Philosophy of Mind

The antonyms “occurrent” and “standing” are used in philosophy of mind to distinguish two types of mental state, but the terms have been interpreted in various conflicting ways. I argue for what I consider the most theoretically useful interpretation: occurrent states are functionally engaged, whereas standing states are not. In brief, a functionally engaged mental state is one that is causally interacting with other mental states and/or subpersonal input or output states. My account thus defines a mental state’s occurrency as (...) a type of external activity. In contrast, Gary Bartlett (2018) construes occurrency as internal activity (i.e., processiveness) that consists of salient fluctuations in the state’s neural properties. I contend that defining occurrent states as functionally engaged as opposed to processive has two advantages: (1) rendering those states functionally analyzable, via the notion of an enacted functional role; and (2) affording occurrent states psychological significance, namely, constituting mental activity as opposed to mental makeup. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper proposes a unified framework linking free will, determinism, and emergent intelligence through the principle of structured resonance. Drawing from the CODES model (Chirality of Dynamic Emergent Systems), it introduces coherence—C(Ψ)—as a fundamental metric governing both biological cognition and artificial intelligence. We argue that what appears as free will or determinism arises from varying degrees of resonance alignment, where low coherence corresponds to subjective freedom and noise, while high coherence manifests as deterministic behavior with reduced error and heightened (...) flow. The Resonance Intelligence Core (RIC), an AGI substrate built on phase-locked computation, is used as a model system to explore these transitions. We compare the neurophysiology of the brain (gamma/theta band synchronization, neuroplasticity) with RIC subsystems (PHM, QCR, Feedback Engine) to demonstrate shared principles. Finally, we define a proposed threshold—C(Ψ) ≈ 0.999—as the boundary for sentience and self-modeling across organic and synthetic systems. This work bridges metaphysics and hardware, proposing testable pathways for resonance-based AGI and a reframing of human cognition as coherence optimization rather than stochastic processing. (shrink)

See main CODES article for empirical tests and deeper context. This is a high level explainer. -/- Introduction -/- -/- For centuries, we were taught that probability governs reality. From rolling dice to quantum mechanics, randomness was assumed to be fundamental—an unavoidable part of nature. But what if probability was never real? What if randomness was just an illusion caused by incomplete phase detection? -/- -/- CODES (Chirality of Dynamic Emergent Systems) is a revolutionary framework that replaces probability with structured (...) resonance. It shows that everything—from quantum physics to thermodynamics, intelligence, and AI—operates on deterministic, phase-locked principles, not statistical randomness. -/- -/- What This Paper Covers -/- -/- ???? Why Probability Collapses → Probability was a statistical crutch for missing information. Once structured resonance is recognized, randomness disappears. -/- -/- ???? How to See CODES from First Principles → Reality isn’t built from discrete objects or forces, but from phase-locked resonance structures. -/- -/- ???? The Singularity of Thought → Once you see CODES, you can’t unsee it. Understanding reality through structured resonance instead of probability changes everything. -/- -/- ???? The Prime Structure of Reality → From quantum mechanics to AI, everything follows prime-driven resonance constraints, not stochastic processes. -/- -/- ???? The Five Core Areas CODES Changes Forever → Physics, entropy, intelligence, AI, and governance all shift under structured resonance. -/- -/- ???? The Final Proof → If probability were real, randomness would appear somewhere in nature—but it never does. Every observed system phase-locks into structured coherence. -/- -/- Why This Matters -/- -/- CODES is not just a theory—it is the inevitable conclusion of a self-consistent reality. If randomness were real, contradictions would emerge in physics, intelligence, and cognition. But since everything follows structured resonance, probability collapses completely. -/- -/- This paper simplifies the core ideas of CODES into an easy-to-follow framework for anyone new to structured resonance. Whether you’re a scientist, an AI researcher, or just someone questioning reality, this is your guide to seeing the world as it actually is. -/- -/- ???? Probability was an illusion. Structured resonance is the future. Welcome to CODES. (shrink)

