I discuss how modern cosmology illustrates under-determination of theoretical hypotheses by data, in ways that are different from most philosophical discussions. I emphasise cosmology's concern with what data could in principle be collected by a single observer ; and I give a broadly sceptical discussion of cosmology's appeal to the cosmological principle as a way of breaking the under-determination.I confine most of the discussion to the history of the observable universe from about one second after the (...) Big Bang, as described by the mainstream cosmological model: in effect, what cosmologists in the early 1970s dubbed the ‘standard model’, as elaborated since then. But in the closing Section 4, I broach some questions about times earlier than one second. (shrink)

Łukasiewicz three-valued logic Ł3 is often understood as the set of all 3-valued valid formulas according to Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued matrices. Following Wojcicki, in addition, we shall consider two alternative interpretations of Ł3: “well-determined” Ł3a and “truth-preserving” Ł3b defined by two different consequence relations on the 3-valued matrices. The aim of this paper is to provide (by using Dunn semantics) dual equivalent two-valued under-determined and over-determined interpretations for Ł3, Ł3a and Ł3b. The logic Ł3 is axiomatized as an extension of (...) Routley and Meyer’s basic positive logic following Brady’s strategy for axiomatizing many-valued logics by employing two-valued under-determined or over-determined interpretations. Finally, it is proved that “well determined” Łukasiewicz logics are paraconsistent. (shrink)

This paper explores the options available to the anti-realist to defend a Quinean empirical under-determination thesis using examples of dualities. I first explicate a version of the empirical under-determination thesis that can be brought to bear on theories of contemporary physics. Then I identify a class of examples of dualities that lead to empirical under-determination. But I argue that the resulting under-determination is benign, and is not a threat to a cautious scientific (...) realism. Thus dualities are not new ammunition for the anti-realist. The paper also shows how the number of possible interpretative options about dualities that have been considered in the literature can be reduced, and suggests a general approach to scientific realism that one may take dualities to favour. (shrink)

Łukasiewicz three-valued logic Ł3 is often understood as the set of all 3-valued valid formulas according to Łukasiewicz’s 3-valued matrices. Following Wojcicki, in addition, we shall consider two alternative interpretations of Ł3: “well-determined” Ł3a and “truth-preserving” Ł3b defined by two different consequence relations on the 3-valued matrices. The aim of this paper is to provide dual equivalent two-valued under-determined and over-determined interpretations for Ł3, Ł3a and Ł3b. The logic Ł3 is axiomatized as an extension of Routley and Meyer’s basic (...) positive logic following Brady’s strategy for axiomatizing many-valued logics by employing two-valued under-determined or over-determined interpretations. Finally, it is proved that “well determined” Łukasiewicz logics are paraconsistent. (shrink)

This dissertation presents an objection to Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances, three possible solutions to the objection, evaluations of the solutions, and a sketch of Wittgenstein's approach to the objection. My thesis is that none of the three proposed solutions is satisfactory, but that Wittgenstein can deal with the objection. ;Chapter I presents the Problem of the Under-Determination of Extension, the claim that family resemblances are not enough to explain the extension of a concept, since resemblances may be (...) postulated between cases falling under different concepts. ;Chapters II and III discuss three solutions proposed by commentators on family resemblances. The Basic Predicates Solution claims that points of family resemblance are sufficient conditions, and is incorrect since Wittgenstein denies that one can infer the applicability of a concept based on the presence of a resemblance to an instance of the concept. The Simple Properties Solution claims that only some concepts are family resemblance concepts, and depend upon concepts which are not family resemblance concepts, and is incorrect, since Wittgenstein does not require that family resemblance concepts be reducible to non-family resemblance concepts. The Bi-Directional Determination of Concepts Solution is the claim that a concept is determined by an interaction between facts about cases subsumed under it, and needs and purposes of language-users. This solution is non-Wittgensteinian by ignoring the ramifications of his concepts of grammar and language-games. ;Chapter IV argues that Wittgenstein deals with the original objection by developing new models for understanding language, involving the concepts of grammar and language-games. (shrink)

I argue that academic psychology’s quest to achieve scientific respectability by reliance on quantification and objectification is deeply flawed. Specifically, psychological theory typically cannot support prognostication beyond the binary opposition of “effect present/effect absent”. Accordingly, the “numbers” assigned to experimental results amount to little more than affixing names (e.g., more than, less than) to the members of an ordered sequence of outcomes. This, in conjunction with the conceptual under-specification characterizing the targets of experimental inquiry, is, I contend, a primary (...) reason why psychologists find it difficult to discriminate between competing, explanations of the effects of mind on behavior. Absent well-specified theory capable of enabling precise and detailed quantitative prediction, inferring underlying mental mechanisms from experimental outcomes becomes a difficult, if not impossible, task. (shrink)

Emotions are traditionally considered to be brief states that last for seconds or a few minutes at most. However, due to pioneering theoretical work of Frijda and recent empirical studies, it has become clear that the duration of emotions is actually highly variable with durations ranging from a few seconds to several hours, or even longer. We review research on determinants of emotion duration. Three classes of determinants are identified: features related to the (a) emotion-eliciting event (event duration and event (...) appraisal), (b) emotion itself (nature of the emotion component, nature of the emotion, and emotion intensity), and (c) emotion-experiencing person (dispositions and emotion regulatory actions). Initial evidence on the psychological and neural mechanisms that underlie their effects is discussed. (shrink)

