This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Hobbes' Target Human Action Animal Action Hobbes' Theory of Action and Freedom References: primary sources Further reading: secondary sources.

This paper considers ten questions that those puzzled by or skeptical of extended cognition have posed. Discussion of these questions ranges across substantive, methodological, and dialectical issues in the ongoing debate over extended cognition, such as whether the issue between proponents and opponents of extended cognition is merely semantic or a matter of convention; whether extended cognition should be treated in the same way as extended biology; and whether conscious mental states pose a (...) special problem for the extended mind thesis. Lethocerus, the giant water bug, will be a recurrent reference point for much of the discussion. (shrink)

An analysis of effectiveness of some of hume's arguments in a framework developed by the author. The author states his position that arguments attacking positions attempt to show that, Given the assumptions of a position, Certain consequences are incompatible with it--A valid species of "argumentum ad hominem". Although this species does not work for constructive philosophical "proofs," it will work inversely in arguments (defending such proofs) which cite possible objections. These charge "petitio": the objection assumes what the position denies or (...) "vice versa". Eight arguments are judged as "ad hominem" or as charging "petitio" and as effective or ineffective in either case. The analyses elaborate the author's position, And the mode of analysis is suggested as an adjunct to considering a philosopher's conclusions. (shrink)

Contemporary education now appears to be dominated by the continual drive for improvement measured against the assessment of what students have learned. It is our contention that a foundational relation with assessment organises contemporary education. Here we draw on a 'way of thinking' that is deconstructive in its intent. Such thinking makes clear the vicious circularity of the argument for improvement, wherein assessment valorised in discourses of improvement provides not only a rationalisation for improvement via assessment, but also the very (...) means of achieving such possibilities via targets grounded in limited specifications of assessment. On reading Heidegger's 'question concerning technology' we sought to reconsider the vicious circle of improvement in relation to Being. We claim that the means-ends driven technology of assessment, rather than being at our disposal and under our control, only serves to reveals the Real to us in accordance with the restricting principle of reason. The principle of reason, we argue, grounds 'Enframing' that ranks and orders the very beings of education as objects to produce an objective 'world as picture', rather than opening the possibility of their identity as belongings with a movement of difference. So, 'improvement' becomes normative and binding for institutions and practices on grounds of the principle of assessment, and renders agents of education as functionaries of 'Enframing'. (shrink)

This paper explores what may be happening with information and also with happening itself: those versions of the event, of historicizing, deemed suitable to interrogating information. It pairs Claude Shannon’s foundational work on information theory with Martin Heidegger’s meditation on technology (and his evolving understanding of history), investigating each in light of the other. For Heidegger, the question concerning technology does not primarily concern an invention or tool, but a mode of revealing or truth. Similarly, Shannon’s invention is (...) not a device, but a new theory, a new way of viewing all media. Heidegger’s take on technology and Shannon’s theorization of information both ultimately rely, however, on events (of communicating and of appropriation, Ereignis, respectively). This permits, by way of conclusion, questioning how our own talk and thinking stand in information’s context, as well as our and Heidegger’s understanding of epochs and ages themselves. (shrink)

How should critical realists do social theory? This paper considers several issues raised by this question, in response to Jamie Morgan’s recent article in this journal, and comments on his discussion of norm circles.

We define a mathematical formalism based on the concept of an ‘‘open dynamical system” and show how it can be used to model embodied cognition. This formalism extends classical dynamical systems theory by distinguishing a ‘‘total system’’ (which models an agent in an environment) and an ‘‘agent system’’ (which models an agent by itself), and it includes tools for analyzing the collections of overlapping paths that occur in an embedded agent's state space. To illustrate the way this formalism can (...) be applied, several neural network models are embedded in a simple model environment. Such phenomena as masking, perceptual ambiguity, and priming are then observed. We also use this formalism to reinterpret examples from the embodiment literature, arguing that it provides for a more thorough analysis of the relevant phenomena. (shrink)

