Building on the original formulation of the autopoietic theory (AT), extended enactivism argues that living beings are autopoietic systems that extend beyond the spatial boundaries of the organism. In this article, we argue that extended enactivism, despite having some basis in AT’s original formulation, mistakes AT’s definition of living beings as autopoietic entities. We offer, as a reply to this interpretation, a more embodied reformulation of autopoiesis, which we think is necessary to counterbalance the (excessively) disembodied (...) spirit of AT’s original formulation. The article aims to clarify and correct what we take to be a misinterpretation of AT as a research program. AT, contrary to what some enactivists seem to believe, did not (and does not) intend to motivate an extended conception of living beings. AT’s primary purpose, we argue, was (and is) to provide a universal individuation criterion for living beings, these understood as discrete bodies that are embedded in, but not constituted by, the environment that surrounds them. However, by giving a more explicitly embodied definition of living beings, AT can rectify and accommodate, so we argue, the enactive extended interpretation of autopoiesis, showing that although living beings do not extend beyond their boundaries as autopoietic unities, they do form part, in normal conditions, of broader autopoietic systems that include the environment. (shrink)

Context: In this paper I expand aspects of the generalized bottom-up explanatory approach devised in Part I to expound the natural emergence of composite self-organized dynamic systems endowed with self-produced embodied boundaries and with observed degrees of autonomous behavior. In Part I, the focus was on the rules defined by Varela, Maturana & Uribe (VM&U rules), viewed as a validation test to assess if an observed system is autopoietic. This was accomplished by referring to Maturana’s ontological-epistemological frame and by (...) defining distinctions, concepts, and abstractions necessary to describe dynamic systems in any observational domain. This approach concentrates on pure causation flow rather than on domain-specific interaction mechanisms. Problem: It is essential to analyze the requirements imposed by the VM&U rules on the “intra-boundaries” phenomenology for compliance with the self-production capabilities expected from an autopoietic system. Beyond what is merely implied by the compact wording of the VM&U rules, a key point needs to be addressed explicitly: how to describe some “peculiar” capabilities that the components should be endowed with to participate in new component production (as macro-molecules do in the biological domain) so that system’s self-production can be assessed. Method: Using this approach, I first describe the process of constituting self-organized dynamic structures provided with embodied boundaries. Then I explain how a capability of self-organization emerges and how this results in ephemeral configurations that may evolve into self-regulated long-lasting dynamic system stability within a continuous causation flow inside the boundaries, up to the emergence of some “specialized” subsets of components. This explication allows us to distinguish the medium, the boundaries, and the core of a self-organized dynamic system and to focus attention on the “intra-boundaries” phenomenology that should be at the heart of self-production capabilities, as prescribed by the 5th and 6th VM&U rules. Results: I propose an abstract, domain-free description of the “peculiar” composition and decomposition transformation capabilities that components should possess while subject to state transitions triggered within the “intra-boundaries” causation flow. This is combined with a discussion concerning the “intra-boundaries” causation structure’s possible topological layouts that could be compliant with the 6th rule. Implications: The above-mentioned results allow us to improve our analytic criteria when observing dynamic systems existing in non-biological domains in order to assess their autopoietic nature. They also reveal that the task of consistently identifying possible non-biological autopoietic systems is harder than merely identifying self-organized dynamic systems provided with boundaries and some observable autonomous behavioral capabilities in a given observational domain. More implications will be discussed further in Part III. (shrink)

Zuckerberg almost always tells users that change is hard, often referring back to the early days of Facebook when it had barely any of the features people know and love today. He says sharing and a more open and connected world are had barely any of the features people know and love today. He says sharing and a more open and connected world are good, and often he says he appreciates all the feedback.

How is moral thinking, ethics, related to evolutionary theorizing? There are two approaches, epitomized by Charles Darwin who works under the metaphor of the world as a machine, and by Herbert Spencer who works under the metaphor of the world as an organism. Although the author prefers the first approach, the aim of this paper is to give a disinterested account of both approaches.

