This essay is part of a larger project exploring the extent to which the market paradigm might be usefully employed to explain and in some instances justify nonmarket institutions. The focus of the market paradigm in this essay is the relationship between the idea of a perfectly competitive market and aspects of both the rationality of political association and the theory of collective choice. In particular, this essay seeks to identify what connections, if any, exist between one kind of market (...) account of the rationality of political association and one kind of market-based social choice rule. The market theory of political association I intend to discuss I call “market contractarianism,” and the collective choice rule whose relation to it I intend to explore is the unanimity rule. What, if anything, is the relationship between market contractarianism and the unanimity rule? (shrink)

In the context of indivisible public objects problems (e.g., candidate selection or qualification) with “separable” preferences, unanimity rule accepts each object if and only if the object is in everyone’s top set. We establish two axiomatizations of unanimity rule. The main axiom is resource monotonicity, saying that resource increase should affect all agents in the same direction. This axiom is considered in combination with simple Pareto (there is no Pareto improvement by addition or subtraction of a (...) single object), independence of irrelevant alternatives, and either path independence or strategy-proofness. (shrink)

We examine collective decision-making in a jury voting game under the unanimity rule when voters have ambiguous beliefs. Unlike in existing studies (Ellis in Theoretical Economics 11:865–895, 2016; Fabrizi et al., in: AUT Economics Working Paper, 2021; Ryan in Theory and Decision 90:543–577, 2021), the locus of ambiguity is the likelihood function (signal precision) rather than the prior. This significantly alters the properties of symmetric equilibria. While prior ambiguity may induce multiple equilibria (Fabrizi et al., in: AUT Economics (...) Working Paper, 2021; Ryan in Theory and Decision 90:543–577, 2021) we show that, under likelihood ambiguity, there exists a unique non-trivial symmetric responsive equilibrium that takes the same form as in the absence of ambiguity (Feddersen and Pesendorfer in The American Political Science Review 92:23–35, 1998). Moreover, likelihood ambiguity partially offsets the pernicious effects of pivotality on decision quality: the frequency of Type I error (convicting the innocent) is typically lower than in the absence of ambiguity. (shrink)

This paper presents rational and unanimously agreeable norms in (a) governance, (b) economic policy, (c) constitution and (d) religious and scientific beliefs for civilized coexistence. The basis of unanimous agreeability is that individuals do not prefer to have their wealth (including life) robbed, even surreptitiously. This preference is unanimous because even robbers do not want to be robbed. I argue that unanimously agreeable norms are necessary for civilized co-existence of humans and are consistent with the ancient philosophy (Hindutva), which originated (...) in India more than 3000 years BC and is reflected in Gita, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/bhagavad_gita. Gita is considered by Courts of India as a philosophical document. The basic ethos of Gita is explicit and transparent: the state (King Dhristarastra) must not allow anyone (including privileged princes like Duryodhan) to take away others' (Pandavas') property even surreptitiously (through Sakuni's rigged game of Pashakhel). The modern constitution ordains freedom through rights to property, liberty and pursuit for happiness of individuals. But it has tacitly allowed establishment of a system (rules) of governance to facilitate surreptitious robbery. Individuals accumulate property like home and retirement savings with a hope to attain freedom, eventually, which they cannot achieve if they are robbed, even surreptitiously. The ancient philosophy of Gita prohibits robbery of any kind and, thus, guarantees hope for individual freedom. The modern philosophy—underlying the established system (rules) tacitly allowing surreptitious robbery—cannot, however, achieve individual freedom. Widespread or inclusive economic prosperity can be attained only if the constitution and rules of law are unanimously agreeable which will be consistent with ancient ethos but not modern philosophy. (shrink)

We show how voting rules like the simple and the absolute majority rules, unanimity, consensus, etc. can be represented as logical operators in Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic. First, we prove tha...

Toward the end of his famous Rule, written late in his life, near the middle of the sixth century, St. Benedict provides instructions for the selection of an abbot, the leader and spiritual "father" of the cenobitic monastic community, who is to represent Christ to the men under his charge. The beginning of Chapter 64 of RB states: In the installation of an abbot, the proper method is always to appoint the one whom the whole community agrees to choose (...) in the fear of God. Or a part of the community, no matter how small, may make the choice if they possess sounder judgment. Let the candidate be chosen for merit of life and wisdom of teaching, even if he hold the last rank in the community. But it can happen... (shrink)

Several authors have analyzed the optimal k-majority rule based on a variety of criteria. Buchanan and Tullock argued that, in constitutional settings, the criterion should be that all changes meet the Pareto criterion; otherwise the status quo should be preferred (we call this the BT criterion). They then asserted that unanimity rule would be the preferred voting rule in this setting. In parliamentary settings, they claimed that a near majority rule would be preferred because it (...) minimizes the sum of decision costs and external costs. This article investigates both claims in an N-voter, two-alternative setting. We show the conditions under which unanimity rule is less likely to select BT preferred alternatives than other k-majority rules and prove that the difference in performance can be negligible when Nis large and certain weak conditions are met. Furthermore, if we define external costs as the expected number of losers from a BT-inferior vote, then external costs become negligible for a range of supermajority rules. This implies that unanimity rule and a range of supermajority rules should be equally preferred when decision costs are added. Finally, we show that the external cost function can actually increase for certain populations. Many of the broader conclusions should also hold for multiple alternatives. (shrink)