Humanity entered the twenty-first century with revolutionary achievements in biomedical research. At the same time multiple “dual-use” results have been published. The battle against infectious diseases is meeting new challenges, with newly emerging and re-emerging infections. Both natural disaster epidemics, such as SARS, avian influenza, haemorrhagic fevers, XDR and MDR tuberculosis and many others, and the possibility of intentional mis-use, such as letters containing anthrax spores in USA, 2001, have raised awareness of the real threats. Many great men, including Goethe, (...) Spinoza, J.B. Shaw, Fr. Engels, J.F. Kennedy and others, have recognized that liberty is also a responsibility. That is why the liberty to decide now represents an acknowledged necessity: biomedical research should be supported, conducted and published with appropriate measures to prevent potential “dual use”. Biomedical scientists should work according to the ethical principles of their Code of Conduct, an analogue of Hippocrates Oath of doctors; and they should inform government, society and their juniors about the problem. National science consulting boards of experts should be created to prepare guidelines and control the problem at state level. An international board should develop minimum standards to be applicable by each country. Bio-preparedness is considered another key-measure. (shrink)

This paper develops an update semantics for weak necessity modals like ‘ought’ and ‘should’. I start with the basic approach to the weak/strong necessity modal distinction developed in Silk 2018: Strong necessity modals are given their familiar semantics of necessity, predicating the necessity of the prejacent of the actual world (evaluation world). The apparent “weakness” of weak necessity modals derives from their bracketing the assumption that the relevant worlds in which the prejacent is necessary (...) (deontically, epistemically, etc.) need be candidates for actuality. ‘Should φ’ can be accepted without needing to settle that the relevant considerations (norms, preferences, expectations, etc.) that actually apply, given the facts, verify the necessity of φ. I formalize these ideas within an Update with Centering framework. The meaning of ‘Should φ’ is explained, fundamentally, in terms of how its use updates attention toward possibilities in which φ is necessary. The semantics is also extended to deontic conditionals. The proposed analyses capture various contrasting logical properties and discourse properties of ‘should’ and ‘must’ — e.g., in sensitivities to standing contextual assumptions, entailingness, and force — and provide an improved treatment of largely neglected data concerning information-sensitivity. (shrink)

Since it was first presented, James Fowler’s faith development theory has proven influential in pastoral care and counselling, pastoral and practical theology, spiritual direction, and Christian education. However, it has also been subject to substantial critical evaluation. This article reviews the major themes within psychological critiques and considers the agenda provided by these critiques for the theory’s future development. Critical themes concern Fowler’s understanding of “faith”; the theory’s structural “logic of development”; its overemphasis on (...) cognition and lack of attention to processes of transition and transformation; its gender bias and cultural specificity; and its purported difficulty in accommodating postmodern trends in psychology. To address these critiques in a meaningful way, there is a need to embrace alternative existing theories of faith development and spiritual/religious change, to construct a radically revised, process-focused version of faith development theory, and to continue to develop new localized process models of faith development. (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to identify organizations’ information security issues and to explore dynamic, organizational culture and contingency theories to develop an implementable framework for information security systems in human service organizations based soundly in theory and practice. Design/methodology/approach The paper includes a critical review of global information security management issues for HSOs and relevant multi-disciplinary organizational theories to address them. Findings Effective information security management can be particularly challenging to HSO because of their use of volunteer staff in (...) a borderless electronic environment. Organizations’ lack of recognition of the need for staff awareness of information security threats and for training in secure work practices, particularly in terms of maintaining clients’ privacy and confidentiality, is a major issue. The dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation, organizational culture theory and contingency theory were identified as the most suitable theoretical perspectives to address this issue and underpin an effective information security management framework for HSOs. Research limitations/implications The theory-based framework presented here has not been tested in practice. Such testing will be carried out in further research. Originality/value Currently, there is no framework for information security systems in HSOs. The framework developed here provides a foundation on which HSO can build information security systems specific to their needs. (shrink)

Ethical consumerism theory aims to describe, explain, and evaluate the ways in which producers and consumers use the market to support social and environmental values. The literature draws insights from empirical studies of sectors that largely take place on the legal market, such as textiles and agri-food. This paper takes a first step toward theorizing ethical consumerism in semi-legal sectors where market activities occur legally and illegally. How does extant theory extend to sectors such as sex work, cigarettes, (...) and recreational drugs? This study draws on the case of recreational cannabis (marijuana) in Portland, OR (USA). Data from 33 interviews, structured fieldwork at 64 dispensaries, and the US Census Bureau American Community Survey are analyzed using qualitative, quantitative, and spatial methods. The findings are compared to 12 suggestions that emerge from the literature on fair trade, organics, alternative agriculture, and political consumerism. I argue that not all ethical consumerism theory extends to semi-legal sectors. Cannabis closely resembles theoretical expectations in terms of supply/demand, prioritization of ethical issues, and pervasiveness of false claims, but differs in terms of who organizes, which types of strategies are pursued, and how ethical products are framed. The differences stem from several pervasive stigmas about cannabis. I also argue that the stigmas that set cannabis apart from other (more legal sectors) and present challenges to ethical consumerism in cannabis are directly related to the War on Drugs. These insights suggest that prohibition (and its lingering effects) can inhibit the emergence of ethical consumerism. (shrink)

