Discussions of the problem of evil presuppose and appeal to axiological and metaethical assumptions, but seldom pay adequate attention to those assumptions. I argue that certain theories of value are consistent with theistic answers to the argument from evil and that several other well-known theories of value, such as hedonism, are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with theism. Although moral realism is the subject of lively debate in contemporary philosophy, almost all standard discussions of the problem of (...) evil presuppose the truth of moral realism. I explain the implications of several nonrealist theories of value for the problem of evil and argue that, if nonrealism is true, then we need to rethink and re-frame the entire discussion about the problem of evil. (shrink)

Lyons’s (2003, 2018) axiological realism holds that science pursues true theories. I object that despite its name, it is a variant of scientific antirealism, and is susceptible to all the problems with scientific antirealism. Lyons (2003, 2018) also advances a variant of surrealism as an alternative to the realist explanation for success. I object that it does not give rise to understanding because it is an ad hoc explanans and because it gives a conditional explanation. Lyons might use (...) axiological realism to account for the success of a theory. I object that some alternative axiological explanations are better than the axiological realist explanation, and that the axiological realist explanation is teleological. Finally, I argue that Putnam’s realist position is more elegant than Lyons’s. (shrink)

In this note I shall: discuss Vivas' definition of "naturalism" and his criticism of naturalistic theories; characterize a naturalistic theory which Vivas overlooks, and which, hence, invalidates his attempted refutation; suggest criticisms of Vivas' "axiological realism", with special attention to the central doctrine of the objectivity of values.

Many would consider the lengthening debate between moral realists and anti-realists to be draw-ish. Plainly new approaches are needed. Or might the issue, which most broadly concerns realism in relation to normative judgments, be broken down into parts or sectors? Physicists have been saying, in relation to a similarly longstanding debate, that light in some respects behaves like waves and in some respects like particles. Might realism be more plausible in relation to some kinds of normative judgments than (...) others? (shrink)

L’article présente les propositions principales de la métaphysique du réalisme axiologique de Tadeusz Czeżowski, l’un des représentants éminents de l’École de Lvov-Varsovie. La thèse soutenue par Czeżowski est que les valeurs ne sont pas des propriétés de n’importe quel genre, mais qu’elles constituent des notions transcendentales au sens de Duns Scot (et pas au sens de Thomas d’Aquin). Une des conséquences de cette position est que le réalisme de Czeżowski a la forme d’un non-naturalisme. La position prise par Czeżowski n’est (...) pas tout à fait claire ni élaborée en détails ; pour des raisons discutées dans le présent texte, il est possible de considérer les valeurs comme des sortes d’états de choses non-naturels, qui sont les correspondants des phrases axiolo-giques pertinentes. (shrink)

The axiological tenet of scientific realism, “science seeks true theories,” is generally taken to rest on a corollary epistemological tenet, “we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve (or approximate) that aim.” While important debates have centered on, and have led to the refinement of, the epistemological tenet, the axiological tenet has suffered from neglect. I offer what I consider to be needed refinements to the axiological postulate. After showing an intimate relation between the refined (...) postulate and ten theoretical desiderata, I argue that the axiological postulate does not depend on its epistemological counterpart; epistemic humility can accompany us in the quest for truth. Upon contrasting my axiological postulate against the two dominant non-realist alternatives and the standard realist postulate, I contend that its explanatory and justificatory virtues render it, among the axiologies considered, the richest account of the scientific enterprise. (shrink)

In this paper I distinguish between two kinds of meta-hypotheses, or hypotheses about science, at issue in the scientific realism debate. The first are descriptive empirical hypotheses regarding the nature of scientific inquiry. The second are epistemological theories about what individuals should / can justifiably believe about scientific theories. Favoring the realist Type-D meta-hypotheses, I argue that a particular set of realist and non-realist efforts in the debate over Type-E’s have been valuable in the quest to describe and understand (...) the nature of scientific inquiry. For the realism debate itself has inadvertently and indirectly laid the foundations for an important kind of Type-D meta-hypothesis, one regarding creativity in the history of science—which, in turn, is relevant to refining our descriptions of inference. After illustrating this result with regard to the historical argument against realism, I suggest that these empirically attained meta-hypotheses pertaining to scientific creativity can, in turn, be made methodologically prescriptive. (shrink)

This article endeavors to identify the strongest versions of the two primary arguments against epistemic scientific realism: the historical argument—generally dubbed “the pessimistic meta-induction”—and the argument from underdetermination. It is shown that, contrary to the literature, both can be understood as historically informed but logically validmodus tollensarguments. After specifying the question relevant to underdetermination and showing why empirical equivalence is unnecessary, two types of competitors to contemporary scientific theories are identified, both of which are informed by science itself. With (...) the content and structure of the two nonrealist arguments clarified, novel relations between them are uncovered, revealing the severity of their collective threat against epistemic realism and its “no-miracles” argument. The final section proposes, however, that the realist’s axiological tenet “science seeks truth” is not blocked. An attempt is made to indicate the promise for a nonepistemic, purely axiological scientific realism—here dubbed “Socratic scientific realism.”. (shrink)