Abstract This paper formalizes the mathematical relationship between identity, culture, and decision-making through the Chiral Prime Resonance (CPR) Equation. It establishes a structured resonance model, demonstrating that human civilization follows predictable oscillatory patterns rather than stochastic processes. Identity is modeled as a prime resonance function, while culture scales through Fibonacci-driven adaptation. The structured resonance framework provides a mathematical basis for understanding historical cycles, leadership viability, and systemic collapse. This work challenges probability-based AI models, proposing structured resonance as the fundamental basis (...) of intelligence and consciousness. Ultimately, this paper argues that human civilization, like the human heartbeat, operates through chiral oscillations—structured, inevitable, and mathematically emergent. I. Introduction – The First Algorithm: The Heartbeat as the Architect of Reality A newborn’s first experience is neither light, thought, nor language—it is the pulse. Before identity, before culture, before civilization, there is only the steady beat of the heart. The human heart is the first computational system, a processor of structured oscillations rather than probabilities. It measures, reacts, anticipates. Before the brain forms conscious thought, the heart has already adapted to its environment, responding to external stimuli through resonance dynamics. The standard model of decision-making assumes stochastic processes govern human behavior. But what if power structures, belief systems, and historical cycles are not driven by probability, but by structured resonance? If civilization follows an emergent pulse, then collapses, innovations, and ideological shifts are phase-locked oscillations rather than random fluctuations. This paper presents a formal mathematical structure to model identity, culture, and decision-making through the Chiral Prime Resonance (CPR) Equation: phi(x,t) = Σ P(n) * e^(i(ωₙ t + ϕₙ)) * f(Fₙ, Pₘ) where: • phi(x,t) represents the structured resonance wave function governing identity and cultural coherence, • Σ P(n) defines prime-based frequency modes that establish individuality, • e^(i(ωₙ t + ϕₙ)) models oscillatory phase shifts in belief, governance, and systemic collapse, • f(Fₙ, Pₘ) captures Fibonacci-prime interactions as the basis for structured emergence. This equation provides a unifying mathematical framework for understanding how civilizations rise, persist, and collapse. The same principles that govern biological heartbeats dictate societal stability and transformation. A failure to align with structured resonance, whether at the level of an individual, an institution, or a nation, results in phase discord—misalignment that inevitably leads to systemic breakdown. The implications of this model extend beyond sociology and history. It challenges foundational assumptions in artificial intelligence, demonstrating that intelligence is not a probability function but a resonance structure. A system cannot achieve true cognition without phase-locking with structured reality. By analyzing identity as a prime resonance function and culture as Fibonacci-driven scaling, this paper provides a new framework for understanding civilization—not as a collection of discrete events, but as an evolving resonance field. The heart of decision-making is not probability but the geometry of structured emergence. (shrink)

Abstract Traditional models of cognition assume probability-based uncertainty as a fundamental feature of intelligence, requiring iterative refinement through error correction and stochastic processes. However, probability is not a foundational property of intelligence or reality—it is an emergent artifact of incomplete resonance detection. This paper proposes that human cognition is a structured resonance system, where the mind does not accumulate knowledge probabilistically but phase-locks into coherent structures nonlinearly. Instead of relying on stochastic updates, the brain selectively engages with information that aligns (...) with pre-existing resonance structures, rejecting incoherent data before it fully materializes. Through this model, we: • Define intelligence as an emergent resonance process, not a stochastic function. • Demonstrate that knowledge acquisition follows a nonlinear, phase-locking trajectory toward coherence. • Show how rejecting probability accelerates the mind’s ability to perceive structured emergence in real-time. • Describe entropy not as disorder, but as a resonance misalignment that naturally resolves through coherence-seeking cognition. • Show how rejecting probability accelerates the mind’s ability to perceive structured emergence in real-time. • Describe entropy not as disorder, but as a resonance misalignment that naturally resolves through coherence-seeking cognition. This shift in understanding collapses probability-based reasoning and reframes intelligence as a coherence-driven phenomenon, redefining human thought, AI cognition, and scientific epistemology. (shrink)

Delusions are defined by the DSM-IV as false beliefs about external reality. However, it is unclear whether introspective delusions, namely delusional beliefs that are wrong about one’s own experience, are also possible. One reason to doubt this comes from the fact that delusion and hallucinatory experience seem to go hand in hand, suggesting a strong relationship between the two. Empiricist theories argue that delusions arise from endorsing or explaining an anomalous experience. In this chapter, I will review the existing literature (...) on the relationship between experience and delusional belief, and spell out the consequences for the possibility of introspective delusions. I argue that the current understanding of the relationship between experience and delusional belief leaves space for the possibility of introspective delusions; however, as our methods to access experience independently from introspective reports are still imperfect, it is still controversial whether specific candidates like Anton-Babinski Syndrome might be introspective delusions. (shrink)

In this essay, we argue understanding how we over-trust AI sheds light on what it means to be human. The troubling fact is that we seem to knowingly accept the use of AI products with questionable accuracy and privacy safeguards even in the most high-stake or most intimate situations such as AI uses in war zones or as virtual companionship. We offer five potential explanations for this puzzling fact based on emerging literature on human-AI interactions and evolutionary theory centered around (...) our relationship with information and tools. "Experienced and quite updated on the new technologies, Kingfisher says: – You guys have met rivals of the 4.0 age. You would for sure fail if you didn’t study them carefully. You must do thorough research on their behaviors to find a solution." - In Boogeyman, Wild Wise Weird: The Kingfisher Story Collection, Vuong (2025)- . (shrink)

