact nucleoid. Mechanistic aspects of the induction of transcription by replication are discussed with respect to the modulation of transcriptional initiation by negative supercoiling effects, promoter methylation status and derepression. It is shown that RI transcription offers plausible explanations for the constancy of the C period of the E. coli cell cycle and the remarkable conservation of gene order in the chromosomes of enteric bacteria. Some experimental tests of the hypothesis are proposed. (shrink)

Transcription and DNA supercoiling are known to be linked by a cause‐effect relationship that operates in both directions. It is proposed here that this two‐way relationship may be exploited by the E. coli genome to facilitate constitutive transcription of supercoil‐sensitive genes by polymerase batteries made up of uniformly spaced RNA polymerase elongation complexes. Specifically, it is argued that (1) polymerases transcribing DNA in tandem cooperate to relax each other's transcription‐driven positive supercoils; and (2) negative supercoils driven upstream by elongation complexes (...) tend to be ‘harnessed’ and used to cooperatively (and periodically) initiate fresh transcription from promoters. Harnessing of transcription‐driven negative supercoils is thought to be achieved through the erection of protein barriers to the rotational upstream propagation of supercoils from transcription events. The possible relevance of such cooperation amongst polymerases to the activation of transcription by DNA‐binding protein factors is emphasized. Some testable predictions are made and implications are discussed. (shrink)

Articles on Vedanta school of philosophy.

We propose that hyper‐inflammation (HYPi) is a ‘‘runaway’’ consequence of acute inflammation (ACUi) that arises more easily (and also abates less easily) in those who host a pre‐existing chronic inflammation (CHRi), because (i) most factors involved in generating an ACUi to limit viral proliferation are already present when there is an underlying CHRi, and also because (ii) anti‐inflammatory (AI) mechanisms for the abatement of ACUi (following containment of viral proliferation) are suppressed and desensitized where there is an underlying CHRi, with (...) this causing the ACUi to spiral into a HYPi. Stress, pollution, diet, and gut microbiomes (alterable in weeks through dietary changes) have an intimate and bidirectional cause‐effect relationship with CHRi. We propose that avoidance of CHRi‐promoting foods and adoption of CHRi‐suppressing foods could reduce susceptibility to HYPi, in Covid‐19 and in other viral diseases, such as influenza, which are characterized by episodic and unpredictable HYPi. (shrink)

RésuméOn examine ?on;abord les termes explicites et implicites du contrat de justice selon Rawls. Ensuite on rappelle ľinterprétation ‘procédurale’ que ce dernier donne de ľautonomie kantienne et ľon montre ľinanité de cette interprétation. Cependant la doctrine de Rawls exprime avec bon‐heur une conception sceptique de la justice.SummaryAfter a short examination of the explicit and implicit contract of justice according to Rawls, the reasons afforded by him to give a Kantian foundation to the contract are recalled and rebutted. However Rawls's doctrine (...) remarkably expresses the main argument of a sceptical conception of justice.ZusammenfassungNach einer kurzen Untersuchung des expliziten und impliziten Begriffs des Gesellschaftsver‐trages, wie Rawls ihn versteht, wird die besondere Interpretation erOrtert, die er vom Kantschen Autonomiebegriff gibt. Es wird gezeigt, dass diese unzutreffend ist und dass Rawls Lehre eher auf eine skeptische Auffassung der Gerechtigkeit zutrifft. (shrink)

It's a common idea in philosophy that we possess a peculiar kind of "phenomenal concept" by which we can think about our conscious states in "inner" and "direct" ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such phenomenal ways of thinking figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy – the phenomenal concept strategy – for defending (...) the physicalist view that conscious states are reducible to brain states. It also considers, more briefly, how phenomenal concepts have been used to defend dualism about consciousness, and how they have been used to explain our special access to our consciousness. It concludes with a discussion about whether, and in what more precise sense of the term, we at all possess "phenomenal concepts" of our conscious states. (shrink)

According to a widely held physicalist view, consciousness is identical with some physical or functional phenomenon just as liquidity is identical with loose molecular connection. To many of us, this claim about consciousness seems more problematic than the claim about liquidity. To many—including many physicalists—the identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon even seems “absurd” or “crazy”. A full defence of physicalism should explain why the allegedly correct hypothesis comes across this way. If physicalism is true and we have reason (...) to accept it, why does it seem “absurd”? One possibility is that this is fully explained by the fact that we have an erroneous understanding of consciousness or its physical basis. This explanation is embraced by few if any physicalists. It is rejected by many, including proponents of the “phenomenal concept strategy”, which lately has become the dominant strategy for defending physicalism. But the “error explanation” is clearly the most plausible explanation that is available to physicalists. So this paper argues. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently argued that consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts (...) can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim. (shrink)

This paper articulates a case for supposing that all shades of colour are visually complex.