This article focuses on Auguste Comte’s understanding of the organism–environment relationship. It makes three key claims therein: (a) Comte’s metaphysical position privileged materiality and relativized the intellect along two dimensions: one related to the biological organism, one related to the social environment; (b) this twofold materiality confounds attempts to reduce cognition to either nature or nurture, so Comte’s position has interesting parallels to the field of ‘epigenetics’, which sees the social environment as a causative factor in biology; and (...) (c) although Comte ultimately diverged from the ‘postgenomic’ view in crucial ways, he remains a forerunner of the trend towards viewing the social and biological as entangled. Tending to these dimensions challenges the view that Comte is notable from a classical standpoint but ignorable from a contemporary one. It consequently invites renewed attention to his theoretical system. (shrink)

Some of Catherine Malabou’s recent work has developed her conception of plasticity (originally deployed in a reading of Hegelian Aufhebung ) in relation to neuroscience. This development clarifies and advances her attempt to bring contemporary theory into dialogue with the natural sciences, while indirectly indicating her engagement with the French tradition in philosophy of science and philosophy of medicine, especially the work of Georges Canguilhem. I argue that we can see her development of plasticity as an answer to some specific (...) shortcomings in Canguilhem’s conception of organic or biological normativity as advanced in The Normal and the Pathological . Such a view of plasticity shows its potential to provide the basis for a powerful critical engagement with contemporary conceptions of selfhood, self-transformation, subjectivation, and the general theory of norms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 122-123 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Spirits and Clocks: Machine & Organism in Descartes Dennis Des Chene. Spirits and Clocks: Machine & Organism in Descartes. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2001. Pp. xiii + 181. Cloth, $39.95. Confronted with the thousandth "entirely new" interpretation of the Cartesian mind-body union, one sometimes wonders whether anything new can (...) in fact be said about the great Descartes. Once again, after his invaluable and prize-winning Physiologia (Cornell University Press, 1996), Des Chene proves that a serious historian, with a keen awareness of historical context, actually can. Unlike the usual accounts of Descartes's animal-machine, Des Chene does not concentrate on the all too familiar set of questions whether or not machines can think, sense, etc. Instead, Des Chene interprets the machine-metaphor the way Descartes meant it to be, viz. as a model for explaining animal and human physiology instead of (cognitive) psychology. Des Chene's central claim is that the Traité de l'Homme and Descartes's later (unpublished) physiological tracts are an attempt to replace scholastic commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima, itself discussed in this book's companion volume Life's Forms (Cornell University Press, 2000). Spirits and Clocks investigates how Descartes's general mechanistic program (outlined in Physiologia) is applied to the field of animal and human life. This project in itself had a far more lasting influence than Descartes's specific and often bizarre physiological explanations. Therefore, Des Chene rightly concentrates on the philosophical aspects of Descartes's general project of "mechanizing" physiology. His short but illuminating book studies a wide range of ontological, epistemological, and even aesthetic aspects of the machine metaphor and, although this is not the express goal [End Page 122] of the book, it also sheds new light on the epistemology and metaphysics of the Meditations. In this sense Spirits and Clocks is not only a significant contribution to the history of biology but first and foremost a must for historians of philosophy.Des Chene explains that the use of a machine model in physiology was neither new nor entirely unacceptable to the Aristotelians. What is new is Descartes's use of it. His mechanistic understanding of the body as a machine is incompatible with accepting the soul as the source of life and the principle of all our physiological and psychological capacities, while Aristotelians had no problem in accepting both the soul and certain machine models of the body. (Aristotle himself uses the lever to explain animal motion.) Des Chene sketches Descartes's attempt to explain all physiological processes by means of the physical properties of material parts that obey the general laws of motion, excluding all talk of ends. In this context, the use of illustrations is of considerable importance: though they cannot per se convey a denial of a "soul-model" of physiology, they strongly suggest that the (mechanistically understood) machine is all there is to say about the functions of human and animal bodies. Des Chene offers an interesting, albeit sometimes somewhat speculative and ahistoric, discussion of the aesthetic aspects of the machine model.As Des Chene showed in his Physiologia, the rejection of teleology is one of the main goals of Descartes's physics. However, although Descartes may be successful in rejecting the view that stones fall down from some kind of desire to reach their final destiny, he is less successful in denying that the eye is meant for seeing (and hence for our self-preservation). Des Chene gives a truly fascinating account of the limits of Descartes's denial of teleology in physiology. This includes questions about the physical unity of the human body: how can I explain why I have this body and how can I even identify this body as a unit without invoking ends? Similarly, Descartes takes the healthy, "normally" functioning body as the norm of his investigations. But, again, can he do so without acknowledging some form of teleology? Descartes's answer in most of these cases is that the final goals... (shrink)