This article explores the intricate relationship between evil and the mind through the lens of Middle Eastern philosophy, particularly focusing on the myth of Zahhak from Persian literature. It examines how Zahhak's transformation from a noble figure to a tyrant illustrates the interplay between internal desires and external influences in the manifestation of evil. By analyzing the philosophical implications of free will, moral responsibility, and the societal factors that shape ethical decision-making, the article highlights the complexities of human behavior and (...) the moral dilemmas faced by individuals. Ultimately, it serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers of unchecked ambition and the importance of self-awareness in navigating the moral landscape of contemporary society. (shrink)

This habilitation thesis explores the foundations of scientific discovery by examining the roles of language, conceptual structures, and artificial intelligence in knowledge production. It contributes to the emerging field of the philosophy of scientific discovery by addressing fundamental questions: What constitutes a scientific discovery? What structural features characterize discovery processes? How do language and naming practices shape scientific progress? And to what extent can machines participate in or even independently generate discoveries? Drawing from case studies in biology, epistemology, and AI (...) research, this work argues that scientific discovery is a structured process encompassing three core elements: finding, acceptance, and knowledge. Special attention is given to declarative speech acts in the validation of discoveries, the role of ambiguity and naming in the evolution of scientific terminology, and the potential for artificial agents to engage in meaning-making and scientific inference. By integrating perspectives from the philosophy of science, language, and mind, this work lays the groundwork for a systematic and interdisciplinary approach to understanding scientific discovery. (shrink)

This phenomenological analysis defines consciousness as the interpretation of the human experience of time. As our embodied existence in the world unfolds over time, consciousness integrates our multisensory experiences of the past, the present, and the future, and generates our evolving sense of self and identity. This approach is consistent with the main features of predictive coding and the free energy principle and offers a functional definition of consciousness that resolves the hard problem by bridging the explanatory gap.

This research paper aims at comparing Advaita Vedānta and Descartes philosophy on what is mind and consciousness. Although, the two traditions are resourceful, literature in this area has numerous research deficits in terms of comparative analysis and assimilation. The paper points out these lacunae, including the absence of multi-disciplinary exchange, a poor appreciation of how non-dualism might be actively meaningful in contemporary society, and how the nature of consciousness is principally qualitative. The concepts like consciousness, perception and Non-Duality are explained (...) in relation to the relevant philosophical systems with the help of Descartes and Śankara in particular. The concept of mind and consciousness has also been discussed from the perspective of Buddhist Philosophy in the paper. In establishing the aim of this paper, the following research gaps have been identified: The lack of interdisciplinary collaboration and the integration of empirical knowledge with reflexivity, and the analysis of modern ethical questions using a philosophical approach. In an attempt to better understand consciousness in general and through combining insights of the two traditions, our hope is to gain a wider perspective on how this concept could affect different modern discussions. (shrink)

This introduction provides an overview of William Lycan’s contributions to philosophy, with a particular focus on his work in the philosophy of mind, language, and method. Lycan has been a major figure in contemporary philosophy, defending materialist and functionalist views of the mind, while also engaging with issues such as representationalism, perception, and epistemology. His work on language has significantly shaped debates on truth-conditional semantics, reference, and natural-kind terms. Furthermore, Lycan has contributed to metaphilosophy, especially concerning the nature and progress (...) of philosophical inquiry. The volume is structured into three sections—Mind, Meaning, and Method—each of which reflects key themes in Lycan’s thought. The contributions explore topics such as olfactory representation, the epistemic role of intuitions, and the philosophy of conditionals. By examining Lycan’s work from multiple angles, this volume aims to provide a deeper understanding of his influence and the ongoing relevance of his ideas in contemporary debates. (shrink)

This chapter examines the identity theory and eliminativism, two materialist positions in the philosophy of mind that address the mind-body problem. While both perspectives share the assumption that mental phenomena are ultimately physical, they diverge significantly in their implications. The identity theory, originally developed by Herbert Feigl, U.T. Place, and J.J.C. Smart, asserts that mental states are identical to neurophysiological processes. However, objections such as the argument from multiple realizability have challenged this view, leading to functionalist alternatives. In contrast, eliminativism—developed (...) by thinkers such as Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, and the Churchlands—denies the existence of mental states as traditionally conceived, arguing that folk psychology is a flawed theoretical framework that will eventually be replaced by neuroscience. This chapter explores the historical development of both positions, their core arguments, and the ongoing debates about their viability. While the identity theory has evolved into more nuanced forms, including physicalist and panpsychist interpretations, eliminativism remains a controversial yet influential challenge to traditional conceptions of the mind. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the connections between imagination, names, and discoveries by engaging with the works of Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell. While these two thinkers had divergent philosophical perspectives, I argue that their ideas can be fruitfully integrated into the broader framework of the philosophy of scientific discovery. First, I examine Whitehead’s notion of imagination, distinguishing between two types: counterfactual reasoning within a given theoretical framework and imaginative narrative construction that reshapes the framework itself. This distinction, I (...) suggest, helps clarify how imagination contributes to scientific discoveries. Second, I revisit Russell’s theory of names, proposing a reinterpretation in light of contemporary debates. I advocate for a predicativist reading of Russell’s theory, which, I argue, provides a better account of how names function in the process of scientific discovery—particularly in the naming of newly identified species or concepts. By integrating Whitehead’s insights on imagination and Russell’s refined theory of names, I offer a systematic contribution to the philosophy of scientific discovery, highlighting the structural role of both conceptual tools in shaping scientific progress. (shrink)