Although the notion of natural behavior occurs in many policy-making and legal documents on animal welfare, no consensus has been reached concerning its definition. This paper argues that one reason why the notion resists unanimously accepted definition is that natural behavior is not properly a biological concept, although it aspires to be one, but rather a philosophical tendency to perceive animal behavior in accordance with certain dichotomies between nature and culture, animal and human, original orders and invented artifacts. The paper (...) scrutinizes the philosophy of natural behavior as it developed in the organic movement in response to a perceived contrast between industrialized and traditional agriculture. There are two reasons for focusing on the organic movement: (i) the emphasis on “the natural” is most accentuated there and has a long history, (ii) everyday life on organic farms presupposes human/animal interplay, which conflicts with the philosophical tendency to separate nature from culture. This mismatch between theory and practice helps us see why, and how, the philosophy of natural behavior needs to be reconsidered. The paper proposes that we understand farms as local human/animal cultures, and asks what we can mean my natural behavior in such contexts. Since domestic animals adapt to agricultural environments via interaction with caretakers, such interplay is analyzed as “hub” in these animals’ natural behavior. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes two types of qualia theory, which I call Galilean and non-Galilean qualia theories. It also offers considerations against each type of theory. To my mind the considerations are powerful. In any case, they bring out the importance of distinguishing the two types of theory. For they show that different considerations come into play—or considerations come into play in quite different ways—in assessing the two types of theory.

This paper articulates a case for supposing that all shades of colour are visually complex.

RésuméLa sélection du matériel biologique, sa préparation en vue de ľapplication de diverses techniques?on;investigation de plus en plus sophistiquées ainsi qu'un univers experimental bien déterminé vont contraindre le chercheur à travailler sur un modèle parfois éloigné de son contexte biologique propre. Aussi la signification des résultats obtenus doit être de plus en plus discutée en fonction des limites imposées, non seulement par les techniques, mais également par le modèle même de recherche choisi.SummaryThe selection of the biological material, its preparation for (...) the application of several techniques more and more complex and selected experimental conditions strain the biologist to use biological samples sometimes removed of their environment. The discussion of the results obtained must be done carefully and not only in function of the technical limitations but also in function of the limits due to the experimental material itself.ZusammenfassungDie Auswahl des biologischen Materials, seine Vorbereitung im Hinblick auf die Anwendung auf immer kompliziertere Untersuchungstechniken sowie ein wohlbestimmter Experimentier‐bereich werden den Forscher zwingen, mit einem Modell zu arbeiten, das gelegentlich weit von seinem eigentlichen biologischen Kontext entfernt ist. Deshalb muss die Bedeutung der erhaltenen Ergebnisse immer mehr mit Riicksicht auf die Grenzen diskutiert werden, die nicht allein durch die Techniken, sondern auch durch das Forschungsmodell selbst gesetzt werden. (shrink)