Florida International University, USA edwardj{at}fiu.edu ' + u + '@ ' + d + ' '/ /- -> Several authors have analyzed the optimal k -majority rule based on a variety of criteria. Buchanan and Tullock argued that, in constitutional settings, the criterion should be that all changes meet the Pareto criterion; otherwise the status quo should be preferred. They then asserted that unanimity rule would be the preferred voting rule in this setting. In parliamentary settings, (...) they claimed that a near majority rule would be preferred because it minimizes the sum of decision costs and external costs. This article investigates both claims in an N -voter, two-alternative setting. We show the conditions under which unanimity rule is less likely to select BT preferred alternatives than other k -majority rules and prove that the difference in performance can be negligible when N is large and certain weak conditions are met. Furthermore, if we define external costs as the expected number of losers from a BT-inferior vote, then external costs become negligible for a range of supermajority rules. This implies that unanimity rule and a range of supermajority rules should be equally preferred when decision costs are added. Finally, we show that the external cost function can actually increase for certain populations. Many of the broader conclusions should also hold for multiple alternatives. Key Words: constitutional design • Pareto criterion • external costs • social contract. (shrink)

We consider the problem of choosing the location of a public facility either (a) on a tree network or (b) in a Euclidean space. (a) (1996) characterize the class of target rules on a tree network by Pareto efficiency and population-monotonicity. Using Vohra's (1999) characterization of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency and replacement-domination, we give a short proof of the previous characterization and show that it also holds on the domain of symmetric preferences. (b) The result obtained for model (a) (...) proves to be crucial for the analysis of the problem of choosing the location of a public facility in a Euclidean space. Our main result is the characterization of the class of coordinatewise target rules by unanimity, strategy-proofness, and either replacement-domination or population-monotonicity. (shrink)

In a voting context, when the preferences of voters are described by linear orderings over a finite set of alternatives, the Maximin rule orders the alternatives according to their minimal rank in the voters’ preferences. It is equivalent to the Fallback bargaining process described by Brams and Kilgour (Group Decision and Negotiation 10:287–316, 2001). This article proposes a characterization of the Maximin rule as a social welfare function (SWF) based upon five conditions: Neutrality, Duplication, Unanimity, Top Invariance, (...) and Weak Separability. In a similar way, we obtain a characterization for the Maximax SWF by using Bottom Invariance instead of Top Invariance. Then, these results are compared to the axiomatic characterizations of two famous scoring rules, the Plurality rule and the Antiplurality rule. (shrink)

This paper claims that the intuitive and widespread legitimating power of majority rule (MR) arises from the link between majority rule and the principle of equality of political opportunity. The egalitarian character of MR is established by exploring “puzzles” in democratic theory, such as the insensitivity of democratic voting procedures to unequal intensity of citizens' preferences, and the relationship between the principle of unanimity (sometimes thought better to respect citizens' equality) and MR. Special attention is directed to (...) the relationship between political equality and equality in the outcomes of political decisions: The claim is made that the language of equal political opportunity captures well the idea of equal political influence, in the circumstance of disagreement about what is required to achieve equal treatment through the outcomes of political decisions. (shrink)

On January 18, 2006, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the constitutional challenge to New Hampshire's Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act would be remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, to determine whether the Court of Appeals could, consistent with New Hampshire's legislative intent, formulate a narrower remedy than a permanent injunction against enforcement of the parental notification law in its entirety.In 2003, New Hampshire enacted the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act. (...) The Act specifies, in pertinent part, that “No abortion shall be performed upon an unemancipated minor or upon a female for whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed… until at least 48 hours after written notice of the pending abortion has been delivered....” The Act allows for three exceptions where a physician may perform an abortion on a minor child without parental or guardian notification. (shrink)

A dichotomous decision-making context in committees is considered where potential partisan members with predetermined votes can generate inefficient decisions and buy neutral votes. The optimal voting rule minimizing the expected costs of inefficient decisions for the case of a three-member committee is analyzed. It is shown that the optimal voting rule can be non-monotonic with respect to side-transfers: in the symmetric case, majority voting is optimal under either zero, mild or full side-transfer possibilities, whereas unanimity voting may (...) be optimal under an intermediate side-transfer possibility. The side-transfer possibilities depend on the power of partisans (their ability or willingness to pay for neutral votes) relative to the corruptibility of neutral members (personal cost of deliberately casting a `wrong' vote). (shrink)

The right to trial by jury and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are two of the most fundamental commitments of American criminal law. This article asks how the two are related, that is, whether disagreement among jurors implies anything about whether the beyond a reasonable doubt standard has been satisfied: Does the due process requirement of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard also require jury unanimity in criminal cases? Drawing on literature about the epistemological significance of (...) disagreement, this article considers the “equal-weight view” and its implications for the unanimity rule in criminal jury decision-making. The equal-weight view says that, roughly speaking, when people disagree on a topic, each view should be given equal weight. This implies, this article concludes, that the unanimity rule is required as a way of enforcing the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement. This article further concludes, however, that jurors should not always be instructed to apply the equal-weight view in their deliberation. Jurors, when applying crime definitions to particular cases, make determinations about both historical facts and normative issues through moral terms like “reckless,” “unjustifiable,” “depraved,” “cruel,” and “heinous,” which are common in criminal law. This article argues that while the equal-weight view should guide the jurors in determining factual issues, it is not the correct model for moral issues, not only because it would imply that acquittals are appropriate in many cases involving controversial moral questions but also because having the jurors follow it would undermine the basic justification for having the criminal jury as an articulator and enforcer of morality. (shrink)