Kant’s distinction between the determining and reflecting power of judgment in the third Critique is not well understood in the literature. A mainstream view unifies these by making determination the telos of all acts of judgment (Longuenesse 1998). On this view, all reflection is primarily in the business of producing empirical concepts for cognition, and thus has what I call a determinative ideal. I argue that this view fails to take seriously the independence and autonomy of the ‘power of (...) judgment’ [Urteilskraft] as a higher cognitive faculty in its own right with its own a priori principle. Instead of seeing merely reflecting judgments as failed or incomplete acts of judgment, I argue that these are in fact paradigmatic of the activity of the power of judgment. More precisely, the reflecting power of judgment just is the power of judgment. Accordingly, reflecting judgment takes precedence over determining judgment; while the former operates according to a law that it gives itself, the latter requires another higher cognitive faculty to provide its principle. On my view, reflecting judgment should be understood as the capacity for purposive subsumption—most clearly seen in the activity of mere reflection. (shrink)

We initiate the study of model theory in the absence of the Axiom of Choice, using the Axiom of Determinateness as a powerful substitute. We first show that, in this context, L ω 1 ω is no more powerful than first-order logic. The emphasis then turns to upward Lowenhein-Skolem theorems; ℵ 1 is the Hanf number of first-order logic, of L ω 1 ω , and of a strong fragment of L ω 1 ω . The main technical innovation is (...) the development of iterated ultrapowers using infinite supports; this requires an application of infinite-exponent partition relations. All our theorems can be proven from hypotheses weaker than AD. (shrink)

The question of whether problems with the social determinants of health that might impact decision-making justify denying eligibility for assisted dying has recently come to the fore in debates about the legalisation of assisted dying. For example, it was central to critiques of the 2021 amendments made to Canada’s assisted dying law. The question of whether changes to a country’s assisted dying legislation lead to descents down slippery slopes has also come to the fore—as it does any time a jurisdiction (...) changes its laws. We explore these two questions through the lens of Canada’s experience both to inform Canada’s ongoing discussions and because other countries will confront the same questions if they contemplate changing their assisted dying law. Canada’s Medical Assistance in Dying law has evolved through a journey from the courts to Parliament, back to the courts, and then back to Parliament. Along this journey the eligibility criteria, the procedural safeguards, and the monitoring regime have changed. In this article, we focus on the eligibility criteria. First, we explain the evolution of the law and what the eligibility criteria were at the various stops along the way. We then explore the ethical justifications for Canada’s new criteria by looking at two elements of the often-corrosive debate. First, we ask whether problems with the social determinants of health that might impact decision-making justify denying eligibility for assisted dying of decisionally capable people with mental illnesses and people with disabilities as their sole underlying medical conditions. Second, we ask whether Canada’s journey supports slippery slope arguments against permitting assisted dying. All data relevant to the study are included in the article. (shrink)

One of the most complex and uncertain areas of international legal doctrine concerns how to deal with the aspiration of a people to achieve self-determination through the establishment of a new state and the related claim to a specific territory over which statehood is to be exercised. Recently, when the General Assembly of the United Nations referred to the International Court of Justice the question of the legality of the declaration of independence by Kosovar Albanians, the Court was given (...) an opportunity to clarify and develop the law on external self-determination. Instead, the Court answered extremely narrowly, confining its analysis to the legality of the act of declaration without determining any consideration of international legal norms applicable to the act of secession that was being proposed. This article intends to fill the gap left by the ICJ’s decision: first by critiquing the inadequacy and tensions visible in the existing doctrine and second by examining how recent developments in international law may allow for a more normatively coherent approach to the problem. (shrink)

Human life is operationally defined by the onset and cessation of organismal function. At postnatal stages of life, organismal integration critically and uniquely requires a functioning brain. In this article, a distinction is drawn between integrated and coordinated biologic activities. While communication between cells can provide a coordinated biologic response to specific signals, it does not support the integrated function that is characteristic of a living human being. Determining the loss of integrated function can be complicated by medical interventions that (...) uncouple elements of the natural biologic hierarchy underlying our intuitive understanding of death. Such medical interventions can allow living human beings who are no longer able to function in an integrated manner to be maintained in a living state. In contrast, medical intervention can also allow the cells and tissues of an individual who has died to be maintained in a living state. To distinguish between a living human being and living human cells, two criteria are proposed: either the persistence of any form of brain function or the persistence of autonomous integration of vital functions. Either of these criteria is sufficient to determine a human being is alive. (shrink)

