Kant claims that the understanding prescribes the existence and necessity of empirical laws to nature, while it does not prescribe which particular empirical laws hold. That is to say, the understanding prescribes the general form of nature and the form of the empirical laws without prescribing the material content. But how is this possible? How can the understanding guarantee that there are necessary empirical laws without prescribing particular empirical laws to nature? In this paper, I want to answer this (...) question by analyzing Kant’s argument for the Second Analogy of Experience in combination with an analysis of his conception of actuality. As I want to show, an application of Kant’s conception of actuality to the argument for the Second Analogy not only fills a gap in this argument, but also leads to an explanation of how the understanding can prescribe lawfulness to nature without prescribing particular laws. (shrink)

"Rather than bookish, it is much enjoyable to create and evaluate something from own centralizing the facts and thoughts of the contents only pervaded in the book.

That form shall correspond to the content of a work is a law of realist art. Marxist-Leninist esthetics, on the basis of discovery of this law, does not prescribe an invented norm for the artist, but generalizes from the experience of art itself. Methodologically, it takes as its point of departure the dialectics of content and form. In so doing, Marxist-Leninist esthetics does not dissolve in philosophical concepts the distinctive features of content in art and the nature (...) of form. It examines the unity of content and form, and their development, in the context in which they manifest themselves specifically in art. In other words, it investigates the esthetic features of the relationship between content and form in art. (shrink)

One of the distinctive features of the obligation to obey the law is its content-independence. We ought to do what the law commands because the law commands it, and not because of the law's content—i.e., the independent merits of the actions it prescribes. Despite its popularity, the notion of content-independence is marked by ambiguity. In this paper, I first clarify what content-independence is. I then develop a simple test—the “content-independence test”—which allows us to establish whether (...) any candidate justification of the obligation to obey the law delivers genuine content-independence. I apply this test to prominent such justifications and conclude that several of them, surprisingly, fail it. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper traces a Kantian and pragmatist line of thinking that connects the ideas of conceptual content, object cognition, and modal constraints in the form of counterfactual sustaining causal laws. It is an idea that extends from Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason through C. I. Lewis’s Mind and the World-Order to the Kantian naturalism of Wilfrid Sellars and the analytic pragmatism of Robert Brandom. Kant put forward what I characterize as a modal conception of objectivity, which he developed (...) as an extended argument stretching from the transcendental deduction through the analogies of experience to the regulative maxims of reason and reflective judgment. In related ways in Lewis and Sellars, the very idea of an object of knowledge (and of intentionality more generally) is connected with a certain lawfulness or modal constraint the necessary representation of which, they argue, is an achievement of conceptualization. While Sellars agreed with the spirit of Lewis’s famous pragmatic conception of the a priori, Sellars’s conception of meaning and conceptual content differed in crucial ways with important consequences for this issue. I argue furthermore that a certain phenomenalist temptation threatens to spoil this insight both among some of Kant’s interpreters and in Lewis’s thought. Finally, I point out that Brandom’s “Kant-Sellars thesis” provides new support for this line of thought. Although questions concerning idealism continue to raise controversies for neo-Kantians and pragmatists, the line of thought itself represents a distinctive and still promising approach to questions concerning intentionality and conceptual content. (shrink)

Lithuania was one of the first states in Europe to approve a comprehensive list of patients’ duties under a special Law on the Rights of Patients of 2010. The approval of the catalogue of patients’ duties at the level of a law is based on the restatement of the principle of equal rights of the parties participating in health care relations, and the prevention of consumerism in these relations. The paper distinguishes between general and special patients’ duties. The general duties (...) include the duty to exercise the patient’s rights in good faith, the ban to abuse them, the duties of cooperation and looking after one’s health, as well as the duty of treatment with due respect. The norms that entrench duties of ethical nature should serve to prevent any inappropriate behaviour of patients in health care institutions. Nevertheless, legal application of these provisions and proving the infringements in practice is likely to be complicated. The special duties include: the duty to familiarise oneself against signature with the internal regulations of the health care institution as presented to him or her, other documents prescribed by the health care institution; the duty to present the documents confirming identity; the duty upon receiving information about the health care services prescribed for him or her to confirm in writing his or her consent or refusal with regard to the provision of such health care services in the cases specified by the law; the duty to provide health care professionals with any information about one’s health, to follow the prescriptions and recommendations of health care professionals, to inform health care professionals about any deviations from the prescriptions or the prescribed treatment regime which he or she has accepted. The legal analysis of the contents of the duties has revealed certain unsubstantial obscurities. The analysis of the provision that enables to take sanctions against the patient infringing their duties has revealed that the health care institution may only terminate provision of health care services to the patient if one of the two alternative conditions is fulfilled. I.e. if a person violates his or her duties and thereby causes danger to their own and other patients’ health and life, or prevents them from receiving high quality health care services. The conclusions show that application of this provision may be problematic: first, due to the juridical technique of the wording of the norm; second – due to complicated substantiating that the patient prevented or prevents other patients from receiving high quality health care services; third – due to the conflict of this provision with the provision of the Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Medical Practice, which provides that a doctor may refuse provision of health care services in cases of real threat to his or her own life; and fourth – the norm does not provide for the right to terminate the provision of services in cases of threat to health and/or life of health care workers (non-specialists). (shrink)

This book addresses major debates about quality in education, the role of the state and the nature of accountability in the public services, in philosophical and political arenas. It engages with major philosophical discussions, drawing out the relevant policy issues.

The content of Christian spirituality that made waves since the inception of the early church soon took on different contours as the faith got adapted to different gentile contexts. The expression of this faith, along with its liturgical symbolism and sacramental observances, is still gaining momentum in African Christianity. The emerging practice of the use of ‘anointing oil’ in its religious expression is receiving more attention than the Christ of the Gospel. In this article, we argue that against its (...) primitive intent, the use of the ‘anointing oil’ by the African Church is a mere display of fetish ancestral religion that expresses its unique African traditional religious root rather than a true expression of Christian spirituality. Our thesis is framed on the basis that the manner in which some African churches apply the purported ‘anointing oil’ is discriminatory vis-à-vis its ancient understanding and purpose. In our attempt to address this damaging practice to true Christian spirituality, also standing as a huge challenge for pastoral theology, we undertook a careful historical–theological analysis of the extant biblical data and its contextual interpretation vis-à-vis its distortion today. We concluded that what pastoral theologians have to deal with within the Christian community in Africa is offering the right biblical perspective against the distorted mode of the application of the contemporary purported ‘anointing oil’ that is falsely projecting the Christian faith and belief in a bad light. Contribution: The application of the anointing oil in contemporary Christian religion in Africa is, to say the least, not an inherent textually prescribed requisite criterion for Christian spirituality, but merely an outburst of fetish ancestral religious worldview that stands contra the hermeneutics of the biblical text and its ancient tradition. That no Old Testament prophet, not even Jesus nor Paul, mentioned the subject, makes its contemporary application textually and theologically suspect, and therefore, heretically infectious for the spiritual health of the community of faith. These insights sit quite well with the textual hermeneutics within the mainline transdisciplinary religious and multidisplinary theological perspective of this journal. (shrink)

Many people claim that semantic content is normative, and that therefore naturalistic theories of content face a potentially insuperable difficulty. The normativity of content allegedly undermines naturalism by introducing a gap between semantic 'ought's and the explanatory resources of naturalism. I argue here that this problem is not ultimately pressing for naturalists. The normativity thesis, I maintain, is ambiguous; it could mean either that the content of a term prescribes a pattern of use, or that it (...) merely determines which pattern of use can be described as 'correct'. For the antinaturalist argument to go forward, content must be prescriptive. I argue, however, that it is not. Moreover, the thesis that content supplies standards for correct use is insufficient to supply a similar, a priori objection to naturalism. (shrink)

_Covert treatment raises a number of ethical and practical issues in psychiatry. Viewpoints differ from the standpoint of psychiatrists, caregivers, ethicists, lawyers, neighbours, human rights activists and patients. There is little systematic research data on its use but it is quite certain that there is relatively widespread use. The veil of secrecy around the procedure is due to fear of professional censure. Whenever there is a veil of secrecy around anything, which is aided and abetted by vociferous opposition from some (...) sections of society, the result is one of two: 1) either the activity goes underground or 2) it is reluctantly discarded, although most of those who used it earlier knew it was needed. Covert treatment has the dubious distinction of suffering both such secrecy and disapproval. Covert treatment has a number of advantages and disadvantages in psychotic disorders. The advantages are that it helps solve practical clinical problems; prevents delays in starting treatment, which is associated with clinical risks and substantial costs; prevents risk of self-destructive behaviour and/or physical assault by patient; prevents relapse; and prevents demoralization of staff. The disadvantages are that it maybe used with malafide intent by caregivers with or without the complicity of psychiatrists; it may be used to force conformity in dissenters; and the clinician may land himself in legal tangles even with its legitimate use. In addition, it may prevent insight, encourage denial, promote unhealthy practices in the treating staff and prevent understanding of why noncompliance occurs in the first place. Some support its use in dementia and learning disorders but oppose it in schizophrenia. The main reason is that uncooperative patients of schizophrenia (and related psychoses) are considered to be those who refuse treatment but retain capacity; while in dementia and severe learning disorder, uncooperative patients are those who lack capacity. This paper disputes this contention by arguing that although uncooperative patients of schizophrenia (and related psychoses) apparently retain capacity, it is limited, in fact distorted, since they lack insight. It presents the concept of insight-unconsciousness in a patient of psychosis. Just as an unconscious patient has to be given covert medical/surgical treatment, similarly an insight-unconscious patient with one of the different psychoses (in the acute phase or otherwise) may also have to be given covert treatment till he regains at least partial insight. It helps control psychotic symptoms and assists the patient in regaining enough insight to realize he needs treatment. Another argument against covert treatment is that people with schizophrenia have the capacity to learn and therefore can learn that they are required to take medications, but if medications are given covertly it may well fuel their paranoia. However, it should be noted that the patient who has lack of insight cannot learn unless he regains that insight, and he may need covert treatment to facilitate this process. Covert treatment can fuel the paranoia, true, but it can also control the psychotic symptoms sufficiently so that regular treatment can be initiated. In a patient who refuses to accept that he is sick and when involuntary commitment is not an option to be considered, covert treatment is the only option, apart from physical restraint. Ultimately, a choice has to be made between a larger beneficence (control of symptoms and start of therapy) and a smaller malevolence (necessary therapy, but without the patient's knowledge and consent). A number of practical clinical scenarios are outlined wherein the psychiatrist should adopt covert treatment in the best interests of the patient. Ethical issues of autonomy, power, secrecy and malafide intent arise; each of these can be countered only by non-malfeasance (above all, do no harm) under the overarch of beneficence (even above that, dare to care). An advance directive with health care proxy that sanctions covert treatment is presented. Questions raised by the practical clinical scenarios are then answered. The conclusions are as follows: covert treatment, i.e, temporary treatment without knowledge and consent, is seldom needed or justified. But, where needed, it remains an essential weapon in the psychiatrist's armamentarium: to be used cautiously but without guilt or fear of censure. However, the psychiatrist must use it very judiciously, in the rarest of rare cases, provided: i) he is firmly convinced that it is needed for the welfare of the patient; ii) it is the only option available to tide over a crisis; iii) continuing efforts are made to try and get the patient into regular psychiatric care; iv) the psychiatrist makes it clear that its use is only as a stop-gap; v) he is always alert to the chances of malevolence inherent in such a process and keeps away from conniving or associating with anything even remotely suspicious; and vi) he takes due precautions to ensure that he does not land into legal tangles later. The need of the hour is to explore in greater detail the need and justification for covert treatment, to lay out clear and firm parameters for its legitimate use, follow it up with standard literature and, finally, to establish clinical practice guidelines by unconflicted authors. The term "covert treatment" is preferable to "surreptitious prescribing"; they should not be used synonymously, the latter term being reserved for those cases where there is malafide intent._. (shrink)