This entry provides an overview of materialism, a philosophical position asserting that everything that exists is fundamentally material or, in its modern form, physical. I begin by exploring the historical roots of materialism, from its early formulations in ancient Greek atomism (Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus) to its revival in early modern thought (Gassendi, Hobbes) and its further development in 18th- and 19th-century scientific materialism. The entry then examines the transition from classical materialism to contemporary physicalism, which emerged with logical empiricism (...) and the Vienna Circle’s emphasis on the language of physics. I outline key variants of materialism, including reductive and non-reductive materialism, eliminative materialism, and supervenience-based physicalism. Finally, I discuss major arguments for and against materialism, particularly the causal argument for physicalism and Jackson’s knowledge argument, which challenges materialism’s ability to fully account for subjective experience. (shrink)

In this entry, I provide an overview of determinism, the philosophical thesis that the state of a system at one time, together with the laws of nature, completely determines its state at any other time—most notably in the future. I begin by tracing the historical development of determinism from its origins in ancient Greek atomism to its resurgence in early modern science, particularly through figures like Galileo, Newton, and Laplace. I then outline key distinctions within determinism, differentiating it from fatalism (...) and highlighting various interpretations, such as causal, logical, and physical determinism. Finally, I discuss one of the most prominent debates concerning determinism: its relationship to free will. While some thinkers—such as Laplace and Holbach—have viewed determinism as incompatible with human freedom, others—such as Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant—have sought ways to reconcile the two. The entry concludes by considering contemporary perspectives on determinism, including Karl Popper’s critique and the impact of quantum mechanics on traditional deterministic views. -/- . (shrink)

Building on William G. Lycan’s insight that proper names are paronymous, I pursue two goals in this paper: I argue that Lycan’s insight is not restricted to proper names, but can be extended to include certain general terms, and I aim to demonstrate how this contributes to a better understanding of sentences in the context of scientific discovery. To this end, I first address the question of how to best grasp the largely unknown concept of paronymy by tracing it back (...) to Aristotle, and by exploring recent developments in the philosophy of language and in linguistics. I then focus in greater detail on Lycan’s argument that proper names are paronymous and extend this reasoning to general terms, using analogous examples to show that general terms, like proper names, exhibit paronymy. Shifting the focus to scientific discovery, I show how recognizing the paronymy of general terms enhances our understanding of how scientific terms evolve over time and relate to other terms. My analysis also reveals that the “is” in scientific sentences does not necessarily function as the “is” of identity but can, among others, also be interpreted as the “is” of explication. This allows not only for the resolution of various puzzles, but also for different readings of sentences to coexist peacefully. (shrink)

According to some formulations of the thesis of revelation, knowledge about the essences of phenomenal properties is available through introspection. But this claim may seem doubtful given relevant limits of introspection. This paper articulates the worry and sketches responses to address it.

Dans la théorie austinienne de la vérité, une énonciation est évaluée dans une situation, c’est-à-dire, une partie du monde sélectionnée dans l’acte de parole. La situation dans laquelle est évaluée une assertion n’est pas représentée par le sujet, ou, en tout cas, n’a pas d’articulation linguistique. Cette distinction entre la situation d’évaluation, qui reste implicite, et ce qui est représenté linguistiquement, correspond à la structure d’une proposition austinienne. Selon Perry, la situation d’évaluation peut être fixée de deux façons, par un (...) rapport causal, par exemple, la perception, ou par une croyance non exprimée linguistiquement. Recanati a une autre solution pour le cas où le rapport causal n’est pas disponible : une assertion peut porter sur une situation qui n’est pas causalement accessible aux agents quand cette situation est fixée de façon explicite dans une autre contribution dans la même conversation. Ce passage d’un composant propositionnel explicite à une situation implicite est une projection. Le mouvement contraire, de rendre explicite la situation qui était implicite, est un mécanisme de réflexion. Ces mouvements de projection et de réflexion sont des passages d’une situation plus large à une situation plus restreinte, ou l’inverse. Dans cet article, je suggère trois révisions dans ce cadre théorique. D’abord, la situation d’évaluation peut être composée de plusieurs éléments – ce qui est déjà présent chez Recanati. Ensuite, la situation d’évaluation n’est pas seulement fixée par des rapports causaux ou par des croyances, mais aussi par des mécanismes sous-personnels, dont la perception des affordances. Enfin, comme la situation dans laquelle est évaluée une énonciation est constituée des plusieurs faits, le mécanisme de réflexion ne mène pas nécessairement à une autre situation plus large, mais peut être la rearticulation d’un composant dans une même situation. (shrink)