Herbert Simon held that the fundamental turn in the study of bounded rationality is the turn from substantive to procedural rationality. Theories of substantive rationality begin with normative questions about attitudes: what should we prefer, intend, or believe? By contrast, theories of procedural rationality begin with normative questions about processes of inquiry: how should we determine what to prefer, intend, or believe? If Simon was right, then the central task for theories of bounded rationality is to develop an account of (...) rational inquiry for bounded agents. We need, that is, a theory of inquiry under bounds. -/- Inquiry Under Bounds takes as its starting point a five-point bounded rationality program inspired by recent work in cognitive science. To elaborate on and defend that program, Thorstad argues we need an account of rational inquiry for bounded agents. Inquiry under bounds develops an account of rational inquiry for bounded agents: the reason-responsiveness consequentialist view. I use this account to clarify and defend key insights from the bounded tradition as well as to shed light on recent controversies in the epistemology of inquiry. (shrink)

This study uses data from the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey of 1993 to examine factors determining the use of maternal–child health services in rural Ghana. The MCH services under study are: use of a doctor for prenatal care; soliciting four or more antenatal check-ups; place of delivery; participation in family planning. Bivariate and multivariate techniques are employed in the analyses. The analyses reveal that the use of MCH services tends to be shaped mostly by level of education, religious (...) background and region of residence, and partially by ethnicity and occupation. The implications of these results are discussed. (shrink)

Criminal law operates under the assumption that persons have the capacity for free, voluntary choice. However, since the concept of free will and self-determination may be understood in a variety of ways, it must be made the subject of philosophical scrutiny if it is to provide a solid foundation for law. This paper will present two major philosophical concepts of self-determination and evaluate their utility for criminal law. The conclusion delineates the possibilities and limitations of these concepts (...) when applied in particular to the field of criminal law. (shrink)

The subject of the study is the ontological nature of the phenomenon of creativity in the context of conceptual constructions of the most important nominal layers of non-classical philosophy. The aim of the work is to reveal the ontological essence of creativity in the context of European philosophy of the XIX–XX centuries based on the works of A. Schopenhauer, A. Bergson, J.-P. Sartre, A. Camus and M. Heidegger. The theoretical and methodological basis of the research is the works of representatives (...) of the non-classical period of the development of philosophical thought, as well as the works of modern domestic and foreign researchers, in their works directly or indirectly touching on the problem of the ontological determinant of creativity. The central research methods are comparative and complex methods for establishing connections and relationships between phenomena that are part of the sphere of creative being, as well as an analytical and interpretive method for analyzing existing interpretations of the phenomenon under study and presenting the author's position. The scientific novelty of the research consists in the identification and systematization of philosophical ideas regarding the ontological determinant of creativity in the conceptual field of Western European non–classical philosophy of the XIX-XX centuries. As a result of the conducted research, the author comes to the conclusion that within the framework of non-classical philosophy, the ontological nature of creativity is revealed both at the level of objective reality and in the existential-personal space of the subject. Unlike the classical tradition of philosophizing, which absolutizes the epistemological component of the subject's creativity, in the subject field of non-classical philosophy, creativity regains its ontological rootedness, since it acts as the general existential of human existence, revealing itself through the prism of such concepts as the Will to live, pure duration, creative evolution, Vital impulse, imaginative consciousness, rebellion against the absurd, the promotion of truth and the way out of inauthenticity. (shrink)

It is argued that truth value of a sentence containing free variables in a context of use, just as the reference of the free variables concerned, depends on the assumptions and posits given by the context. However, context may under-determine the reference of a free variable and the truth value of sentences in which it occurs. It is argued that in such cases a free variable has indeterminate reference and a sentence in which it occurs may have indeterminate truth (...) value. On letting, say, x be such that \, the sentence ‘Either \ or \’ is true but the sentence ‘\’ has an indeterminate truth value: it is determinate that the variable x refers to either 2 or \, but it is indeterminate which of the two it refers to, as a result ‘\’ has a truth value but its truth value is indeterminate. The semantic indeterminacy is analysed in a ‘radically’ supervaluational semantic framework closely analogous to the treatment of vagueness in McGee and McLaughlin and Smith, which saves bivalence, the T-schema and the truth-functional analysis of the boolean connectives. It is shown that on such an analysis the modality ‘determinately’ is quite clearly not an epistemic modality, avoiding a potential objection raised by Williamson against such ‘radically’ supervaluational treatments of vagueness, and that determinate truth is the semantic value preserved in classically valid arguments. The analysis is contrasted with the epistemicist proposal of Breckenridge and Magidor which implies that ‘\’ has a determinate but unknowable truth value. (shrink)

According to the objective Bayesian approach to inductive logic, premisses inductively entail a conclusion just when every probability function with maximal entropy, from all those that satisfy the premisses, satisfies the conclusion. When premisses and conclusion are constraints on probabilities of sentences of a first-order predicate language, however, it is by no means obvious how to determine these maximal entropy functions. This paper makes progress on the problem in the following ways. Firstly, we introduce the concept of a limit in (...) entropy and show that, if the set of probability functions satisfying the premisses contains a limit in entropy, then this limit point is unique and is the maximal entropy probability function. Next, we turn to the special case in which the premisses are categorical sentences of the logical language. We show that if the uniform probability function gives the premisses positive probability, then the maximal entropy function can be found by simply conditionalising this uniform prior on the premisses. We generalise our results to demonstrate agreement between the maximal entropy approach and Jeffrey conditionalisation in the case in which there is a single premiss that specifies the probability of a sentence of the language. We show that, after learning such a premiss, certain inferences are preserved, namely inferences to inductive tautologies. Finally, we consider potential pathologies of the approach: we explore the extent to which the maximal entropy approach is invariant under permutations of the constants of the language, and we discuss some cases in which there is no maximal entropy probability function. (shrink)