When preferences are defined over two alternatives and societies are variable, the group formed by the relative majority rule, the unanimity rule, the dictatorial rules, and the strongly dictatorial rules is characterized in terms of five axioms: unanimity, reducibility, substitutability, exchangeability, and parity. This result is used to provide characterizations of each of these rules by postulating separating axioms, that is, an axiom and its negation. Such axioms identify traits specifically differentiating a type of rule (...) from the other types. For instance, majority differs from strong dictatorship in the existence of a society for which collective indifference should be a less likely outcome than the strict preference of one alternative over the other. As a second example, the difference between majority and strong dictatorship can be traced back to the requirement that the likelihood of collective indifference diminishes with the size of society. (shrink)

Hybrid belief aggregation addresses aggregation of individual probabilistic beliefs into collective binary beliefs. In line with the development of judgment aggregation theory, our research delves into the identification of precise agenda conditions associated with some key impossibility theorems in the context of hybrid belief aggregation. We determine the necessary and sufficient level of logical interconnection between the propositions in an agenda for some key impossibilities to arise. Specifically, we prove three characterization theorems about hybrid belief aggregation: (i) Precisely the path-connected (...) and pair-negatable agendas lead to the ‘oligarchy result’—only oligarchic rules satisfy universal domain, proposition-wise independence, respect for unanimity, and deductive closure of collective beliefs. (ii) Precisely the negation-connected agendas lead to the ‘triviality result’—only unanimity rules satisfy those conditions as well as anonymity. (iii) Precisely the blocked agendas lead to the ‘non-existence result’—no rules satisfy those conditions as well as completeness and consistency of collective beliefs. Furthermore, we compare these novel findings with existing agenda-theoretic characterization theorems in the domains of judgment aggregation and belief binarization. (shrink)

In a homogeneous jury, in which each vote is correct with the same probability, and each pair of votes correlates with the same correlation coefficient, there exists a correlation-robust voting quota, such that the probability of a correct verdict is independent of the correlation coefficient. For positive correlation, an increase in the correlation coefficient decreases the probability of a correct verdict for any voting rule below the correlation-robust quota, and increases that probability for any above the correlation-robust quota. The (...) jury may be less competent under the correlation-robust rule than under simple majority rule and less competent under simple majority rule than a single juror alone. The jury is always less competent than a single juror under unanimity rule. (shrink)

I present an original model in judgment aggregation theory that demonstrates the general impossibility of consistently describing decision-making purely at the group level. Only a type of unanimity rule can guarantee a group decision is consistent with supporting reasons, and even this possibility is limited to a small class of reasoning methods. The key innovation is that this result holds when individuals can reason in different ways, an allowance not previously considered in the literature. This generalizes judgment aggregation (...) to subjective decision situations, implying that the discursive dilemma persists without individual agreement on the logical constraints. Notably, the model mirrors the typical method of choosing political representatives, and thus suggests that no voting procedure other than unanimity rule can guarantee representation that reflects electorate opinion. Finally, I apply the results to a normative argument for unanimity rule in contract theory and juries, as well as to problems posed for deliberative democratic theory and the concept of representation. (shrink)

We consider a spatial bargaining model where players collectively choose a facility location on a two-dimensional rectilinear distance space through bargaining using the unanimity rule. We show that as players become infinitely patient, their stationary subgame perfect equilibrium utilities converge to the utilities that satisfy the lexicographic maximin utility criterion introduced by Sen.

Since the publication of Ekins’ The Nature of Legislative Intent, significant attention has been paid to common attitude models of legislative intention, that is, models that require unanimity among its group members. A common interpretation of Ekins is that these common attitudes are to be preferred over aggregated attitudes. I argue that any feasible theory of legislative attitudes will require non-trivial aggregation (ie. not based on unanimity rules alone). Two arguments are put forward in this regard: first, that (...) non-trivial aggregation better explains uncooperative legislative behaviour and second, that mathematical problems with aggregation apply to common attitudes as well since they involve trivial aggregation. These arguments generalise to theories of common attitudes other than Ekins’. (shrink)

Most decision-making research in economics focuses on individual decisions. Yet, we know, from psychological research in particular, that individual preferences can be sensitive to social pressures. In this paper, we study the impact of a group environment on individual preferences for risky and ambiguous prospects. In our experiment, each participant was invited to make a series of lottery-choice decisions in two different conditions. In the Alone condition, individuals made private choices, whereas in the Group condition, individuals belonged to a three-person (...) group and group members’ choices were aggregated according to either a majority or unanimity rule. This design allows us to study the impact of a group environment on individuals’ attitude towards both risky and ambiguous prospects, while controlling for the decision rule used in the group. Our experimental results show that when individuals are in the Group condition, they tend to be less risk averse and more ambiguity averse than when they are not part of a group. Our experiment also suggests that the decision rule matters as it shows that these two trends tend to be stronger when the group implements a unanimity rule. Specifically, we found that individuals who belong to a group implementing a unanimity rule are significantly less risk averse than individuals who belong to a group that relies on the majority rule. We obtained a similar—but non-significant—result under ambiguity. (shrink)

The present paper argues that Rothbard’s economic case against the state is more robust than suggested by his critics. The charge that it might be anemic is based on the suggestion that we can say literally nothing about the way governmental acts bear on social utility. Contra this supposition we submit that Rothbard’s critics missed the fact that the effects of governmental interventions might be actually indeterminate in two ways: weakly or strongly. If the indeterminacy involved in his welfare theory (...) is weak, then his economic criticism of the state is more robust than envisaged by these authors. To the effect that this indeterminacy is indeed weak we advance the following reasons: Rothbard’s understanding of the Unanimity Rule; the avoidance of the contradiction allegedly committed by Rothbard over one and the same page of his famous essay; his economic criticism of interventionism being better aligned with his overall ethical anti-governmental stance; the principle of charitable reading, which cuts across all of the previously stated reasons. If our arguments count for something, then we are warranted in claiming that Rothbard is indeed able to say something about social utility under interventionism. And if so, then his criticism of interventionism should be viewed as robust rather than anemic. (shrink)