RésuméLa théorie des expressions incomplétes dans Principia Mathematica, se fonde sur le principe déja appliqué par Russell dans “On Denoting”, selon lequel il est souhaitable dans certains cas, ?on;établir le statut syntaxique des expressions catégorématiques. Grâce à la théorie intensionnelle ramifyée des types, les expressions incomplétes réféientiellement pourront être logiquement caractérisées par un mode de dérivation principalement basé sur la quantification non‐objectuelle. Ľintroduction des classes cependant, n'est en aucune façon reliée à ce mode intensionnel de dérivation; il en résulte qu'elles (...) fonctionnent en réalité dans ce contexte comme des expressions pourvues de dénotation et ce n'est que par une analogie grammaticale que Russell peut les comparer, du point de vue de leur élimination, aux expressions incomplétes de Principia Mathematica.SummaryThe theory of incomplete symbols in Principia Mathematica is founded on the principle already applied by Russell in “On Denoting“ that it is desirable in certain cases, to establish the syntactical status of “categorematic” expressions. Thanks to the intensional ramified theory of types, the referentially incomplete expressions could be logically caracterised by a mode of derivation primarily based on non‐objectual quantification. The introduction of classes, however, is by no way linked to that intensional mode of derivation; as a result, they function, in that context, like denotative expressions and it is only by a “grammatical” analogy that Russell can compare them, as regards their elimination, to the incomplete symbols in Principia Mathematica.ZusammenfassungDie Theorie der unvollstandigen Symbole in den Principia Mathematica gründet auf dem von Russell schon in “On Denoting” angewendeten Prinzip, wonach es in gewissen Fällen wün‐schenswert ist, den syntaktischen Status kategorematischer Ausdrücke festzulegen. Aufgrund der intensionalen verzweigten Typentheorie könnte man die referentiell unvollständigen Ausdrücke logisch durch eine im wesentlichen auf die nicht objektuelle Quantifi‐kation abstellende Ableitungsart charakterisieren. Die Einführung der Klassen dagegen hüngt keineswegs von dieser intensionalen Ableitungsart ab; daraus geht hervor, dass sie in diesem Kontext wie denotative Ausdrücke funktionieren, und es gelingt Russell nur vermittels einer grammatische Analogie, sie hinsichtlich ihrer Elimination mit den unvollständigen Symbolen der Principia Mathematica zu vergleichen. (shrink)

RésuméCet exposé repose essentiellement sur des idées originates déjà développées par ľauteur. En fait, les concepts en cause, à savoir ľévolution prébiotique et biotique, ainsi que la sénescence et le cancer, sont rassemblés dans une théorie profoundément unitaire résultant, soit de ľaccroissement, soit de la diminution, du poids moléculaire du DNA.Ceci s'apparente singulièrement à la révolution de la physique dans ce premier quart de siècle qui a conduit àľélaboration de la théorie de la relativité et de la mécanique ondulatoire.SummaryThis paper (...) is based essentially on original ideas already developed by the author. In fact the concepts considered, that is to say prebiotic and biotic evolution as well as ageing and cancer, are brought together into a highly unified theory resulting from the increase or the lowering of the molecular weight of DNA.This is closely in agreement with the revolution in physics which took place in the first quarter of this century and which led both to the theory of relativity and of wave mechanics.ZusammenfassungDie Arbeit beruht im wesentlichen auf vom Verfasser schon früher entwickelten Originalge‐danken. Die involvierten Begriffe, die vorbiotische und die biotische Evolution sowie das Altern und die Wucherung, finden sich in der Tat in einer einheitlichen Theorie vereinigt, die aus der Zunahme oder Abnahme des Molekulargewichts des DNA resultiert.Dies stimmt auffällig mit der Revolution in der Physik überein, die im ersten Viertel unseres Jahrhunderts zur Ausarbeitung der Relativitätstheorie und der Wellenmechanik geführt hat. (shrink)

RésuméĽétude du développement?on;un organisme fait appel à diverses approches choisies en fonction des objectifs fixés par ľexpérimentateur. Ainsi, la mise en évidence?on;une corrélation entre deux paramétres, par exemple biochimique et morphologique, permet de les considérer comme associés, sans nécessairement dégager entre eux un lien direct de causalité. Ce dernier peut être explicité par une autre approche, comme ľillustre une étude portant sur la relation entre une enzyme ‐glycohydrolase) et la différentiation sporale chez Neurospora crassa.SummaryThe study of the development of an (...) organism requires diverse approaches selected on the basis of experimental objectives. For instance, the finding of a correlation between two parameters, i.e. biochemical and morphological, allows them to be considered as associated without necessarily pointing to a direct causal relationship. This latter may be brought out by another approach, as illustrated by this study bearing on the relation between an enzyme ‐gly‐cohydrolase) and differentiation of spores in Neurospora crassa.ZusammenfassungDas Studium der Entwicklung eines Organismus erfordert verschiedenartige Annäherungen, je nach den vom Experimendierenden gestellten Ziele. Daher erlaubt der Nachweis einer Korrela‐tion zwischen zwei Parametern, zum Beispiel einem biochemischen und einem morphologischen, sie als verbunden zu betrachten ohne notwendigerweise eine Kausalbeziehung zwischen Ihnen zu beweisen. Eine solche kann von einer anderen Seite geklärt werden, wie es eine Studie der Beziehung zwischen einem Enzym ‐glycohydrolase) und der Sporendifferenzierung bei Neurospora crassa zeigt. (shrink)

RésuméDe l'delimination des causes finales par la mathématisation de la physique à l'hypothèse de Kant‐Laplace sur la formation du système solaire, puis au développement des sciences de la vie qui déterminent un nouveau champ de rationalité, le théme de la création au 18ème siècle est parti‐culièrement apte a manifester l'évolution des rapports entre sciences, philosophie et métaphysique, jusqu'à son progressif effacement dans des philosophies aussi differentes que celles de Diderot, Hume et Kant.