Wheat is the most imperative crop for man feeding and is planted in numerous countries under rainfed conditions in semiarid zones. It is necessary for decision-makers and governments to predict the yield of rainfed wheat before harvest and to determine the effect of the major factors on it. Different methods have been suggested for forecasting yield with various levels of accuracy. One of these approaches is the statistical regression model, which is simple and applicable for regions with scarce data (...) available. Since the weather is the most important factor affecting the production of wheat, particularly in rainfed cultivation, regression models using weather parameters are very common. However, the coefficients of these models are location based and should be determined locally. Therefore, in this research, backward multiple linear regression technique based on relative importance metrics was used to determine the most important effective weather parameters on rainfed wheat productions in Fars Province, south of Iran, during 2006–2013. The influence of each parameter in the final model was analyzed using the values of LMG relative importance metric. The result indicated that sunshine hours had the biggest LMG and, therefore, was the most effective parameter. Also, among the other considered parameters, rainy days, minimum relative humidity, and average relative humidity with LMG values of 21.97%, 21.69%, and 21.62%, respectively, had the most effects on rainfed wheat yield in the studied area. All parameters except for the sunshine hours positively affected rainfed wheat yield. The most important reason for the significance of these parameters can be the prevailing dry and semidry climate in the southern areas of Iran. The proposed model for determination of weather parameters effects on rainfed wheat could be a great guidance and aid for different stakeholders such as farmers, decision-makers, and governments. (shrink)

The under-reporting of sexual abuse reduces the chances of winning the battle against sexual abuse of women and children in Zimbabwe. It leaves girl children powerless and vulnerable, despite the country’s determination to put an end to injustice and gender discrimination in line with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in particular, SDG 5, which focuses on gender and equality, and SDG 16, which is concerned with justice and peace. The aim of this study was to explore the barriers (...) to reporting sexual abuse in Ruwa. Informed by the human rights-based approach, the study adopted a quantitative research design. Survey data were solicited from 51 randomly selected female respondents. Results revealed that 69% of the respondents were abused, yet only 2% of the total respondents reported the abuse to authorities, while 67% did not report incidences of abuse. About 98% of respondents believed that most sexual abuse cases in Ruwa went unreported. Results also showed that barriers to reporting sexual abuses comprised cultural and economic factors, most of which were characterised by shame, embarrassment, and fear, as well as the desire to protect male breadwinners. The results are consistent with existing literature generalisations on sexual abuse, particularly in terms of the prevalence of sexual abuse and under-reporting. It is also argued that culture is the determinant factor for most of the barriers to reporting sexual abuse, as well as the effects of reporting.Based on the results and in view of promoting and protecting human rights associated with sexuality, the study recommends that local authorities and social institutions implement awareness programmes and campaigns on reporting sexual abuse in the community.Contribution: This study is the first of its kind in Ruwa. Its significance is embedded in how it reflects on the role played by culture, religion and societal views on matters of sexual abuse. (shrink)

Sex‐determining factors are usually assumed to be either genetic or environmental. The present paper aims at drawing attention to the potential contribution of developmental noise, an important but often‐neglected component of phenotypic variance. Mutual inhibitions between male and female pathways make sex a bistable equilibrium, such that random fluctuations in the expression of genes at the top of the cascade are sufficient to drive individual development toward one or the other stable state. Evolutionary modeling shows that stochastic sex determinants should (...) resist elimination by genetic or environmental sex determinants under ecologically meaningful settings. On the empirical side, many sex‐determination systems traditionally considered as environmental or polygenic actually provide evidence for large components of stochasticity. In reviewing the field, I argue that sex‐determination systems should be considered within a three‐ends continuum, rather than the classical two‐ends continuum. (shrink)

We highlight the need to focus on the underlying determinants and production mechanisms to fully understand the nature of facial expression of emotion and to settle the theoretical debate about the meaning of motor expression. Although emotion theorists have generally remained rather vague about the details of the process, this has been a central concern of componential appraisal theories. We describe the fundamental assumptions and predictions of this approach regarding the patterning of facial expressions for different emotions. We also review (...) recent evidence for the assumption that specific facial muscle movements may be reliable symptoms of certain appraisal outcomes and that facial expressions unfold over time on the basis of a sequence of appraisal check results. (shrink)

As part of an attempt to give a “libertarian” account of some aspects of human agency, the author articulates and defends a modified interpretation of “internalism” which makes coherent the notion of a genuinely, self-determined choice amongst fundamental conceptions of practical reason. That such choices are “nomologically irreducible” is evidenced by the fact that although (contextually) unavoidable, they are nonetheless under-determined with respect to any combination of the agent’s (specific) desires and circumstances. Alternatively, to the extent that orthodox “externalism” (...) subordinates reason to the field of externally determined “passions,” it is rejected, in conclusion, as yielding a naive and excessively reductive analysis of human agency. (shrink)