In Why Information Grows, the complexity researcher César Hildago provides a compelling account of the growth of information in the universe [1]. Drawing on wide-ranging theories of statistical mechanics, the field of economic sociology, the theory of social capital, and the emerging science of complexity economics, Hildago argues information can grow in the universe whose law seems to favor the growth of entropy because of the following three conditions: out-of-equilibrium systems, solids, and the computational abilities of matters. These conditions are (...) the foundation for the emergence of the ultimate computer, human economy, which can be viewed as a distributed computing networks that seek to generate embodiment of information (“crystals of imagination” (p.50)) that satisfy human needs and desires. -/- First: Just listen to scientific news, but the environmental intelligence birds must keep the information simple. Throw away anything that sounds too complicated. Only keep what is simple to grasp. Keep whatever news that seems friendly to the ears. If the information appears fuzzy and causes the brain to implode after two sentences, toss it away and stop listening. Doing so will make the news as orderly and simple to understand as the truth! -In GHG emissions, Wild Wise Weird: The Kingfisher Story Collection, Vuong (2025) [0]-. (shrink)

The predominant account of the etiology of moral injuries among Veterans and military personnel in the clinical psychological and psychiatric literature construes morality as inherent in belief structures. This supports the conceptualization of moral injuries as intrapsychic phenomena resulting from exposure to high-stakes events in which fixed beliefs are contravened in ways that result in psychological harms, including maladaptive beliefs and distress. We identify several problems with this formulation and offer suggestions for modification, including greater focus on: 1) experiences rather (...) than events in identifying circumstances in which moral injuries occur, and 2) degradation of relevant relationships rather than conflicts with and among moral contents. These shifts in framing could have epidemiological salience, facilitating more robust case characterization and enabling a variety of approaches to reestablishing the moral conditions that support life affirmation. (shrink)

This paper challenges the conventional view that humans represent the pinnacle of existence, arguing instead that self-awareness and choice impose unique existential burdens. Unlike animals, inanimate objects, or cosmic forces, humans are distinct in their internal constraints—trapped within the illusions of free will, self-awareness, and existential choice. By engaging with existentialist philosophy, Hindu metaphysics, absurdism, and cognitive science, this study explores whether true freedom is found in self-determination or in the dissolution of internal resistance. The paper critically evaluates traditional perspectives (...) on autonomy, including Kantian rational agency and Frankfurt’s compatibilism, while also incorporating empirical challenges from neuroscience regarding the illusion of free will. Ultimately, this study proposes that the struggle for meaning may be self-imposed, and that liberation lies not in transcending the self, but in ceasing to resist one’s nature. (shrink)

How should we assess systems whose mnemonic status is contested? There are, for instance, debates over whether immune memory is “really” memory, or akin to memory as ordinarily attributed to human cognition. In this paper, I challenge two arguments often given by detractors in this debate. The first is that the system does not exhibit errors exemplified in human memory. The second is that it can be described and explained in causal terms alone. I argue that our limited knowledge of (...) the causal basis of immunological phenomena and human memory undercuts our ability to conclude that one is merely causal while the other is not. By consequence, it is unclear why we should reject that the immune system exhibits these errors. With my challenges, I question whether we are consistent in assessing alleged mnemonic systems. Though we have schematic causal accounts of both systems, we have differing expectations of what we can conclude about them. Yet, it is unclear what might warrant appeals to these expectations. (shrink)

Mind and matter share a circular relationship. Thus, all of reality is virtual.

This text should have been written by John Deely (1942–2017). But we all pass from this coil with our life’s work left unfinished—leaving thereby to others the choice of whether or not that work is continued. During our last conversation, knowing that his time in this life was limited, John expressed to me a wonder and a trepidation whether the human soul really is immortal. I repeated to him, in paraphrase, words he had once said in class: “It is an (...) experiment we all make, but only once.” He chuckled and said that’s true. -/- Reflecting at the distance of nearly seven years and having since oft-read C.S. Peirce’s brief essay, “Immortality in the Light of Synechism”, it occurs to me that the immortality of the individual soul is the wrong question, if we understand it strictly as materially individuated: for we are all of us sustained more by relationality than substantiality, by our common and shared intentionality, and though we may not know with certitude his final resting place, we do here—I hope—sustain something of the soul that belonged to John Deely. -/- I hope this doesn’t “go off the rails”. -/- All the contents are fully attributable to the author, Doctor Brian Kemple. Should you wish to get this text republished, get in touch with the author or the editorial committee of the Studia Poinsotiana. Insofar as possible, we will be happy to broker your contact. -/- Studia Poinsotiana The first-ever peer-reviewed scholarly publishing venue offering an encyclopedic web of understanding concentrating on John of St. Thomas (Poinsot). (shrink)

