Why is evolutionary theory controversial among members of the American public? We propose a novel explanation: allegiance to different criteria for belief. In one interview study, two online surveys, and one nationally representative phone poll, we found that evolutionists and creationists take different justifications for belief as legitimate. Those who accept evolution emphasize empirical evidence and scientific consensus. Creationists emphasize not only the Bible and religious authority, but also knowledge of the heart. These criteria for belief remain predictive of (...) views about evolution even when taking into account other related factors like religion, political affiliation, and education. Each view is supported by its own internally specified criteria for what constitutes a justified belief. Changing minds may thus require changing epistemic norms. (shrink)

Ervin Laszlo's Science and the Akashic Field is vital to our transition from a long epoch of empire building - of the drive to control Earth's resources by fierce competition in a situation of perceived scarcity - to a future of truly cooperative global family. Laszlo's universe is a far cry from the one Western science has taught us and compatible with my own views as a "post-Darwinian" evolution biologist. In fact, no small number of Western scientists today have defected (...) from the official scientific story of How Things Are to create or adopt various versions of the new scientific worldview Laszlo presents - a worldview rooted in older sciences and cultures such as Vedic, yet ultimately not just timely, but futuristic. These new scientific models, integrating ancient and modern knowledge, represent a paradigm shift greater than the Copernican revolution and are crucial to the next stage in humanity's evolution as a planetary species. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to articulate, discuss in detail and criticise Reichenbach’s sophisticated and complex argument for scientific realism. Reichenbach’s argument has two parts. The first part aims to show how there can be reasonable belief in unobservable entities, though the truth of claims about them is not given directly in experience. The second part aims to extent the argument of the first part to the case of realism about the external world, conceived of as a world (...) of independently existing entities distinct from sensations. It is argued that the success of the first part depends on a change of perspective, where unobservable entities are viewed as projective complexes vis-à-vis their observable symptoms, or effects. It is also argued that there is an essential difference between the two parts of the argument, which Reichenbach comes to accept. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend a moderately cognitive account of religious beliefs. Religious beliefs are interpreted as “worldview beliefs”, which I explicate as being indispensable to our everyday and scientific practice; my reading is nonetheless distinct from non-cognitivist readings of “worldview belief” which occasionally appear in the literature. I start with a brief analysis of a recent German contribution to the debate which on the one hand insists on the priority of epistemic reasons for or against (...) religious beliefs, but on the other hand contends that religious beliefs are worldview beliefs. This leads me to explicate a special sense of worldview beliefs, as well as their cognitive role. After that, I shed some light on a special epistemological characteristic of worldview beliefs, namely the strong involvement of “free certitude” in their acceptance. I explore the implications for the possible role of arguments for worldview beliefs, especially for worldview beliefs concerning theism. (shrink)

This paper is about how to aggregate outside opinion. If two experts are on one side of an issue, while three experts are on the other side, what should a non-expert believe? Certainly, the non-expert should take into account more than just the numbers. But which other factors are relevant, and why? According to the view developed here, one important factor is whether the experts should have been expected, in advance, to reach the same conclusion. When the agreement of two (...) (or of twenty) thinkers can be predicted with certainty in advance, their shared belief is worth only as much as one of their beliefs would be worth alone. This expectational model of belief dependence can be applied whether we think in terms of credences or in terms of all-or-nothing beliefs. (shrink)

Trenton Merricks, among others, has recently championed in a series of papers what he takes to be a novel and simple solution to an age-old problem concerning the compatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom. The solution crucially involves the thesis that God’s beliefs about the future actions of human persons asymmetrically depend on the future actions of those persons. I show that Merricks’s defense of this thesis is inadequate and that the prospects for improving his defense of it (...) would require him to enter the fray of articulating and defending a view about the mechanics whereby divine foreknowledge is achieved—something he and other advocates of the strategy he advances had hoped to avoid. (shrink)