There is a controversy as to the moral status of an action in the face of uncertainty concerning a non-moral fact that is morally significant (according to an applicable moral standard): According to the objective conception, the right action is determined in light of the truth, namely the actual state of affairs (regarding the pertinent fact), whereas according to the subjective conception, the right action depends on the epistemic state of the agent, namely her (justified) belief (concerning the pertinent fact). (...) A similar debate concerns the law, with respect to uncertainty regarding a legally significant fact. In this paper, I argue that moral and legal normative concepts are ambiguous and include two aspects: The ideal aspect, which is concerned with the constitutive feature of the normative standard, and the pragmatic aspect, which determines the correct action under uncertainty . With regard to each aspect, a different conception is appropriate: The objective conception should govern the ideal aspect and the subjective conception the pragmatic aspect. And the relevant aspect (and therefore the appropriate conception) depends on the question under consideration regarding the pertinent normative standard: what is its constitutive feature or whether an action is right (according to the applicable normative standard) in the face of uncertainty. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The article presents a descriptive characteristic of the functioning of a person’s attitude to oneself, the formation of self-awareness through a combination of one’s emotional and creative features with the components of attitude toward oneself, which allows one to study in depth the process of formation and development of a mature, adapted personality._ Theoretical basis._ The existing variety of scientific approaches makes it difficult to systematize the aspect under study and prevents the formation of a clear structure of (...) a person’s attitude toward oneself. The study of self-consciousness of the personality remains relevant in connection with a wide range of issues related to the development of knowledge of the mechanisms that act as internal determinants of the individual originality of the personality’s life realization. The theoretical and methodological basis of the study is as follows: the principles of determinism of mental phenomena, the activity concept of self-consciousness, the provision on the regulative function of emotions in activity, the concept of creative activity and ideas about the personality’s creative characteristics. _Originality__._ The author supplemented and expanded knowledge about the phenomenon of self-attitude, the mechanisms of its formation and features of determination based on the systematization of thematic issues; the idea of the determination of attitude toward oneself, in particular, by personal and situational factors, in the context of its functioning in the conditions of activity with creative elements has been further developed._ Conclusions._ Attitude toward oneself, emotional and creative features of the personality have a common problematic aspect with regard to their nature of interaction and the necessity for the expediency of their unification as a subject of interaction with the world. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In spite of vast global improvements in living standards, health, and well‐being, the persistence of absolute poverty and its attendant maladies remains an unsettling fact of life for billions around the world and constitutes the primary cause for the failure of developing states to improve the health of their peoples. While economic development in developing countries is necessary to provide for underlying determinants of health – most prominently, poverty reduction and the building of comprehensive primary health systems – inequalities (...) in power within the international economic order and the spread of neoliberal development policy limit the ability of developing states to develop economically and realize public goods for health. With neoliberal development policies impacting entire societies, the collective right to development, as compared with an individual rights‐based approach to development, offers a framework by which to restructure this system to realize social determinants of health. The right to development, working through a vector of rights, can address social determinants of health, obligating states and the international community to support public health systems while reducing inequities in health through poverty‐reducing economic growth. At an international level, where the ability of states to develop economically and to realize public goods through public health systems is constrained by international financial institutions, the implementation of the right to development enables a restructuring of international institutions and foreign‐aid programs, allowing states to enter development debates with a right to cooperation from other states, not simply a cry for charity. (shrink)

Ingvar Johansson has argued that there are not only determinate universals, but also determinable ones. I here argue that this view is misguided by reviving a line of argument to the following effect: what makes determinates falling under a same determinable similar cannot be distinct from what makes them different. If true, some similarities — imperfect similarities between simple determinate properties — are not grounded in any kind of property-sharing. I suggest that determinables are better understood as maximal disjunctions (...) of brutely and imperfectly similar determinates. Such brute similarities have been thought to clash with realism about universals. I argue that this worry stems from the mistaken assumption that perfect and imperfect similarities are relations of a same kind. If exact and inexact resemblances are distinct and heterogeneous explananda, the realist about universals might explain the first thanks to property-sharing, while happily leaving imperfect similarities between properties unexplained. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to propose and justify the thesis that Kant's theory of judgment, which plays a vital role in the Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgment, is fundamentally theoretical in nature, and that this theory insures the unity of the critical philosophy. Most of the contemporary writers who have dealt with the question of the unity of Kant's philosophy on the basis of his theory of judgement have emphasized the priority (...) of either practical, aesthetic, or even political judgment. Such interpretations, however, seem at odds with the fact that Kant's theory of judgment is rooted in the non-practical, theoretical discipline of formal logic, a discipline that underlies the structure of all three Critiques. The "theoretical" understanding of judgment is first developed in the Critique of Pure Reason wherein Kant distinguishes between general and transcendental logic. This distinction governs the distinction between two ways of employing the same logical form of judgment, viz., indeterminately and determinately. The determinate-indeterminate distinction with respect to judging is elaborated in both the first and the second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Prolegomena and the Preface to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science . ;In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals , Kant distinguishes between "general practical philosophy" and "the metaphysics of morals." In fact, general practical philosophy "differs from a metaphysics of morals in the same way that general logic is distinguished from transcendental philosophy." Thus, the distinction between general practical philosophy and the metaphysics of morals in Kant's practical philosophy represents the distinction between indeterminate and determinate functions of judging practically, i.e., of willing. ;In the Critique of Judgment , the determinate-indeterminate distinction is expressed by means of the distinction between determinative and reflective power of judgment . Kant shows that while the determinative Urteilskraft gives rise to scientific and moral judgments, the reflective Urteilskraft makes possible both aesthetic and teleological judgments by leaving something undetermined, viz., the cognizability of an object and the intentionality of the purposiveness of nature, respectively. (shrink)