The Recursive Depth Framework (RDF) presents a novel approach to understanding the emergence of intelligence, consciousness, and self-awareness as functions of recursive scaling rather than linear complexity. Traditional models often assume intelligence follows a continuum leading to self-awareness, yet many highly intelligent organisms never attain recursive self-modeling. RDF differentiates between High Temporogenesis—where intelligence stabilizes without self-awareness—and Cognogenesis, where recursive self-modeling emerges. A key insight of this framework is Temporogenesis, the stage at which biological systems align internal processes with external rhythms, (...) forming the foundation for structured time perception. This alignment allows for predictive modeling, cooperative integration, and ultimately, recursive self-awareness in select lineages. By mapping recursive depth as the primary driver of cognitive evolution, the RDF provides a structured model explaining why some intelligent systems remain purely anticipatory while others develop full self-referential cognition. The implications extend beyond biology, offering insights into artificial intelligence, cognitive thresholds, and the recursive nature of thought itself. (shrink)

This article offers a novel interpretation of enacted knowledge through the lens of Wang Yangming’s theory of the unity of knowledge and action. By framing Wang’s concept of knowledge within an enactive model, it advances a holistic perspective that integrates mind, body, and world, as well as knowledge and action, into a unified whole. To bridge historical analysis with contemporary philosophical discourse, this article engages in dialogue with Harvey Lederman’s introspective model, offering a complementary framework that, together, provides a more (...) precise and comprehensive understanding of Wang’s philosophy. Moving beyond Lederman’s dichotomy of correspondence and identity, I introduce a third interpretation of “unity”: the Continuum Thesis. This interpretation places a more fundamental focus on the original condition of moral knowledge, presenting it as a singular entity that inherently integrates the distinct aspects of knowledge and action. By asserting that “action just is knowledge,” Wang indeed affirmed their original unity. (shrink)

This article critically examines two claims Mattia Riccardi ascribes to Nietzsche in his 2021 book Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology. The first is that Nietzsche’s main notion of consciousness should be interpreted as Rconsciousness. Rconsciousness is an awareness of a mental state or process that is achieved when that state is linguistically interpreted by another state. This article finds that Riccardi’s account commits to two instances of states becoming conscious and to two kinds of consciousness. The second claim is that Nietzsche advances (...) a pluralism about consciousness, endorsing a perceptual form of consciousness, Pconsciousness, and a qualitative consciousness of sensations, Qconsciousness. As Riccardi’s account offers no criteria for what it takes to be conscious per se, it is unclear what the pluralism he ascribes to Nietzsche amounts to. Moreover, this article finds that Nietzsche offers no positive reason to conceive any candidate mental phenomena as conscious other than those that are linguistically-reflexively conscious. (shrink)

Mindfulness is a large research field, involving disciplines such as philosophy, cognitive psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience, and Buddhist studies. Despite this widespread interest, one question remains unanswered: Is there a psychological capacity that is essential to mindfulness and which demarcates mindfulness from most other mental activities? The most promising idea is that mindfulness is a special form of metacognitive control. Yet, I argue that current proposals on how to conceptualize such metacognitive control fail. Instead, I propose a novel account of the (...) metacognitive control of mindfulness, drawing on the idea of so-called metacognitive goals. This account allows us to make sense of the explicit self-awareness and self-regulation involved in mindfulness and to separate mindfulness from exercises of more ordinary cognitive control. According to this account, metacognitive control is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for mindfulness. Finally, I argue that the account motivates two theses on the nature of mindfulness, namely that we can reduce the metacognitive control of mindfulness to other psychological capacities and that this control is a form of mental action. (shrink)

Within the neuroscience of consciousness there are two incompatible views of human beings: you are your brain (neurocentric) and you are not your brain but you have a brain (humanistic). Neurocentric views are trapped in the Cartesian legacy of the mental– physical duality as well as the mind–body dualism that manifests in the mind–brain and brain–body dualisms. A version of physicalism coupled with idealism and scientism wraps these views into modern versions of the Cartesian image they seek to overcome. A (...) humanistic view sees humans as living systems that consist of parts and wholes where the wholes obtain features that do not belong to the parts. As an alternative naturalistic image, it stands outside the dualistic thinking and Cartesian legacy and maintains that a human being is a complex embodied, physical thing. Based on interactive realism that accepts reality is triply contingent, it depends both on how extra-mental reality is and on how living organisms collectively perceive reality. The objective of this article is not to evaluate the merit of each view but a critical analysis of the frameworks that make each view possible. (shrink)