RésuméLa démarche biologique est épaulée par des sciences supports comme la physique ct la chimie. Elles ont largement contribué a la rendre plus systématiquement quantitative. Récemment, des sciences annexes, derectement dérivées de ces sciences auxiliaires – comme la biophysique et la biochimie – ont largement contribuéàľacquisition de faits nouveaux et à la mise en place ?on;explications originales. Dans la connaissance de la matière vivante , la complémentarité de ces disciplines ?on;étude est évidente mais, de par les caractéristiques mêmes des méthodes (...) impliquées, des discordances dans les données expérimentales et dans les interprétations demeurent inévitables. Plus que jamais, les resultats obtenus doivent done être soumis à une discussion critique portant sur les limites qu'imposent tout à la fois àľexpérimentation, les techniques ?on;analyse et la nature même de ľobjet étudié. Et il n'est pas toujours possible de juger dans quelle mesure ces frontières méthodologiques ne sont pas, en fait, dépassées …la représentation trouvée du sujet étant peu conformc à sa réalité propre. En tentant de dominer toujours mieux sa technologie – respectant le plus possible ľaspect in vivo de ľanalyse – en nuançant davantage les théories suggérées, la biologie ?on;aujourd'hui est placee devant de nouvelles options technologiques decisives.SummaryBiological method is backed up by the support sciences such as physics and chemistry… These have largely contributed to render biology more systematically quantitative. More recently, related sciences derived directly from these support sciences, such as biophysics and biochemistry, have provided a stimulus to the acquisition of new facts and the working out of original explanations. In the domain of knowledge about living material the complementarity of these study disciplines is obvious, but in view of the nature of the methods involved, inconsistencies in the experimental data and their interpretation remain inevitable. Henceforth, results and hypotheses have to be considered in the view of the limitations both due to the techniques employed and the nature itself of the specific object of experimentation. And it is not always easy to be sure that these “methodological frontiers” have been respected… the representations suggested for the tested object being quite different from the reality. By overcoming these obstacles and in drawing out the theories suggest by experiments having more and more an “in vivo aspect”, biology is today at the forefront of new, decisive technological alternatives.ZusammenfassungDie Verfahren der Biologie werden durch Hilfswissenschaften wie die Physik und die Chemie gestützt, die weitgehend dazu beigetragen haben, diese systematischer quantifizierbar zu machen. In neuester Zeit haben zusätzliche, unmittelbar von diesen Hilfswissenschaften abgeleitete Wis‐senschaften wie die Biophysik und die Biochemie zur Erwerbung neuer Tatsachen und zur Schaffung von originellen Erklärungen beigetragen. Fur die Erkenntnis der lebendigen Materie ist die Komplementaritaut dieser Disziplinen offensichtlich, aber wegen der charakteristischen Zuuge der involvierten Methoden bleiben unvermeidbare Diskrepanzen zwi‐schen den experimentellen Daten und den Interpretationen zurück. Mehr denn je müssen deshalb die erhaltenen Ergebnisse einer kritischen Diskussion unterzogen werden, die die Grenzen betrifft, welche das Experimentieren, die Techniken der Analyse und die Natur der Gegenstände selbst uns setzen. Es ist nicht immer möglich zu beurteilen, in welchem Masse diese methodolo‐gischen Grenzen in der Tat nicht schon überschritten worden sind…, indem die vom Subjekt gefundene Darstellung nicht mit der Wirklichkeit als solcher übereinstimmt. Dadurch dass er versucht, seine Technologie immer besser zu beherrschen, den in vivo Aspekt seiner Analyse soweit wie möglich zu berücksichtigen und die naheliegenden Theorien immer mehr zu nuancieren, wird der zeitgenössische Biologe vor entscheidende technologische Optionen gestellt. (shrink)