Several neo-Kantians have questioned the standard deontological interpretation of Kant's ethical theory. They have also responded to charges of rationalism and rigorism by emphasizing the role of virtues and emotions in Kant's view. However, none have defended a fully virtue theoretic interpretation of Kant's theory. I claim that virtue theory has much to offer Kantians, but that resistance to developing a Kantian virtue theory rests on faulty assumptions about virtue theory. In this paper I clear (...) away three apparent obstacles to developing a Kantian virtue theory. The first regards his account of the virtues, which I argue is tangential to the issue of whether he can be interpreted as a virtue theorist. The second is Kant's codification of moral principles, which I argue is compatible with virtue theory. The third is the apparent explanatory primacy of the Categorical Imperative, which I argue is not fully supported by the textual evidence. (shrink)

What explains the outcomes of chance processes? We claim that their setups do. Chances, we think, mediate these explanations of outcome by setup but do not feature in them. Facts about chances do feature in explanations of a different kind: higher-order explanations, which explain how and why setups explain their outcomes. In this paper, we elucidate this 'mediator view' of chancy explanation and defend it from a series of objections. We then show how it changes the playing field in (...) four metaphysical disputes concerning chance. First, it makes it more plausible that even low chances can have explanatory power. Second, it undercuts a circularity objection against reductionist theories of chance. Third, it redirects the debate about a prominent argument against epistemic theories of chance. Finally, it sheds light on potential chancy explanations of the Universe's origin. (shrink)

Smartphone use plays an increasingly important role in our daily lives. Philosophical research that has used first wave or second wave theories of extended cognition in order to understand our engagement with digital technologies has focused on the contribution of these technologies to the completion of specific cognitive tasks (e.g., remembering, reasoning, problem-solving, navigation).However, in a considerable number of cases, everyday smartphone use is task-unrelated. In psychological research, these cases have been captured by notions such as absent-minded smart-phone use (...) (Marty-Dugas et al., 2018) or smartphone-related inattentiveness (Liebherr et al., 2020).Given the prevalence of these cases, we develop a conceptual framework that can accommodate the functional and phenomenological characteristics of task-unrelated smartphone use. To this end, we will integrate research on second wave extended cognition with mind-wandering research and introduce the concept of ‘extended mind-wandering’. Elaborating the family resemblances approach to mind-wandering (Seli, Kane, Smallwood, et al., 2018), we will argue that task-unrelated smartphone use shares many characteristics with mind-wandering. We will suggest that an empirically informed conceptual analysis of cases of extended mind-wandering can enrich current work on digitally extended cognition by specifying the influence of the attention economy on our cognitive dynamics. (shrink)

Liberalism has often been viewed as a continuing dialogue about the relative priorities between liberty and equality. When the version of equality under discussion requires equalization of outcomes, it is easy to see how the two ideals might conflict. But when the version of equality requires only equalization of opportunities, the conflict has been treated as greatly muted since the principle of equality seems so meager in its implications. However, when one looks carefully at various versions of equal opportunity and (...) various versions of liberty, the conflict between them is, in fact, both dramatic and inescapable. Each version of the conflict poses hard choices which defy anysystematicpattern granting priority to one of these basic values over the other. In this essay, I will flesh out and argue for this picture of fundamental conflict, and then turn to some more general issues about the kinds of answers we should expect to the basic questions of liberal theory. (shrink)

Philosophers of language have paid some attention in recent years to the nature of direct quotation, especially in discussions warning against confusion between use and mention, and perhaps even more attention to the proper interpretation of indirect quotation. Virtually all work on quotation has been confined exclusively to linguistic or verbal quotation. What about quotation of other sorts? If a string of words can quote another string of words, can a picture quote a picture, or a symphony quote another symphony? (...) And if I can quote your words can I also quote, or only imitate or describe, your gestures? (shrink)