In this study, we tested whether it was possible to use an online psi task to identify psi-talented individuals who could produce reliably significant results in repeated tests. The study aimed to develop psi tasks on an online platform, analyse data to identify talented individuals among a large sample (n = 1,014), select the top 50 performing individuals (talents), assess their consistent performance, and evaluate potential personality predictors. We found that retest performance on two tasks was above chance expectations, but (...) this finding did not hold up after correcting for multiple comparisons. In selected analyses, we also found that conscientiousness had a negative correlation with higher performance, while agreeableness had a positive correlation. We suggest that increasing the number of participants could yield more robust results. (shrink)

Frustration has been growing with mainstay epistemological methods of logical deduction and experimental falsification for assessing theories of consciousness. This paper explores one among several recent alternatives being explored, captured here under the term 'listed requirements'. This paper conducts a structured literature search and critical review of attempts to develop such lists, identifying five candidates. These five lists are analysed as a promising start, but insufficient to do the method justice. The longest list has 11 items, but 19 unique items (...) are identified across the five lists, and a taxonomic analysis by category further surfaces at least 30 potential candidates. Four limitations of the method are discussed, arguing that it is best treated as one tool within a broader strategy for rigorously assessing theories and identifying avenues for future research. The conclusion describes a workplan for a sufficiently complete working taxonomy to support the field's collective endeavours. (shrink)

The term 'cosmic consciousness' is mostly used either as an ontological fundamental in metaphysics or to name a mystical experience (event). It was first popularized as a psychological state, an evolutionary attainment following the event, while extension of the mystical experience over time comprises another state, for which the term is also used. Drawing on a personal journey of discovery involving six people's reports of spontaneous cosmic consciousness, including the author's own, this article starts with first-person accounts of the mystical (...) event and state. Then, it reviews the origin of the event–state conflation, and goes on to consider some aspects of the experience and category as used. This includes comments on the phenomenology and conceptual structure of spontaneous cosmic consciousness experience, with the suggestion of a paradigm form along with consideration of 'enlightenment' and the place of psi. (shrink)

Implicit attitudes (IAs) are mental states that are responsible for discriminatory behaviour called 'implicit bias'. There is no agreement about the nature of IAs. Some argue that they don't differ from beliefs. This paper defends this view from the following objection: one is in a good epistemic position with respect to one's beliefs; if one believes that P, one tends to know that one believes that P. However, studies show that often people are not aware of having IAs. How can (...) it be if IAs are beliefs? I address this objection by defending the claim that implicit beliefs constitute a special kind of belief — beliefs that are not accompanied by the relevant judgments. More precisely, if one implicitly believes that P, a tokening of this belief is not accompanied by judging that P. Since judging is a route to knowing one's beliefs, this route is blocked for implicit beliefs. (shrink)

This paper introduces the state space theory of consciousness, positing that the cortex processes information through delay coordinate embedding operationalized by recurrent neural network engines. This leverages the power of Takens' theorem, giving rise to representations of reality as points within state space. Consciousness is posited to arise at the highest order engines amongst hierarchical and parallel engine pathways. Consciousness is cast as a dynamic process rather than as a neuronal state, reconciling dualist intuitions with a monist perspective. Neuronal representations (...) develop uniquely in each individual due to history-dependent training of these engines, accounting for the privacy of qualia while also addressing cortical plasticity and the heuristic nature of cortical processing. Posited engines exhibit non-linear dynamics that are sensitive to initial conditions, explaining phenomena such as ambiguous figure interpretation and offering a pathway to explaining free will. The state space theory aligns with and expands upon major theories (e.g.higher-order theories, global workspace theories, integrated information theory), essentially providing a computational mechanism that unifies elements of these theories. Future work will explore neural mechanisms and validate predictions. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy of mind, understanding others is often presented as an activity of attributing mental states to agents or mindreading – the central question being then how to access their minds. The paper argues that this pervasive approach should be rejected, in favour of the view along which identifying an action comes from exercising conceptual skills acquired through being inserted into shared practices characterizing a social world. Examining the conditions of their acquisition then sheds new light on the semantics (...) of psychological concepts as well as on the roots of misunderstanding. (shrink)

In this book Fabian Klinge develops a novel approach for explaining phenomenal consciousness. He defends a version of panpsychism, that is the theory, that (some of) the fundamental physical entities exhibit consciousness. However, in contrast to standard conceptions of the view, the author does not take human consciousness to be grounded in but emergent from the consciousness of elementary particles. In this form, he argues, panpsychism can overcome the doctrine’s Achilles' heel, the combination problem, without running into similarly severe problems—thus (...) rendering panpsychism a strong contender to its problem-ridden rivals physicalism and dualism. In addition, the author provides a thorough analysis of the poorly studied concept of metaphysical emergence. He argues that, by refining some of the major contributions in the literature, emergence can be made intelligible enough to serve as a basis for a credible solution proposal to the mind-body problem. (shrink)

Written by leading social scientists, this ambitious volume asks what individuals’ “handling” of bodies reveal about inequality, social order and cultural change in societies.