RésuméEn introduisant les concepts disjoints de temps et d'espace absolus, Newton dote la physique d'un double cadre encore reçu au début du XXe siècle. Par l'énoncé du principe de Relativité restreinte, Einstein joint les dew cadres en un seul, l'espace‐temps, lui‐même disjoint de son contenu, l'univers physique. Par le biais du principe d'équivalence, la Relativité générale réalise la fusion du cadre de l'espace‐temps et de son contenu, l'univers physique. Cette vision «classique» est cependant perturbée par les conséquences des principes de (...) la Physique quantique, qui jettent comme une sorte de voile sur la structure spatio‐temporelle de l'espace‐temps relativiste, fondement de la Cosmologie contemporaine: le concept même d'espace‐temps, plus précisément sa séparabilité sont remis en question.Il en résulte une situation de précarité qui affecte jusqu'aux modkles d'univers fournis par la Cosmologie contemporaine, celui du Grand Boum compris. (shrink)

RésuméPrésentation de la correspondance inédite entre Bertrand Russell et Louis Couturat, proba‐blement la plus remarquable qui nous reste de Russell tant par son ampleur que par son contenu. Ľauteur en expose ici les thèmes les plus importants, concernant en particulier les fondements de la géométrie et la logique mathématique, et les met en relation avec les positions philosophiques respectives de Russell et de Couturat.SummaryIntroduction to the unpublished correspondance between Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat – probably the most remarkable that remains (...) from Russell, as tar as its richness and its content is concerned. The author exposes the most important themes concerning mainly the foundations of geometry and of mathematical logic which she relates with the respective philosophical positions of Russell and Couturat.ZusammenfassungEs wird der noch unveröffentlichte Briefwechsel zwischen Bertrand Russell und Louis Couturat vorgestellt. Was Russell betrifft, so dürfte es sich sowohl in bezug auf den Umfang als auch in bezug auf den Gehalt um das Bemerlcenswerteste handeln, was er uns zurückgelassen hat. Die Autorin stellt die wichtigsten Themen dar, die im besonderen die Grundlagen der Geometrie sowie der mathematischen Logik berühren, und sie setzt diese in Beziehung zu der von Russell und Couturat eingenommenen philosophischen Positionen. (shrink)

RésuméNous analysons un épisode important dans ľévolution de la théorie des probabilityés: la phase?on;axioraatisation. La premiere approche de ce type fut proposeée par Mises en 1919. Elle šappuie sur le concept de collectif. La probabilityé y est définie comme la valeur‐limite de la fréquence relative. La seconde approche, élaborée en 1933 par Kolmogorov, šinscrit dans la lignée des travaux de Borel?on;inspiration purement analytique. Cette dernière axiomatique fut unanimement choisie tant par les théoriciens que par les empiristes. Après avoir présente les (...) divers arguments invoqués lors de la confrontation des deux théories, nous en proposons une interprétation épistémologique.SummaryWe analyse an important episode of the evolution of the theory of probability: the axiomatic phase. The first approach was proposed by Mises in 1919. It is based on the concept of “collective”. The probability is defined as the limit‐value of the relative frequency. The second one, elaborated by Kolmogorov in 1933, follows the work of Borel which is inspired by purely analytical considerations. This last axiomatisation was unanimously chosen by the theoreticians and empiricists. After having presented the different arguments raised when both theories were confronted, we suggest an epistemological interpretation.ZusammenfassungWir untersuchen eine wichtige Episode in der Entwicklung der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung: die Phase ihrer Axiomatisierung. Der erste Versuch einer solchen wurde 1919 von Mises vorgelegt. Er stützt sich auf den Begriff eines Kollektivs ab. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit wird dabei als Grenzwert der relativen Häufigkeit definiert. Der zweite 1933 von Kolomogorov ausgearbeitete Versuch liegt in der rein analytischen Richtung, die von den Arbeiten Borels inspiriert wurde. Dieses Axiomatisierungsverfahren wurde einhellig sowohl von den Theoretikern als auch von den Empiristen vorgezogen. Nachdem wir die verschiedenen Argumente angeführt haben, die während der Konfrontation der beiden Theorien ins Feld geführt wurden, geben wir eine erkenntnis‐theoretische Deutung von diesen. (shrink)

