From a psychological standpoint, communicating a severe diagnosis entails more than just naming a disease, it is a complex process with a number of stages: finding out what the patient already knows about the illness (some of which might be wrong, and thus psychologically detrimental), informing the patient while answering any questions (about the illness itself, the treatment, prognosis, recovery period, etc.) and last but not least, providing a minimum of psychological support depending on the patient’s reaction. Romanian law regarding (...) doctor-patient relationship and communication is modeled on the Anglo-Saxon model centered on patient autonomy and direct communication with the latter if the patient desires to know the truth about his condition. If this is not the case, the patient can name a proxy for doctor-patient communication. There are three legal documents that clarify these aspects: Law of Patient Rights, Medical Association’s Ethics Code and the Health Reform Law. The first two are conflicting on several aspects that we will discuss in this paper. The few studies on doctor-patient communication published in Romania reveal that there is no unitary methodology in this field. The doctors attest that often times the patient’s family, when faced with severe illness turn to the traditional model of communication, i.e. they desire to know the severe diagnosis first and pressure the physician to hide the truth form the patient, contrary to the letter of the law. The aim of this paper is to discuss the issue of communicating severe diagnosis in nowadays Romania in a very complex context: 1. The model of doctor-patient relationship and communication has changed after communist era (from paternalistic to partenerial); 2. Conflicting and missing issues in laws; 3. Laws based on patient’s autonomy principle in a traditional society based on another model of taking care (the patient is part of a family nucleus and the family wants to interfere into the medical communication process). Communication has only recently entered the curriculum of some medical schools in Romania. The doctors questioned as part of a study reveal that they‘ve learned to communicate a severe diagnosis by trial and error. This being said we recommend the inception of practical doctor-patient communication courses that could lead to improving doctor-patient relationships, communication of the diagnosis being their foundations. (shrink)

This paper provides an answer to the question why birth parents have a moral right to keep and raise their biological babies. I start with a critical discussion of the parent-centred model of justifying parents’ rights, recently proposed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift. Their account successfully defends a fundamental moral right to parent in general but, because it does not provide an account of how individuals acquire the right to parent a particular baby, it is insufficient for addressing the (...) question whether and why there is a right to parent one’s biological child. Such a right is important because, in its absence, fairness towards adequate prospective parents who are involuntarily childless would demand a ‘babies redistribution’; moreover, in societies with entrenched histories of injustice there may be reasons of fairness for shuffling babies amongst all recent parents. I supplement the Brighouse-Swift account of fundamental parental rights by an account of how adequate parents acquire the right to parent their biological babies. I advance two arguments to this conclusion: by the time of birth, the birth parents will have already shouldered various burdens in order to bring children into existence, and are likely to have formed an intimate relationship with the future baby. Denying birth parents who would make at least adequate parents the right to keep their baby would be unfair to them and would destroy already formed parent-baby relationships which, I assume, are intrinsically valuable. (shrink)

Talk of gender identity is at the core of heated current philosophical and political debates. Yet, it is unclear what it means to have one. I examine several ways of understanding this concept in light of core aims of trans writers and activists. Most importantly, the concept should make good trans people’s understanding of their own gender identities and help understand why misgendering is a serious harm and why it is permissible to require information about people’s gender identities in public (...) life. I conclude that none of the available accounts meets these essential criteria, on the assumption that the gender norms of femininity and masculinity are unjustified. But we can, and should, pursue the feminist project without “gender identity”. Such feminism can include trans people because it is possible to account for the specific harm of misgendering without assuming a claim to the recognition of our gender identities. I conclude that we should eliminate the concept of “gender identity.” To understand the phenomena that are putatively captured by “gender identity,” we are better off employing other concepts, such as “sexual dysphoria,” (assigned or aspirational) “gender roles,” and (internalised or endorsed) “gender norms”. These concepts can usefully replace “gender identity” in an individual evaluation of each of the trans people’s claims to inclusion into particular spaces. (shrink)