Psychological wisdom concepts were reviewed. 304 people aged 18-85 were tested with use of a questionnaire aimed at learning individual wisdom concepts. Popular wisdom concepts take into account broad declarative and procedural knowledge, life experience of a person and the features of his/her character. Explicitly, under a half of respondents take the following wisdom criteria into account : balancing own profits with concern for others and relation to existential problems, such as sense and direction of life. (...) The respondents lack the consciousness that wisdom is associated with: acting for common good, deep and conscious reflection of value system, the consciousness of limited nature of knowledge and logical thinking and developing relativistic and dialectic thinking. 5 clusters were differentiated, representing popular wisdom concept types. In order to verify the hypothesis about the connection between popular wisdom concepts and the value system of the research participants, value questionnaires were used: Scheler’s and Schwarz’s Portrait Value Questionnaire. The hypothesis was confirmed. Popular wisdom concepts are connected with values appreciated by them. (shrink)

This study examines the effects of demographic characteristics on ethical perceptions. While earlier research has produced conflicting results regarding the predictive power of these variables, significant and definite insights were obtained with proper controls. The following predictors of ethical attitudes are examined: age, gender, marital status, education, dependent children status, region of the country and years in business, while controlling for job status. A nation-wide random sample of employees was used in obtaining a response rate of fifty-three percent (total n (...) of 423). Indices of aspects of business ethical attitudes were constructed using factor analysis. Linear multiple regression analysis indicated the significant predictive variables. Age was found to be a most-significant predictor. Older workers had stricter interpretations of ethical standards. Gender and region predicted attitudes about job-discrimination practices only, with women and persons from the Midwest most strongly opposed to the practice. All the other variables proved to be unreliable ethics predictors. (shrink)

This volume of the Thinker’s Guide Library introduces readers to powerful methods for questioning that pinpoint underlying beliefs and systems of logic. Richard Paul and Linda Elder show how practical and accessible the Socratic method of inquiry can be and how useful it is when assessing and solving any problem.

How do novel scientific concepts arise? In Creating Scientific Concepts, Nancy Nersessian seeks to answer this central but virtually unasked question in the problem of conceptual change. She argues that the popular image of novel concepts and profound insight bursting forth in a blinding flash of inspiration is mistaken. Instead, novel concepts are shown to arise out of the interplay of three factors: an attempt to solve specific problems; the use of conceptual, analytical, and (...) material resources provided by the cognitive-social-cultural context of the problem; and dynamic processes of reasoning that extend ordinary cognition. Focusing on the third factor, Nersessian draws on cognitive science research and historical accounts of scientific practices to show how scientific and ordinary cognition lie on a continuum, and how problem-solving practices in one illuminate practices in the other. (shrink)

This paper examines the interplay between conceptual structure and the evolution of scientific concepts, arguing that concepts are fundamentally ‘forward-looking’ constructs. Drawing on empirical studies of similarity and categorization, I explicate the way in which the conceptual taxonomy highlights the ‘relevant respects’ for similarity judgments involved in categorization. I then propose that this taxonomy provides some of the cognitive underpinnings of the ongoing development of scientific concepts. I use the concept synapse to illustrate my proposal, (...) showing how conceptual taxonomy both facilitates and constrains the accommodation of newly discovered phenomena. I end by briefly considering the implications of the proposed approach for a normative evaluation of scientific concepts. (shrink)

Before talking about the vision of Orikhov's essence of the relationship between the church and the state, one must first determine what the church is about - Catholic or Orthodox. After all, the thinker lived in Poland when there were still strong, even parity positions of both denominations. He himself was brought up in a family where his father was Catholic and his mother was Orthodox. This was reflected in his mentality: he repeatedly publicly stated the benefits of certain (...) tenets of the Orthodox faith. But most of all he settled on the problem of relations between the Catholic Church and the state. (shrink)

A ‘scientific worldview’ is commonly seen as contradictory to belief in supernatural forces, and there is little research on the supernatural beliefs of individuals who identify with science. In this article, we investigate the supernatural explanations of science-oriented individuals in domains of fundamental concern (suffering, death, and origins), and how supernatural causality is reconciled with belief in science. The open-ended responses of 387 Finns were analysed. The results show that science-oriented Finns endorsed both religion-related and more secular supernatural (...) beliefs (such as belief in evolution as a purposeful process). Following the coexistence model, science-oriented Finns applied synthetic and target-dependent reasoning. In addition, many who invoked supernatural explanations integrated supernatural causality with science. Two forms of integrated reasoning were found: 1) supernatural agency as the ultimate cause and scientific theory as the proximate cause, and 2) a similarity-based heuristic, as seen in afterlife beliefs appealing to the law of conservation of energy. (shrink)

A brief account of epistemological models that try to unfold the intertheoretic context of theory change is proposed. It is stated that all of them has a host of drawbacks, the most salient one being the lack of adequate description of the research traditions interaction process. The epistemological model of mature theory change, eliminating the drawback, is contemplated and illustrated.