A question of Woodin asks if κ is strongly compact and GCH holds below κ, then must GCH hold everywhere? One variant of this question asks if κ is strongly compact and GCH fails at every regular cardinal δ < κ, then must GCH fail at some regular cardinal δ ≥ κ? Another variant asks if it is possible for GCH to fail at every limit cardinal less than or equal to a strongly compact cardinal κ. We get a negative (...) answer to the first of these questions and positive answers to the second of these questions for a supercompact cardinal κ in the context of the absence of the full Axiom of Choice. (shrink)

When we seek a fuller understanding of individual liberty including its relational character, we confront a conundrum. The evident advantages of a single individual possessing liberty cannot be simply transferred to a greater number of beneficiaries. This conundrum is confronted with the resources of Hohfeld's analytical framework, developed specifically to elucidate the practical outworkings of interpersonal relations within the law. Attention is also paid to concerns expressed by von Wright over a representation of liberty (permission) within the resources of standard (...) deontic logic which fails to address its social aspect. The aggregate level of the Hohfeldian scheme is employed to represent a complete picture of liberty, but one that cannot guarantee benefits for a plurality of holders. The conclusion is reached that in order to extend the advantages of individual liberty to all, something other than liberty is required. (shrink)

Chez Foucault le pouvoir est d'abord pensé comme déploiement de la visibilité et comme inscription des corps. On voit dans une première partie comment les figures de l'autorité disparaissent, laissant place à un espace de dispersion où s'estompe la figure de l'homme comme effet passager d'une discontinuité entre le savoir et le pouvoir. Si le pouvoir est invisible lorsqu'il se confond avec l'adéquation à soi du savoir, c'est dans un effet de résistance que se constituent nos expériences qui sont à (...) la fois événements et significations : dans une deuxième partie nous reprenons la question du pouvoir à partir de l'impuissance du sujet à fonder son expérience, la perte de l'intériorité, la difficulté de la contestation, la perte de la profondeur, la perte du corps comme « propre » qui est aussi perte de l'excellence inhérente à tout être humain et du sexe comme affirmation de la différence . Nous croyons toujours opposer une nature intacte au déploiement du pouvoir. Nous examinons comment nous croyons trouver cette nature dans ce que nous caractérisons comme sujet de la contestation, peuple-substrat, corps-rebelle ou sexe-nature. Mais - nous le voyons dans la troisième partie - ces natures sont toujours « informées » par le pouvoir. C'est pourquoi, dans ce qui oppose une résistance au pouvoir, tels les expériences de la contestation sociale, de la sexualité et aussi du redoublement et de la transgression dans le langage, on retrouve les mêmes figures de déploiement qui caractérisent un pouvoir qui se redouble en lui-même et se dissémine dès qu'il rencontre des résistances, pour informer celles-ci. Car chez Foucault, l'expérience est une structure tripartite qui met en relation savoir, pouvoir et subjectivité.In Foucault's first writings, power was the spreading-out of visibility and an inscription of bodies. In the first part of this paper we examine how the figures of authority slowly faded, as power became very dispersed and diffused, only to give a last glimpse of the figure of man, a mere discontinuity between knowledge and power. If power remains invisible when it merges completely with a self-sufficient knowledge, our experiences take shape as effects of resistance to power. This is why experiences are simultaneously events and meanings : in a second part we reconsider the query on power in the light of Foucault's commentary on the difficulty of the subject to give foundation to his experiences, the loss of inferiority and profoundness, the challenge of true subversion, the loss of the body as one's "own", the loss of belief in a core of goodness in all human beings and the loss of sex as being decisive in recognition of a difference . We believe we ultimately can oppose an untouched and profound quality in human nature to the dispersion of power. We examine the different forms of such a belief in what we caractérise as the subject of subversion, the people as substratum, the body as rebel and sex as nature. But - as we can see in the third part - these natures are always "informed" by power. This is why we can find in most forms of resistance to power, as in the experiences of social subversion, sexuality, redoubling and transgression in language, the same forms of scattering which are specific to power itself, to a power which redoubles itself and in itself and is disseminated wherever he meets some resistance, to inform the latter. As with Foucault, experience is a tripartite structure which relates knowledge, power and subjectivity. (shrink)