This paper studies the three kinds of conservativeness in a jury decision-making structure: the voting rule, the threshold of reasonable doubt, and the legal information system. In a model of simultaneous voting, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (The American Political Science Review, 92(1), 23-35, 1998) argue that the unanimity rule is the worst-performing voting rule because voters with strategic behaviour mitigate the bias brought about by the voting rule. If this bias can be offset by an opposing (...) (less conservative) bias in the legal information system, we would be able to restore the rationality of informative voting. The new informative equilibrium is strictly better than the original strategic equilibrium in terms of ex post error probability. When a strategic equilibrium survives, we can lower the probability of convicted defendant being innocent by making the information system more informative or by forming a jury with a higher (more conservative) threshold of reasonable doubt. (shrink)

The Condorcet Jury Theorem formalises the “wisdom of crowds”: binary decisions made by majority vote are asymptotically correct as the number of voters tends to infinity. This classical result assumes like-minded, expected utility maximising voters who all share a common prior belief about the right decision. Ellis : 865–895, 2016) shows that when voters have ambiguous prior beliefs—a set of priors—and follow maxmin expected utility, such wisdom requires that voters’ beliefs satisfy a “disjoint posteriors” condition: different private signals lead to (...) posterior sets with disjoint interiors. Both the original theorem and Ellis’s generalisation assume symmetric penalties for wrong decisions. If, as in the jury context, errors attract asymmetric penalties then it is natural to consider voting rules that raise the hurdle for the decision carrying the heavier penalty for error. In a classical model, Feddersen and Pesendorfer :23–35, 1998) have shown that, paradoxically, raising this hurdle may actually increase the likelihood of the more serious error. In particular, crowds are not wise under the unanimity rule: the probability of the more serious error does not vanish as the crowd size tends to infinity. We show that this “Jury Paradox” persists in the presence of ambiguity, whether or not juror beliefs satisfy Ellis’s “disjoint posteriors” condition. We also characterise the strictly mixed equilibria of this model and study their properties. Such equilibria cannot exist in the absence of ambiguity but may exist for arbitrarily large jury size when ambiguity is present. In addition to uninformative strictly mixed equilibria, analogous to those exhibited by Ellis : 865–895, 2016), there may also exist strictly mixed equilibria which are informative about voter signals. (shrink)

We need to acknowledge that the members of most modern societes adhere to different and partially contradictory moral convictions which to overcome we yet don’t have the intellectual means. Since such convictions typically include opions about which moral rules should be established as laws there will be disagreement about the correct rules of law as well. The article investigates the possibilities to find a system of laws that all can accept on the basis of such moral pluralism. It develops six (...) steps and models for the required justification. As the final step has the form of a strategic negotiation the concluding section explores which forms of representation and which deviations from unanimity are acceptable within this procedural model of justification. (shrink)

Consensus plays an ambiguous role in deliberative democracy. While it formed the horizon of early deliberative theories, many now denounce it as an empirically unachievable outcome, a logically impossible stopping rule, and a normatively undesirable ideal. Deliberative disagreement, by contrast, is celebrated not just as an empirically unavoidable outcome but also as a democratically sound and normatively desirable goal of deliberation. Majority rule has generally displaced unanimity as the ideal way of bringing deliberation to a close. This (...) article offers an epistemic perspective on this question of consensus versus disagreement. For ensuring the production of better decisions, we argue, the normative appeal of consensus varies depending on the deliberative task – whether it entails problem solving or prediction. We argue that in pure problem-solving contexts, consensus retains a strong normative appeal and forms the ideal deliberative outcome of deliberation. In contrast, on predictive tasks, consensus should generally not be used as a stopping rule noris it likely to be epistemically desirable as an outcome. Instead deliberators may be better served by ending the deliberation with a form of deliberative disagreement we call ‘positive dissensus’, which paves the way for more accurate aggregate predictions. (shrink)

Concepts, such as death, life and spirit cannot be known in their quintessential nature, but can be defined in accordance with their effects. In fact, those who think within the mode of pragmatism and Cartesian logic have ignored the metaphysical aspects of these terms. According to Islam, the entity that moves the body is named the soul. And the aliment of the soul is air. Cessation of breathing means leaving of the soul from the body. Those who agree on the (...) diagnosis of brain death may not able to agree unanimously on the rules that lay down such diagnosis. That is to say, there are a heap of suspicions regarding the diagnosis of brain death, and these suspicions are on the increase. In fact, Islamic jurisprudence does not put provisions, decisions on suspicious grounds. By virtue of these facts, it can be asserted that brain death is not absolute death according to Islamic sources; for in the patients diagnosed with brain death the soul still has not abandoned the body. Therefore, these patients suffer in every operation performed on them. (shrink)

One objection to the principle of public reason is that since there is room for reasonable disagreement about distributive justice as well as about human flourishing, the requirement of reasonable acceptability rules out redistribution as well as perfectionism. In response, some justificatory liberals have invoked the argument from higher-order unanimity, or nested inclusiveness. If it is not reasonable to reject having some system of property rights, and if redistribution is just the enforcement of a different set of property rights, (...) redistribution is legitimate if chosen democratically. This article explores two problems with this response. First, there are different ways to describe the set of possible policies, and so different ways to specify the noncoercive default that obtains in the absence of conclusive justification. Second, if the coercive exercise of political power must be conclusively justified, policies that are more coercive ought to require conclusive justification as against policies that are less coercive. These problems about the baseline with respect to which we require public justification raise the question of how we measure coercion, and whether or in what sense there is a presumption against coercion. The article distinguishes and argues against three such presumptions. (shrink)