The paper examines three tenets of Dancy’s meta-ethics, finds them incompatible, and proposes a response-dependentist (or response-dispositional) solution. The first tenet is the central importance of thick concepts and properties. The second is that such concepts essentially involve response(s) of observers, which Dancy interprets in a way that fits the pattern of context-dependent resultance: thick concepts are well suited for the particularist grounding of moral theory. However, and this is the third tenet, in his earlier paper (1986) (...) Dancy forcefully argues against response-dispositional accounts of moral concepts and properties. The present paper argues that an anti-dispositional view is incompatible with the first two points concerning thick concepts. If thick concepts and properties are paramount and ubiquitous in moral thought and reality, and if they are essentially tied to human responses, then anti-dispositionalism is false. Dancy himself avoids obvious contradiction by characterizing thick items (concepts) differently from the usual characterization of response-dependent items. Actions that satisfy thick concepts do so in virtue of meriting a determinate response. The (non-reductionist) response-dependentist usually puts it slightly differently: such actions satisfy a given moral concepts in virtue of eliciting a merited response. I have argued at length that this tenuous difference in formulation is too weak to support a relevant difference in rebus. If the argument is right, Dancy is implicitly committed to a kind of response-dependentism. Finally, the particularist should embrace thick concepts and properties, and reject anti-dispositionalism. However, this would bring back the analogy with color and other secondary qualities. Since there are ceteris paribus laws governing such properties, the analogy suggests that moral properties might also be best accounted for by a ceteris paribus, or hedged account, a compromise between traditional generalism and the particularism of Dancy’s variety. (shrink)

Our best sciences are frequently held to be one way, perhaps the optimal way, to learn about the world’s higher-level ontology and structure. I first argue that which scientific theory is “best” depends in part on our goals or purposes. As a result, it is theoretically possible to have two scientific theories of the same domain, where each theory is best for some goal, but where the two theories posit incompatible ontologies. That is, it is possible for us (...) to have goal-dependent pluralism in our scientific ontologies. This ontological pluralism arises simply from our inability to directly know the world’s objects, rather than any particular claims about our cognitive limits, values, or social structures. I then present two case studies in which this possibility actually occurs—one based on simulations and theoretical analyses of constructed causal systems, and one from actual scientific investigations into the proper ontology for ocean regions. (shrink)

This is a short version of Lindström & Rabinowicz 1991.In earlier papers, we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. The proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather than as a function on theories (or belief sets). Going relational means that one allows for several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of generalizing in a certain (...) way an approach to belief revision due to Adam Grove. In his (1988) paper, Grove presented two closely related modelings of functional belief revision, one in terms of a family of "spheres" around the agent's theory G and the other in terms of an epistemic entrenchment ordering of propositions. The "sphere"-terminology is natural when one looks upon theories and propositions as sets of possible worlds. Grove's spheres may be thought of as possible "fallback" theories relative to the agent's original theory: theories that he may reach by deleting propositions that are not "sufficiently" entrenched (according to standards of sufficient entrenchment of varying stringency). The entrenchment ordering can be recovered from the family of fallbacks by the definition: A is at least as entrenched as B iff A belongs to every fallback to which B belongs. To revise a theory T with a proposition A, we go to the smallest sphere that contain A-worlds and intersect it with A. The relational notion of belief revision that we are interested in, results if one allows that some propositions may be incomparable with respect to epistemic entrenchment. As a result, the family of fallbacks around a given theory will no longer have to be nested. This change opens up the possibility for several different ways of revising a theory with a given proposition. (shrink)

Accession Number: ATLA0001788481; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 128-138.; Language(s): English; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay; Related Essays: By: Van Inwagen, Peter Explaining belief in the supernatural Believing primate, p 128-138. Oxford ; New York : Oxford Univ Pr, 2009 ATLA0001788481.