ResumeLa question du filtrage de ľinformation génétique dans la cellule est fondamentale. Comment la cellule sélectionne‐t‐elle, avant de les transformer en RNA puis en protéines, certaines parties bien déterminées de son information génétique? Il ne sera probablement pas possible de donner une explication cohérente du développement embryonnaire, de la différentiation cellulaire et du maintien de ľétat différencie tant que nous n'aurons pas repondu de manière satis‐faisante à cette question.Dans un premier chapitre, quelques notions de base concernant ľexpression génétique sont préséntées. (...) Le dogme de flux de ľinformation génétique dans la cellule, DNARNA protéine est valable à la fois pour les procaryotes et les eucaryotes malgré des différences significatives au niveau de la structure et de la régulation des gènes. Contrairement aux génes procaryotes, la plu‐part des gènes eucaryotes sont morcelés. Le DNA codant pour une protéine est interrompu par des régions non‐codantes dont les transcrits sont éliminés par excision pendant la maturation du RNA messager ultérieurement traduit en protéine. Une grande variété de mécanismes interviennent dans la régulation de ľactivité de ces gènes.Le pouvoir et les limites des méthodes modernes de ľanalyse structurale et fonctionnelle des génes sont discutés dans la deuxième partie de ľarticle. Ľhybridation moléculaire reposant sur la complémentarité des bases azotées des acides nucléiques joue un rôle déterminant dans ľétude de la complexity des génomes et de leur expression. Récemment, ľapplication de la technologie du DNA recombinant et des techniques annexes a permis ľisolement ainsi que la caractérisation de plusieurs génes eucaryotes. La question de ľexpression différentielle de ces génes est actuellement intensément étudiée dans plusieurs systèmes de transcription ayant chacun ses points forts et ses faiblesses.En guise de conclusion, quelques implications de ľessor prodigieux que connaît la génétique moléculaire sont discutées.SummaryThe question of selective expression of genetic information in the cell is fundamental. How does a cell choose particular parts of its genetic information prior to transforming them into RNA and then into proteins? It will probably not be possible to give a coherent explanation of embryonic development, of cell differentiation, and of the maintenance of the differentiated state as until we have answered this question satisfactorily.In the first chapter, several basic notions concerning genetic expression are presented. The central dogma of the flow of genetic information in the cell, DNARNA‐ protein is valid both for prokaryotes and eukaryotes despite significant differences at the level of gene structure and regulation. In contrast to prokaryotic genes, most eukaryotic genes are split. The DNA coding for a protein is interrupted by non‐coding regions whose transcripts are eliminated by excision during the maturation of the messenger RNA which will subsequently be translated into protein. A wide variety of mecanisms are implicated in the regulation of these genes.The scope and limits of modern methods for the structural and functional analyses of genes are discussed in the second part of the article. Molecular hybridization, which is based on the complementarity between the bases of the nucleic acids, plays a key role in the study of the complexity and expression of genes. Recently, the application of recombinant DNA technology and associated techniques has allowed the isolation as well as the characterization of several eukaryotic genes. The question of the differential expression of these genes is currently studied intensively in many transcription systems which all have their strengths and weaknesses.As a conclusion, several implications of the prodigious progress of molecular genetics are discussed.ZusammenfassungDie Frage nach der selektiven Expression der genetischen Information in der Zelle ist fundamental. Wie wählt eine Zelle bestimmte Teile ihrer genetischen Information, um diese dann in RNA und Proteine zu übersetzen? Wahrscheinlich wird es nicht möglich sein, eine vollständige Erklärung für die Embryonalentwicklung, für die Zeildifferenzierung und für di Aufrechterhaltung des differenzierten Zustandes zu geben, bevor wir eine befriedigende Antwort auf diese Frage gefunden haben.Im ersten Kapitel sind mehrere grundlegende Erkenntnisse über die Genexpression dargestellt. Das zentrale Dogma über den Fluss der genetischen Information in der Zelle, DNA RNA Protein, gilt sowohl für Prokaryonten als auch für Eukaryonten trotz bedeutender Unterschiede auf der Ebene der Genstruktur und Genregulation. Im Gegensatz zu den Genen von Prokaryonten sind die meisten Gene der Eukaryonten unterteilt. Die DNA, welche für ein Protein kodiert, ist durch nicht‐kodierende Regionen unterbrochen, welche wahrend des Reifungsprozesses der messenger RNA herausgeschnitten werden. Diese messenger RNA wird schliesslich in ein Protein iibersetzt. Sehr verschiedenartige Mechanismen sind an der Regulation dieser Gene beteiligt.Im zweiten Teil des Artikels werden Ziele und Grenzen moderner Methoden zur Analyse von Struktur und Funktion von Genen diskutiert. Molekulare Hybridisation, welche auf der Komplementarität zwischen den Basen der Nukleinsäuren beruht, spielt eine Schlüsselrolle in der Analyse der Komplexität und Expression der Gene. Die Anwendung der rekombinanten DNA Technologie sowie damit zusammenhängender Methoden hat kürzlich die Isolierung und Charak‐terisierung verschiedener eukaryontischer Gene erlaubt. Die Frage nach der differenziellen Expression dieser Gene wird gegenwärtig mit Hilfe verschiedener Transkriptionssysteme, welche alle ihre Stärken und Schwächen haben, intensiv studiert.Zusammenfassend werden verschiedene Implikationen des gewaltigen Fortschrittes der molekularen Genetik diskutiert. (shrink)