Despite the general applicability of philosophical concepts of the subject and subjectivity among philosophers, there is no unanimity in their understanding, even if we are talking about representatives of one philosophical trend. The subject of this article is the different understandings of subjectivity by two well-known French authors of analytical inspiration, V. Descombes and S. Laugier, which are united by the critique of the reflexive subject of the philosophy of mind, defending the idea of social mental nature, as well (...) as appeal to the methodological resources of later Wittgenstein’s philosophy to develop the idea of a social subject. Despite their common attitudes, Descombes and Laugier are inspired by different traditions — Descombes, in general, develops the ideas of the French School of Sociology, while Laugier works in line of linguistic phenomenology, defined by the ordinary language philosophy and skeptical interpretations of Wittgenstein’s thought. Descombes builds the conception of the subject as an actor, formed not by his inside world, but by his action, the model of which is the institution of social life. Descombes’s practical subjectivity grows out of his critique of the reflexive paradigm of the philosophy of mind (consciousness) and is the actor’s ability to take the responsibility for his own actions. Instead, Laugier’s concept of «depsychologized subjectivity » focuses on the other side of the actor’s ability to act following some rule within the institutional paradigm of practice, namely the fragility and vulnerability of any human action, its defeats and difficulties, and the subject’s reluctance to be an actor and take the responsibility for his actions. Laugier defends the skeptical understanding of subjectivity as a property of the action of the delocalized subject of language and knowledge, his ability even by his inability to express the social naturalness of the human way of life. (shrink)

It is a platitude among decision theorists that agents should choose their actions so as to maximize expected value. But exactly how to define expected value is contentious. Evidential decision theory (henceforth EDT), causal decision theory (henceforth CDT), and a theory proposed by Ralph Wedgwood that this essay will call benchmark theory (BT) all advise agents to maximize different types of expected value. Consequently, their verdicts sometimes conflict. In certain famous cases of conflict—medical Newcomb problems—CDT and BT seem to get (...) things right, while EDT seems to get things wrong. In other cases of conflict, including some recent examples suggested by Andy Egan, EDT and BT seem to get things right, while CDT seems to get things wrong. In still other cases, EDT and CDT seems to get things right, while BT gets things wrong. It's no accident, this essay claims, that all three decision theories are subject to counterexamples. Decision rules can be reinterpreted as voting rules, where the voters are the agent's possible future selves. The problematic examples have the structure of voting paradoxes. Just as voting paradoxes show that no voting rule can do everything we want, decision-theoretic paradoxes show that no decision rule can do everything we want. Luckily, the so-called “tickle defense” establishes that EDT, CDT, and BT will do everything we want in a wide range of situations. Most decision situations, this essay argues, are analogues of voting situations in which the voters unanimously adopt the same set of preferences. In such situations, all plausible voting rules and all plausible decision rules agree. (shrink)

The article analyzes one of the fundamental rights – the right to maintenance, which proper implementation ensures normal development of the child. This right matches with the duty of parents to maintain their minor children. Paragraph 6 of Article 38 of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania states that parents have a duty to educate their children to be honest people and loyal citizens, supporting them until adulthood. The obligation to maintain children is established in the first 3.192 Article (...) paragraph of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, and the responsibility for avoiding to maintain a child is provided in Article 164 of the Criminal Code. The article discusses the fact that the analysis of criminal law rate is not precise enough. Article 164 of the Criminal Code does not match with the child maintenance methods specified in the CC Article 3.196 paragraph 1. Since criminal liability is only for judgment in default in civil cases, a person shall only be liable for breaking the right to maintain a child, provided in the CC 3.196 paragraph 1. This article deeply analyzes the problematic qualification aspects of the avoidance to maintain a child. Some alternative ways of child maintenance are mentioned, as can be chosen from other law instruments (bailiffs, Guarantee child support fund) and it leads to the ultima ratio principle. On the other hand, it is not required to seek alternative remedies for affected interests, and it is possible to initiate a pre-trial investigation. Therefore, this article seeks to identify specific civil and criminal law rules delimitation. Avoidance of child maintenance is an ongoing crime. The main problem in legal practice is to determine an end of this ongoing criminal conduct. The practice of the Supreme Court of Lithuania is not unanimous. In some cases, the end of this ongoing conduct is considered to be a moment when the past judgment has entered into force, in other cases – the moment of indictment. These positions are criticized by many authors and it is suggested to follow the Supreme Court’s practice, according to which the moment when a judgment of conviction for the criminal act is passed should be considered as an end of an ongoing criminal conduct. (shrink)