Superstitious practices have been considered since the ancient times as signs of deviating cognitive forms, concerned with irrelevant causal relationships, and/or reducible to religious beliefs. Recent theories such as the extended mind and cognitive niche construction, though, can shed new light on superstition and its apparently unreasonable success. The trigger is to observe how most superstitions are not mere “beliefs” hosted in a naked mind, but rather involve a strong coupling between the mind and some external props allowing its (...) extensions away from the skull: from bodily gestures, to artifacts and other agents. The mind’s capability to extend into the environment supports the related theory of cognitive niche construction, suggesting that human agents achieved better and better performances by creating external structures able to provide better and persistent scaffoldings for their cognitive performances. When it is not possible to detect and exploit the presence of a cognitive niche in the environment, superstitious practices can be identified as the possibility to deploy an emergency-cognitive niche projected by the superstitious agent into the world by means of a superstitious prop. It is poorer and less reliable but preferable to utter blank, and most important it is still coupled with the external world, thus maintaining the fundamental characteristic of cognitive niches, that is distribution. (shrink)

An important objection to preference-satisfaction theories of well-being is that they cannot make sense of interpersonal comparisons. A tradition dating back to Harsanyi :434, 1953) attempts to solve this problem by appeal to people’s so-called extended preferences. This paper presents a new problem for the extended preferences program, related to Arrow’s celebrated impossibility theorem. We consider three ways in which the extended-preference theorist might avoid this problem, and recommend that she pursue one: developing aggregation rules that violate (...) Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition. (shrink)

Heyes sets out an intriguing theory but it raises more questions than compelling answers concerning culturally shaped cognition. I set out what I see as the most pressing questions, ranging over the book's early chapters concerning the structure of the theory, to two of Heyes’ four exemplar cognitive domains, selective social learning and imitation.

This paper attempts to shed light on three sets of issues that bear directly on our understanding of Locke and Kant. The first is whether Kant believes Locke merely anticipates his distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or also believes Locke anticipates his notion of synthetic a priori cognition. The second is what should we as readers of Kant and Locke should think about Kant’s view whatever it turns out to be, and the third is the nature of Kant’s justification (...) for the comparison he draws between his philosophy and Locke’s. I argue (1) that Kant believes Locke anticipates both the analytic-synthetic distinction and Kant’s notion of synthetic a priori cognition, (2) that the best justification for Kant’s claim draws on Locke’s distinction between trifling and instructive knowledge, (3) that the arguments against this claim developed by Carson, Allison, and Newman fail to undermine it, and (4) that Kant’s own justification for his claim is quite different from what many commentators have thought it was (or should have been). (shrink)

About 1970, Van Rensselaer Potter coined the term bioethics to bring under one heading broad questions of human survival, environment, and biology. In 1971, Potter outlined a statement of principles that linked the ethics of the biological sciences with the ethics of environmental concern. Regrettably, the field that adopted his rubric bioethics immediately diverged from Potter’s interests. Bioethics has become for the most part identified with medical ethics or health care ethics and in so doing has developed few ethical (...) principles and analyses in relationship to environmental ethics. Similarly, environmental ethics seldom touches on clinical or health care issues, even though the field of environmental health has grown greatly in recent decades. It is the purpose of this article to indicate briefly some of the topics that could be treated effectively as part of a project to reconnect medical ethics and environmental ethics into what may be called sustainable bioethics. (shrink)

This article claims that private law theorists ought to bear in mind the distinction between wholesale questions about the best interpretation or justification of legal institutions, and retail que...