Law is a discourse on the world with a view to transforming it. It uses legal concepts to effect these changes. The application of legal concepts to individual cases, enabled by the judge, is not, however, automatic. Law is not justice, but a way of regulating relations between human beings.

In this highly personal book, one of Europe’s foremost contemporary philosophers confronts the theme of faith and religion. He argues that there is a substantial link between the history of Christian revelation and the history of nihilism, in particular as the latter appears in the work of Nietzsche and Heidegger, Vattimo’s philosophical specialty. Tracing the relation between his response to these two thinkers and his own life as a devout Catholic, Vattimo shows how his interpretation of Heidegger’s work and (...) his conceptions of “weak thought” and “weak ontology” can be seen as closely linked to a rediscovery of Christianity. Vattimo speaks here in the first person—a risk that results in a disarmingly open exploration of the themes of charity, truth, dogmatism, morality, and sin, viewed through the lens of his own life and his own return to Christianity. While deeply critical of institutionalized religion and the Church, Vattimo discovers in the Christian tradition a voice whose interpretation is still being played out around us. Shaped by his readings of Nietzsche and Heidegger, Vattimo’s decision to affirm his formation within the Christian tradition provides an original and engaging contribution to the contemporary debate on religion. At the center of this book is the enigma of belief. Freed by modernity from its Platonic subordination to knowledge, belief is recovered as a crucial and inevitable feature of our cultural and personal lives. “Do you believe?” Vattimo is asked. “I believe so,” he replies. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce holds some views about science and inquiry whose exact significance and ratio essendi are notoriously hard to grasp. One of these is particularly intriguing, namely, his frequently inferring from the intuitive ideas that science consists “in diligent inquiry into truth for truth’s sake”, and that the greatest threat to science is to “block the way of inquiry”, the conclusions that “belief […] has no place in science” and that the “scientific man”, when inquiring, has only “provisional” (...) opinions. In this article, I examine the ground and validity of the infamous and, arguably, strongly counterintuitive thesis that “belief has... (shrink)

Social epistemologists often operationalize the task of indirectly assessing experts’ trustworthiness to identifying whose beliefs are more reliably true on matters in an area of expertise. Not only does this neglect the philosophically rich space between belief formation and testimonial utterances, it also reduces trustworthiness to reliability. In ethics of trust, by contrast, explicitly relational views of trust include things like good will and responsiveness. One might think that relational aspects can be safely set aside for social epistemology of (...) trust in experts, that such considerations may be relevant for personal relationships but not for expert trustworthiness. Against these claims I argue for the social-epistemic relevance of relational aspects of trust in experts, and to that end I discuss three sorts of considerations – responsively positive, neutral, and negative factors – that can make a difference for expert trustworthiness. (shrink)

My purpose is to offer an assessment of the scientific legacy of Converse's “Belief Systems” by reviewing five productive lines of research stimulated by his authoritative analysis and unsettling conclusions. First I recount the later life history of Converse's notion of “nonattitudes,” and suggest that as important as nonattitudes are, we should be paying at least as much attention to their opposite: attitudes held with conviction. Second, I argue that the problem of insufficient information that resides at the center (...) of Converse's analysis has not gone away, and that newly fashioned models of information processing offer only partial remedies. Third, I suggest that the concept of the “average voter” is a malicious fiction, as it blinds us to the enormous variation in political attention, interest, and knowledge that characterizes mass publics, in Converse's time as in our own. Fourth, I develop an affirmative aspect of Converse's analysis that has mostly been overlooked: namely, that if ideological reasoning is beyond most citizens’ capacity and interest, they might fall back on a simple and reasonable alternative, which I will call “group‐centrism.” And fifth, I consider the possibility that while the majority of individual citizens falls short of democratic standards, the public as a whole might do rather well. (shrink)