Prior research has found attributions to mediate the relationship between the elements of corporate social responsibility activities and consumer responses to firms; however, the question of what variables determine consumer attributions of CSR remains partially unaddressed. This article analyzes why consumers make attributions of CSR that are either positive, or negative. The results obtained from two empirical studies indicate that company–cause fit, corporate ability, and interpersonal trust have a positive influence on the motives that consumers attribute to CSR, whereas corporate (...) hypocrisy has a negative effect. This research contributes to our understanding of the psychological mechanisms underlying impactful consumer judgments and provides guidance for organizations in responding to such evaluations. (shrink)

It is commonly supposed that at least some states possess a moral right against external intervention in their domestic affairs and all human rights violations give members of the international community reasons to undertake preventive or remedial action against offending states. No state, however, currently protects or could reasonably be expected to protect its subjects’ human rights to a perfect degree. In view of this reality, many have found it difficult to explain how any existing or readily foreseeable state could (...) enjoy a moral right of nonintervention without denying the normative force of human rights. This article seeks to reconcile these apparently incompatible commitments by arguing that, in addition to acting in defense of human rights, outsiders must be appropriately responsive to individuals’ distinct and potentially countervailing interests in collective self-determination. I show that, under certain demanding but not unrealistic conditions, individuals’ interests in self-determination are of sufficient weight not simply to ground a judgment against intervention in particular cases but to generate arobust right of nonintervention on the part of some states that nevertheless fail to secure perfect protection of their subjects’ human rights. (shrink)

We define the notion of a completely determined Borel code in reverse mathematics, and consider the principle $CD - PB$, which states that every completely determined Borel set has the property of Baire. We show that this principle is strictly weaker than $AT{R_0}$. Any ω-model of $CD - PB$ must be closed under hyperarithmetic reduction, but $CD - PB$ is not a theory of hyperarithmetic analysis. We show that whenever $M \subseteq {2^\omega }$ is the second-order part of an (...) ω-model of $CD - PB$, then for every $Z \in M$, there is a $G \in M$ such that G is ${\rm{\Delta }}_1^1$-generic relative to Z. (shrink)

According to externalism, reference is a relation between uses of an expression and features of the environment. Moreover, the reference relation is normative , and the referential relata of our expressions are explanatory of successful language use. This paper largely agrees with the broad conception underlying externalism: it is what people do with words that makes them have the references they have, and the world constrains what people can successfully do with words. However, the paper strongly disagrees with the details (...) . A centrally important feature of what people do with words is how they use them in inferential contexts. When due attention is given to the reference-determining role played by inferential properties of expressions, I argue, we arrive at a more satisfactory account of semantic norms and explanations. Much of the argument is based on a detailed look at the language of chemical classification used in the late 19th century. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.3 (2005) 235-237 [Access article in PDF] Determined by Chaos: The Nonlinear Dynamics of Free Will Jessica Wahman Keywords free will, chaos theory, determinism, materialism In "antidepressants and the Chaotic Brain: Implications for the Respectful Treatment of Selves," Douglas Heinrichs provides an intriguing justification of individuated and longer term therapy for depressive clients. He does not reject medication as a therapeutic strategy, nor does he (...) question the materialist basis of the traditional medical model. Rather, he offers a physically deterministic account of depression that is at the same time compatible with a sense of human agency and individuality. Heinrichs suggests that human physiology and its psychiatric disorders are better accounted for by the nonlinear dynamics of chaos theory than by the traditional account of neurotransmitter production and reuptake. Because the latter, microscopic, explanation suggests a direct cause-and-effect relationship between synaptic activity and subjective affect, it cannot account for the wide variation of responses to the same medications, nor can it satisfy the client's fears that her drug-induced well-being is not fully hers to control. Chaos theory, he asserts, can provide a better explanation by treating the human organism as a complex holistic system whose patterns resemble a topographical map of probability more than they do a unidirectional vector model of cause to effect. Like the weather, human affect and behavior are physically determined but difficult to predict, and so careful attention to both the individual history of the client and the uniqueness of responses to medication are a necessary part of any successful therapeutic program.Connected to this theory of nonlinear physiology is Heinrichs's account of autonomy and agency under this rubric. He notes that a psychology based on chaos theory is not only compatible with the notion of free will, it can better explain why the successful use of medication actually increases freedom and autonomy instead of limiting it. It is here that I wish to focus my comments, because his interpretation of free will may give us, to borrow a phrase from Daniel Dennett, a "variet[y] of free will worth wanting" (1984, title page). Free will, in this case, is not a metaphysical ability to act above and beyond our material causes, but is instead a property of the material system itself, namely when that system feels itself capable of greater psychic mobility around the topographical map of probabilistic patterns.According to this model, our ability to reason, plan, and act on the decisions we make is itself a [End Page 235] part of our chaotically determined neurologic system. When we are healthy, we are able to reason in our best interests and act on those reasons. This is modeled as an ability for the organism to metaphorically "move about" the map of its own possibilities, and more important, to both enter and escape certain states, known as chaotic attractors, into which it is likely to be drawn. "Where" we wind up, psychologically speaking, at any point in time is determined by our own system, and so we may say that in such a case we are autonomous and our choices are made freely. Depression, on the other hand, can be compared to a deep groove in the map, a chaotic attractor that is hard to escape, and so the system quite literally becomes "stuck in a rut." This is subjectively experienced as the tendency for thought processes and activities to fall into negative and self-defeating patterns despite the best efforts of the client to escape these habits. So long as the organism does not have a sense of being "trapped" in an attractor (whether a depressive or, for example, manic or compulsive state), then that organism may be said to be free. Medication and the therapy that accompanies it, so far as it facilitates our ability to escape deep chaotic attractors, promotes our own freedom of will. If a car cannot spin its way out of a ditch, does the tow truck hinder or promote its freedom by hauling it back onto solid pavement where it may again... (shrink)