RésuméContrairement à ce que pourrait donner à penser la these de E. Mayr sur ľimportance actuelle des explications évolutives en biologie, par opposition aux explications fonctionnelles, ľauteur soutient que, pour ľépistémologie de la causalité, le second type ?on;explication reste plus significatif que le premier. II tente de le montrer en reprenant brièvement son analyse des travaux de P.E. Pilet sur les inhibiteurs de croissance , telle qu'elle a ete présentée dans quatre articles antérieurs.SummaryStarting from E. Mayr's distinction between functional and (...) evolutionary explanation, the author suggests that, as far as the epistemological analysis of causality is concerned, the former type of explanation remains of more interest than the latter. He illustrates this claim by briefly taking up his philosophical and logico‐linguistic study of P.E. Pilet's work on growth inhibitors in the field of plant growth regulation, which was presented in a series of four previous papers.ZusammenfassungVon E. Mayrs Unterscheidung zwischen funktionaler und evolutiver Erklärung ausgehend, weist der Autor nach, dass die erste Art der Erklärung in bezug auf die erkenntnistheoretische Analyse der Kansalität mehr Bedeutung hat. Er versucht aufgrund seiner früheren Analysen von P.E. Pilets Schriften über Wachstumsinhibitoren auf dem Gebiet der Wachstumsregulation von Pflanzen diese Auffassung zu erhärten. (shrink)

A visual experience, as understood here, is a sensory event that is conscious, or like something to undergo. This chapter focuses on three issues concerning such experiences. The first issue is the so-called ‘transparency’ of experiences. The chapter distinguishes a number of different interpretations of the suggestion that visual experiences are ‘transparent’. It then discusses in what sense, if any, visual experiences are ‘transparent’, and what further conclusions one can draw from that. The second issue is which properties we are (...) presented with in visual experiences. It is widely accepted that we sometimes experience red for example. But exactly which properties do we sometimes visually experience, and which properties do we never visually experience? The third issue is which particulars, if any, we are presented with in visual experiences. Do we for example sometimes visually experience mind-independent particulars like trees? Do we sometimes visually experience mind-dependent, particular ‘sense-data’? (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to understand and assess Thomas Nagel's influential case against physicalism in the philosophy of mind. I show that Nagel has claimed that experience is "subjective", or "essentially connected with a single point of view" in at least three different senses: first, in the sense that it is essential to every experience that there be something it is like to have it; second, in the sense that what an experience is like for its possessor cannot be (...) understood by a radically different type of organism; and third, in the sense that an experience cannot be "apprehended" or "observed" from a third-person perspective. I also show that these three claims have entered into two different arguments for his view that experience cannot be accounted for in physicalist terms. By way of assessment, I suggest that physicalists have decent resources for responding to the second and third of Nagel's claims about the subjectivity of experience, but that they currently have less convincing things to say about the first claim. (shrink)

Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is the view that there is some concept Q that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.