Background: Moral case deliberation is increasingly becoming part of various Dutch healthcare organizations. Although some evaluation studies of moral case deliberation have been carried out, research into the results of moral case deliberation within aged care is scarce. Research questions: How did participants evaluate moral case deliberation? What has moral case deliberation brought to them? What has moral case deliberation contributed to care practice? Should moral case deliberation be further implemented and, if so, how? Research design: Quantitative analysis of a (...) questionnaire study among participants of moral case deliberation, both caregivers and team leaders. Qualitative analysis of written answers to open questions, interview study and focus group meetings among caregivers and team leaders. Participants and research context: Caregivers and team leaders in a large organization for aged care in the Netherlands. A total of 61 moral case deliberation sessions, carried out on 16 care locations belonging to the organization, were evaluated and perceived results were assessed. Ethical considerations: Participants gave informed consent and anonymity was guaranteed. In the Netherlands, the law does not prescribe independent ethical review by an Institutional Review Board for this kind of research among healthcare professionals. Findings: Moral case deliberation was evaluated positively by the participants. Content and atmosphere of moral case deliberation received high scores, while organizational issues regarding the moral case deliberation sessions scored lower and merit further attention. Respondents indicated that moral case deliberation has the potential to contribute to care practice as relationships among team members improve, more openness is experienced and more understanding for different perspectives is fostered. If moral case deliberation is to be successfully implemented, top-down approaches should go hand in hand with bottom-up approaches. Conclusion: The relevance of moral case deliberation for care practice received wide acknowledgement from the respondents. It can contribute to the team’s cohesion as mutual understanding for one another’s views is fostered. If implemented well, moral case deliberation has the potential to improve care, according to the respondents. (shrink)

A fiction may prescribe imagining that a pig can talk or tell the future. A fiction may prescribe imagining that torturing innocent persons is a good thing. We generally comply with imaginative prescriptions like the former, but not always with prescriptions like the latter: we imagine non-evaluative fictions without difficulty but sometimes resist imagining value-rich fictions. Thus arises the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Most analyses of the phenomenon focus on the content of the relevant imaginings. The present analysis focuses (...) instead on the character of certain kinds of imaginings, arguing that we resist in such cases given the rich evaluative character of the imaginings prescribed, and the agent-dependent constraints on imagining in such ways. (shrink)

This paper examines voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting as a form of moral discourse. It explores how alternative stakeholder perspectives lead to differing perceptions of the process and content of responsible reporting. We contrast traditional stakeholder theory, which views stakeholders as external parties having a social contract with corporations, with an emerging perspective, which views interaction among corporations and constituents as relational in nature. This moves the stakeholder from an external entity to one that is integral to corporate (...) activity. We explore how these alternative stakeholder perspectives give rise to different normative demands for stakeholder engagement, managerial processes, and communication. We discuss models of CSR reporting and accountability: EMAS, the ISO 14000 series, SA8000, AA1000, the Global Reporting Initiative, and the Copenhagen Charter. We explore how these models relate to the stakeholder philosophies and find that they are largely consistent with the traditional atomistic view but fall far short of the demands for moral engagement prescribed by a relational stakeholder perspective. Adopting a relational view requires stakeholder engagement not only in prescribing reporting requirements, but also in discourse relating to core aspects of the corporation such as mission, values, and management systems. Habermas’ theory of communicative action provides guidelines for engaging stakeholders in this moral discourse. (shrink)

Background: Patients prescribed with medication that treats mental health conditions benefit the most compared to those prescribed with other types of medication. However, they are also the most difficult to adhere. The development of mobile health (mHealth) applications (‘apps’) to help patients monitor their adherence is fast growing but with limited evidence on their efficacy. There is no evidence on the content of these apps for patients taking psychotropic medication. The aim of this study is to identify (...) and evaluate the aims and functioning of available apps that are aiming to help and educate patients to adhere to medication that treats mental health conditions. Method: Three platform descriptions (Apple, Google and Microsoft) were searched between October 2015 and February 2016. Included apps need to focus on adherence to medication that treats mental health conditions and use at least a reinforcement strategy. Descriptive information was extracted and apps evaluated on a number of assessment criteria using content analysis. Results: Sixteen apps were identified. All apps included self-monitoring properties like reminders and psycho-educational properties like mood logs. It was unclear how the latter were used or how adherence was measured. Major barriers to medication adherence like patients’ illness and medication beliefs and attitudes were not considered nor where information to patients about mediation side effects. Very few apps were tailored and none was developed based on established theories explaining the processes for successful medication adherence like cognitions and beliefs. Reported information on app development and validation was poor. Discussion: A variety of apps with different properties that tackle both intentional and unintentional non-adherence from a different perspective are identified. An evidence-based approach and co-creation with patients is needed. This will ensure that the apps increase the possibility to impact on non-adherence. Theories like social cognition models can be useful in ensuring that patients’ education, motivation, skills, beliefs and type of adherence are taken into consideration when developing the apps. Findings from this study can help clinicians and patients make informed choices and pursue policy-makers to integrate evidence when developing future apps. Quality-assurance tools are needed to ensure the apps are systematically evaluated. (shrink)

Prudie the cat, no longer content with being "just" a pet with prescribed behavior, decides that she no longer wishes to be dictated to or to be owned.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ice Cream for BreakfastMichelle MethvenIn June of 2011, on a warm sunny day in Toronto, Canada, my partner and I brought our daughter Stella into the local hospital emergency room for what we believed would be a routine check–up. She had been exhibiting worsening clumsiness and limping for the previous two weeks and we thought it would be easier just to get her seen and have whatever it (...) was dealt with rather than wait two months to see a specialist. My partner and I believed it was likely a severe ear infection, or maybe Lyme disease from a recent camping trip. We each called our workplaces and said we would be an hour or so late. Nothing could have prepared us for the news 22 hours after arriving at the hospital, that Stella had a cancerous mass in her brain. After a biopsy three days later to confirm the diagnosis, Stella was diagnosed with Diffuse Intrinsic Pontine Glioma (DIPG), and given less than a year to live.Parents most often describe DIPG as “a monster.” The tumour saturates the pons and shuts down nerve pathways one at a time. In no particular order, and in no particular time, sufferers (most often young children) lose the ability to walk, sit up, hold up their head, speak and see. The pons is also responsible for breathing, swallowing and regulating the heartbeat, so death can come in many forms at any given time. Though it destroys the brain’s ability to command, the person continues to think and understand as the main part of the brain is untouched. Different from most cancers, chemotherapy and radiation have almost no effect on DIPG; even trials with the most toxic chemotherapies do not slow its progress.My partner and I were shaken to the core at this diagnosis. Looking at our energetic, redheaded [End Page 31] mop–topped little imp, it was impossible to fathom that she had just been given a fatal diagnosis. Yet we knew the doctors at the hospital were among the best and most sought–after in the world, so denial was never a part of our mantra.A week after Stella was diagnosed, we met with a neuro–oncologist to discuss our plans. The only treatment that is slightly effective for DIPG is focal radiation, which can stall the tumor’s growth, granting what is known as a “honeymoon period” of no new symptoms. The honeymoon lasts approximately six months, but there are no guarantees. Twenty percent of children get no honeymoon whatsoever after radiation, and others get only weeks. The doctor we met with confirmed radiation would not be curative, but would “buy time”. He explained that radiation involved six weeks of treatment, seven days a week. Following the six weeks of treatment, there would be a period of anywhere from one to six months in which Stella would likely be asymptomatic. However, at some point, the symptoms generally return and when they do, children deteriorate relatively quickly. Sometimes it takes a month or two, but on occasion there is as little as two weeks between progression and death.As Stella’s parents, we were not convinced that the prescribed radiation was something we wanted to subject Stella to. Because she was only two, and a very spirited and energetic child, it would have been virtually impossible to have her lie quietly on the table in hospital each day for six weeks while radiation was put behind her ear. The neuro–oncologists’ solution was that Stella be sedated for each daily radiation treatment, which would make her groggy for a big part of the day and necessitate needles and IV. As parents, we were presented with an impossible gamble. Do we risk taking away six weeks of her still somewhat symptom–free life for a possible extra three to six months later? And the timing was difficult as well. It was late June. If we chose to radiate it would mean spending the entire summer shuttling her between hospital and home with no weeks at the cottage, and much less time to attend neighbourhood BBQ’s, parties, trips to the park, the library, science centre and zoo... (shrink)

This is a paper about The Causal Self-Referential Theory of Perception. According to The Causal Self-Referential Theory as developed by above all John Searle and David Woodruff Smith, perceptual content is satisfied by an object only if the object in question has caused the perceptual experience. I argue initially that Searle's account cannot explain the distinction between hallucination and illusion since it requires that the state of affairs that is presented in the perceptual experience must exist in order for (...) the perception to be veridical. Smith's account is interestingly different in that the descriptive content, i.e. the content that presents the perceptual object as having certain properties, does not determine the object of the experience. His account consequently does not require that the state of affairs that is presented in perception exists in order for the perception to have an object. Smith argues instead that perceptual reference is determined by a specific kind of demonstrative content. In this paper it is argued that Smith's account of demonstrative content is too indeterminate and in certain circumstances prescribes the wrong object. It is subsequently argued that the theory of demonstrative content can be modified so as to avoid these consequences. This modification involves deriving the conditions of satisfaction of seeing an object from the conditions of satisfaction of seeing the shape of the object, where the shape of the object is conceived of as a particularized property, what is also called a ‘trope’. (shrink)

The European Union is making increased efforts to find simpler and more effective ways to function adequately in the eyes of its citizens by using ‘soft law’ instruments such as recommendations. Although they have no legally binding force, recommendations have practical and legal effects occurring partly due to their normative content in which a course of action is prescribed and further supported by arguments intended to persuade the addressees of a political position. Although recommendations function as persuasive instruments (...) due to their argumentation, the characteristics of argumentation and how it is employed to convince the addressee to comply with certain measures have not been investigated at all. The main goal of the paper is to explain how arguments are used by the European Commission when recommending Member States to follow a new course of action. First, we will unravel the justificatory reasons employed by the Commission in order to make Member States comply with new measures and we will show how these reasons are combined into an argumentative pattern : 1–23, 2016; J Argum Context 6: 3–26, 2017). This pattern basically prescribes a course of action to Member States, which is further supported by arguments in which the necessity and advantages of following the proposed course of action are justified. Second, we will explain how and why the way in which the arguments are combined in this complex pattern could be potentially persuasive for the Member States despite the legally non-binding character of recommendations. We will show that the European Commission tries to persuade the Member States to take new measures by evading the burden of proof imposed by the legislative framework. At a more specific level of analysis, we will delve into the implicit premises in the argumentation, which enable us to identify cases of evasion of the burden of proof due to the Commission’s use of implicit starting points which might not be accepted by the Member States. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.4 (2001) 651-664 [Access article in PDF] Walter Charleton and Early Modern Eclecticism Eric Lewis The publication of Michael Albrecht's Eklektik (1994) revived a small amount of scholarly interest in an early modern "movement" with a lineage that can be traced back to Clement of Alexandria, who described a method of constructing a philosophical system by selecting among different philosophical sects. 1 (...) Not surprisingly, the reception of Albrecht's work demonstrated the complexities associated with identifying the "movement" and categorizing those who labeled themselves "eclectic" philosophers; that is, those who seemed to expound a system of philosophy assimilated from ancient and modern sources. The difficulties involved with defining "eclecticism" and applying the term to early modern natural science is further complicated by the tendency for "eclectics" to categorize their contemporaries in ways that are counterintuitive to our modern sensibilities. 2 Nevertheless, the proponents of this patchwork style of natural science are interesting precisely because they give us a glimpse into their interpretation of the state of philosophy and its relation to history during a time when the authority of The Philosopher was falling under ever increasing scrutiny.The recent literature on philosophic eclecticism largely ignored the English context where rising sentiment against sectarianism influenced the formation of the Royal Society. 3 The perceived chaos of a nation divided and redivided by the multiplication of religious associations produced a plethora of proposals for the restoration and maintenance of intellectual and social order. In particular the problems of religious and political order motivated certain members of the [End Page 651] "Newcastle Circle" (largely Royalists) to construct philosophical methodologies at least congruent with their ideological commitments to social stability. Thomas Hobbes, Margaret Cavendish, and her close friend the physician Walter Charleton each offered his and her own style of natural science. 4 Both Hobbes and the Duchess of Newcastle were excluded from participating in the community of natural philosophers formed in 1660; yet Charleton became a founding member of the Royal Society that year. Despite relative neglect, Charleton's importance to understanding the development of modern natural science in England should not be overlooked; and particularly his prescribed method of doing natural philosophy needs more attention. 5 Like the radically different methods developed by Margaret Cavendish and Thomas Hobbes, Charleton's eclecticism should be viewed as an exhaustive effort to prescribe a remedy to the perceived threat of rampant sectarianism. 6 Unlike Hobbes and Cavendish, however, Charleton saw authoritarianism and dogmatism as the greatest challenge to order, and found the solution to that challenge in mitigated skepticism and a style of philosophy that did not make an epistemic differentiation between the novel philosophies of his day and those of the ancients.Despite being a prolific writer, having a considerable reputation as a physician and placing himself in the center of the English community of natural scientists, Walter Charleton has been mostly ignored by modern scholars. In part this lack of attention can be attributed to the common view that he never developed a comprehensive philosophy nor maintained consistent metaphysical commitments. References to him claim that he was an "intellectual barometer of the age," 7 and his work has been described as "important as a case study in the reception of a mechanical philosophy." 8 His name is virtually absent from discussions concerning scientific methodology, though he is often described as a Renaissance [End Page 652] alchemical philosopher who fell under the influence of mechanistic atomism and the experimental agenda of a fledgling society of natural philosophers. Most accounts simply portray Charleton as a converted follower of the novel philosophy rather than as a novel thinker.The failure to see Charleton as more than a converted empiricist and mechanist likely results from the opinion that eclecticism does not constitute a philosophical method as much as it constitutes the last refuge for scholars during periods of intellectual crisis. The article on eclecticism in Encyclopedia Britannica (fourteenth edition) states: Eclecticism always tends to spring up after a period of vigorous constructive speculation, especially in the later stages of a controversy between... (shrink)