Summary The task of this article is to review the principle of relational determination, as described by Solomon Asch (1952) which expands over Karl Duncker’s (1939) critique of ethical relativism. Relational determination has much to offer to the therapeutic community first with regard to interpersonal relations and social relations. My main goal is to extend this relational analysis to intrapsychic life, which may expose new potentialities for internal conflict resolution and personal integration, predicated on the cultivation of relational (...) understanding (i.e., recognition of relational determination in organization of conscious experience). But this approach is best illustrated in its application to value differences and conflict across societies, which are typically viewed from the absolutist or relativist perspective. The principle of relationality casts doubt on elementaristic assumptions common to both (e.g., meaning constancy). Such assumptions lead to some ill-considered conclusions: of irreconcilable moral differences dividing both individuals and groups, deprived of any basis in understanding. Those views fail to consider the contexts underlying the meanings and valuations we impute. When these are taken into account, Duncker’s hypothesis of an invariant relation between meaning and value finds support. Value differences (or changes) need not represent fundamental differences in morality, but instead (factual) differences in understanding of the situation. If so, then value differences may indeed be both understandable and reconcilable. Relational determination reveals this same potentiality with regard to intrapsychic conflict, where the same presumption of irreconcilable differences must be overcome. Work by Erich Neumann provides a valuable depth psychological perspective on this inner conflict, which accords surprisingly well with the relationality principle in particular and field theory in general. From that vantage point, psychological defenses may be recognized as structural properties of yet unreconciled psychical fields. Gestalt theory’s relational view, which aligns well with Neumann’s account of a “new ethic” helps to reveal the processes by which these defensive postures might abate, as value realms that earlier dwelt in hostile opposition develop more of a conscious and respectful relation with each other, as the individual inches toward greater wholeness. (shrink)

This book constitutes the outcome of an international conference held at the Otto-Mobes-Volkswirtschaftsschule, Graz-Stifting( Austria), from June 16 to 22, 1974. The conference was initiated by a project group working on determinants and controls of social science development at the In stitute for Advanced Studies and Scientific Research in Vienna and or ganized by the editors of this volume. It was held under the auspices of the Austrian Ministry of Science and Research. The main topics of the conference were (...) those at the forefront of the 'state of argumentation' (to borrow from one of our contributors) in philosophy and sociology of science ever since the controversy between Thomas S. Kuhn and Sir Karl R. Popper has sharpened our awareness for the methodological and substantial presuppositions involved with questions of growth and development in science. Let us give two examples of those topics. The borderline between sociology of science and philo sophy of science has become more and more unclear; while the work of at least some philosophers of science comes to have an empirical flavour, sociologists of science are increasingly apt to include logical and methodo logical components of the research process as their objects of examina tion. Papers included in this volume testify to both tendencies. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the objection that unilateral secession by a national group (e.g., the Scots) from a legitimate, nonusurping state would wrong minority nationalities within the seceding territory. I show first that most proponents of this objection assume that the ground of the right to national self-determination is the protection of the group’s culture. I show that there are alternative justifications available. I then set out a version of this objection that does not rely on this claim; (...) on this objection, a national minority that seceded and created its own state would commit an expressive wrong against minorities within the territory over which it claimed jurisdiction. I show that this objection is undermotivated: only under a specific set of circumstances would the minorities of the secessionist region be subject to an expressive wrong. Finally, I show that the correct way to think about the claims of minorities in secessionist regions is in terms of a claim to secure access to equal civic status such that they are not at risk of becoming justifiably alienated from their new state. If a secessionist group cannot provide this guarantee to the minority residents of their territory, then their seceding would commit wrongful harm, and the presumption in favour of collective autonomy is defeated. I call this defeater the ‘Alienation Defeater.’With this in hand, we are now in a position to explain why nations are normatively special. Responding to the objections broached by Allen Buchanan and others, I show that even if other kinds of groups, such as religious groups, have the features in virtue of which nations have a claim to self-determination, this does not entail that those groups also have the right to secede. This is because an account of self-determination needs a list of ‘defeaters’—features in virtue of which a group’s claim to self-determination is defeated. I argue that religious groups are the strongest candidate for having a claim to collective autonomy in virtue of sharing many features with nations. I then argue that religious groups will run afoul of the Alienation Defeater; religious identity is too narrow to be the basis of the dominant collective identity of a state. This does not apply to nationality. This, I explain, is because of qualitative differences between religious groups, qua religious groups, and nations. (shrink)