Emprunte au domaine de la lumiere et assimile au domaine de la pensee, le diaphane designe pour Aristote, son inventeur, une nature commune a tout milieu dans lequel la vue et la visibilite des choses s'achevent en regard recepteur et en image recue du monde diurne. Car, il ne suffit pas qu'il y ait de la lumiere et du solide pour que le monde puisse etre vu dans ses couleurs et connu sous ses formes et ses especes; il faut aussi (...) qu'il y ait du diaphane, c'est-a-dire un tertium quid qui relie les choses entre elles et ouvre a travers lui la porte de la reception sensible et de l'entendement. Des lors, la notion de diaphane en vient a impregner tacitement toute la representation du monde sous son double aspect sensible et intelligible; il s'opere la une veritable mutation du physique au metaphysique. (shrink)

I review three existing arguments in favor of having some childcare done by nonparents and then I advance five arguments, most of them original, to the same conclusion. My arguments rely on the assumption that, no matter who provides it, childcare will inevitably go wrong at times. I discuss the importance of mitigating bad care, of teaching children how to enter caring relationships with people who are initially strangers to them, of addressing children's structural vulnerability to their caregivers, of helping (...) children and parents contain the ambivalent feelings of the child-parent relationship, and of distributing the responsibility of care and the ensuing blame for bad care more widely. I conclude that nonparental childcare should be universal. (shrink)

The evaluation of labour markets and of particular jobs ought to be sensitive to a plurality of benefits and burdens of work. We use the term 'the goods of work' to refer to those benefits of work that cannot be obtained in exchange for money and that can be enjoyed mostly or exclusively in the context of work. Drawing on empirical research and various philosophical traditions of thinking about work we identify four goods of work: 1) attaining various types of (...) excellence; 2) making a social contribution; 3) experiencing community; and 4) gaining social recognition. Our account of the goods of work can be read as unpacking the ways in which work can be meaningful. The distribution of the goods of work is a concern of justice for two conjoint reasons: First, they are part of the conception of the good of a large number of individuals. Second, in societies without an unconditional income and in which most people are not independently wealthy, paid work is non-optional and workers have few, if any, occasions to realize these goods outside their job. Taking into account the plurality of the goods of work and their importance for justice challenges the theoretical and political status quo, which focuses mostly on justice with regard to the distribution of income. We defend this account against the libertarian challenge that a free labour market gives individuals sufficient options to realise the goods of work important to them, and discuss the challenge from state neutrality. In the conclusion, we hint towards possible implications for today’s labour markets. (shrink)

Uncovering an archive of laughter, from the forbidden giggle to the explosive guffaw.

Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (...) (3) is the most generally endorsed claim of the three, I conclude we should reject it in order to avoid the paradox. (shrink)

In “Tragedy and Resentment” Ulrika Carlsson claims that there are cases when we are justified in feeling non-moral resentment against someone who harms us without wronging us, when the harm either consists in their attitude towards us or in the emotional suffering triggered by their attitudes. Since they had no duty to protect us from harm, the objectionable attitude is not disrespect but a failure to show love, admiration, or appreciation for us. I explain why unrequited love is the wrong (...) example to use when arguing for the possibility of justified non-moral resentment—and why, therefore, Carlsson’s claim remains unsubstantiated. Pace Carlsson, people who fail to return our love are not best described as harming us, but as merely failing to benefit us by saving us from harm. Moreover, their role in the causal chain that results in our coming to harm is insufficient to warrant our resentment; more plausibly, we ourselves play a greater and more direct causal role in this process. This is a welcome result: Responding with resentment to someone’s failure to return our love indicates that our love has not taken the form of a genuine gift. When we put conditions on successful gifting by allowing for justified resentment if the gift is not returned we are not in fact giving gifts but making a bid for an exchange: I love you so that you love me back. (shrink)

This article considers the functionality, method and import of the critical theorist Slavoj Žižek’s engagement with theology against the wider intellectual backdrop of the relationship between an idea and its cultural context. I propose that his engagement can be better understood and interpreted with reference to how Christian theology has historically come to understand its own cultural context. When Žižek’s appropriation of theology is read alongside theology’s appropriation of classical philosophy in the patristic period, a distinctly speculative understanding of theology (...) as an idea developing through a dialectical process of determinate negation in its various contexts. (shrink)