We focus on collaborative activities that engage computer graphics designers and social scientists in systems design processes. Our conceptual symmetrical account of technology design and theory development is elaborated as a mode of mutual engagement occurring in an interdisciplinary trading zone, where neither discipline is placed at the service of the other and nor do disciplinary boundaries dissolve. To this end, we draw on analyses of mutual engagements between computer and social scientists stemming from the fields of computer-supported (...) cooperative work, human−computer interaction, and science and technology studies. We especially build on theoretical work in STS concerning information technology in health care and extend recent contributions from STS with respect to the modes of engagement and trading zones between computer and social sciences. We conceive participative digital systems design as a form of inquiry for the analysis of cooperative work settings, particularly when social science becomes part of design processes. We illustrate our conceptual approach using data from an interdisciplinary project involving computer graphics designers, sociologists, and neurosurgeons with the aim of developing patient-centered visualizations for clinical cooperation on a hospital ward. (shrink)

This paper is a new defense of the old orthodox view that self-consciousness requires self-concepts. My defense relies on two crucial constraints. The first is what I call Bermúdez’s Constraint, that is, the view that any attribution of content must account for the intentional behavior of the subject that reflects her own way of understanding the world. The second is the well-known Generality Constraint of Evans, which is also termed the recombinability constraint. The claim I want to support in this (...) paper is the following: Since whether and to what extent we can attribute to non-linguistic creatures and prelinguistic infants genuine knowing self-reference or de se contents is an open empirical question, the proponents of the nonconceptual self-consciousness face a dilemma. If we are convinced that the available empirical evidence is overwhelming, I argue--based on Evans’s Generality Constraint--that these self-representations are nothing but primitive prelinguistic self-concepts. However, if we are convinced that the available empirical evidence is not persuasive, I maintain--relying on Bermudez’s Constraint--that we do better by assuming that the subject is not self-represented. The content of her experiences and thoughts are best modeled as simple selfless propositional functions that are true or false relative to the subject of these experiences and thoughts. I refer to this as self-concernment without self-reference. Thus, against the recent ingenious work of Peacocke, I claim that there is no compelling reason for postulating nonconceptual middle level self-representation, between self-concernment and conceptual self-reference. However, as I hope to make clear, my claim is quite different from those of other recent oppositions to the idea of nonconceptual self-consciousness. According to the thesis of self-concernment without self-reference, the contents of experiences and thoughts are selfless propositional functions, true or false relative to the bearer of the respective mental states. (shrink)

In the book Extended Conceptual Metaphor Theory, Zoltán Kövecses presents a holistic view of how conceptual and contextual factors influence metaphor production and comprehension, with a comprehens...

We read with interest Lanphier and Anani’s manuscript on trauma-informed ethics consultation. Their model rightly integrates trauma-informed principles within the ethics c...

The purpose of this study is to propose the structural outline and conceptual framework of a Ricœurian translation theory. Following a discussion on the ambiguities around situating Ricœur in translation theory, three major interlinked components of the theory are explored. First, the metaphysics of meaning and translation is established based on Ricœur’s hermeneutics of infinitude. Then, the language-processing component is constructed through an incorporation of Ricœur’s narrative theory. Finally, the ethics and politics of translation, particularly in (...) globalization, are founded based on Ricœur’s “age of hermeneutics theory.”. (shrink)

We study constructive set theories, which deal with operations applying both to sets and operations themselves. Our starting point is a fully explicit, finitely axiomatized system ESTE of constructive sets and operations, which was shown in 10 to be as strong as PA. In this paper we consider extensions with operations, which internally represent description operators, unbounded set quantifiers and local fixed point operators. We investigate the proof theoretic strength of the resulting systems, which turn out to be impredicative . (...) © 2011 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim. (shrink)

La theorie physique? Ce titre, qui fut au debut de notre siecle celui d'un ouvrage controverse, suggere bien une question, celle de savoir si en matiere de science la theorie doit se qualifier en fonction d'un domaine plus particulier d'application. L'auteur, Pierre Duhem, n'aurait pas hesite, semble-t-il, a repondre par l'affirmative en ce qui concerne le vaste champ de la recherche que l'on peut signifier sous le nom de physique. Son ouvrage est en fait construit comme une preparation rigoureuse a (...) une telle reponse et bien que les annees aient modifie considerablement le contexte du champ sus-dit, les analyses proposees ont ete jugees suggestives par de nombreux epistemologues d'aujourd'hui. (shrink)

I argue that there are non-trivial objective chances (that is, objective chances other than 0 and 1) even in deterministic worlds. The argument is straightforward. I observe that there are probabilistic special scientific laws even in deterministic worlds. These laws project non-trivial probabilities for the events that they concern. And these probabilities play the chance role and so should be regarded as chances as opposed, for example, to epistemic probabilities or credences. The supposition of non-trivial deterministic chances might seem (...) to land us in contradiction. The fundamental laws of deterministic worlds project trivial probabilities for the very same events that are assigned non-trivial probabilities by the special scientific laws. I argue that any appearance of tension is dissolved by recognition of the level-relativity of chances. There is therefore no obstacle to accepting non-trivial chance-role-playing deterministic probabilities as genuine chances. (shrink)