Two related asymmetries have been discussed in relation to the ethics of creating new lives: First, we seem to have strong moral reason to avoid creating lives that are not worth living, but no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Second, we seem to have strong moral reason to improve the wellbeing of existing lives, but, again, no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Both asymmetries have proven very difficult to account for in any (...) coherent moral framework. I propose an impersonal population axiology to underpin the asymmetries, which sidesteps the problematic issue of whether or not people can be harmed or benefited by creation or non-creation. This axiology yields perfect asymmetry from a deliberative perspective, in terms of expected value. The axiology also yields substantial asymmetry for large and realistic populations in terms of their actual value, beyond deliberative relevance. (shrink)

The prominent Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky and his ex-student Nicolai Hartmann shared many metaphysical and epistemological views, and Lossky is likely to have influenced Hartmann in adopting several of them. But, in the case of axiological issues, it appears that Lossky also borrowed from the axiologies of Hartmann and the latter's Cologne colleague, Max Scheler. The links between the theories of values of Scheler and Hartmann have been studied abundantly, but never in relation to Lossky. In this paper, I (...) examine the manifold relationships – similarities, differences, borrowings, criticisms, and possible influences – between Lossky's axiology and those of Scheler and Hartmann on four key interweaving issues: (1) their ontological realism with regards to the objectivity of values, (2) their epistemological theories of the intuition of values, (3) their ontological definitions of "value", i.e., whether values are relations, qualities, essences, powers, meanings, etc., and (4) their theories of the stratification of values. (shrink)

According to the naturalistic normative axiology of Laudan's reticulated model of scientific change, empirical discoveries in the advance of science can provide a rational basis for axiological decisions concerning which epistemic goals scientific inquiry ought to pursue. The Bohr-Einstein debate over acceptance of quantum theory is analyzed as a case of axiological change. The participants' aims are incompatible due to different formulations of the goal of objective description, but neither doubts the realist commitment to the existence of microsystems (...) or the intention of quantum mechanics to provide knowledge of them. Thus the general aim of realism is not at issue. (shrink)

In this paper, I treat the question of the meta-axiological standing of Nietzsche's own values, in the service of which he criticizes morality. Does Nietzsche, I ask, regard his perfectionistic valorization of human excellence and cultural flourishing over other ideals to have genuine evaluative standing, in the sense of being correct, or at least adequate to a matter-of-fact? My goal in this paper is modest, but important: it is not to attribute to Nietzsche some sophisticated meta-axiological view, because (...) I am doubtful that he has one. It is, however, to show that Nietzsche's texts do not necessitate the sceptical meta-axiological positions that have been attributed to him in the recent secondary literature. And it is thereby to suggest that we need not give up on the idea that Nietzsche takes the values he champions to have genuine evaluative standing – not because he has some sophisticated realist theory to this effect, but in a more philosophically unreflective way. (shrink)

The scientific realism debate has now reached an entirely new level of sophistication. Faced with increasingly focused challenges, epistemic scientific realists have appropriately revised their basic meta-hypothesis that successful scientific theories are approximately true: they have emphasized criteria that render realism far more selective and, so, plausible. As a framework for discussion, I use what I take to be the most influential current variant of selective epistemic realism, deployment realism. Toward the identification of new case studies (...) that challenge this form of realism, I break away from the standard list and look to the history of celestial mechanics, with an emphasis on twentieth century advances. I then articulate two purely deductive arguments that, I argue, properly capture the historical threat to realism. I contend that both the content and form of these novel challenges seriously threaten selective epistemic realism. I conclude on a positive note, however, arguing for selective realism at a higher level. Even in the face of threats to its epistemic tenet, scientific realism need not be rejected outright: concern with belief can be bracketed while nonetheless advocating core realist tenets. I show that, in contrast with epistemic deployment realism, a purely axiological scientific realism can account for key scientific practices made salient in my twentieth century case studies. And embracing the realists favored account of inference, inference to the best explanation, while pointing to a set of the most promising alternative selective realist meta-hypothesis, I show how testing the latter can be immensely valuable to our understanding of science. (shrink)

The discipline of psychology has been poorly represented in critical realist texts to date. This is despite Bhaskar’s use of psychoanalytical concepts to underpin his concept of the dialectic. By comparison, other aspects of social science, such as sociology and economics, have a well-established body of critical realist texts. The original approach to psychoanalysis was analogous to the critical realist ontological-axiological chain. It moved from an ontological problem to an axiological solution. Freud’s eagerness to reframe psychoanalysis within a (...) scientistic, objective framework was perhaps due in part to the difficulties that he faced as European Jew in the fin-de-siècle. The application of the critical realist explanatory critique can contribute to our understanding of how and why the fragmentation of Freud’s legacies emerged. Critical realists should avoid the assumption that psychoanalysis is a unitary body of knowledge; as such, they should consider its various legacies separately. (shrink)