The revolution of artificial intelligence (AI), particularly generative AI, and its implications for human–robot interaction (HRI) opened up the debate on crucial regulatory, business, societal, and ethical considerations. This paper explores essential issues from the anthropomorphic perspective, examining the complex interplay between humans and AI models in societal and corporate contexts. We provided a comprehensive review of existing literature on HRI, with a special emphasis on the impact of generative models such as ChatGPT. The scientometric study posits that due to (...) their advanced linguistic capabilities and ability to mimic human-like behavior, generative AIs like ChatGPT will continue to grow in popularity in pair with human rational empathy, tendency for personification and their advanced linguistic capabilities and ability to mimic human-like behavior. As they blur the boundaries between humans and robots, these models introduce fresh moral and philosophical dilemmas. Our research aims to extrapolate key trends and unique factors in HRI and to elucidate the technical aspects of generative AI that enhance its effectiveness in this field compared to traditional rule-based AI systems. We further discuss the challenges and limitations of applying generative AI in HRI, providing a future research agenda for AI optimization in diverse applications, including education, entertainment, and healthcare. (shrink)

In philosophy, there are two competitor views about the nature and value of childhood: The first is the traditional, deficiency, view, according to which children are mere unfinished adults. The second is a view that has recently become increasingly popular amongst philosophers, and according to which children, perhaps in virtue of their biological features, have special and valuable capacities, and, more generally, privileged access to some sources of value. This article provides a conceptual map of these views and their possible (...) interpretations, and notes their bearing on issues of population ethics and on the duties that we are owed during childhood. (shrink)

There is a widespread belief that, conceptually, justice cannot require what we cannot achieve. This belief is sometimes used by defenders of so-called ‘non-ideal theories of justice’ to criticise so-called ‘ideal theories of justice’. I refer to this claim as ‘the feasibility constraint on the concept of justice’ and argue against it. I point to its various implausible implications and contend that a willingness to apply the label ‘unjust’ to some regrettable situations that we cannot fix is going to enhance (...) the action-guiding potential of a conception of justice, by providing an aspirational ideal. This is possible on the condition that, at all times, we cannot specify with certainty the limits of what is feasible for us collectively. The rejection of the feasibility constraint entails that there can be injustice without perpetrators; this is a theoretical price worth paying. (shrink)

There is a broad philosophical consensus that both children’s and prospective parents’ interests are relevant to the justification of a right to parent. Against this view, I argue that it is impermissible to sacrifice children’s interests for the sake of advancing adults’ interest in childrearing. Therefore, the allocation of the moral right to parent should track the child’s, and not the potential parent’s, interest. This revisionary thesis is moderated by two additional qualifications. First, parents lack the moral right to exclude (...) others from associating with the child. Second, children usually come into the world as part of a relationship with their gestational mother; often, this relationship deserves protection. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that children who were selected for particular traits or genetically enhanced might feel, for this reason, less securely, spontaneously and fairly loved by their parents, which would constitute significant harm. ‘Parents’ refers, throughout this chapter, to the people who perform the social function of rearing children, rather than to procreators. I rely on an understanding of adequate parental love which includes several characteristics: parents should not make children feel they are loved conditionally, for features such (...) as intelligence, looks or temperament; they should not burden children with parental expectations concerning particular achievements of the child; and parental love is often expressed in spontaneous enjoyment and discovery of children’s features. This understanding of parental love provides a reason to question the legitimacy of parental use of selection and enhancement and to explain why parents should not engage on a quest for the ‘best child’. (shrink)

My intention in this text is to present the most significant contribution of some French philosophers and anthropologists to the notion of reconstruction and advancement of institutions. The paradox of change, reform or transformation of the institution – is an entirely new institution possible? How do institutions die? – lies in the difficulty or even impossibility to change something that manifests what we are as a group. If institutions really present or represent the relations among all of us, how can (...) they be changed in the first place? Whence the capacity for change? What allows for the idea of the “new”? (shrink)

The article addresses a common difficulty of counselors in confronting clients with the problems in their thinking and behavior in a way that they could start benefiting from a constructive self-reflective state in the long run, a state that would replace the common tendency to hide oneself, to blame, to victimize or to repress aspects of their humanity connoted as negative in order to maintain a positive self image. The highlight is on the main characteristics of efficient confrontations with oneself (...) and others, so as to engender reasoning competence training without an unnecessary loss in the quality of the consultative relationship. Working in psychotherapy and having progressively integrated more philosophical work into this professional practice, the author puts together a few concepts and ideas that are likely to facilitate the processes in the psychotherapeutic and the philosophical approaches to intrapsychic and interpersonal dialogue. (shrink)