In this paper, the author attempts to explore some of the problems connected with the formulation and application of international biomedical ethical guidelines, with particular reference to Africa. Recent attempts at revising and updating some international medical ethical guidelines have been bedevilled by intractable controversies and wrangling regarding both the content and formulation. From the vantage position of relative familiarity with both African and Western contexts, and the privilege of having been involved in the revision and updating of one (...) of the international ethical guidelines, the author reflects broadly on these issues and attempts prescribing an approach from both the theoretical and practical angles liable to mitigate, if not completely eliminate, some of the problems and difficulties. (shrink)

Although there have been various issues involving shame in the educational scene, little research in the field of philosophy of education has seriously investigated this topic. In my dissertation, a comparative philosophical study is conducted in an attempt to develop a better understanding of shame in moral education. This study explores when shame is morally appropriate and how shame is relevant to moral education, either positively or negatively, through historical and multidisciplinary reviews on the concept of shame and cross-cultural analysis (...) of shame-related matters within the context of moral education between South Korea and the United States. In the process of finding sources discussing shame and related issues, a variety of scholarly works in the humanities and social sciences, from classical to contemporary, are surveyed in early chapters of this dissertation. Accordingly, diversified concepts of shame and its complex nature concerning moral education are identified. The later chapters illustrate how shame is associated with education practices, pedagogical approaches, and curriculum by providing selected examples, not only observed by other researchers but also obtained from my own case studies—utilizing content analysis of Korean textbooks and semi-structured interviews with education practitioners in an urban area in central Oklahoma. As a result, this study shows that the moral value of shame is explicitly taught in the Korean education system and negative shame-related phenomena such as shaming are tightly guarded against in the American education setting. This leads to two different consequences: the misuse of shame is underestimated in South Korea, while the moral potential of shame is undervalued in the United States. Ultimately, the study prescribes the re-contextualization of shame in company with the promotion of intercultural awareness, which are both urgently needed for a well-balanced, high quality moral education in today’s multicultural and globalized age. Keywords: sense of shame, shame in moral education, moral pedagogy. (shrink)

Throughout his work, Adorno contrasted liberal ideology to the newer and more pernicious form of ideology found in positivism. The paper explores the philosophical basis for Adorno's contrast between liberal and positivist ideology. In Negative Dialectics, Adorno describes all ideology as identity-thinking. However, on his view, liberal ideology represents a more rational form of identity-thinking. Fearing that positivism might obliterate our capacity to distinguish between what is and what ought to be, Adorno sought a more secure foundation for his critique (...) of existing conditions. He found this basis in liberal discourse. In the concept of freedom, for example, Adorno located ideas or ideals that negate and transcend the given. One of the conditions for the possibility of critical thought lies in such ideas; critical thinking consists in wielding the more emphatic content of concepts against the pathic rationality of existing conditions. Far from prescribing mimesis as the antidote to a damaged social, political and economic reality, then, Adorno advocates a more dialectically inflected use of concepts as the basis for social criticism. Key Words: Adorno • Critique • Identity • Ideology • Liberalism • Positivism. (shrink)

Nurses in all practice roles and settings need to understand the therapeutic use and potential for abuse of prescription drugs. Nursing roles, which include the administration and prescription of medication, health teaching and the implications of application, and the detection of drug-related problems, require that such education be timely and comprehensive. This paper discusses the state of knowledge dissemination about prescription drugs within the general context of nursing education. It highlights educational needs and explores the attitudinal factors and knowledge deficits (...) that influence the nursing practices of prescribing, pain management, nursing assessment, and care of persons with drug problems.Standard educational requirements in all nursing curricula undergird teaching about licit and illicit drugs and medication, as well as their therapeutic use, misuse, and abuse. It has been recognized widely since the early 1980s, however, that clinical experiences and didactic content on licit and illicit drugs presented in nursing programs is inadequate. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 124.3 (2003) 477-481 [Access article in PDF] Martha C. Nussbaum and Juha Sihvola, eds. The Sleep of Reason: Erotic Experience and Sexual Ethics in Ancient Greece and Rome. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. viii + 457 pp. Paper, $26. The Sleep of Reason derives from a conference held at the Finnish Institute at Rome in 1997. In their introduction to the volume, the (...) editors, Martha Nussbaum and Juha Sihvola, note that the incommensurability between sexual behavior/desire and reason was a perennial concern to ancient philosophers and that the modern discipline of philosophy has avoided this topic because of skittishness about "emotional topics" (3) and a pronounced tendency to consider ancient philosophy in a decontextualized manner. The editors accordingly have assembled a mixture of papers on ancient philosophy and other aspects of ancient culture to bring philosophical rigor and context to discussions of ancient sexual ethics. With only a third of the papers specifically about philosophy, however, the volume is more "context" than philosophy. Of greater concern, however, is their claim that the book covers both Greece and Rome. With the exception of Cantarella's discussion of Roman marriage law, Konstan's of Catullus, and Goldhill's few pages on Tertullian, substantive discussion of Latin sources is lacking. The book treats classical Greece in some detail and then skips through Greek sources to the Second Sophistic. Indeed, the failure to engage imperial Rome substantively leaves Goldhill's essay damagingly decontextualized. The editors' tendentious sketch of modern scholarship on ancient sexual behavior (7-8), which overlooks important contributions of Eva Keuls and Amy Richlin, is likewise regrettable.In the first paper, "Forgetting Foucault: Acts, Identities, and the History of Sexuality," David Halperin prescribes a proper way to investigate ancient sexual activity. Beginning with a discussion of Michel Foucault's famous statement on the progress from sodomy ("a category of forbidden acts") to the homosexual ("a life form... a species"), Halperin persuasively argues that Foucault's statement has been misunderstood as social history when it is better regarded "as a claim about the internal logic and systematic functioning of two different discursive styles of sexual disqualification" (28). Elsewhere, however, Halperin's disciplining zeal is wearisome. Opposing the terms deviant sexual morphology and deviant sexual subjectivity (the former deviance in gender presentation and the latter identity based on sexual activity), Halperin predictably asserts that the cinaedus possessed a deviant sexual morphology whose non-normative sexual behavior sprang from innate effeminacy. According to ideology recoverable from the sources, this is correct. Consideration of the cinaedus latens (from Firmicus [End Page 477] Maternus; see below), to take an example, brings up a question: what are we to make of this cinaedus if "the kinaidos's betrayal of his masculine gender identity was so spectacular as to brand him a deviant type of person and to inscribe his deviant identity all over his face and body" (34)? Caution is called for here; discourse surely produces less schematic results (see, e.g., Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1 [1978], 96, or Judith Butler, GenderTrouble [1990], 28).In "Eros and Ethical Norms: Philosophers Respond to a Cultural Dilemma," Nussbaum surveys different approaches to the uneasy coexistence of sexual desire and education in pederastic relationships: if Eros is about loss of control in the face of desire, will the ero \ menos be cared for properly or merely be the means for desire's satisfaction? Nussbaum compares Socrates' explication of a "generous madness," wherein reverence and gratitude inspire kindly care, to the Stoics' valuation of friendship undertaken with consummate self-control. Nussbaum's work here has considerable value in its explication of the Stoic position and in her conclusion on the usefulness of analysis of ancient philosophic responses to ero \ s in current debates about sexuality (86-87).The next two papers, Maarit Kaimio's "Erotic Experience in the Conjugal Bed: Good Wives in Greek Tragedy" and Stephen Halliwell's "Aristophanic Sex: The Erotics of Shamelessness," take us to the Athenian stage. Starting from the observation that words for "bed"... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 64.4 (2003) 599-618 [Access article in PDF] The "Herbert Butterfield Problem" and its Resolution Keith C. Sewell Dordt College Herbert Butterfield (1900-1979) 1 published The Whig Interpretation of History in 1931, a year after he became a Lecturer in the University of Cambridge. 2 He became Professor of Modern History in the university in 1944, the same year in which he published (...) The Englishman and His History. 3 This discussion addresses what J.G.A. Pocock referred to as das Herbert Butter-fieldproblem—that is, the problem of ascertaining the precise relationship between the arguments presented in these volumes. 4The Whig Interpretation of History of 1931 (hereafter, The Whig Interpretation) was a sustained critique of the motivation, methods and fallacious conclusions of the "Whig" practice of staging historiographical narratives anachronistically so as to produce a ratification of the present, or justification of a position currently espoused by the author. 5 The term "Whig," as Butterfield used it in 1931, referred to the nineteenth-century school of historiography that praised "progress," "protestantism," and "liberty" and that generally attributed the triumph of such principles to the beliefs and activities of generations of Whig politicians. 6 [End Page 599]The Whig Interpretation argued that the judgments concerning both progressive and reactionary individuals and movements in Whig historiography were anachronistic, in that they were based on general propositions held by the Whig historian in the present. To correct this error Butterfield argued that historiography should not be based upon any general propositions. Basing historiographical narratives on general propositions purporting to be of universal and unchanging validity was seen as inevitably placing them on an anachronistic basis. In The Whig Interpretation Butterfield required the historian to represent past "life itself " but to avoid doing so on the basis of a view or "interpretation" of past human experience and action. Historiographical narration should be free of any interpretative standpoint and equally open to any possible subsequent interpretation. For Butterfield "the historian carries us away from the world of general ideas. It is not for him to give a philosophical explanation of what happens in time and space"; "any history that he writes ought to be as capable of varied philosophical interpretation as life itself seems to be... the historian's explanation... is not a piece of general reasoning," and "if at any point we need further elucidation all that he can do is to take us into greater detail." 7 It seems appropriate to refer to this as Butterfield's "neutrality postulate." Butterfield subsequently used the term "technical history" to denote this methodological concept. 8As might be expected, such a neutrality postulate was replete with problems, however valid Butterfield's strictures towards Whig historiographical anachronism. How is the historian to abridge for the purposes of narration and explanation without interpreting? Butterfield argued that we are right to demand of the historian that "he shall not change the meaning and purport of the historical story in the mere act of abridging it." No theory should intrude. As the detailed complexity is abridged, there should be no loss of "the purport and tenor of the whole." 9 Abridgment was to be accomplished without interpretative perspective, even though sympathy and imagination are indispensable. 10 Such was Butterfield's prescribed antidote. Yet the exercise he recommended requires more than a specific statement of the concrete, the individual, and the particular. It also requires a general idea of the "meaning" of "the whole" that the historian is called upon not to distort. Indeed, Butterfield drew attention to the basis of his historical thinking when he asserted that while historical research does not provide proof of the existence of a providential order, it nevertheless provides evidence of how profound and mysterious are its workings. 11In The Whig Interpretation no attempt was made to reconcile the advocacy of a non-interpretative neutrality dealing exclusively with the individual, the [End Page 600] concrete and the particular, and Butterfield's actual belief in a providential order to which the historical process is subject. After 1931... (shrink)