Limited distribution phenomena related to negation and negative polarity are usually thought of in terms of affectivity where affective is understood as negative or downward entailing. In this paper I propose an analysis of affective contexts as nonveridical and treat negative polarity as a manifestation of the more general phenomenon of sensitivity to (non)veridicality (which is, I argue, what affective dependencies boil down to). Empirical support for this analysis will be provided by a detailed examination of affective dependencies in Greek, (...) but the distribution of any will also be shown to follow from (non)veridicality. (shrink)

This book addresses the different forms that religious belief can take. Two primary forms are discussed: propositional or doctrinal belief, and belief in God. Religious belief in God, whose affective content is trust in God, it is seen, opens for believers a relationship to God defined by trust in God. The book addresses the issue of the relation between belief and faith, the issue of what Søren Kierkegaard called the subjectivity of faith, and the issue of the relation (...) between religious belief and religious experience. After the introductory chapter the book continues with a chapter in which features and forms of belief allowed by the general concept of belief are presented. Several of these forms and features are related to the features of religious belief examined in succeeding chapters. The book's final chapter examines God-relationships in the Christian tradition that de-emphasize belief and are not defined by belief. (shrink)

In complex societies, there will always be situations in which an individual's deeply held beliefs conflict with the collective norms of the society. When only one individual challenges those norms, the norms generally hold. When challenges come from many individuals, the norms themselves may change. The tolerance for different beliefs will depend upon the political structure of the society and the specific beliefs that are being challenged.The Greek tragedy Antigone is an exploration of the choices that rulers (...) can make regarding such conflicts. They can either tolerate the unpopular and subversive views of an individual or punish the individual in a way that attempts to uphold the existing rules, bolster the... (shrink)

Boelen's recent book provides a systematic investigation and tightly woven discussion of the question, "What does it mean to be mature?" The reader soon learns that the author's interest in this question is motivated by concerns other than those found in the standard textbooks of developmental psychology. Indeed the ensuing discussion unfolds as a continuing critique of the psychobiological concept of maturity. This is the case, the author informs us, not because the traditional scientific treatments of the issue (...) are research-oriented, replete with alleged empirical confirmations, but because the research is not done with the "proper perspective.". (shrink)

This chapter discusses how we should think about experiences that threaten to radically transform our understanding of the world. While it can be rational to treat the “doxastically transformative” potential of an experience as a reason to choose against it, such a decision must be based in something more than the fact that this experience would alter one’s current beliefs. It only in light of knowledge of how things are that a person can choose rationally against transformative processes that (...) would destroy this knowledge. (shrink)

In the theater the fictional Dr. Kelekian’s relief that he does not have to talk to family members about his patient’s cancer treatment draws uneasy laughter from the audience. Doctors, patients, and family members alike recognize the situation, even if hearing it so baldly expressed discomfits them.Why do physicians and other health care professionals, including lawyers and bioethicists, so often view families as “trouble”? And why do families so often see medical professionals as uncaring and uncommunicative? Presumably everyone wants the (...) same goal—recovery or the best possible outcome for the patient. And yet trouble clearly exists. We do not see the problem as one of “dysfunctional families” or “callous doctors,” although there are undoubtedly many of each. (shrink)

Scientific inquiry is represented as a process of rational hypothesis revision in the face of data. For the concept of rationality, we rely on the theory of belief dynamics as developed in [5, 9]. Among other things, it is shown that if belief states are left unclosed under deductive logic then scientific theories can be expanded in a uniform, consistent fashion that allows inquiry to proceed by any method of hypothesis revision based on "kernel" contraction. In contrast, if (...) belief states are closed under logic, then no such expansion is possible. (shrink)

For quite a long time now I have argued against the view, widely held, and forcefully expounded by John Burnet, that at Phaedo 102b2-d2 Plato is formulating the notion of essential attribute and contrasting essence with accident. I have claimed that the essence-accident contrast is absent from that passage. This is a view that others have also held. But I have since 1950 found in that passage a formidable theory of relations. Recently, Professor David Gallop has taken me to task (...) for my heterodoxy. His reaction is overwhelming:I confess that I do not see how such a theory, [A] even if the text were to embody it, [B] could be held to provide an adequate account of relational statements in general. Gallop's paper is very tantalizing. Although he establishes neither A nor B, he does offer a series of very extraordinary arguments, whose examination reveals the depth of Plato's thinking on relations. (shrink)

We construct a computable vector space with the trivial computable automorphism group, but with the dependence relations as complicated as possible, measured by their Turing degrees. As a corollary, we answer a question asked by A.S. Morozov in [Rigid constructive modules, Algebra and Logic, 28 570–583 ; 379–387 ].