In extreme situations such as war, genocide or refugee crises, anthropologists, who are usually closer to afflicted people than other scholars, face the crucial questions of the utility and responsibility of anthropology. However, anthropologists in particular are susceptible to the way of reasoning that concludes that anthropology as a science (or even as a technique or art) does not offer any answers to these questions. Some become engaged trying to help one way or the other, yet not as anthropologists, since (...) they hold that as an anthropologist one is powerless to help …. (shrink)

This paper addresses the nature of the Charter as the basic document of the Institution, that is, the most important document that lends the institution its force. The “and” between Charter and Institution or the conjoining of Charter with Institution has two tasks to perform. Firstly, the Institution needs to be structured and incorporated as a Charter (and conversely, the Charter is the Institution embodied). In this sense, my question is: can the institute of the Charter be the starting point (...) of a potential theory of the institution? Secondly, it is the Charter – and not law, contract, norm, not Searle’s declaration, not Husserl’s Ausweiss – that could improve the theory of documentality and its connection with institutionalism. (shrink)

In this text, I analyze the most important topics of one of the most complex portions of Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption. The chapter “The Fire or the Eternal Life” deals with the community and communal life of the eternal people, and it reconstructs the basic elements and conditions of communal living. A presentation of all key protocols of life and work of a group of people ought to show the plurality of heterogeneous practices that have helped maintain a people scattered (...) and always on the verge of extinction. (shrink)

Violence and Messianism looks at how some of the figures of the so-called Renaissance of "Jewish" philosophy between the two world wars - Franz Rosenzweig, Walter Benjamin and Martin Buber - grappled with problems of violence, revolution and war. At once inheriting and breaking with the great historical figures of political philosophy such as Kant and Hegel, they also exerted considerable influence on the next generation of European philosophers, like Lévinas, Derrida and others. This book aims to think through the (...) great conflicts in the past century in the context of the theory of catastrophe and the beginning of new messianic time. Firstly, it is a book about means and ends - that is, about whether good ends can be achieved through bad means. Second, it is a book about time: peace time, war time, time it takes to transfer from war to peace, etc. Is a period of peace simply a time that excludes all violence? How long does it take to establish peace? Building on this, it then discusses whether there is anything that can be called messianic acting. Can we - are we capable of, or allowed to - act violently in order to hasten the arrival of the Messiah and peace? And would we then be in messianic time? Finally, how does this notion of messianism - a name for a sudden and unpredictable event - fit in, for example, with our contemporary understanding of terrorist violence? The book attempts to understand such pressing questions by reconstructing the notions of violence and messianism as they were elaborated by 20th century Jewish political thought. Providing an important contribution to the discussion on terrorism and the relationship between religion and violence, this book will appeal to theorists of terrorism and ethics of war, as well as students and scholars of Philosophy, Jewish studies and religion studies. (shrink)

The relation between violence and the institution was truly thematized for the first time in the writings of Hume, and in an entirely different way in Saint-Just's texts on the Republic and the institution. Gilles Deleuze's early works represent an original attempt at reconstruction of a possible dialogue between these two dissimilar authors. Regardless of the possibility of reconstruction of Deleuze's own theory of the institution , and analysis of the various combinations of the terms institution and revolution, the intention (...) is above all to examine the link between violence and the institution. Deleuze's attempt to make a preliminary systematic examination of the figure of the institution came about as a result of the conjoining of several fragments of his famous predecessors. (shrink)

This article is an argument for furthering the understanding, role and scope of critical theology in reflection on the act, content and implications of theological thought through appropriation of...