This book demonstrates the importance of a duty-based approach to morality. The dominance of what has been labeled “rights talk” leads to the neglect of duties without corresponding rights and stimulates the proliferation of questionable human rights. Therefore, this book argues for a duty-based perspective on morality in order to, first, salvage duties of virtue, and, second, counter the trend of rights-proliferation by providing some conceptual clarity concerning rights and duties that will enable us to differentiate between genuine and spurious (...) rights-claims. The argument for this duty-based perspective is made by examining two particularly contentious duties: duties to aid the global poor and civic duties. These two duties serve as case studies and are explored from the perspectives of political theory, jurisprudence and moral philosophy. The argument is made that both these duties can only be adequately defined and allocated if we adopt the perspective of duties, as the predominant perspective of rights either does not recognize them to be duties at all or else leaves their content and allocation indefinite. This renewed focus on duties does not wish to diminish the importance of rights. Rather, the duty-based perspective on morality will strengthen human rights discourse by distinguishing more strictly between genuine and inauthentic rights. Furthermore, a duty-based approach enriches our moral landscape by recognizing both duties of justice and duties of virtue. The latter duties are not less important or supererogatory, but function as indispensable complements to the duties prescribed by justice. In this perceptive and exceptionally lucid book, Eric Boot argues that a duty-focused approach to morality will remedy the shortcomings he finds in the standard accounts of human rights. The study tackles staple philosophical topics such as the contrasts between duties of virtue and duties of justice and imperfect and perfect obligations. But more importantly perhaps, it also confronts the practical question of what our human rights duties are and how we ought to act on them. Boot's book is a splendid example of how philosophy can engage and clarify real world problems. Kok-Chor Tan, Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania A lively and enjoyable defence of the importance of our having duties to fellow human beings in severe poverty. At a time when global justice has never been more urgent, this new book sheds much needed light. Thom Brooks, Professor of Law and Government and Head of Durham Law School, Durham University. (shrink)

In the initial phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, Sweden’s response stood out as an exception. For example, Sweden did not introduce any lockdowns, while many other countries did. In this paper I take the Swedish Corona Commission’s critique of the initial Swedish response as a point of departure for a general analysis of precaution in relation to pandemics. The Commission points out that in contrast to many other countries Sweden did not follow ‘the precautionary principle’. Based on this critique, the (...) Commission proposes that the precautionary principle should be included among Sweden’s guiding principles for crisis management. However, as the debate on this principle during the last 30 years indicates, the principle is loaded with problems. I discuss one of these problems, namely its lack of clarity. I argue, however, that this problem is not unsurmountable. A principle is lacking clarity precisely by being a principle and not a rule with a well-defined meaning. As a principle it indicates a direction but does not prescribe a specific action. However, to be action-guiding its content needs to be specified by rational deliberation. With this in mind, I propose a framework for specification of the precautionary principle as applied to pandemics. The framework focuses on the principle’s four key elements: threat, uncertainty, action and responsibility. I also suggest certain general ethical restrictions on specification. (shrink)

Logic in Action/Doron Avital Nothing is more difficult, and therefore more precious, than to be able to decide (Napoleon Bonaparte) Introduction -/- This book was born on the battlefield and in nights of secretive special operations all around the Middle East, as well as in the corridors and lecture halls of Western Academia best schools. As a young boy, I was always mesmerized by stories of great men and women of action at fateful cross-roads of decision-making. Then, like as today, (...) I felt the full weight of the moment of truth as it confronts the individual, the man or woman of action, with the imminent necessity to decide. Alongside, as I was climbing up the ladder of education, I found myself just as well captivated by the great intellectual stories of our times, in particular 20th century analytic philosophy and, at its core, the machinery of modern logic. How do then the cool contemplative modes of the philosophical and analytic outlooks, that are better fitting of the philosopher's armchair at the fireplace, hang together with the heat of the battlefield or the angst of the ticking clock of time left to the completion of a daring special operation? Growing up I was pondering exactly that. Not accidently, and in fact as consequence, I have chosen a course in life that challenged me to visit the poles of both theory and practice. I set myself on a mission to unravel the tension between the contemplative inquiry, supposedly theoretical, aiming at the logical structure of things, and the uncompromising test of life and action. The puzzle of the gap between theory and practice has become ever since the guiding question of my life. -/- Not long ago, I met two friends, Avner Shor, a veteran combat soldier of the special forces unit I eventually commanded, and Aviram Halevi, a fellow officer with whom I served. Why will we not put into writing the ideas that guided us during our years of military action, we wondered. At that time, I used to deliver the keynote lectures to the senior officers' course of Israel central intelligence organization, the Mossad. For this I already had to put some of these ideas in writing. Avner was quick to introduce me with a notable publisher and even helped me write the first chapter. With Aviram I sat to many meetings, where he would challenge me with key questions, and we followed them with memories of operations and battles, aiming to draw the required lessons. This served me well when I finally sat down to write the first draft of the book. The result was more extensive than me and my friends had expected. I had to add a particularly long chapter dealing with the story of modern philosophy and logic. This was required, I felt, as no decision-making process lives in an intellectual vacuum. Knowingly or subconsciously, the intellectual climate of the time guides us for better or worse with the decisions we finally take. The initial draft was naturally cumbersome and inaccessible. But here I had the privilege of meeting a particularly talented editor, Rami Rothholtz. I found in Rami both an editor and a critical reader. As an infantry combat soldier at youth and now a senior journalist and editor, Rami insisted on simplifying and refining my ideas. Had it not been for his work, this book would have been literally unreadable. *** I opened my book with a brief description of a single night of a special operation deep at the Lebanon Bekaa valley, far away from Israel northern border. The mission was to kidnap a senior terror leader known to be holding in captivity an Israeli pilot. This was also the last special operation I commanded in my military career. A single special operation night, but what had to precede it? For sure, many months of intense and skillful preparations. What is Planning? This is the question with which I open up chapter (2) of the book. I confront in this chapter two approaches to planning. The first is the one I saw as a mission to myself to cultivate in my many years of military service. The second is the one I saw as representing a deep-rooted fallacy that holds a firm grip on today's conventional wisdom about planning. To further examine the logic of the competing models, I was required in chapter (3) to analyze the concept of "The Standard". I argue that the false model of planning has its roots in an attitude of an uncompromising adherence to the power of literal obedience to standards and rules. The standard, or what is outlined by a rule as prescribing a future course of action, is seen as an answer to the fundamental tension between theory (planning) and practice (execution). I argue in contrast that the standard does not produce an answer but rather what I call: "A Well-Defined Question". In essence, it is a meticulously-well-planned invitation to exercise a fresh judgment. A judgement that has as an anchor the default answer that the standard produces but is open to extension as it confronts the new frame of reference of the test of reality. In chapter (4), I present a new tool for planning and execution: "The Polygon of Risks" or "The Polygon of Execution". The Polygon is a geometric illustration of the underlying tension that exists between all dimensions of the operational project. The construction and conceptualization of the trade-offs that exist between the various dimensions - segments of the polygon - is the first topic on the planner's agenda. I position the concepts of "Daring" and "Taking Proactive and Well-Informed Risks" as necessary logical constituents of the polygon and show how in contrast the false model of planning is responsible for an operational culture that is risk-averse. It encourages, in fact, the piling up of false securities at the segments' level that eventually lead to the collapse of the polygon. The necessary trade-offs relationships that exist between the segments of the polygon express the fundamental tension between partnership and competition: partnership in a joint goal and competition over resources, both material and abstract. When this tension is not managed well, that is, when the players' local optimizations overshadow the global optimization required for the success of the project, the execution polygon collapses. In this scenario, we may find the setting of the bar of "High Standards" in a players' spheres of responsibility to conceal a hidden agenda of personal insurances taken against a possible failure. Once the overall risk is not mitigated by way of collaborative joint executional dialogue, the process that leads to a collapse of the polygon is literally unstoppable. *** In chapter (5), I discuss "(Fateful) Decisions". I examine the way in which we should translate the polygon into sequential critical decisions on the timeline. The execution polygon is not a rigid scaffolding but a dynamic conceptual illustration of the -/- project. It will need now to be converted into successive decision junctions. We will find the content of a decision and its timing on the timeline to be inseparable. The right decision is the one that is taken at the right time. The moment of decision is in fact the last moment of deliberation, the first moment available for action, i.e. the first possible "Can" is also the latest possible "Must". Deciding too soon is analog to the "Jumping of the Gun". The decision maker is forcing a pre-conceived answer to a state of affairs not ripe for an answer, e.g. the target in the shooting range is not yet erected. Late to decide and the decision maker may envision what he or she should have done but reality is no longer available for them to harness it right, e.g. consider a tennis player's frustration when reviewing a too-late-to-react move in the video replay. I review in this chapter many fateful decisions, both historical, from Napoleon's Waterloo, to a Bridge Too Far of WWII, to the failed rescue attempt of American hostages at the time of the Iranian Revolution, as well as fateful decisions I had to take in the course of my military life, both in combat and in special operations, and show the sense in which they all answer to our analysis. The theme of chapter (6) is "The Moment of Truth". This is the moment when everything is on the line and from which there is no turning back. I discuss the formative repetitive structure of the schooling and simulation phase and contrast it with the "One Shot, One Opportunity" nature of the moment of truth. This is extremely helpful when we analyze the logical structure of failures as unwarranted repetitions of past lessons. The schooling curriculum indeed consists of important abstractions drawn from lessons of the past. However, it is when we project them in a fashion that is literal or mechanical that we cross path with the possibility of a failure. The paradox of education is that what we must repeat in school and simulation must be extended and not repeated in real life. What is required of us so we do not fall into the fallacy of repetition in face of the moment of truth is the core subject of the discussion of this chapter. In chapter (7), I took a lengthy philosophical detour surveying the intellectual drama of modern logic, and in general, the story of 20th century analytic philosophy. Readers who choose to bypass the somehow demanding narrative of this drama can do so and still keep the argumentative thread of the book. However, even by way of skipping the more technical parts, I would still urge the readers to delve into the discussion in this chapter as I believe this would grant them a deeper understanding of the overall conceptual framework. I explore here the work of two key figures: the logician Kurt Gödel and the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, both were crowned in 2000 by TIME Magazine, as the leading Logician and Philosopher, respectively, of the 20th Century. I review the fascinating logical result of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem and examine its relevance as setting a theoretical limit to the power of formalization. This amazing logical result - a result that shakes the logical foundations of 20th century thought in as much as the discovery of irrational numbers shook the foundations of the Pythagorean program of the ancient Greeks - bears significantly on the question of action and the blind trust we place in the power of formalization in the form of protocols and rules. It is here that Wittgenstein's philosophy enters in full force. We follow Wittgenstein as he dismantles our conception of rules as if there were "Railroads to Infinite", i.e. as prescribing for us in-advance their proper employments in all possible -/- future eventualities. Instead we propose that the dilemma of action demands of us an extension of rules rather than a mechanical or blind repetition of their literal imperative. In turn, this extension can serve as a new lesson added to the curriculum of school and simulation. The theme of chapter (8), the concluding chapter, is Strategy, Logic, and Ethics. The chapter comes to place the ethical dilemma in the conceptual map we presented in the book. I discuss here the tension between strategy as a process of setting goals and deriving backward as it were the steps that are necessary for achieving these goals, to the inescapable dictation of the ethical imperative. This unavoidable tension is particularly important against the backdrop of contemporary culture that is guided by a vision of personal success and achievement that may threaten our ability to do what is right. Most of all, I am troubled in this chapter, with the role logic may play, first as a liberating force enabling a change that is tuned to the ethical imperative, and second, as a force designed to justify on logical grounds, as it were, the existing power structure. It is in this junction that brave individuals will be called to challenge the governing logic of the zeitgeist - logic that operates now as an oppressive force that serves the vested interest of beneficials of the existing order. When success is favored over doing what is right, as we must admit is the prevailing cultural mood of our times, that the words of Emanuel Kant carry their full weight: "Do the Right thing and leave the Consequences to God". For this we need heroes and heroines that challenge the time by bearing the full weight of responsibility that comes with the doing of what is Right. *** This book was written more than anything from the perspective of the heroes and heroines of action. Sometimes they may be missing the exact words or the full insight into the solid logical complexity that stands between them and the doing of what is right. They feel what is right to do on the battlefield of life, whether in real battle, in political or economic life or whether in the life of creativity and the quest of the intellect. They do need, in analogy, proper logical and intellectual artillery. I hope they will find the logical cannons they require as they travel through the pages of this book. The rest is in their hands at the Moment of Truth. -/- Doron Avital, Tel Aviv 2011 -/- . (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:How Policies and Practices in Medical Settings Impact Communication Access with Deaf Patients and CaregiversKelley Cooper, Maggie Russell, Debra Chaiken, Michael W. Mazzaroppi, and Gretchen RomanIntroductionWe are a group of Deaf community members, sign language interpreters, organizational leaders, and academic partners. We have a collective point of view about how policies and practices in medical settings impact communication access with Deaf patients and caregivers. Here, we account multiple (...) stories from our respective experiences in an effort to improve healthcare institutions' awareness of the recommended modalities when communicating with Deaf patients accessing care. Our stories clarify any misunderstandings about communication with Deaf patients who expressively use spoken language and receptively use sign language. We convey that it is imperative to use visual language when explaining discharge paperwork and emphasize that it is critical for a Deaf caregiver to be fully aware of the plan of care when offering support to their loved one. We illustrate the importance of honoring the requests for in-person sign language interpreting versus video remote interpreting (VRI) as well as requests for Deaf-Hearing sign language interpreter teams. Deaf interpreters bring formative cultural, linguistic, and life experiences and work in partnership with a hearing interpreter to provide a more nuanced communication exchange across a wide range of visual languages.Maggie Russell: Anecdote 1The hospital recidivism rate for a Deaf Nepali male patient continues to increase. As the Interpreter Referral Service Director, I am aware of this patient because he receives care management services from our organization. He has several life-threatening conditions, attends dialysis, is on multiple medications, and is frequently in and out of the local hospital. The hospital considers him as someone who identifies as an oral Deaf person, as he has severe to profound hearing loss with little or no residual hearing and visually receives signed language but expressively uses spoken language. Three interpreters, a spoken Nepalese interpreter, a Deaf Nepali Sign Language (NSL) interpreter, and a hearing American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter, working together as a team are recommended for effective communication with this patient and the medical team of providers. However, interpreting services at the hospital provide only one interpreter, a spoken Nepalese interpreter, which [End Page E3] does not satisfy the necessary accommodations for access. A plethora of prescriptions were added to his regimen to counter the condition that caused a recent inpatient stay. The patient's wife is his primary caregiver. She communicates receptively and expressively using NSL. A Deaf NSL and hearing ASL interpreter team creates effective communication with his wife and the medical team of providers. Since she is expected to follow the doctor's recommendations as explained in the discharge instructions, she also requires accommodations for communication access. Neither the patient nor his wife received a formal education, and they do not read or write English or the language of their country of origin. Therefore, information in English or Nepalese conveyed in the printed discharge paperwork is inaccessible. The new medications were not incorporated into his already established monthly "pill pack," and the couple was unable to read the information on the pill bottles that were delivered to their home. Subsequently, incorrect use of the newly prescribed medications significantly delayed the patient's course of recovery. This couple also had minimal exposure to medical information and medical processes prior to living in the United States; the medical services in the refugee camps in Nepal were typically non-existent. Utilizing a hearing ASL interpreter alone does not constitute barrier-free access for either of these individuals. Interpreting medical documents in a visual format is so critical for providing access, but it doesn't necessarily guarantee comprehension because of their limited health literacy. In addition to employing the recommended interpreting team, using teach-back methods during an encounter is a good way for medical providers to ensure the patient and caregiver's understanding of the plan of care.Maggie Russell: Anecdote 2As the Interpreter Referral Service Director at our organization, I served as the hearing interpreter on a Deaf-Hearing ASL interpreter team at a follow-up gastrointestinal appointment from a gall bladder biopsy for a Deaf male patient, along with his Deaf... (shrink)