Ontologies of living things are increasingly grounded on the concepts and practices of current life science. Biological development is a process, undergone by living things, which begins with a single cell and (in an important class of cases) ends with formation of a multicellular organism. The process of development is thus prima facie central for ideas about biological individuality and organismality. However, recent accounts of these concepts do not engage developmental biology. This paper aims to fill the gap, proposing (...) the lineage view of stem cells as an ontological framework for conceptualizing organismal development. This account is grounded on experimental practices of stem cell research, with emphasis on new techniques for generating biological organization in vitro. On the lineage view, a stem cell is the starting point of a cell lineage with a specific organismal source, time-interval of existence, and ‘tree topology’ of branch-points linking the stem to developmental termini. The concept of ‘enkapsis’ accommodates the cell-organism relation within the lineage view; this hierarchical notion is further explicated by considering the methods and results of stem cell experiments. Results of this examination include a (partial) characterization of stem cells’ developmental versatility, and the context-dependence of developmental processes involving stem cells. (shrink)

This paper proposes a prolegomenal model for the mechanisms through which new styles and schools of art – Cubism or conceptual art, for example – undergo the catalytic, evental transition from potential to actual. The model proposed herein, of fine art as a complex adaptive system that emerges and grows in a manner analogous to that of certain specific forms of biological organization, is predicated on a shift from the residual traces of Greenbergian disciplinary and mediumistic differentiation – grounded in (...) an analytic autonomy – to modes of interaction and aesthetic signal exchange emergent from an autopoietic autonomy – a systemic process of autocatalysis and transformation similar to the recursively generative feedback relations seen in cell metabolism and in ecosystems. This conceptual recalibration leads to a model of artistic eventalization and change that algorithmically unfolds from the adjacent possible as an emergent phenomenon, analogous to the aggregative and spontaneous, self-organizational swarm behavior seen in the flocking of birds or the schooling of fish, applied here to schools of art. (shrink)

In Autopoiesis and Cognition, Humberto R. Maturana and Franscico J. Varela state that “the way an autopoietic system maintains its identity depends on its particular way of being autopoietic, that is, on its particular structure, different classes of autopoietic systems have different classes of ontogenies”. With this in mind, in this article I develop how this conception of autopoietic systems is both present in, and operates through, Wynter’s employment of space and place, poetry, and wonder.

This commentary puts pressure on the “resistance to dissipation” criterion for Villalobos and Razeto-Barry’s conception of “autopoietic bodies.” It argues that resistance to dissipation can only be assessed against the backdrop of certain background conditions. If this is right then it is no longer so clear that systems not considered as autopoietic bodies but merely as autopoietic systems do not fulfill the requirements of being an autopoietic body. -/- .