It is natural to think that questions in the metaphysics of chance are independent of the mathematical representation of chance in probability theory. After all, chance is a feature of events that comes in degrees and the mathematical representation of chance concerns these degrees but leaves the nature of chance open. The mathematical representation of chance could thus, un-controversially, be taken to be what it is commonly taken to be: a probability measure (...) satisfying Kolmogorov’s axioms. The metaphysical questions about chance seem to be left open by all this. I argue that this is a mistake. The employment of real numbers as measures of chance in standard probability theory brings with it commitments in the metaphysics of (objective) chance that are not only substantial but also mistaken. To measure chance properly we need to employ extensions of the real numbers that contain infinitesimals: positive numbers that are infinitely small. But simply using infinitesimals alone is not enough, as a number of arguments show. Instead we need to put three ideas together: infinitesimals, the non-locality of chance and flexibility in measurement. Only those three together give us a coherent picture of chance and its mathematical representation. (shrink)

We associate the semantic game with chance moves conceived by Blinov with Blamey’s partial logic. We give some equivalent alternatives to the semantic game, some of which are with a third player, borrowing the idea of introducing the pseudo-player called Nature in game theory. We observe that IF propositional logic proposed by Sandu and Pietarinen can be equivalently translated to partial logic, which implies that imperfect information may not be necessary for IF propositional logic. We also indicate that (...) some independent quantifiers can be regarded as dependent quantifiers of indeterminate sequence, using the interjunction connective in partial logic. We conclude our paper by indicating some further research in a more general setting. (shrink)

How, according to Darwin, does chance variation affect evolutionary outcomes? In his 1866 book, On the Various Contrivances by which British and Foreign Orchids are Fertilised by Insects, Darwin developed an argument that played an important role in his overall case for evolution by natural selection, as articulated in later editions of the Origin. This argument also figured significantly in Darwin's reflections on the theological dimensions of evolution by natural selection.

The cluster of concerns usually identified asmatters of privacy can be adequately accountedfor by unpacking our natural rights to life,liberty, and property. Privacy as derived fromfundamental natural rights to life, liberty,and property encompasses the advantages of thecontrol and restricted access theories withouttheir attendant difficulties.

Günter Wagner’s Homology, Genes, and Evolutionary Innovation is a compelling, and empirically well-supported account of the evolution of character identity and character origination which emphasizes the importance of homology and novelty as central explananda for 21st century evolutionary biology. In this essay review, I focus on the similarities and differences between the structuralist picture of evolutionary biology advocated by Wagner, and that presented by standard evolutionary theory. First, I outline the ways in which Wagner’s genetic theory of homology (...) diverges from the account of homology offered by standard evolutionary theory. Then, I consider the motivations for these divergences. Lastly, I discuss a number of concerns with Wagner’s view, and offer some concluding thoughts on the relationship between structuralism and adaptationism. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a formal criterion that distinguishes between deductively valid arguments that do and do not beg the question. I define the concept of a Never-failing Minimally Competent Knower (NMCK) and suggest that an argument begs the question just in case it cannot possibly assist an NMCK in extending his or her knowledge.

For more than one decade, Andy Clark has defended the now-famous extended mind thesis, the idea that cognitive processes leak into the world. In this paper I analyse Clark’s theoretical justification for the thesis: explanatory simplicity. I argue that his way of justifying the thesis leads into contradiction, either at the level of propositional attitude ascriptions or at the theoretical level. I evaluate three possible strategies of dealing with this issue, concluding that they are all likely to fail and (...) that therefore, as regards explanatory simplicity, the burden of proof is on Clark’s side. The paper divides into two main sections: in “Simplicity and Coherence”, I define the two concepts that are important in this context (simplicity and explanatory coherence). In “How to Cope with Coherence”, these two concepts are applied to the central thought experiment, the Inga/Otto case. It will be shown that justifying the extended mind thesis by reference to simplicity may cause trouble, because ‘extended’ behavioural descriptions are likely to yield rather complicated explanations. (shrink)