Scientism in medical education distracts educators from focusing on the content of learning; it focuses attention instead on individual achievement and validity in its measurement. I analyze the specific form that scientism takes in medicine and in medical education. The competencies movement attempts to challenge old “scientistic” views of the role of physicians, but in the end it has invited medical educators to focus on validity in the measurement of individual performance for attitudes and skills that medicine resists conceptualizing (...) as objective. Academic medicine should focus its efforts instead on quality and relevance of care. The social accountability movement proposes to shift the focus of academic medicine to the goal of high quality and relevant care in the context of community service and partnership with the institutions that together with medicine create and cope with health and with health deficits. I make the case for this agenda through a discussion of the linked histories of the opioid prescribing crisis and the professionalism movement. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Randall Allsup, “Music Teacher Quality and Expertise”Bennett ReimerI am delighted to have this opportunity to reflect on Randall Allsup’s excellent, incisive, and wise paper. The issues he raises reach to the core of who we have been, where we are now, and how we must adapt ourselves to new challenges that deeply question both our ideals and our practices.Allsup’s opening questions relate directly to the most (...) pressing matters our profession is now facing—questions philosophical in essence. What kind of music teachers do our students deserve? What is the purpose of public education? And how do we get beyond our continuing and understandable desire for better-trained music teachers to ask the more pertinent question of what constitutes effective music teaching and learning in what the musical world is swiftly becoming. He has the courage to address this level of complexity seriously, and to make significant progress toward clarification. That deserves my respect and, I am quite sure, the respect of all of us.Allsup approaches his central premise on the significant changes needed in our professional identity by reminding us that we have “a long and distinguished [End Page 108] commitment to teaching and teachers.” That commitment, however, is based on the established assumption that music education is founded on excellence of performance as its ultimate goal and its greatest value. To achieve this musical end, he points out, requires mastery, attained through prolonged, careful apprenticeship. This “long running pedagogy of mastery and excellence appears closed to, or at least hostile to, innovation and popular input.”In addition, he argues, this belief system embroils all of us, teachers and their students, in the dichotomy of, on the one hand, replication of existing excellence as our goal, and, on the other, the need for emancipation from what was and what is, toward what might be; the need, that is, for transformation. The past, he recognizes, cannot simply be ignored: it is too precious for that. The future, however, also cannot be excluded. Within this antinomy we must find our way, honoring the past while not allowing it to constrict our future.At this point in his exposition Allsup approaches the proposition he is harboring, a proposition I want to explore for its potential in both clarity and complication. The basis of his key proposal is our need for teachers who are able “to think openly and less certainly about the design and implementation of musical instruction. Our pluralistic society,” he continues, “makes it imperative that we multiply the methods employed in the pursuit and construction of knowledge.”To accomplish this, Allsup presents a foundational dichotomy. There are “open forms of music” relating to “new and evolving ways of aesthetic participation that break with our traditional processes and our established codes and standards.” Contrasting with open forms are “closed forms,” representing the authoritative, the certain, and the canonic. “Closed forms,” he says, “represent culturally-structured and norm-driven literacies, where valuations of goodness pre-exist any aesthetic encounters.” Closed forms, he argues, are based on culturally agreed-upon modes of participation that are rigid in nature, such as in the prescribed and proscribed sequence of musical events proceeding inexorably in the order of composer-conductor-performer-audience.Such past (and present) rigidities, he points out, have become increasingly irrelevant. In every dimension of our lives significant and fast-occurring changes have become dominant, even expected, leaving us, as citizens and as educators, in confusion and uncertainty, and therefore in distress. We encounter aesthetic forms that are open-sourced and de-authored, unconnected to shared standards of practice. Technologies of music making and taking, he points out, have overthrown tradition to a startling degree, erasing distinctions among expert and amateur, between master and apprentice, between process and product, specialist and generalist, the classical and the vernacular.All this, and much more, is argued cogently and, I think, persuasively. It leads us to a central conception influencing how we must act as professionals. Our [End Page 109] obligation is to not only incorporate openness of musical engagements into our present culture of musical “closedness,” but to recognize the advent of openness as being a... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"If You Are Led by the Spirit, You Are Not Under the Law":Lex Privata and Veritas Vitae as a Divine Personal VocationJustin M. AndersonCharles Taylor, not assuming that Western secularity is without its own ethic, has described the moral impulses shaping modern lives as an "ethic of authenticity."1 Among the various marks one might discern in today's wider ethic is a desire to take seriously the particularities unique (...) to each human life. This means that any method of validly describing or prescribing for the modern person must show itself able of genuinely engaging with the particularities of an unrepeatable person enmeshed in a distinct and unique situation. Under such a predisposition, in so far as a moral matrix proves itself incapable of performing on such an individual and particular level, to that extent it is seen as artificial and even inhumane. By its modern hearer, such a morality is necessarily limited. It is perceived as a purely deductive morality that can merely apply general and undifferentiated norms without grasping with the variances in person and situations that lead to the potentially infinite variation of right values and actions. This pervasive, wider Western secular ethic of authenticity is worth considering the true locus of the rejection of the classical Christian affirmation of "absolute moral norms" or the "intrinsically evil acts" those norms prohibit. For his or her part, the Catholic moral theologian is left either attempting to explain how this classic Christian ethic is one that in fact bequeaths life and joy despite its apparent [End Page 1297] rigorism and insensitivity, or abandoning it altogether. The modern Catholic in turn would only be forced to consider their own decision making as "out of touch with real people" or to abandon their own intellectual tradition as having been so.At first glance, luminaries like Thomas Aquinas and others of his scholastic guild seem ill-equipped to help us. There is a serious reason for this, namely Aquinas's own Aristotelian method. According to the Aristotelian method, true scientific knowledge can be had only about universals, not particulars. This simple truth, which Aquinas embraced, entailed a focus on natures, essences, and causes, each of which were universals, and therefore capable of being meaningfully treated as part of any science, including sacra doctrina. Particulars mattered, but particulars simply needed to be perceived, since they were not per se universals.2While this method generally meant that Thomas did not speak at length of particulars, this itself is only a general rule. For there are places in his oeuvre where, like many Christian authors before him, Aquinas does give attention to individual cases of divine vocation in apparent contradiction of a divine commandment given to all. He treats the individual case of Abraham being called to sacrifice Isaac. But such treatments often fall only to biblical examples. Unfortunately, however, this means such cases are all very particular. For precisely that reason, if one wishes to move to reflections on modern human life, one needs to be willing to claim the same sort of inspiration that Abraham could.3 A second kind of particularity Aquinas [End Page 1298] addresses constitutes an oft-ignored portion of the secunda pars of the Summa theologiae (ST). Here he treats of charismatic gifts, states of life, and hierarchical offices.4 Yet here again is not the moral particularity for which the modern reader wishes. These do not touch on every human life, and Thomas gives only a generic understanding of these gifts, states, and offices. A third kind of particularity arises when Thomas is attempting to help confessors guide individual penitents. In such rarified places Aquinas distinguishes between two fora where a particular person was to be counselled. The first was a public forum, like a local diocesan marriage tribunal (forum exterius Ecclesiae), and the other was the forum of conscience (forum conscientiae), most obviously present in the context of sacramental confession and equipped with its own rules and guidelines.5 While the situations that arise out of such differentiation of fora are fascinating, the cases usually deal with agents in circumstances of rare moral perplexity and framing any wider moral matrix out of such... (shrink)

In a climate of growing intolerance and violence, marked by various forms of injustice across the democratic world, human rights and democratic citizenship education have the potential to help cultivate knowledge, values and skills or competences in the young that are necessary to foster a culture of human rights and democracy. However, education about, through and for human rights and democracy needs to be critical and transformative by going beyond delivering content knowledge and prescribing values to practically developing distinctly (...) democratic habits and dispositions. We argue that the Community of Philosophical Inquiry as developed by Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp can contribute to creating a human rights and democratic culture by facilitating democratic experiences and the co-construction of knowledge through dialogue. This pedagogic process can be used to confront prejudices, discrimination, and violence as well as to address the problems of alienation facing young people today. (shrink)

I will first discuss how social interactions organize, coordinate, and specialize as “artifacts,” tools; how these tools are not only for coordination but for achieving something, for some outcome (goal/function), for a collective work. In particular, I will argue that these artifacts specify (predict and prescribe) the mental contents of the participants, both in terms of beliefs and acceptances and in terms of motives and plans. We have to revise the behavioristic view of “scripts” and “roles”; when we play a (...) role we wear a “mind.” No collective action would be possible without shared and/or ascribed mental contents. This is also very crucial for a central form of automatic mind-reading (mind ascription). Second, I will argue that often what really matters is the ascribed/prescribed, worn, mind not the real, private one. We have to play (like in the symbolic play) “as if” we had those mental contents. This social convention and mutual assumption makes the interaction work. The ascribed beliefs and goals are not necessarily explicitly there; they might be just implicit as inactive (we act just by routine and automatically) or implicit as potential. The coordination and social action works thanks to these “as if” (ascribed and pretended) minds, thanks to those conventional constructs. Our social minds for social interactions are coordination artifacts and social institutions. (shrink)