Summary The concept of unified theory is defined in logical and abstract semantic terms, and employed in the analysis of relations between empirical scientific theories. The conceptual framework of the approach applies to binary relations such as the reduction or replacement of one theory by another, and to multiple intertheory relations. Historically, unified theories tend to arise within the contexts of scientific conflicts which they may show susceptible of solution even in the most controversial cases of the logical (...) incompatibility or conceptual incommensurability of competing theories. These conclusions are exemplified by the Planck-Einstein quantum theory of thermal radiation. The analysis shows in which sense it can, and in which it cannot, be said that this theory unifies Wien's law and the Rayleigh-Jeans law of black-body radiation. (shrink)

In this exploratory, correlational study, several psychophysiological measures were assessed and the relation between these measures and an experimental self-report questionnaire to measure the seven implicit beliefs of sexual offenders ) was established in a sample of Dutch participants recruited from the healthy population using correlational analyses. After analyzing task performance, electroencephalogram data and electrocardiogram data, the psychophysiological variables were correlated with the experimental QITSO subscales. The subscale “children as sexual beings” correlated positively with the P300 amplitude at (...) electrode Pz. The subscale “women are unknowable” correlated positively with resting-state beta activity during eyes closed and eyes open, and with alpha activity during eyes open. Additionally, the subscale “entitlement’ correlated positively with low frequency heart rate variability power during eyes closed and eyes open, and with high frequency power during eyes closed. This study is a first exploratory step towards establishing a psychophysiological profile underlying the self-report questionnaire QITSO. (shrink)

Had we grown up elsewhere or been educated differently, our view of the world would likely be radically different. What to make of this? This paper takes an accuracy-centered first-personal approach to the question of how to respond to the arbitrary nature in which many of our beliefs are formed. I show how considerations of accuracy motivate different responses to this sort of information depending on the type of attitude we take towards the belief in question upon subjecting (...) the belief to doubt. (shrink)

Ontic structural realists hold that structure is all there is, or at least all there is fundamentally. This thesis has proved to be puzzling: What exactly does it say about the relationship between objects and structures? In this article, I look at different ways of articulating ontic structural realism in terms of the relation between structures and objects. I show that objects cannot be reduced to structure, and argue that ontological dependence cannot be used to establish strong forms of (...) structural realism. At the end, I show how a weaker, but controversial, form of structural realism can be articulated on the basis of ontological dependence. (shrink)

Conceptualist accounts of the representational content of perceptual experiences have it that a subject _S_ can experience no object, property, relation, etc., unless _S_ "i# possesses and "ii# exercises concepts for such object, property, or relation. Perceptual experiences, on such a view, represent the world in a way that is conceptual.

In this paper, we review Keith Lehrer’s account of the basing relation, with particular attention to the two cases he offered in support of his theory, Raco (Lehrer, Theory of knowledge, 1990; Theory of knowledge, (2nd ed.), 2000) and the earlier case of the superstitious lawyer (Lehrer, The Journal of Philosophy, 68, 311–313, 1971). We show that Lehrer’s examples succeed in making his case that beliefs need not be based on the evidence, in order to be justified. These (...) cases show that it is the justification (rather than the belief) that must be based in the evidence. We compare Lehrer’s account of basing with some alternative accounts that have been offered, and show why Lehrer’s own account is more plausible. (shrink)

Ecological and sensorimotor theories of perception build on the notion of action-dependent invariants as the basic structures underlying perceptual capacities. In this paper we contrast the assumptions these theories make on the nature of perceptual information modulated by action. By focusing on the question, how movement specifies perceptual information, we show that ecological and sensorimotor theories endorse substantially different views about the role of action in perception. In particular we argue that ecological invariants are characterized with reference to transformations produced (...) in the sensory array by movement: such invariants are transformation-specific but do not imply motor-specificity. In contrast, sensorimotor theories assume that perceptual invariants are intrinsically tied to specific movements. We show that this difference leads to different empirical predictions and we submit that the distinction between motor equivalence and motor-specificity needs further clarification in order to provide a more constrained account of action/perception relations. (shrink)