Sustainable product-service system (PSS) has potentiality to reduce the environmental stress through dematerialization of economy based on function-based well-being. PSS (also called as service) is a type of human-activity system with a series of events and is produced only after the demand from a consumer. The features of the events influence the consumer to act rationally according to the particular situations. Consumers must have freedom to choose a combination of relieving and enabling model of PSS to act rationally upon those (...) according to the feature of events and the consumers have reasons to value their selection of services. A case of a complete journey of a passenger with urban mobility services is considered to visualize and realize the rational behaviour, which shows a systemic pattern and also autopoietic in nature. (shrink)

This essay presents, first, a description of Niklas Luhmann’s notion of autopoietic system. Luhmann theorises society as a self-referential, differential, and posthuman communication system that constitutes meaning. Then, second, it defends Luhmann against the new materialist challenge that stresses the role of matter in meaning-making.

Context: This paper is intended for readers familiar with Humberto Maturana’s theory of autopoietic systems and with the still unresolved debate concerning the existence of non-biological autopoietic systems. Because the seminal work of the Chilean biologist has not yet been fully and correctly understood in other disciplines, I consider that it is necessary to offer a more generalized concept of the autopoietic system, derived by implication from Maturana’s grounding definition. Problem: The above-mentioned debate is rooted in a (...) deficient application of some rigorous distinctions, definitions, and epistemological considerations introduced by Maturana when he coined the term “autopoiesis.” Some researchers think that social or economic organizations could be considered as autopoietic systems of a higher order because they appear to behave autonomously and be self-organized and self-producing. However, in practice some precise distinctions would need to be verified through observation in order to claim properly their autopoietic nature. These distinctions were defined by Varela, Maturana and Uribe in 1974 as a set of six decisional rules (“MV&U rules”) whereby an observer may possibly justify this stand. My aim is to pinpoint clearly the basic cognitive tasks that an observer should perform in order to ascertain such a claim. Method: I accomplish this with a thorough analysis of the entailments derived from each rule when applied to the most general case – when the observational domain where the system manifests itself is not specified. A bottom-up approach is used to avoid referring to “apparent autopoietic behavior” as a starting point distinction (top-down approach): the aim is to distinguish “autopoietic behavior” as an outcome of more basic distinctions, not as a premise for these. These may be used as abstract tools to facilitate a rigorous description of observations and lead to precise explanations of the emergence of complex self-generated dynamic systems. In theory, this conceptual frame is not limited to the macro-molecular domain and may therefore be applicable to non-biological systems. Results: According to MV&U rules, the most important distinctions are those that refer to intra-boundary phenomenology: this focus is necessary to explain how the key processes involved in the emergence of autopoiesis actually manifest themselves. These explanations are crucial to validating a claim about the “autopoietic nature” of an observed system. Implications: This work could help multidisciplinary researchers to apply properly the theory of autopoietic systems beyond the realm of biology and to settle ongoing debates. It could also help investigations related to the specifications of software simulation processes for modeling a minimal artificial autopoietic system. However, the rigorous focus on the role of intra-boundary phenomenology and self-production of components reveals that our chances of detecting “natural” meta-molecular autopoietic systems are scarce. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to start a dialogue between the so-called autopoietic enactivism and the semiotic pragmatism of C. S. Peirce, in order to re-examine both action and representation under a Peircean light. The focus lays on autopoietic enactivism because this approach offers a wider theoretical scope to cognition based on the continuity of life and mind, embodiment, dynamic and non-linear interaction between a system and its environment which are compatible ideas with Peirce’s semiotic pragmatism. The (...) term ‘pragmatic’ has been introduced in cognitive science to reinforce the idea that cognition is a form of practice and to help action-oriented viewpoints to escape representationalism. In this paper, I shall try to demonstrate that Peirce’s semiotic pragmatism can be a meaningful methodological path to guide a reconciliation between not only anti-Cartesianism and representation but also representation and action. In order to accomplish this purpose, Peirce’s account to action, habit, thought and mind will be addressed through some of the guiding principles of his semiotic—sign and sign action. What follows is the re-examining of the problem of representation—as refuted by autopoietic enactivism—under the light of Peirce’s semiotic pragmatism. (shrink)