Kann die moderne Gestalt der Demokratie den Werten der Freiheit und Gleichheit gerecht werden? Oder befinden sich Mehrheitsregel und Repräsentation in einem unversöhnlichen Widerstreit mit den Grundwerten der politischen Moderne? Nach einer kritischen Präsentation der traditionellen Inkompatibilitätsthese wie auch jüngerer Varianten der Konvergenzthese wird – auf der Grundlage unseres politischen Selbstverständnisses – für die Notwendigkeit einer neuen, komplexen Bestimmung dieses Verhältnisses argumentiert: Die politischen Mechanismen der modernen Demokratie können als ein unvollkommener Ausdruck ihrer Kernwerte verstanden werden: Zwar kann ihre vollkommene (...) Kongruenz nicht garantiert werden, doch eine partielle Konvergenz zwischen dem Wert der Gleichheit und der Mehrheitsregel einerseits und dem Wert der Freiheit und der politischen Repräsentation andererseits ist auch nicht unmöglich. Der potentielle Konflikt zwischen ihnen kann zwar nicht vollständig ausgeräumt werden, aber er lässt sich doch begrenzen: Die Mehrheitsregel kann durch die Einstimmigkeitsregel und die politische Repräsentation durch direktdemokratische Elemente ergänzt werden.Does the institutional design of modern democracy live up to its basic values of liberty and equality? Or do we have to assume an irreconcilable antagonism between majority rule and political representation and the basic values of political modernity? After a critical presentation of the traditional view of an incompatibility as well as more recent views of a convergence between the values and mechanisms of democracy I argue – on the basis of our political self-understanding – for the necessity of a new and complex analysis of this relationship. The political mechanisms of modern democracy may be understood as an imperfect expression of its basic values: Even if we cannot guarantee their perfect congruence, we do not have to exclude the possibility of a partial convergence between the value of equality and majority rule on the one hand and the value of liberty and political representation on the other. The potential conflict between the values and mechanisms may not be completely avoided, but it can at least be limited: Majority rule can be complemented by the rule of unanimity, and political representation can be complemented by certain elements of a more direct and participatory democracy. (shrink)

This study examines a recent claim that it was the Umayyad caliph ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz who instituted the requirement that non-Muslims living under Muslim rule adopt distinctive dress and behavior. After showing that the evidence for the origins of the ghiyār is neither as unanimous nor as consistent as was suggested, it is argued that the ghiyār cannot be securely attributed to ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz and that the problem of its origins therefore remains in question.

This article deals with a highly debated text, namely 2 Maccabees 12, specifically the problematic verses (38–45) which contain a theology that is distinctly non-Jewish in import. Indeed, most recent scholars concerned with this passage do not seem to be unanimous apropos the best interpretation of the events that are described, resulting in a range of different opinions concerning, inter alia, the afterlife, purgatory and/or doctrinal disputes between Pharisees and Sadducees. By means of an interpretivist or constructivist epistemology, the authors (...) advocate that normally, traditional Judaism emphasises personal, individual responsibility and accountability, whereas in this text God is portrayed as requiring material, financial payment for wrongdoing and not individual תשובה [teshuvah]. This is in contradistinction to, inter alia, Exodus 30:11–16 and theologically Jewish ‘transgression’ has clearly metamorphosed into Christian ‘sin’. In addition, Judas Maccabeus seems to have retained a half-shekel methodology (employed for Jewish men of military age – soldiers) whilst emphasising the ‘atonement for your lives’ from Exodus 30:11–16 in a more literalistic, materialistic, non-Jewish sense whilst de-emphasising the real need to maintain the Temple as well as the proper, traditional rules of תשובה. (shrink)

There are many studies and theories in the literature on the source of power in the formative years of the Mamlūk state. In these studies, the importance of power and influence as a form of becoming a sultan in the Mamlūks has been emphasized, although the oligarchic power of the umara has been indirectly mentioned in terms of the source of power by discussing the distinction between a puppet sultan and an authoritarian sultan. However, this axiom causes a number of (...) problems and ambiguities within itself and leads to the supersession of the determinism of the elite amirs. This work will try to overcome this problem by focusing on the political developments during the foundation years of the state and discussing how powerful and influential amirs were restricted by the umara on their way to becoming sultans. At the same time, by focusing on the chronicles of the period in question, the administrative determinism of the Mamlūk factions as a decision-making mechanism in the Mamlūk state will be pointed out. On the other hand, the statement that power emanated from both the sultan’s household faction and the military support of the elite amirs or khushdāshs who held the Mamlūk oligarchy in their hands leads to overlooking the tension or conflict between the two throughout Mamlūk political history. Considering the state of conflict between the two sides, it is a logical contradiction for the two opposing poles to agree on the same candidate. For instance, considering Muʿizz Aybak’s accession to power, the Sālihiyya-Bahriyya amirs unanimously endorsed his sultanate, but in the process, Muʿizz Aybak prevailed over the tensions he experienced with the elite that brought him to power and managed to become the absolute sultan, albeit for a short time. Therefore, it is essential to keep in mind that there was no uniform relationship between the sultan and the elite amirs, but rather a dynamic functioning. In other words, the future sultan, who had to establish good relations with the amirs until he became sultan, had to go against the amirs who brought him to power if he wanted to become an absolute ruler after he became sultan. In this study, the source of Mamlūk power is traced to the collective interests of the Mamlūk factions. It is emphasized that these interests were usually centered on candidates who were seen as more moderate among the factions. At the same time, by revealing the shortcomings of the understandings presented as a rule such as “the one who kills the sultan becomes the sultan” and “the powerful and influential become the sultan”, the analysis of the period from the founding years of the Mamlūks to Baybars’ sultanate mostly emphasizes the continuity of the status quo of the elite amirs by highlighting the “sultanate of weak and middle-ranking amirs”. The analysis has pointed out that those who killed sultans or usurped the throne were punished rather than usurping the throne as a legitimate right. Similarly, the consensus of the umara on the candidate for sultanate was pointed out by mentioning that those who were powerful and influential were being challenged rather than made sultan. (shrink)