This multi-methodological study applied functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate neural activation in a group of adolescent students ( N = 88) during a probabilistic reinforcement learning task. We related patterns of emerging brain activity and individual learning rates to socio-motivational (in-)dependence manifested in four different motivation types (MTs): (1) peer-dependent MT, (2) teacher-dependent MT, (3) peer-and-teacher-dependent MT, (4) peer-and-teacher-independent MT. A multinomial regression analysis revealed that the individual learning rate predicts students’ membership to the independent MT, or the peer-and-teacher-dependent (...) MT. Additionally, the striatum, a brain region associated with behavioral adaptation and flexibility, showed increased learning-related activation in students with motivational independence. Moreover, the prefrontal cortex, which is involved in behavioral control, was more active in students of the peer-and-teacher-dependent MT. Overall, this study offers new insights into the interplay of motivation and learning with (1) a focus on inter-individual differences in the role of peers and teachers as source of students’ individual motivation and (2) its potential neurobiological basis. (shrink)

This paper disputes the widespread assumption that beliefs and desires may be attributed as theoretical entities in the service of the explanation and predic- tion of human behavior. The literature contains no clear account of how beliefs and desires might generate actions, and there is good reason to deny that principles of rationality generate a choice on the basis of an agent’s beliefs and desires. An alter- native conception of beliefs and desires is here introduced, according (...) to which an attribution of belief is, in a certain sense, an assertion on the believer’s behalf and an attribution of desire is, in a certain sense, a command on the desirer’s behalf. In terms of this conception of the attribution of beliefs and desires, we can begin to understand how attributions of beliefs and desires can be explanatory, although we still cannot expect the attribution of beliefs and desires to generate predictions based on an assumption of rationality. Finally, the reality of beliefs and desires is likened to the reality of money; it is the reality of things governed by objective norms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 111 One fascinating item is the author's extensive account of the most violent and extended controversy in the history of aesthetics---the veneration of images and the disputes between the Iconoclasts and the Iconophiles. This sometimes physical battle raged for over 100 years! The Byzantine society, obviously, took art seriously. Tatarkiewicz' great labor is an object lesson in historiography and bibliographic technique. At one and the same time (...) it demonstrates how much of value remains to be discovered by careful adherence to the detail of scholarship, while it also displays how much fruitful scholarship depends upon a brilliant and profoundly informed mind. Such a work, in short, could only have descended from a fully mature scholar. Publication of these volumes underscores the continuing need for publication of significant translations waiting to be made. When can we return to those conditions which make possible this kind of international scholarly achievement? The Humanities Press is now offering these two volumes for $10.00. ALLAN SHIELDS Cali/ornia State University, San Diego Tempo, Coscienza e Essere nella filosofia di Aristotele. By Luigi Ruggiu. (Brescia: Paideia Editrice, 1970. Pp. xxviii+662. L. 6,000.) Ruggiu gives us here a careful and extended account of Aristotle's view of time with special attention to the necessary connections that obtain between time and consciousness, and time and beilag. Ruggiu is also interested in saying something about the origins of later Western conceptions of time and what he calls the nihilistic tendency which runs through them. The reader who (wishing to follow Ruggiu in this 690 page enterprise) begins by trying to get a sense of the architectonic of the essay, is immediately advised to skip E. Severino's somewhat misleading preface. In his own very useful Introduction, Ruggiu rightly notes that Aristotle's review of the aporia in the notion of time found that his predecessors had tended to assimilate (or reduce) time to non-being. But Ruggiu neglects to emphasize something that would have been very helpful at this stage, and which is altogether required, for the understanding of Aristotle's view of time. This is, that Aristotle himself assimilates time, not to non-being but to change and motion. It is also fundamental to Aristotle's philosophy of time, just as it is to his philosophy as a whole, that it acknowledges the primacy of change in the realm of the conditional. Let it be emphasized, then, that generation or change in Aristotle are not from nothing into something, or from something into nothing but from one thing into another. Ruggiu is trying to recover the sense of being in Aristotle which transcends the oppositions between idealism and naturalism, subjectivism and objectivism, and which is the matrix of Aristotle's sense of, and doctrine about, time. He finds that from Plotinos to the present, the prevailing interpretation of Aristotle's conception of time has been a spatial one in which, for instance, temporal succession has been reduced to spatial co-existence. Plotinos, of course, accepted the distinction found in Aristotle between the eternal sort of being which is outside of time and the being which is in time. But in trying to deduce temporal being from eternal being Plotinos is found guilty, by Ruggiu, both of equivocating between radically opposed senses of being and of developing his notion of time on the basis of the denial of time (quite like some modern mathematical philosophers of physics). Others have been equally mistaken in approaching Aristotle with the belief that consciousness is the basis of time. But the substrate of time, in Aristotle, is change, not conscious being. According to Ruggiu time in Aristotle is more than just a mode of being whose essence consists in succes- I 12 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY sion, for the reason that time conditions the very way in which we conceptualize being. The relations between being, time, and consciousness are, so to say, intrafoundational. Existing things or processes can, of course, be thought of as not existing; so, there is a sense or mode (namely, possibility) in Aristotle in which things disappear. Ruggiu (p. 411) understands Aristotle to mean by "the possible" that which does not now exist... (shrink)