This chapter draws an analogy between computing mechanisms and autopoietic systems, focusing on the non-representational status of both kinds of system (computational and autopoietic). It will be argued that the role played by input and output components in a computing mechanism closely resembles the relationship between an autopoietic system and its environment, and in this sense differs from the classical understanding of inputs and outputs. The analogy helps to make sense of why we should think of computing (...) mechanisms as non-representational, and might also facilitate reconciliation between computational and autopoietic/enactive approaches to the study of cognition. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Social Autopoiesis?” by Hugo Urrestarazu. Upshot: I argue that it is possible to conceptualise the social system as autopoietic if we derive the social from the most important feature of a living being on which his relationship to the environment is based - from consciousness. This approach also allows us to solve Husserl’s problem of intersubjectivity.

본 논문은 매킨타이어(Alasdair MacIntyre)가 제시한 정의주의(emotivism) 개념과 그에 따른 그의 관점들에 대해 살펴 보면서 문제점들을 검토해 보고자 하는 것이 목적이다. 즉 정의주의 자체를 옹호하기 위한 것이 아니라 정의주의에 대한 매킨타이어의 관점을 살펴보고자 하는 것이다. 그는 근대 이후의 서구를 정의주의가 지배해온 사회로 규정하면서 그 부정적인 면을 에서 부각시키면서 그 대안으로 목적론적 합리성을 기초로 하는 공동체적 사회의 바람직함을 역설하고 있다. 그가 동원하고 있는 아리스토텔레스적 목적론과 이를 통해 추구하는 공동체적 사회의 이상에 대해서는 상당한 정도의 공감을 얻어 왔다고 할 수 있다. 그러나 그의 저서의 (...) 전반적인 논의 과정을 면밀히 살펴보면 여러 가지 문제점들이 발견된다. 그 중 중요한 것만 몇 가지 열거하면 다음과 같다. 첫째 매킨타이어는 정의주의에 대한 정의(定義)를 모호하게 내리고 있는데다가 정의주의 이론을 대표하는 사람들의 범위도 지나치게 넓게 잡고 있다는 것이다. 이 때문에 무엇보다도 도덕에 있어서 소박하게 정서의 중요성을 말하는 사람들 까지도 정의주의자로 인식될 수 있는 여지를 제공하고 있다는 것이다. 두 번째로 매킨타이어가 기술하고 있는 내용을 통해서 보면 그가 제시하고 있는 정의주의적 자아 개념은 사실상 개인주의적 자아 개념과 별 차이가 없다는 것이다. 세 번째로 매킨타이어가 현대 사회를 정의주의가 지배하는 사회로 규정하는 가운데 정의주의의 사회적 구현의 주요 형태로 제시하고 있는 사회적 내용과 사회적 맥락 또한 모두 상당한 정도로 논의의 일관성을 결여하고 있을 뿐 아니라 설명에 있어서 혼선을 일으키고 있다는 점이다. 네 번째로 매킨타이어가 정의주의에 대한 대안으로 제시하고 있는 합리성 개념 또한 설득력이 부족하다는 점이다. 다섯 번째로 매킨타이어는 근대 이후 도덕의 분리․독립이 정의주의를 가져오게 된 주된 계기로 작용한 것으로 상정하고 있으나 필자가 판단하기에는 오히려 근대 이후 개인주의적인 종교적․철학적 사유가 매킨타이어가 말하는 정의주의적 사회로 이끄는 역할을 했다고 본다. 여섯 번째로 그는 근대 이후의 서구가 정의주의적 도덕문화가 주류를 이루는 것으로 보고 있으나 이 또한 지나치게 획일적이고 단선적인 규정이며 현대 사회의 다양성과 복잡성을 도외시하는 것으로 보인다. 일곱 번째로 매킨타이어는 정의주의에 대한 대안으로서 아리스토텔레스적 목적론을 자신의 합리성 개념과 결합시키려 하고 있으나 너무 합리성의 정당화에만 지나치게 초점을 맞추어 논의를 전개함에 따라 설득력있는 결론에 이르는데 한계를 드러내고 있다. 그러한 한계를 스스로 인식하게 되면서 새로운 돌파구를 마련하고자 나중에는 아리스토텔레스로부터 토마스 아퀴나스로 전환하게 되지만 이를 통해 오히려 그 자신의 합리성 개념이 더욱 손상되는 방향으로 나아가게 된 것으로 보인다. 매킨타이어가 현대사회의 문제점을 치유하고자 제시한 공동체론과 이를 위한 목적론적 사유양식은 오늘날의 지나친 개인주의적 병폐들을 개선하기 위한 훌륭한 대안 중 하나로서 많은 사람들에 의해 인정을 받고 있으나, 그는 이러한 이론을 정립하는 과정에서 비판의 표적을 잘못 선정하는 한편 또한 자신의 합리성 개념의 정당화에 지나치게 집착함으로써 논의의 전개에 있어서 여러 허점을 드러내고 있다고 할 수 있다. 그러나 그가 추구하는 공동체와 목적론적 이상은 계속 연구․발전시켜야 할 중요한 대상이라고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