From 1940 to 1945, Kruno Krstić published a series of articles on language in various newspapers and magazines. He approaches the language phenomenonfrom different points of view. In some of the articles he discusses the Croatian literary language and its relation to the Croatian dialects, while in others he considers the relation between the Croatian and Serbian language. At certain times he presents his views on the development of language, whereas at other he explores the relation between language and thought. (...) Krstiæ, regardless of the topic he deals with, is considered to be a predecessor in this field in Croatia: from sociolinguistics and theory of standard to philosophy of language in its narrower sense. On the other hand, Krstić also pays special attention to language and the analysis of meaning when he considers other philosophical problems. Thus he becomes closely associated with a particular approach to philosophy, sometimes also called linguistic philosophy. (shrink)

Uporišta. O Markovićevim filozofskim rukopisima u arhivima HAZU ; O Hondlovu prigovoru Bazalinu tumačenju Spinozine filozofije -- Začetnik filozofije jezika u Hrvatskoj : uz knjigu Kruna Krstića Studije, rasprave, i članci ; Što je činjenica? O Krstićevu poimanju (znanstvene) objektivnosti ; Supek kao filozof ; Supekov odnos prema pojedinim pravcima u suvremenoj filozofiji ; Marijan Cipra : život, misao, radovi -- Hrvatska filozofija i hrvatski jezik. Rječnik hrvatskoga filozofskoga nazivlja ; Filozofija i hrvatski jezik : bibliografija ; Je li suština (...) nužna? O sustavnosti hrvatskoga filozofskoga nazivlja -- Nazivlje u Markovićevoj Etici -- Sutlićev odnos spram jezika -- László i filozofsko nazivlje. (shrink)

The text aims to explore one peculiar practice of translation manifested in the transformation of passion for knowledge into passion for life. More precisely, the issue at stake is the modification of libido sciendi, which occurred during the 20th century, notably in writings inspired by ‘DS’, the shorthand Hélène Cixous uses to refer to ‘sexual difference/différence sexuelle’. The Latin words in the title serve as markers in interpreting politics/poetics of writing, which actively include forms of expression that belong to different (...) disciplines such as philosophy, psychoanalysis and above all, literature. Special attention is paid to Cixous’s early text, Révolutions pour plus d’un Faust, written in 1975, and its attempt to transform/translate energies of destruction into life-respecting creativity. (shrink)

We review the hypothesis that the brain uses a generative model to explain the causes of sensory inputs, using prediction schemes that operate based upon assimilation of time-series sensory data. We put this hypothesis in the context of psychopathology, in particular, schizophrenia's positive symptoms. Building upon work of Helmholtz and upon theories in computational cognitive processing, we hypothesize that delusions in schizophrenia can be explained in terms of false inference. An impairment in inferring appropriate information from the sensory input reflects (...) upon the ability to assess the environment and predict outcomes. Although the inference mechanism likely involves both conscious and unconscious processes, we hypothesize that the trigger of delusions may lie within the unconscious neural pathways. A collection of computational predictive codes have been proposed for modeling perception. We discuss two examples, which may be eligible as substrates for intuitive coding. We argue that failure of the psychotic patient to choose the correct computational scheme, or the optimal range of parameters, may readily lead to an altered reconstruction of the object and false inference, feeding into the delusion mechanism. We finally propose using these models in conjunction with cognitive and imaging data, in order to obtain more testable predictions. (shrink)