In Kant, Science, and Human Nature, Robert Hanna argues against a version of scientific realism founded on the Kripke/Putnam theory of reference, and defends a Kant-inspired manifest realism in its place. I reject Kriple/Putnam for different reasons than Hanna does, and argue that what should replace it is not manifest realism, but Kant‘s own scientific realism, which rests on a radically different theory of reference. Kant holds that we picture manifest objects by uniting manifolds of sensation using (...) class='Hi'>concepts-qua-inferential-rules. When these rules are demonstrated to be invalid, we replace the picture of the macroscopic world with a picture of the microscopic entities of theoretical science that unites the very same manifolds using different rules of inference. Thus, we refer to "unobservable" theoretical entities in the same way that we do manifest ones: by specifying both their determinate location in space and time and the concepts by which they are understood. (shrink)

In this paper I will first examine Williamsons case where he posits that ‘Justified Belief’ is not acceptable to use in the cases where one is deceived in some way, regardless of how the belief has been formed. Williamson aims to eradicate the use of the term ‘justified’ in these cases and instead impose the term unjustified but blameless. I counter this by suggesting that Williamson sets the bar too high to attain knowledge and does not give enough weight to (...) the manner in which beliefs are formed. I then offer another way to describe the situation. The structure of the essay is as follows: I will present Williamson’s main argument, define his concept of ‘norms’ and present some examples to illustrate this. I will then move on to Williamson’s formulation of blamelessness whilst unjustified in a belief as an alternative to simply justified or unjustified beliefs. I will again illustrate this with examples. Then we will explore some objections to this theory. (shrink)

In the never-ending debate about the scope and limits of science, the hottest argument now centres on the scientific study of man himself. Can there be a science of man at all, in any comprehensive sense? Or is the idea in some way ultimately self-defeating, like that of pulling oneself up by one's own shoelaces? My purpose in this paper is not to venture a direct answer to this ticklish question, but rather to highlight one or two desirable characteristics (...) of a science which I think must inevitably be lacking in any attempt to turn the scientific spotlight upon ourselves. Whether we call the attainable residue by the name of ‘science’ is less important than that we see clearly what not to expect of it. (shrink)

By setting out the grammar of event causality, as developed by Hume and Mackie, in contrast to the grammar of agent causality in the natural sciences, a kind of hybrid hierarchical format for chemical explanations is sketched. From this starting point the history of agentive concepts in chemistry is displayed as a progression from Newton’s ‘forces’, through the nineteenth century concepts of ‘affinity’ and ‘valency’ to recent theories of molecular binding in terms of the migration of electrons and (...) protons as powerful particulars. The final stage of this development is the rewriting of chemical theory in terms of energy. (shrink)