Definition The authors’ definition of the autopoietic system has evolved through the years. One of them states that an autopoietic system is organized (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components that produces the components which: (1) through their interactions and transformations regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (2) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the space in which they exist by (...) specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network (Varela 1979, p. 13). Nearly the same formula was earlier used to define an autopoietic machine (Maturana and Varela 1973/1980, 1984/1987, p. 135). (shrink)

The essay studies the Chinese connections of Leibniz and the corresponding transformation of his philosophical ideas in terms of a two-phase relationship. Between 1667 and 1700/01, the author suggests, Leibniz was heavily influenced by the Jesuits' promulgation of China as a certain benevolent despotism compatible with both Christian charity and the rule of the Platonic philosopher-king. In contrast, the author argues, the development of Leibniz's ideas about organism between 1700/01 and 1716 was decisively inspired by the Chinese cosmic view (...) of the world as a creative and self-creative process. (shrink)

Eric Scerri has argued that chemists using ab initio calculations pursue a partial reduction of chemistry to physics, while accepting that full reduction (through axiomatization) is impractical. He characterizes this view as Popperian and naturalistic. However, Popper's position on reduction is not naturalistic, as he rejected axiomatization for different reasons.

In traditional Chinese expressions, guannian 观念 (ideas) are results of guan 观 (viewing). However, viewing can be understood to have two different levels of meanings: one is “viewing things,” that is, viewing with something to view; another is “viewing nothing,” that is, viewing with nothing to view. What are viewed in “viewing things” are either physical beings—all existing things and phenomena—or the metaphysical being (for example, the “Dao as a thing”). In both cases, something is being viewed. What is viewed (...) in “viewing nothing” is the being itself, or “nothing,” in which there is nothing to view. According to Confucianism, the existence of “nothing” manifests itself as life sentiments, especially the sentiment of love, which is the very root and source of benevolence; moreover “viewing nothing” is, in essence, a perception of life. Life sentiments or the perception of life is “the thing itself ” prior to any being or any thing. (shrink)

The theory of autopoiesis, that is systems that are self-producing or self-constructing, was originally developed to explain the particular nature of living as opposed to non-living entities. It was subsequently enlarged to encompass cognition and language leading to what is known as second-order cybernetics. However, as with earlier biological theories, many authors have tried to extend the domain of the theory to encompass social systems, the most notable being Luhmann. The pur-pose of this paper is to consider critically the extent (...) to which the theory of autopoiesis, as originally defined, can be applied to social systems-that is, whether social systems are autopoietic. And, if it cannot, whether some weaker version might be appropriate. It addresses this question by considering whether autopoiesis can be applied to the theoretical conceptions of Giddens and Bhaskar. It follows an earlier paper that evaluated Luhmann's autopoietic social theory. (shrink)