It seems a function of normal human empathy for us to treat others as we would like to be treated. If, through empathy, we have the capacity of experiencing the distress of others, then we refrain from harming them. Our guide is the “golden rule,” variations of which occur in all the world’s religions.[i] Yet despite apparent unanimity on the rule as “the sum of duty,” conceptions of justice, of how best to organize a state, differ widely. (...) There is often a surprising disjunct between the private ethical conduct of citizens and what counts as “just” or “fair” in the actions of the state. Victor Klemperer’s diaries of the Nazi years bear eloquent testimony both to the private decency of ordinary individuals and the brutality of the state that had at least their passive acquiescence.[ii] Such considerations prompt one to ask: how can we make the transition from ethics to justice? How do we keep intact our sense of empathy and decency when we move from the private to the public realm? How can the universal ethics implied by empathy take on a political presence? To attempt an answer, I am going to look at the nature of empathy to see how it relates to our having a conscience. I will then turn to Hannah Arendt’s account of the human condition to show how the structures implicit in empathy might be translated to society at large. (shrink)

In recent literature there is unanimous agreement about children's pragmatic competence in drawing scalar implicatures about some , if the task is made easy enough. However, children accept infelicitous some sentences more often than adults do. In general their acceptance is assumed to be synonymous with a logical interpretation of some as a quantifier. But in our view an overlap with some as a determiner in under-informative sentences cannot be ruled out, given the ambiguity of the experimental instructions and the (...) attitude of trust by children in adults. Our study investigated this hypothesis with different experimental manipulations. We found that when the experimenter's intentions are clear (Experiment 1, all / some order effect; Experiments 2 and 4, conditions 2 and 3), under-informative sentences are usually rejected; otherwise (Experiment 1, some / all order effect; Experiments 3 and 4, control condition) they are accepted. However, analysis of verbal protocols indicated that pragmatically infelicitous sentences are accepted, with some interpreted mostly as a determiner, irrespective of the function of some as a quantifier. Acceptance is not in itself synonymous with a logical interpretation of some as a quantifier. (shrink)

In the fifth book of Plato'sLaws(745e7–746a8), the Athenian stranger concedes that some requirements posed in the description of the ideal city might be unrealistically demanding. The passage quotes the due limits fixed with regard to wealth and the regulations about the number of children and the size of the family, as well as the rules to be observed in the allocation of houses in the city and in the countryside. The latter requirement is recalled at 746a6–7 (ἔτι δὲ χώρας τε (...) καὶ ἄστεος, ὡς εἴρηκεν, μεσότητάς τε καὶ ἐν κύκλῳ οἰκήσεις πάντῃ), where the word μεσότης is unanimously understood as indicating a geographic notion of ‘middle’, with regard to either the position of the houses in the ideal city, or that of the city in the territory. (shrink)

We analyse the liberal ethics of noninterference in social choice. A liberal principle, capturing noninterfering views of society and inspired by John Stuart Mill's conception of liberty, is examined. The principle expresses the idea that society should not penalise individuals after changes in their situation that do not affect others. An impossibility for liberal approaches is highlighted: every social decision rule that satisfies unanimity and a general principle of noninterference must be dictatorial. This raises some important issues for (...) liberal approaches in social choice and political philosophy. (shrink)

NOT BOLDNESS, but circumspection, and again circumspection, and always circumspection." That is the motto A. O. Lovejoy, in his presidential address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, recommended to his fellow philosophers. Observing that the course of American philosophy from the turn of the century to the first World War had undergone a revolution against the alleged certitudes of idealism and witnessed the rise of discordant realisms and pragmatisms, Lovejoy wondered whether philosophy must lose itself in incessant (...) disagreement and fail forever to arrive at universally intelligible and definitely cogent results. He ascribed the failures of philosophers to their confusion of the distinct activities of edification and of inquiry; and he undertook to formulate the conditions for progress in philosophical inquiry. Above all, he urged that philosophers pledge themselves to dispassionate, disinterested inquiry. Philosophers, he contended, must develop the habit of "logical observation." They must deliberately and systematically attempt to enumerate exhaustively all the elements that bear upon a philosophical problem. Philosophy, he held, is intrinsically a cooperative enterprise, since it requires more than one mind to advance toward the truth. Yet, he readily added, philosophical cooperation consists primarily in disagreement, for he quoted Harrington's aphorism with approval: "Truth is a spark to which objections are like bellows." Nevertheless, he seldom wavered from his conviction that truth would win unanimous assent. Philosophers, he advised, should adopt a common and an unambiguous terminology and should formulate a common set of rules for the purposes of philosophical discussions. They should treat individual problems in isolation and deal with general issues in piecemeal fashion. And finally, they should prepare an undogmatic, nonpartisan, comprehensive catalogue of philosophical considerations, organized according to the problems or theses to which they are pertinent. Thus the cooperative pursuit of objective truths would be facilitated, and progress in philosophical inquiry, based upon circumspection, would be attained. (shrink)

On 27 September 2002, the Bush administration issued final rules allowing states to define a fetus as a child eligible for government‐subsidized health care under the Children's Health Insurance Program. CHIP does not cover any illegal immigrants and only covers legal immigrants who have been in the country for five years. Babies born in the United States, however, are citizens and therefore eligible for assistance. The response from women's groups and pro‐choice advocates was swift and unanimously negative.