Introduction to, and overview of, the contents of the Symposium on consent and confidentialityThe papers in this symposium are based on a meeting held by the Academy of Medical Sciences in London on 12 February 2002. The decision to hold this meeting, and to explore in detail these important and contentious issues, arose from a number of concerns that the Academy felt about what may reasonably be called “impediments to medical research”.These include: The regulations arising from the implementation of the (...) European data protection directive and their effect on the gathering and holding of data needed for disease surveillance as well as for research. Phil Boyd, in his paper, presents the views and the work of the Information Commission, the responsible UK body in this area. The “Source Informatics” case where the Department of Health requested a judicial review on the use, by this company, of anonymised prescribing data from general practitioner records for informing the pharmaceutical industry about patterns of drug use. Mr Justice Latham ruled that the use of even this anonymised data for commercial purposes could be a breach of patients' rights to confidentiality. The Court of Appeal, however, emphatically reversed his decision and, no further appeal having been made to the House of Lords, the law of the land is now clear that there is no breach of confidentiality in the use of anonymised data. It did seem to us, …. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Rousseau’s Debt to Burlamaqui: The Ideal of Nature and the Nature of ThingsRobin DouglassThe aim of this essay is to examine two very different thinkers writing in a very similar context: Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rather than providing a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between the two, attention is focused on one important respect in which their theories converge: the way that both employed the idea of (...) nature as a normative ideal, and both maintained that what is good and just is so by the very nature of things. The significance and purpose of doing so is threefold. Building on recent research, the opening section of the essay establishes Burlamaqui’s status as more than just a plagiarist of earlier natural law theorists, emphasizing the originality of his thought in this context. The extent to which Rousseau’s approach to natural right followed Burlamaqui’s is explored in the second section. In doing so the problematic relationship between nature as a normative ideal and the role of artifice and denaturing is addressed, a problem that has proved a source of much contention amongst Rousseau scholars. The final section adumbrates the implications for the way that modern natural law was received in Geneva, drawing attention to the infusion of a transcendent standard of justice into the existing discourse, which owed more to Malebranche and Leibniz than to Pufendorf and Barbeyrac. [End Page 209]While Rousseau is one of the most written about figures in the history of ideas, the place of Burlamaqui, his Genevan contemporary, has received very little attention. When he has been considered it has usually been alongside other natural law theorists in analyzing their influence on the founding fathers and the American Revolution.1 For a long time the relationship between the two thinkers went unexamined, seemingly bearing testimony to the opinion of Giorgio Del Vecchio that Burlamaqui was an unoriginal theorist who had little influence on Rousseau.2 Helena Rosenblatt’s comprehensive study of the Genevan context of Rousseau’s thought suggests otherwise, however, stressing the importance of Burlamaqui in the political controversies that shaped 1750s Geneva, to which Rousseau responded in his main political writings.3 In addition, Petter Korkman’s recent edition of Burlamaqui’s seminal work—in which many of the originally unreferenced sources are identified—not only demonstrates the extent to which Burlamaqui deferred to Jean Barbeyrac’s editions of Grotius and Pufendorf, but also draws attention to where he distinctively broke from them and merits being appreciated as an original thinker in his own right.4Although Burlamaqui is best known as the author of The Principles of Natural and Political Law, the opus consists of two quite distinct volumes: The Principles of Natural Law and The Principles of Political Law.5 It is well to focus on the former of these when assessing the extent of Burlamaqui’s originality as he never authorized the latter, which was only published [End Page 210] posthumously based on his lecture notes. Moreover, its content was largely derivative and often deferred to Barbeyrac’s editions of Grotius and Pufendorf verbatim; indeed the most original aspects of The Principles of Political Law were usually little more than summaries of arguments that had been developed in the earlier work. In contrast, Burlamaqui oversaw the publication of The Principles of Natural Law himself in 1747, intending it to serve as an introduction to natural law for his students, and, ironically, to prevent his lectures from being “published against [his] will, in a very imperfect and mangled condition.”6 Both volumes, however, must be taken into account when considering the influence on Rousseau, not least because his most famous work, On the Social Contract, or Principles of Political Right, adopted the title of Burlamaqui’s second volume.7IFrom the opening lines of The Principles of Natural Law Burlamaqui indicated his intention to expand the domain of natural law, its end being not just man’s preservation but ultimately his happiness:My design is to enquire into those rules which nature alone prescribes to man, in order to conduct him safely to the end, which every one has, and indeed ought to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Right HeartIngrid GouldI remarked to a friend, “We haven’t spoken since my arrest!” Alarm and confusion clouded his face, given my half-century of squeaky-clean living. “Cardiac arrest,” I clarified. “The fire department rebooted me.”An electrophysiologist diagnosed Arrhythmogenic Right Ventricular Dysplasia, prescribed medication, and implanted a defibrillator. For the next three-and-a-half years, he helped me live with a disease I didn’t know existed until he told me (...) I had it.The disease progressed—an ironic, disease-centric term since its advancement was to my detriment— prompting my cardiologist to recommend seeing someone who specialized in heart failure. I resisted the very idea of heart failure, a terrible term for a struggling organ, but took her advice and scheduled an appointment.The new cardiologist urged transplant testing, a lengthy process. I agreed, figuring that by the time I needed a new heart in 15–20 years, they’d be rolling off 3D printers.To record occasional transplant musings and inchoate fears and perhaps, over time, untangle them, I began journaling. I chronicled my passage through the echocardiogram, heart catheterization, 31 tubes of bloodwork, interviews with different clinical specialties, a pulmonary function test in a machine reminiscent of Star Trek’s Transporter, and more. Testing had barely begun when my medication stopped working—a Halloween shock.I began a harsher medication, underwent an ablation, and spent six weeks in a wearable defibrillator, a vest with abundant wires, and a purse-sized battery pack that made me resemble a character in [End Page 123] the Jetsons. This attire did not bring holiday comfort or joy to the TSA1 when I flew to visit my sister. As my R-waves faded to a whisper, I swapped the vest for a second implanted defibrillator, substantially more sensitive than the first.In early 2018, we learned I had qualified for transplant listing, though I wished to get as much mileage as possible from the original engine. My cardiologist warned, “There is no Plan B—no machine, device, or medication for the long-term. You will need a transplant.” He explained that since most cardiac patients have left-heart problems, companies develop products for the left side of the heart. My problem was on the right—a tiny market. He also cautioned that a patient needs to be sick enough to warrant transplant and well enough to remain a candidate, survive the surgery, and recover.Although clinically I was ready, I was not personally ready. I felt too good to trade an excellent quality of life for the promised miserable post-transplant year. The cardiologist wisely asked if I wanted to speak with another patient. When I requested someone beyond the dreaded first year, he put me in touch with two women who had received new hearts a few years earlier and befriended each other. They soon became my invaluable mentors and cherished friends. I will never forget seeing them stride into our first meeting and thinking, “They are beautiful! They look totally normal!”By May, climbing four flights of stairs took as much effort as five used to take. Tests confirmed further deterioration and suggested I had 7–13 months of declining health before my heart would give out completely. We chose a date for hospital admission, and I started telling people outside my immediate family. Most were flabbergasted, believing heart transplants were the last hope of the desperately ill. I did not look moribund, though, apparently, I was.The eight months after my first transplant appointment let me prepare psychologically to bid farewell to my heart—the metaphor for kindness, love, and bravery in our culture—and to welcome a new organ from a generous person less medically fortunate than I.In the hospital, I met others awaiting their hearts. A sudden intimacy arises when mortal choices catapult people into a medical realm suggestive of science fiction. Add the emotional intensity that accompanies knowing your extended life comes courtesy of a person who breathes no more on this earth and you wonder how an organ recipient integrates sorrow and gratitude.Two weeks after I was hospitalized, my cardiologist informed me the wait was over... (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper shows that the stated principles and content of the National Curriculum are those presupposed in any justification of education in a democracy. What it also shows is that the National Curriculum can only genuinely exercise its democratic role in the kind of society which provides the social and cultural conditions necessary for its practical application. But since the National Curriculum is being implemented in a society which lacks these conditions, any failure to provide an ‘education for (...) democracy’ will not be a failure of the curriculum it prescribes, but of the kind of democratic society in which it is being enacted. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Bible and the Priesthood: Priestly Participation in the One Sacrifice for Sins by Anthony GiambroneMichael S. HahnThe Bible and the Priesthood: Priestly Participation in the One Sacrifice for Sins. By Anthony Giambrone, O.P. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2022. Pp. xxi + 297. $22.99 (paper). ISBN: 978-1-5409-6186-0.In the Vatican II decree on priestly training, Optatam Totius, the council Fathers prescribe a five-stage pedagogical approach to the (...) treating of topics in dogmatic or systematic theology, such as the sacrament of holy orders. Consideration is to be given first to the witness of Scripture, then to patristic testimony, to subsequent historical developments, to Scholastic speculation, and finally, to the contemporary life of the Church, especially in the addressing of current problems. Although this genetic method of theological instruction may appear plausible and attractive on paper, in actual practice it runs certain risks. Among other things, the immediate relevance of what is to be considered in the final stage threatens to overrun or distort what is to be considered in the earlier stages, such that these sources are mined with too much of an eye to their applicability to present issues. Moreover, even if more equally balanced attention is paid to each stage, the danger arises that in covering so much ground one remains chiefly at surface level, inadvertently foreclosing appreciation for the depths of the mysteries in view and inoculating against the theological studiositas that drives toward greater [End Page 692] understanding. Further compounding the challenges of fruitfully implementing the council Fathers’ vision is the ever-widening divergence of specialization within theological subdisciplines, which too often renders the field Babel-like and crippled by mutual incomprehension. Perhaps nowhere is this tendency toward breakdown of communication more evident than in the disconnect between biblical studies and other theological areas—a tragedy of special import, given the stress placed by Optatam Totius and by other magisterial texts on Scripture as the foundational for theology.While there appears on the horizon neither a one-size-fits-all fix to the problems of theological integration nor an algorithmic means of implementing it, glimmers of hope remain. Holding promise, for instance, are recent trends toward the “theological interpretation of Scripture” and the continued emergence of a self-styled “biblical theology” which, while admitting of great variety in expression and emphasis, nonetheless constitute explicit attempts to bridge this particular gap. What the strongest of these and other endeavors tend to illustrate is that genuine theological integration is to be found not so much in methods or programs of study as in the actual thinking and writing of individual theologians and exegetes, who will approach the consideranda identified by Optatam Totius not as discrete stages of inquiry but as essential ingredients that ought to be creatively and responsibly blended in varying proportions, reflecting both their own particular specializations and their personal attentiveness to the pertinent biblical, patristic, historical, speculative, and practical concerns.A worthy example of such creative and responsible blending is Anthony Giambrone’s The Bible and the Priesthood, the second of seven planned entries in Baker Academic’s new series “A Catholic Biblical Theology of the Sacraments,” edited by Tim Gray and John Sehorn. In keeping with its stated focus on the Bible and Giambrone’s own training as an exegete, the book is chiefly a work of Scripture scholarship, yet it also thoroughly theological, and this not only in its concern with priesthood and the sacrament of orders, but also in how and why the author engages with the biblical (and extrabiblical) texts under investigation in treating these topics. Taking a cue from a 2019 essay by Pope Benedict XVI, Giambrone zeros in on certain “deep roots” of the ongoing priestly crisis that were identified by the late pontiff, including “a methodological flaw in the reception of Scripture as the Word of God” and a related “reject[ion]... of an authentically cultic priesthood in the New Covenant” (3). In directly countering the second of these problems across the bulk of its chapters, the book also exemplifies a corrective to the first, providing remedies to this “flaw” on both the hermeneutical and the... (shrink)