Le Sophiste est un des dialogues les plus difficiles de Platon, dans lequel se croisent deux questions principales : - qu'est-ce qu'un sophiste? - qu'est-ce que ce qui est? Platon les articule en dévoilant le pouvoir qu'a la parole de donner réalité à ce qui est. En mettant en scène le défi de la pensée confrontée au pouvoir démiurgique du langage hérité des poèmes archaïques, le Sophiste s'avère aussi être un dialogue entre un courant philosophique, l'éléatisme, et une pratique du (...) discours, la sophistique. Il apparaît alors comme le véritable contrepoint du Timée : y émerge, à partir d'une pensée de la rationalité du langage et de la cosmologie qu'elle fonde ou semble fonder, ce qu'Aristote, Plotin ou Jamblique reconnaîtront et critiqueront comme une science de l'être avant l'heure. Seule une telle lecture transversale du Sophiste permet d'y caractériser la thèse originale : la philosophie première habite une démiurgie."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L’article tente de saisir le rapport entre exégèse, rhétorique et philosophie dans les textes de Philon à partir d’un angle particulier : l’usage philonien croisé des images bibliques et du rôle spécifique assigné à l’image dans la pensée hellénique. S’il y a chez l’Alexandrin une réflexion sur les vertus du langage déployée entre l’exégèse des textes bibliques et le recours constant aux modèles théoriques de la philosophie, cette réflexion vise explicitement à établir une science, la théologie rationnelle, légitimée par sa (...) fondation sur la lettre biblique et validée en même temps par une démarche et un lexique spécifiquement philosophiques. Or la pratique des images s’inscrit dans cette tentative philonienne de fonder la réflexion théologique sur les rapports de la langue avec les facultés sensibles et intellectives, depuis les figures et les concepts avec lesquels travaille le langage philosophique jusqu’à l’établissement d’un savoir à partir du paradigme des vertus épiphaniques dont la lettre biblique est pourvue. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to explore the relation between democratic values and emotions. The author argues that democratic values and emotional judgments are inter-reducible: political agents use emotional judgments to reflexively evaluate normative paradigms of political life. In the first part of the paper, the author describes the state of emotions in contemporary political philosophy and identifies Charles Stevenson?s ethical conception of emotivism as the first comprehensive attempt to neutrally conceptualize emotions in moral and political thinking. The second (...) part of the paper explores the shortcomings of emotivism and finds an adequate alternative in Martha Nussbaum?s concept of emotional judgment as the one that contains beliefs and values about social objects. In the final part of the paper, the author identifies that moral and political disagreements emerge in democracies from ranking of the importance of political objects. The evaluation criteria for this type of ranking is derived from democratic values which are reducible to agents? emotional judgments. (shrink)

The Unconscious as Space explores the experience of being and the practice of psychoanalysis by thinking of the unconscious in mathematical terms. Anca Carrington introduces mathematical models of space, from dimension theory to algebraic topology and knot theory, and considers their immediate psychoanalytic relevance. The hypothesis that the unconscious is structured like a space marked by impossibility is then examined. Carrington considers the clinical implications, with particular focus on the interplay between language and the unconscious as related topological spaces (...) in which movement takes place along knot-like pathways. The Unconscious as Space will be of appeal to psychotherapists, psychoanalysts, and mental health professionals in practice and in training. (shrink)

I argue that, in the currently gender-unjust societies a basic income would not advance feminist goals. To assess the impact of a social policy on gender justice I propose the following criterion: a society is gender-just when the costs of engaging in a lifestyle characterized by gender-symmetry (in both the domestic and public spheres) are, for both men and women, smaller or equal to the costs of engaging in a gender-asymmetrical lifestyle. For a significant number of women, a basic income (...) would increase the costs of leading gender-symmetrical lifestyles because it would make it easier for both women and men to pursue gender-unjust preferences. I argue that preference satisfaction is distinct from justice. I conclude by showing why a basic income would lead to further privatisation of caregiving, and I outline the negative effects this would have on women. (shrink)

Anca Dohotariu ABSTRACT: This article seeks to identify and analyse the most significant changes regarding parental leave provision in post-communist Romania, as well as the extent to which its legal adjustments that took place after 1990 reveal both old trends inherited from the former political regime as well as new tendencies influenced by EU norms...

Family relationships are often believed to have a unique value; this is reflected both in the special expectations that family members have from each other and in the various ways in which states protect family relationships. Commitment appears to set apart family relationships from other close relationships; however, commitment is in fact present in other close relationships. I conclude that family relationships do not have any special value; love does. In the case of families with children, however, a high degree (...) of commitment between adults may be useful or even necessary for advancing children's wellbeing. This could be a reason to give special protection to relationships between co-parents. (shrink)

This chapter argues that there is a collective responsibility to have enough children in order to ensure that people will not, in the future, suffer great harm due to depopulation. Moreover, if people stopped having children voluntarily, it could be legitimate for states to incentivize and maybe even coerce individuals to bear and rear children. Various arguments against the enforceability of an individual duty to bear and rear children are examined. Coercing people to have children would come at significant moral (...) cost; however, none of the arguments against enforceability seem decisive. The existence of a collective responsibility to have children bears on the question of whether parents and non-parents ought to shoulder the costs of childbearing and child rearing together. (shrink)