Takeuti introduced an infinitary proof system for determinate logic and showed that for transitive models of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Dependent Choice that contain all reals, the cut-elimination theorem is equivalent to the Axiom of Determinacy, and in particular contradicts the Axiom of Choice. We consider variants of Takeuti's theorem without assuming the failure of the Axiom of Choice. For instance, we show that if one removes atomic formulae of infinite arity from the language of Takeuti's proof (...) system, then cut elimination is equivalent to a determinacy hypothesis provable, e.g., in ZFC + “there are infinitely many Woodin cardinals.” A slight extension of the proof system admits cut elimination for countable sequents under the same assumptions. A simple modification of the proof system yields analogs of the results above for the Axiom of Real Determinacy and uncountably many Woodin cardinals. (shrink)

One central but unrecognized strand of the complex debate between W. V. Quine and Donald Davidson over the status of psychology as a science turns on their disagreement concerning the compatibility of strict psychophysical, semantic-determining laws with the possibility of error. That disagreement in turn underlies their opposing views on the location of semantic determinants: proximal (on bodily surfaces) or distal (in the external world). This paper articulates these two disputes, their wider context, and argues that both are fundamentally misconceived. (...) There is no special tension between error and strict semantic-determining laws; moreover, the purported bearing of that issue on the dispute over the location of semantic determinants depends upon a mistaken conception of the relation between the nomic status of generalizations and degree of distance between explanans and explananda. Finally, the wider significance of these conclusions for related contemporary debates is noted. And independent considerations about the possibility of communication, also present in Quine's and Davidson's thinking, are brought to bear on the question of the location of semantic determinants. (shrink)

Peirce's pragmatic notion of semiosis can be described in terms of a multi-level system of constraints involving chance, efficient, formal and final causation. According to the model proposed here, law-like regularities, which work as boundary conditions or organizational principles, have a downward effect on the spatiotemporal distribution of lower-level semiotic items. We treat this downward determinative influence as a propensity relation: if some lower-level entities a,b,c,-n are under the influence of a general organizational principle, W, they will show a (...) tendency to behave in certain specific ways, and, thus, to instantiate a set of specific processes. Our goal in this paper is to examine the role of downward determination in semiotic systems, conceived as multi-level hierarchical systems. (shrink)

The United Nations' (UN) adoption of a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is intended to mark a fundamental ethical turn in the relationships between indigenous peoples and the community of sovereign states. This moment is the result of decades of discussion and negotiation, largely revolving around states' discomfort with notion of indigenous self-determination. Member states of the UN have feared that an ethic of indigenous self-determination would undermine the principles of state sovereignty on which the UN (...) is itself grounded. However, such fears are the result of very poor understandings of the ethical principles under which the relations between indigenous peoples and nation-states already have been formed under centuries of European colonialism. The principle of self-determination embraced in this Declaration does not diverge from colonial norms; it entrenches these norms as international policy. Without doubt, indigenous peoples are more likely to benefit than suffer from states' observance of the Articles within this Declaration. Reducing the challenge of indigenous peoples' rights to the notion of self-determination set out in this document, though, misses an extraordinarily important opportunity to critically investigate the ethic of rights that has produced an opposition between nation-states and indigenous peoples to begin with. A true turn in the ethics of this relationship would see not simply the institution of a right to self-determination but, rather, indigenous peoples' right to first determine the nature of self for themselves. (shrink)

The dead donor rule states that organ donors must be declared dead before any vital organs are removed. Recently, scholars and physicians have argued for the abandonment of the dead donor rule, based on the rule’s supposed connection with the concept of brain death, which they view as a conceptually unreliable definition of death. In this essay, I distinguish between methods of death determination and the question of whether or not the dead donor rule should be a guiding principle (...) of organ transplant ethics. In principle, the dead donor rule does not rely on any one definition of death, but only prohibits the taking of vital organs before a patient is declared dead. In light of this distinction, I argue that even if the dead donor rule is tied to brain death in practice, conceptual disagreement about brain death does not provide grounds for rejection of this rule. I then present evidence in support of the consistency and reliability of the diagnosis of brain death. I show that, when performed carefully and under specific clinical circumstances, the diagnosis of brain death is considered by most neurologists to be reliable. Finally, I argue that, without the dead donor rule, organ transplantation programs would become susceptible to violations of the ethical principle of respect for persons. (shrink)