Faith and Islam -- Honesty and veracity -- Belief in God -- Generosity and contentment -- Belief in the angels -- Fairness, selflessness and mercy -- Belief in divine books -- Friendship, hypocrisy and jealousy -- Belief in the Prophets -- Sincerity and patience -- Belief in the hereafter -- Backbiting and sinful suspicion -- Belief in divine destiny -- Humility tolerance and politeness -- Ablution and the daily prayers -- Seriousness, piety and dignity -- Prayer -- Respect to parents (...) and maintaining the bonds of kinship -- Fasting -- Secrecy and constultation -- Prescribed purifying alms and charity -- Distinction of the lawful and unlawful, loyalty and fidelity -- The major and minor pilgrimage -- Justice, chastity and modesty. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:To Cut or Not to Cut?That is the QuestionTracy WilsonWhat is circumcision? In simple terms, it is the removal or excision of the foreskin of the penis. Seems so simple, right? In some families, it is that simple. In other families, it is a religious exercise. I am a doctorally-prepared Family Nurse Practitioner and started my nursing career in the NICU. I have seen my fair share of (...) circumcisions. As a nurse, our role was to prep the room with whichever instrument the OB/GYNS preferred and then soothe the baby. Some OB/GYNS prescribed Sucrose, which is ultimately sugar water, for the babies to have while undergoing circumcision, while others wouldn't prescribe anything. What I learned in the NICU and by watching circumcisions being performed was that the doctor's preference determined the pain management protocol. Some doctors cared more about pain control, some cared [End Page 85] about presentation and ensuring the foreskin was cut properly, and some were just old school and had their preferences. I wanted to comfort the baby and make his world as comfortable as possible.Watching circumcisions being performed, I never formed an opinion about them. I really looked at circumcision like any other procedure. However, I did see some parents really toil over the decisions, especially fathers who did not want to "see their son tortured or mutilated like that" as one told me once. I didn't quite understand the comparison to mutilation, but I understood why he did not want his son to go through the procedure. It wasn't until years later that I understood the gravity of the decision when I became pregnant with our son and knew immediately it was a boy. Call it a mother's intuition, but I just knew. To circumcise my son was never a decision I had to deliberate very long because it was something I was accustomed to in my family. It wasn't until one of my relatives got married and had her first son that I became aware that this would ever be a weighty decision for someone in my family.I took it for granted all those years before working in the NICU because circumcision was superficial to me. I realized that it's not just a piece of foreskin to many people. For some circumcision is done for religious reasons, for others making the choice to circumcise is about sameness, or hygiene. For my extended family member, it happened to be about sameness. She didn't want her sons to look different from their dad. Since potty training was mostly going to be taught by their father, they wanted their sons to look like him. Many NICU parents told me they wanted their sons to look like their fathers, so this notion was familiar to me. After my extended family member explained why sameness mattered, I understood the reasons why some parents felt this way.There are other stories like this which we pondered upon when we got pregnant with our son, and I really began to reflect on whether we should circumcise or not. Then two additional frames of thoughts arose; one, I ensured that my husband and I jointly made the decision together, but I really leaned on him for his opinion because he was a male and most of the male teaching would come from him. Second, we considered if the decision to circumcise should come from him once he became an adult. His father and I discussed whether he should have a choice regarding being circumcised. He may have chosen a different decision than us and we didn't want to take away his right to choose. However, waiting to have a circumcision as an adult comes with its own sets of challenges, including the possibility of infection, increased pain, missed work, edema, etc. So, ultimately, we made the decision to go ahead with the circumcision.In our case, our pediatrician performed the circumcision. I asked him explicitly which instrument he used because I had my preference, and I was not going to allow my son to be circumcised by a healthcare professional that did not use my... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ministers of the Law: A Natural Law Theory of Legal AuthorityThomas J. BushlackMinisters of the Law: A Natural Law Theory of Legal Authority Jean Porter Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2010. 368 pp. $30.00Jean Porter’s most recent book is the fruit of her participation with the Emory Center for the Study of Law and Religion since 2005. In this project she undertakes two interrelated tasks. First, she provides (...) compelling reasons for Christian ethicists to engage in questions internal to the discipline of jurisprudence. Second, she demonstrates how a natural law theory grounded in the work of the medieval scholastics can address some of the questions of contemporary jurisprudence. Readers familiar with her previous work will be delighted that she has extended her constructive account of natural law into the realms of jurisprudence and in the process also engages cultural psychology, rhetoric, political philosophy, and international law.Porter begins her engagement with jurisprudence in chapter 1 by noting a paradox recognized by many legal philosophers in the Anglophone world. Legal systems, as they have developed in the West, are characterized by a high degree of autonomy and independence vis-à-vis other social dynamics such as politics or morality. At the same time, however, no legal system can function in complete isolation from considerations of politics and morality. How can we account for the paradoxical autonomy of legal authority? Porter suggests that a scholastic account of natural law can provide a rationally defensible solution to this paradox by developing an account of natural authority (in chapter 2).The force of Porter’s argument rests on the capacity of her account to justify political and legal authority as a natural expression of the authority that any community exercises vis-à-vis its individual members. A community’s authority over its members is justified on the grounds that in prescribing or prohibiting particular acts, it must appeal to claims that could potentially be recognized as justifiable by any rational member of that community. The concept that creates this important hinge between an individual’s good and the good of the community is, of course, the common good. Scholars interested in the concept of the common good will find that her reflection upon it is both rooted deeply in the Christian tradition and applied with fresh insight to the realm of politics (chapter 3) and law (chapter 4). [End Page 210]One potential objection to Porter’s account of natural law could arise in response to her insistence that natural inclinations “underdetermine” the normative content of a natural law morality, leaving her account open to charges of cultural relativism or of being merely descriptive as opposed to normative. However, in this work she is able to turn these criticisms into assets for her account of natural law. She shows (successfully, I believe) how her theory of natural law is able to account for the plurality of moral, political, and legal systems that exist in our world today while still providing normative grounds for critiquing existing social systems. And in chapter 5 she demonstrates how nonderogable, jus cogens principles can be developed from her account of natural law and applied to the field of international law and human rights. In fact, the final section left me hungry for further development of her insights regarding the relationship between natural and international law.This book is written with the same rigorous logic and careful research that has made Porter one of the leading scholars of natural law theory in the field today. As such, this book would be suitable for academics in a wide variety of fields, such as law, political theory, and of course Christian ethics, or for advanced graduate students. It is most certainly a groundbreaking work for demonstrating how a theological account of natural law can engage in constructive dialogue with legal theory and politics at both a theoretical and a practical level.Thomas J. BushlackUniversity of St. ThomasCopyright © 2012 The Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Fiora Salis compares the fictional and the artifactual views of models. She argues that both accounts contain several deep insights concerning the nature of scientific models but they also face some difficult challenges. She then puts forward an account of the ontology of models intended to incorporate the benefits of both views avoiding their main difficulties. Her key idea is that models are human-made artifacts that are akin to literary works of fiction. In this view, models are complex objects that (...) are constituted by a model description and the model content generated within a game of make-believe. As per the fiction view, model descriptions are construed as props in a game of make-believe, where props are concrete objects that prescribe certain imaginings. As per the artifactual view, model descriptions are construed as concrete representational tools that enable and constrain a scientist’s cognitive processes and provide intersubjective epistemic access to their imaginings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to Arthur Efland's and Richard Siegesmund's Reviews of The Arts and the Creation of MindElliot W. Eisner, Lee Jacks Professor of Education and Professor of ArtWhen I was invited by the Editor of The Journal of Aesthetic Education to respond to two unidentified reviews of my latest book, The Arts and the Creation of Mind, I thought that I would encounter a bevy of negatively critical comments, (...) which would give me the opportunity to respond equally as critically to theirs. Fortunately — perhaps unfortunately — the reviews prepared by Arthur Efland and Richard Siegesmund are not in the least bit negative. This, of course, is a boon to the book's author, but a bane to the creation of lively debate. I am happy to say that though their purposes differ, both Efland and Siegesmund got it essentially right. Efland's comments put my work in a historical context, particularly the emergence of interest in cognition and, in general, in the higher mental processes as they were called during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. It is true that interest in cognition was in the air at that time, in the field of philosophy, and in the fields of linguistics and psychology as well. My own work is a part of that particular zeitgeist in the twentieth century.I was not aware at the time that I was being influenced by such a broad movement, but, alas or alack, I was. In some ways, the writing that John Dewey did during the early and mid 1930s, particularly his work on art as rendered in Art as Experience, presaged the interest linguists, psychologists, and philosophers developed in the conditions of communication and its relationship to symbolic systems and thought.1 Dewey has been a major influence on my thinking as have Susanne Langer and later Nelson Goodman.2 [End Page 96] The historical perspective that Efland provides is a useful accounting of where ideas about cognition were and where they are now. I do not know whether I have extended the thinking that is being done on cognition, but I certainly have tried to provide a fulsome account of the connections between cognition and the educational mission of the arts, especially the visual arts. Efland's historical portrayal is a useful picture of the period and, I would say, the significance of this way of thinking for education.Siegesmund pushes farther than Efland, in my view, into the sources of human understanding, particularly the function of somatic knowledge in grasping, or better yet, framing meaning. His notion of what might perhaps best be called visual reasoning marries two concepts that are seldom related; the visual and the reasonable. Reason is often associated with matters of logic, and matters of logic pertain to connections between language in its formal sense and with the relationships among numbers within numerical systems. Qualitative relationships are not typically regarded as manifestations, even at their best, of rational forms of thinking. Emotional, yes. Rational, no. As readers of my works know, I reject that conception of the limits of human rationality and Siegesmund does as well. His focus on embodied knowledge, or what is sometimes called somatic knowledge, is a promising conception of the sources of choice and judgment. There is, after all, more known than what can be told, to paraphrase Michael Polayni.3What pleases me most about Siegesmund's account of my work is its receptivity to the students he teaches. The ultimate educational test of any piece of writing is the extent to which people see meaning in it and apparently, at least for the students that Siegesmund teaches, meaning for most is there. I am pleased. What I have always tried to do in my work is to avoid prescribing recipes or formulaic procedures because I do not believe either works very well when one is working with human beings, but rather to provide concepts through which the educational world can be viewed, practice reflected upon, options identified, and action taken. Apparently these aims are being met in some university classrooms in which The Arts and the Creation of Mind is being used. One caveat.Although it is true, as... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Participation and Immersion in Walton and CalvinoM. Carleton SimpsonThe novel begins in a railway station, a locomotive huffs, steam from a piston covers the opening of the chapter, a cloud of smoke hides part of the first paragraph... The pages of the book are clouded like the windows of an old train, the cloud of smoke rests on the sentences.1Part of Kendall Walton's theory of psychological participation, explicated (...) in Mimesis as Make-Believe, is that representations that display or draw attention to their fictionality discourage participation; part of our enjoyment of representational art is our psychological participation with the representation. The activity of participating comprises the game world, while the material representation comprises the work world. We play games of make-believe with representations, much as children play games with toys or other props. For Walton, the fullest psychological participation arises from the fullest immersion in the game world. Immersion means ignoring or being unaware of the materiality of the work world, attending only to the fictional reality of the work world. It is to "look past" the painted surface, or to become engrossed in the novel's narrative.To the extent that we consider the material of the work, we are distracted from participating in the game prescribed by the work: we do either the one or the other. So, Walton claims "One obvious way in which works sometimes discourage participation is by prominently declaring or displaying their fictionality, betraying their own pretense" (p. 275).2 For example, "The conspicuous brush strokes of Van Gogh's Starry Night call attention to themselves and to their record of the process by which paint was applied to the canvas, possibly intruding on the viewer's participation in his game... One can ignore the brush [End Page 321] strokes enough to lose oneself in the fictional world" (p. 277). In response to prodding by Patrick Maynard, Walton tempers this position: "Prominent brush strokes, as in many of Vincent van Gogh's paintings, can have an inhibiting effect, especially if the observer isn't used to such. Then they not only constitute a plain indication that what one is seeing is a mere painted canvas, but force this fact on the viewer's attention" (italics added).3Ernst Gombrich endorsed this position in Art and Illusion, attributing it to Kenneth Clark.4 Gombrich tells of Clark attempting to see both the brush strokes and the representation, and his failure to "observe what went on when the brush strokes and dabs of pigment on the canvas transformed themselves into a vision of transfigured reality as he stepped back" (p. 6). Walton intends his theory of psychological participation to be widely applicable to the representational arts; he argues that what holds for visual representations holds also for verbal representations. When reading a novel our ability to participate in the story is diminished to the extent the novel draws attention to its fictionality. We either immerse ourselves in the fictional world of the novel or attend to the historical production or materiality of the novel.Attending is contained in Walton's notion of appreciation. Appreciation without participation results when some representations "positively discourage participation, especially the psychological participation that would constitute the experience of being caught up in the story" (p. 274). Works like these employ a variety of strategies, "deliberately 'distancing' the appreciator from the fictional world... For if one does not imagine a proposition, it is unlikely to be fictional that one knows or believes it; and if one imagines it with minimal vivacity, one is unlikely to have the experience of fictionally being concerned or upset or relieved or frightened or overjoyed by the fact that it is true" (p. 274). Just as children imagine themselves to be participants in games of make-believe, more mature imaginings require us to imagine we are participants, not simply observers. Reflexive imagining is central to Walton's theory, and is a point he extensively develops.I argue against this disjunction of activities. My thesis is that participation need not arise from immersion at the expense of awareness. I am also critical of Walton's distinction between appreciation and participation—they are... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Introduction: Conflicting Interest in Medicine: Stories by Physicians on How Financing Affects Their WorkJames M. DuBois, Symposium EditorPhysicians frequently enter into special relationships that establish personal financial interests that could conflict with their patients’ best interests. Examples include receiving gifts from drug companies, sharing a patent on a medical device, or accepting funding from industry to conduct a drug study. In recent years, such “conflicts of interests” in (...) medicine have received growing attention from medical associations (Association of American Medical Colleges, 2008, 2010), policy bodies (Institute of Medicine, 2009), industry (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, 2008), journalists (Caputo, 2009; Nguyen, Ornstein, & Weber, 2010), and even Congress, which included in the 2010 Patient Protection Affordable Care Act a Physician Payment Sunshine provision requiring industry to report a wide variety of ties to physicians. All of these efforts appear motivated by a similar assumption: Gifts and financially beneficial relationships can unconsciously motivate physicians to prioritize their own or industry’s interests over patients’ interests when providing care, conducting medical research, or educating physicians (American Association of Medical Colleges, 2008; Dana & Loewenstein, 2003).The call for stories produced for this narrative symposium provided the following request:We are interested in hearing about positive and negative experiences associated with a variety of financial relationships. The stories should give readers a sense of what it is like to be a physician in the midst of complex relationships to industry, physician practices, and third–party payers—relationships that go beyond ordinary reimbursement for care or research expenses.Obtaining stories proved more challenging than anticipated for reasons related to our theme. Precisely because access to physicians is considered valuable, it is highly restricted. Listservs and blogs that serve physicians typically prohibit postings from anyone except physician members, and even they are sometimes not allowed to post messages freely. While at least one listserv circulated our call to members (at the request of a member), others rejected our request, and one blog offered to post our call as a 1–month ad for $20,000. This contrasts radically with the relatively easy access we have had to other groups, including mental health consumers and living organ donors, who have broad grass root communication systems, and bioethicists, who have several listservs and blogs that readily share news about relevant scholarly opportunities.The collection of stories obtained resulted from extensive personal networking and a small amount of arm twisting. The collection was not what we expected to obtain, but is in many ways even more interesting. One story (Hodges) explicitly addresses the impact that pharmaceutical representatives can have on prescribing patterns—the classic, voluntary, conflicted relationship, insofar as sales reps are [End Page 65] welcomed in facilities, often bearing free samples, free lunches, and glossy articles on their products, all in the hopes of influencing prescribing patterns. But most stories do not fit the typical mold found in discussions of conflicts of interest. Among those expressing concerns about the impact of financial factors on medical practice, one focuses on the insufficient management of bias within the Food and Drug Administration (Perlmutter); three focus on the bias that is introduced through our current fee–for–service reimbursement system (Mikulec, Nagaldine, and Zientek)—of these, two illustrate ways that third parties seek to manipulate physician practices to maximize profits; one notes how any kind of clinical trial—whether government or industry sponsored—may affect patient care decisions (Cruz); while two argue that worries over industry sponsorship of research are disproportionate (Bierut and Sofair), and two address widespread concerns about industry sponsorship of educational activities, with one illustrating how bias might be reduced (Seitz & Diao), and another illustrating the potential harms of prohibiting educational sponsorship (Peppin).To be clear, all of these narratives are responsive to our call for stories that “describe positive and negative experiences associated with a variety of financial relationships.” Yet they are not classic conflict of interest stories; rather, they represent the conflicting interests that concern physicians today—conflicts that are often intrinsic to our current healthcare and research systems rather than special relationships courted by physicians.While making no pretense of representativeness or comprehensiveness, these stories provide fertile ground for reflection, as seen in our... (shrink)