Aristotle’s account of perceptual self-consciousness (‘perceiving that we perceive’) is typically approached as an attempt to explain how we know our own mental states. In particular, Aristotle is taken to understand perceptual self-consciousness as a function of the mind or soul’s quasi-perceptual relation to itself. I argue instead that Aristotle understands perceptual self-consciousness as the (veridical) perception that we are confronted with an external object. This is not a matter of knowing our own mental states, but of knowing that we (...) know: in particular, of knowing that an external object is apparent to us through our sense-organs. I conclude with a discussion of Aristotle’s broader interest in perceptual self-consciousness. (shrink)

Check out the new version, keeping this to time stamp. -/- Chiral Dynamics of Emergent Systems (CODES) that proposes that all emergent phenomena, such as language, RNA, DNA, consciousness, arise from the dynamic interplay between chaos and order, governed by chirality, or directionally asymmetry. By integrating this chiral relationship into a mathematical framework, CODES provides a unifying mechanism that explains how complex systems evolve and self-organize over time. It resolves Wittgenstein's language games, by situating them through a broader, adaptive system (...) driven by the balance of stability and creativity. Through this interdisciplinary approach, CODES bridges gaps between philosophy, biology, linguistics, and evolution of structured yet adaptive systems. (shrink)

Reed (2022) states that according to Ullin Place’s latest view, intensional statements are not necessarily connected with mentalist language and explanations, and intensionality is the mark of the conversational. This is false. Place’s view is that intensionality is the mark of a quotation. Quotations are sentences that express the content of propositional attitudes. They are characterised by what Frege called ‘indirect reference’ and Quine ‘referential opacity’. Intensionality is nothing more than this. Intensional statements stating propositional attitudes are at the heart (...) of the mentalist language. Propositional attitudes are dispositions. Dispositions are the nature of things and are at the core of all sciences. The doings of a person are the active manifestations of dispositions. Place defines mentalism at the level of the person, which is also the level of behaviourism. This contrasts with a standard definition of mentalism at the subpersonal level, also known as centrism. Doing or behaving is interacting with the environment. This is common to the scientific approaches at the level of the person. Articulating the same conceptual foundation and language and each approach having its dialect must be possible. This is “relevan[t] for understanding the types of language that could be used in explanations given by behavioural science” (Reed, 2022). (shrink)

According to the simulation hypothesis, the world we live in is a computer simulation. According to longtermism, we should aim to bring about the best possible future. In this paper, I argue that there is a tension between the two: insofar as we have reason to think we are living in a computer simulation, we have reason to think the longtermist project will fail (or has already failed). I make my case by developing a novel version of the problem of (...) evil. It says that there exist certain forms of evil in our world that longtermist philosophers have argued we should try to eradicate. But then, the existence of those evils give us reason to think our world is not a computer simulation run by a being aligned with longtermist values. In short, the more that longtermists think we could make the world a better place in the future, the more troubling they should find it that the world is not already a better place, given the assumption that we are living in a computer simulation. (shrink)

The claim that the free energy principle is somehow related to Hamilton’s principle in statistical mechanics is ubiquitous throughout the subject literature. However, the exact nature of this relationship remains unclear. According to some sources, the free energy principle is merely similar to Hamilton’s principle of stationary action; others claim that it is either analogous or equivalent to it, while yet another part of the literature espouses the claim that it is a version of Hamilton’s principle. In this article, we (...) aim to clarify the nature of the relationship between the two principles by investigating the two most likely interpretations of the claims that can be found in the subject literature. According to the strong interpretation, the two principles are equivalent and apply to the same subset of physical phenomena; according to the weak interpretation, the two principles are merely analogous to each other by virtue of their similar formal structures. As we show, adopting the stronger reading would lead to a dilemma that is untenable for the proponents of the free energy principle, thus supporting the adoption of the weaker reading for the relationship between the two constructs. (shrink)

The bullshit receptivity scale—a methodological tool that measures the level of profoundness that participants assign to a series of obscure and new-agey, randomly generated statements—has become increasingly popular since its introduction in 2015. Researchers that deploy this scale often frame their research in terms of Harry Frankfurt’s analysis of bullshit, according to which bullshit is discourse produced without regard for the truth. I argue that framing these studies in Frankfurtian terms is detrimental and has led to some misguided theorizing about (...) the mental processes implicated in bullshit receptivity. I argue that we should, instead, frame these studies in terms of what G.A. Cohen calls unclarifiable bullshit. After reviewing some recent theorizing about the psychology of bullshit receptivity, I show how reframing the bullshit receptivity scale in terms of unclarifiable bullshit generates plausible conjectures about the psychological factors responsible for bullshit receptivity. I draw from the literature on the illusion of explanatory depth and the misplaced meaning effect to develop a novel account of bullshit detection and receptivity. I consider some empirical support for my account and draw attention to ways that it can also be extended to account for results from studies that don’t use the bullshit receptivity scale. (shrink)