Many bodies around the world make their decisions through voting systems in which voters have several options and the collective result also has several options. Many of these voting systems are anonymous, i.e., all voters have an identical role in voting. Anonymous simple voting games, a binary vote for voters and a binary collective decision, can be represented by an easy weighted game, i.e., by means of a quota and an identical weight for the voters. Widely used voting systems of (...) this type are the majority and the unanimity decision rules. In this article, we analyze the case in which voters have two or more voting options and the collective result of the vote has also two or more options. We prove that anonymity implies being representable through a weighted game if and only if the voting options for voters are binary. As a consequence of this result, several significant enumerations are obtained. (shrink)

We reconsider the Myerson value and the position value for communication situations. In case the underlying game is a unanimity game, we show that each of these values can be computed using the inclusion--exclusion principle. Linearity of both values permits us to calculate them without needing the dividends of the induced games (graph-restricted game and link game). The expression of these dividends is only derived in the existing literature for special communication situations. Moreover, the associated inclusion--exclusion decomposability property depends (...) on what we have called the graph allocation rule. This rule is the relative degree (relative indicator) for the position value (Myerson value). (shrink)

In this chapter, typical examples of methodological individualism explanation are borrowed from Raymond Boudon’s writings. They respectively aim at answering the following questions:Why did Athens’ allies defect in the Peloponnesian War?When does social organization aim at eliminating unintended effects?Why does the rule of unanimity often prevail in traditional village societies?Why do members of an unorganized group tend to defect?Why are collective powers often governed by the iron law of oligarchy?Why did capitalist agriculture develop much more slowly in France (...) than in England in the eighteenth century?Why has the immoral character of interest lending disappeared in modern societies?Why is there no socialism in the United States?Why do economic booms seem to be associated with higher suicide rates?Why does the diffusion of an innovation follow a chain reaction process in situations where interpersonal influence is greater?Why were Mithra cult and Freemasonry, respectively, successful in Ancient Rome and modern Prussia?Why were the peasants in ancient Rome hostile to monotheism?Why did the French intellectuals of the late eighteenth century worship Reason?Why did Indian peasants not adopt the birth control measures advocated by the Indian administration?Why do conflicts between employees in a Taylorized firm tend to be more violent? (shrink)

THIS ESSAY EXPLORES THE IMPLICATIONS OF A NATURAL LAW ACCOUNT of marriage for the gay marriage controversy, starting from the concept of the natural law developed by scholastic jurists and theologians in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Certainly, the scholastics themselves unanimously condemned homosexual acts, and probably never entertained the possibility of same-sex marital unions. Yet this fact taken by itself does not mean that their overall concept of the natural law and the approach to marriage developed out of that (...) concept must necessarily rule out gay marriages. We are the heirs of several centuries of further experiences with and reflection on marriage, and through this process our own conceptions of both marriage and sex itself have changed—leading to perspectives very different from the scholastics yet recognizably products of a trajectory of thought that they initiated. In this essay I argue that the scholastic concept of the natural law, when developed and applied within a contemporary context, does not rule out gay marriage but on the contrary gives us reasons to support the legal recognition of such unions. (shrink)

In Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller,, the Supreme Court unanimously held that states’ “any willing provider” laws are not preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. The Court ruled that states can regulate their health maintenance organizations, and thus upheld a Kentucky law that requires insurers to reimburse services of any health care provider who is willing and able to meet established criteria. The Supreme Court has heard several cases related to ERISA in the (...) last few years, and other such cases are working their way through the court system. Coupled with this most recent decision in Miller, the Supreme Court may significantly alter the shape of the insurance industry. (shrink)

Yuan Dynasty was an era with austere political reality and thinking reality. As a result of despisement to ruling of different races, a large majority of scholars in Yuan Dynasty chose seclusion without other choice, but the “internal beauty” they pursued was amazingly unanimous, which was, without doubt, owing to the spirit of the mountains and forests. When they tried to find enjoyment in painting, they put their willpower in it, which was a spontaneous awareness of cultural spirit and was, (...) moreover, a peak experience of Chinese traditional culture. Achievement of Yuan Dynasty painting was impressive, and extended the aesthetic space of human beings. Thus, it enriched and development and manifestation connotation of landscape painting to a great extent, and would be engraved forever in the spiritual and cultural history of human beings. (shrink)

One of the main results in topological social choice states the non-existence of a continuous, anonymous, and unanimous aggregation rule on spheres. This note provides a proof based upon simple methods such as integration.

Counting is a complex cognitive process that is paramount to arithmetical development at school. The improvement of counting skills of children depends on their understanding of the logical and conventional rules involved. While the logical rules are mandatory and related to one-to-one correspondence, stable order, and cardinal principles, conventional rules are optional and associated with social customs. This study contributes to unravel the conceptual understanding of counting rules of children. It explores, with a developmental approach, the performance of children on (...) non-routine counting detection tasks, their confidence in their answers, and their ability to change a wrong answer by deferring to the opinion of a unanimous majority who justified or did not justify their claims. Hundred and forty nine children aged from 5 to 8 years were randomized to one of the experimental conditions of the testimony of teachers: with or without justification. Participants judged the correctness of different types of counting procedures presented by a computerized detection task, such as pseudoerrors that are correct counts where conventional rules are violated, and compensation errors that are incorrect counts where logical rules were broken twice. Afterwards, children rated their confidence in their detection answer with a 5-point scale. Subsequently, they listened to the testimony of the teachers and showed either conformity or non-conformity. The participants considered both compensation errors and pseudoerrors as incorrect counts in the detection task. The analysis of the confidence of children in their responses suggested that they were not sensitive to their incorrect performance. Finally, children tended to conform more often after hearing a justification of the testimony than after hearing only the testimonies of the teachers. It can be concluded that the age range of the evaluated children failed to recognize the optional nature of conventional counting rules and were unaware of their misconceptions. Nevertheless, the reasoned justifications of the testimony, offered by a unanimous majority, promoted considerable improvement in the tendency of the children to revise those misconceptions. (shrink)