This article will consider the parameters of systematic theological-‘knowledge’ today by examining the contribution of women’s theology to the field. This examination takes place in the context of debates about knowledge-construction within institutes of higher learning, and context of increased numbers of women theology students, as well as international emphasis on achieving gender equality, such as the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals. With regard to curriculums of systematic theology, it is noted that a proverbial ‘canon within a canon’ exists with (...) regard to including a diversity of voices in prescribed study material, specifically the contributions of women’s perspectives and women’s history as subject-content. This ‘data-gap’ is problematic with regard to epistemology and hermeneutics, which are instrumental in constructing a grammar of faith – that is, ‘church doctrine’ (which is traditionally the main component of systematic theology). This implies that a type of decolonisation, or unlearning is necessary. If a next generation of women systematic theologians are to be nurtured, approaches to teaching systematic theology and the methodology of systematic theology itself requires deconstruction. Contribution: This research aims to contribute to the fields of systematic theology, women’s studies, women’s theology and gender studies. It will also contribute to the fields of postcolonial epistemology and hermeneutics, as well as the study of the methodology of systematic theology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:My Ability to FlourishPaulette KoehlerIn twenty years of convulsions, I’ve never heard a neurologist mention the word “epilepsy.” Over this time, the intensity of my original simple partial seizures, “simple” signifying retained consciousness and “partial” indicating disturbances restricted to a specific area of my brain, grew to the complex level on my left temporal lobe. I believe this development was influenced by my use of prescribed medications. (...) Several neurologists from Los Angeles to San Francisco directed various electroencephalograms (EEGs), including a week–long, prescription–free EEG in the hospital; magnetic resonance imaging tests (MRIs); computed tomography (CT) scans anywhere from forty–five minutes to four hours each; and blood profiles to help determine my situation. For legal reasons, one neurologist even had me sign a release stating that he was not able to diagnose my situation.Test results present limited information about my brain and without ever saying, “I don’t know,” these neurologists communicated my test results by utilizing technical terms and thus not always answering my questions. After explaining that my head turns to the left while my right hand shakes, symptoms that have been recognized and reported by several friends and family members, my doctor replied that a seizure on the left side of my brain should cause my head to turn to the right and then changed the subject. I felt like asking, “Am I doing it wrong?”The brain is different from other parts of our anatomy in that it can’t be replaced like a kidney, heart or other organ. It cannot be removed like tonsils, an appendix or even a limb. It can be physically studied or repaired while functioning but the resulting percentage of survival or proper operation of the body after surgery is minimal and the number of people requiring such attention is so low that the amount is scanty. A dead brain limits the analysis of its functions.My “disabilities” involve spontaneous uncontrolled loss of consciousness, exhaustion, mood swings, and the suspension of driving privileges. Activity interference, extra naps, losing friends and not being able to get around are definite disadvantages. However, everyone needs to manage personal problems. No one is perfect.Public transit schedules and directions don’t always offer me the transportation I need. Fortunately, the combination of a bus ride with walking or running can serve my needs while also helping me to keep physically healthy.Limited benefits include discounted transit and the option to ride instead of walking or running. A trip to Nana’s on the train is always a treat.I’d rather not be branded “disabled” even though those who understand my situation address me with compassionate, sympathetic attention, [End Page E4] always asking how I physically feel. I feel fine. A seizure is only a quick, conscious loss of time and an occasional scrape on the knee. I’m more annoyed when I notice strangers looking suspiciously at my public transport discount card as if I don’t really deserve it.Like the “disability” brand, the medications I’ve taken, Dilantin, Neurontin, Depakote, Keppra and Lamictal, among others, all of which produced serious side effects without reducing the frequency of my seizures have only been a cover–up, preventing a search for the true cause and effective treatment of my seizures. Being identified as disabled has only limited my daily schedule. I am not disabled, as society has unfortunately characterized me.My seizures began in 1993, the year our FDA started approving rBGH, recombinant bovine growth hormone, man–made for the use on dairy cows to enhance their milk production. As a result, milk on the market increased while keeping the price from rising, as demonstrated in Economics I. Can the use of rBGH act on my brain in any way?One neurologist, in order to avoid the responsibility of inappropriate recommendations, presented his thoughts in the form of questions, encouraging me to consider options.“You’ve tried all of these medications?”“Has your diet alteration made any difference in your seizures?”“Have you tried organic foods?”His inquiries persuaded me to contemplate whether drugs are an answer to my problem, pay attention to differences in my life and... (shrink)

A Gricean preamble concludes that though utterances have unintended meanings, those cannot be considered apart from their intended meanings. Intention distinguishes artworks from natural phenomena. To allocate an artwork to a genre, to accept its normal authorial boundaries and that its content is not random but chosen, is to concede intention's centrality. Wimsatt and Beardsley were right that meaning is public. But they think 'intention' is 'private' or 'unavailable'. However, it too is public, in the work. Fictions are utterances (...) of a curious kind. They may mimic, but are not meant to be taken for, veridical reports. Neither are they 'pseudo-statements' nor 'pretended illocutionary acts'. Their logical form is actually this: 'I [author] invite you [reader] to imagine that S [content].' This prescribes no response, nor claims to describe the 'real' world, even though it may elicit a response appropriate to real-life events. One reason for imagining fictional situations may be to strengthen the perceptions necessary for real life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Skeptical View of IntegralismElizabeth CoreyNo observer of the American right could say that the past decade has been boring. In recent years, people who formerly called themselves conservatives have become integralists, "national conservatives," "common good" conservatives, and "postliberals." They reject the fusionism that formerly brought libertarians into alliances with paleo- and neo-conservatives. They argue that principles of limited government and individual rights no longer suffice in an (...) age that has suffered the left's Gramscian march through the institutions (Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci, 1891–1937).Among the most prominent of the new dissenters are certain Catholic conservatives who argue not only that "liberalism" has failed, but that that the remedy for its failure lies in a reintegration of religion and politics. Many of these writers argue that liberalism itself is a religion, or at least a quasi-religion, that should be opposed by real religion, which is Catholic Christianity.1 Liberalism's political liturgy, they maintain, is one of individual rights, freedom, and unfettered choice; but liberalism is a bad religion that leads to moral decline. It must be resisted by holding to the true liturgy, an [End Page 919] authentically religious one of obedience to Catholic doctrine and a revival of traditional morality in the public square. Who is responsible for enforcing this new liturgy? Why the new theorists themselves, of course, who believe that they are the recipients of privileged gnosis.These theorists have no qualms about asserting the desirable unity of politics and religion. Indeed, their primary interest in government seems to be in prescribing a religiously inspired morality for those they would govern. No mere rule-of-law regime will do. As journalist Sohrab Ahmari has boldly asserted: "Civility and decency are secondary values. They regulate compliance with an established order and orthodoxy. We should seek to use these values to enforce our order and our orthodoxy."2The confidence of these former conservatives is remarkable, and they are in fact making converts of young men everywhere. The clarity of their moral vision is undeniably attractive to a certain kind of soul. If the highest good for mankind is salvation, as Christians believe it is, then why not strain every nerve to achieve it, not only in worship but also in political action? Chad Pecknold has summarized the postliberal integralist view as follows: "We must recognize that our cities simply are religious. Our most fundamental political conflicts are religious and theological. Thus, Christians who care about their neighbor must not be indifferent to the sacred bonds of the city, but must oppose civic sacrilege, and work to reorient the domestic and civic altars alike to God's heavenly city." He concludes with a rousing peroration: "As pilgrims with our faces set towards Christ, the bright sun of justice itself, our cause is just. We have a great hope even in this temporal order which is passing away; we have a high calling to order not only our souls, but also to order our cities rightly, on earth as it is in heaven."3 The only task that remains, on this telling, is to put this vision into practice.It is never easy to follow the words of Jesus himself in the Lord's Prayer. Yet the skeptic in politics might be excused for a bit of throat-clearing and perplexity about precisely what is being argued, and about how such a grand vision is to be accomplished, or whether it is even desirable. In the pages that follow, I identify an alternative way of thinking about politics that is significantly less exalted than integralism. This more "skeptical" alternative is potentially capable of achievement, given the political institutions currently in place in the United States. It is also significantly more respectful of the political and moral pluralism that now exists and seems unlikely to disappear. [End Page 920]Following the lead of British political philosopher Michael Oakeshott, I consider two opposed ways of thinking about politics, which Oakeshott called, in On Human Conduct, "enterprise and civil association," and elsewhere "faith and scepticism." With this framework in mind, I consider the dark and pessimistic view of modern society held by the postliberal integralists. I... (shrink)