Colours and consciousness both present us with metaphysical problems. But what exactly are the problems? According to standard accounts, they are roughly the following. On the one hand, we have reason to believe, about both colour and consciousness, that they are identical with some familiar natural phenomena. But on the other hand, it is hard to see how these identities could obtain. I argue that this is an adequate characterisation of our metaphysical problem of colour, but a mischaracterisation of the (...) problem of consciousness. It mischaracterises the problem by presenting consciousness as more 'colour-like' than we have reason to take it to be. The real problem of consciousness is, I suggest, that almost nothing theoretically useful is known about this phenomenon at present. I also explore some implications of this perspective on the problem of consciousness. Given the shape of the problem, I argue that we can't rule out all forms of eliminativism about consciousness. Nor can we rule out that future research will close the ' explanatory gap' that consciousness gives rise to. (shrink)

This paper investigates forms of metaphysical vertigo that can appear when contrasts between humans and animals are challenged. Distinguishing three forms of vertigo and four ways of differentiating humans and animals, the paper attempts to achieve a perspicuous representation of what could be termed “the difficulty of being humans when we are animals”; or alternatively, “the difficulty of being animals when we are humans”.

Language Use offers a philosophical examination of the basic conceptual framework of pragmatic theory, and contrasts this framework with detailed descriptions of our everyday practices of language use. While the results should be highly relevant to pragmatics, the investigation is not a contribution to pragmatic theory. Drawing on Ludwig Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical problems, Language Use brings out the relevance of Wittgenstein's methods to fundamental problems in central pragmatic fields of research such as deixis, implicatures, speech acts and presuppositions.

ResumeUn énoncé p est nécessaire, selon Chrysippe, si et seulement si p est vrai et si, étant susceptible ?on;être faux, les circonstances extérieures s'opposent à ce qu'il soit faux. On s'appuie sur cet éclaircissement pour construire le carré ou plutôt les deux carres des modalités. Ce qu'il y a de spécifique dans la logique de Chrysippe, c'est que du nécessaire àľimpossible que non la conséquence est valide, mais qu'il n'en va pas de même pour la conséquence converse.SummaryA sentence p is (...) necessary, according to Chrysippe iff p is true and, p being susceptible of being false, the external circumstances prevent it from being false. This explanation is used in order to construct the modal square or rather the two modal squares. Something is specific in the Chrysippean logic: from the necessity of p we may validly conclude that it is impossible that not p, while the converse conclusion is not valid.ZusammenfassungNach Chrysipp ist ein Satz p dann und nur dann notwendig, wenn p wahr ist und falls p falsch sein könnte, die äusseren Umstände verhindern, dass p falsch ist. Auf diese Bestimmung aufbauend wird das Quadrat – oder werden vielmehr die beiden Quadrate – der Modalitäten konstruiert. Das Besondere an Chrysipps Logik lässt sich daran erkennen, dass von der Notwen‐digkeit von p auf die Unmöglichkeit von nicht‐p geschlossen werden darf, nicht aber umgekehrt. (shrink)

A strong form of representationalism says that every conscious property of every mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. A weaker representationalism says that some conscious property of some mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. David Papineau has recently argued that all such theories are incorrect since they construe consciousness as consisting in “relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time”, whereas consciousness is “concrete” (...) and “here and now”. Papineau defends instead a kind of “qualia theory” according to which all conscious properties are intrinsic non-relational properties of subjects. He argues that this theory bypasses the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. Similar worries about representationalism, and similar ideas to the effect that some qualia theory, adverbial theory, or sense-datum theory fares better with respect to these worries are relatively wide-spread. I argue that Papineau’s theory does not bypass the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. In fact, Papineau’s theory arguably has no advantage at all over representationalism with regard to these issues. The features that concern Papineau about representationalist views do not derive—or do not derive solely—from the representationalism of these views. They derive from a common-factorism of these views. And this common-factorism is embraced by Papineau as well as by most theories of consciousness and perception. (shrink)

In recent years, many philosophers and scientists have argued or accepted that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts like “blue” and “red”. This paper defends a more qualified picture. I try to show that some received characterisations of “learning” are nonequivalent and point towards different learning-nonlearning distinctions. And, on some ways of specifying such a distinction, it might be correct that we do not and cannot “learn” a concept of blue. But on other ways of specifying such a (...) distinction, we can and do sometimes “learn” a concept of blue from experiences of blue. The latter part of the argument connects with some traditional “abstractionist” views, and I defend the present claims in view of some widely circulated concerns about “abstracting” concepts from experience. I close with some reflections on how one might, in view of all this, think about “the learning-nonlearning distinction”. (shrink)

What could you learn if you saw a colour after being confined from birth to a black-and-white room? It turns out that this is surprisingly hard to say. I suggest that reflection on this question teaches us that colour perception has a richer content than we might have thought.