Methodological realism accepts the axiological view that truth is one of the essential aims of science. Following Popper and Levi, truthlikeness as the aim of science, combines the goals of truth and information. This chapter discusses the relations between truthlikeness and other epistemic utilities like explanatory power, problem‐solving capacity, and simplicity. While rationality in science can be defined relative to the goals accepted within scientific communities at different times, a critical realist defines scientific progress in terms of increasing (...) truthlikeness. It is argued that progress in this sense can be assessed, relative to empirical evidence, by the notion of expected verisimilitude. An abductive argument is formulated to defend realism as the best explanation of the empirical and practical success of science. (shrink)

The co-shaping of technology and values is a topic of increasing interest among philosophers of technology. Part of this interest pertains to anticipating future value change, or what Danaher (2021) calls the investigation of “axiological futurism”. However, this investigation faces a challenge: “axiological possibility space” is vast, and we currently lack a clear account of how this space should be demarcated. It stands to reason that speculations about how values might change over time should exclude farfetched possibilities and (...) be restricted to possibilities that can be dubbed to be realistic instead. But what does this realism criterion entail? This paper introduces the notion of realistic possibilities as a key conceptual advancement to the study of axiological futurism and offers suggestions as to how realistic possibilities of future value change might be identified. Additionally, I propose two slight modifications to the approach of axiological futurism. First, I argue that axiological futurism can benefit from a thoroughly historicised understanding of moral change. Secondly, I argue that when employed in normative contexts, the axiological futurist should seek to identify realistic possibilities that come along with substantial normative risks. (shrink)

Abstract:This paper places the debate on intrinsic value taking place in environmental ethics within the context of the traditional controversy between realism and antirealism. It lays the groundwork for a new kind of realism with respect to intrinsic value. The latter does not claim that intrinsic value is real in the sense that it exists in an external, mind-independent reality; nor does it claim that that there are objective truthmakers of valuing statements. First, it aims at acts of (...) valuing instead of values. So, the question is whether there are cases in which something merits an act of intrinsic valuing. We propose that the core of realism with regard to intrinsic value is the endorsement of what might be is provisionally called the axiological rule of excluded middle; it says that for a given subject or group of subjects any entity either merits an act of intrinsic valuing or does not. However, for the proposed account to work, the paper also seeks a new account of meriting an act of valuing itself, endowing this specific relation with a new, more "embodied" sense. (shrink)

Systematicity theory—developed and articulated by Paul Hoyningen-Huene—and scientific realism constitute separate encompassing and empirical accounts of the nature of science. Standard scientific realism asserts the axiological thesis that science seeks truth and the epistemological thesis that we can justifiably believe our successful theories at least approximate that aim. By contrast, questions pertaining to truth are left “outside” systematicity theory’s “intended scope” ; the scientific realism debate is “simply not” its “focus”. However, given the continued centrality of (...) that debate in the general philosophy of science literature, and given that scientific realists also endeavor to provide an encompassing empirical account of science, I suggest that these two contemporary accounts have much to offer one another. Overlap for launching a discussion of their relations can be found in Nicholas Rescher’s work. Following through on a hint from Rescher, I embrace a non-epistemic, purely axiological scientific realism—what I have called, Socratic scientific realism. And, bracketing the realist’s epistemological thesis, I put forward the axiological tenet of scientific realism as a needed supplement to systematicity theory. There are two broad components to doing this. First, I seek to make clear that axiological realism and systematicity theory accord with one another. Toward that end, after addressing Hoyningen-Huene’s concerns about axiological analysis, I articulate a refined axiological realist meta-hypothesis: it is, in short, that the end toward which scientific inquiry is directed is an increase in a specific subclass of true claims. I then identify a key feature of scientific inquiry, not generally flagged explicitly, that I take to stand as shared terrain for the two empirical meta-hypotheses. And I argue that this feature can be informatively accounted for by my axiological meta-hypothesis. The second broad component goes beyond mere compatibility between the two positions: I argue that, in want of a systematic account of science, we are prompted to find an end toward which scientific inquiry is directed that is deeper than what systematicity theory offers. Specifically, I argue that my refined axiological realist meta-hypothesis is required to both explain and justify key dimensions of systematicity in science. To the quick question, what is it that the scientific enterprise is systematically doing? My quick answer is that it is systematically seeking to increase a particular subclass of true claims. (shrink)

This introduction to a special Tradition and Discovery issue on Polanyi’s realism summarizes, and comments on the views of Jha, Gulick, Mullins, Cannon, Puddefoot, Meek and Sanders. All agree that Polanyi advocated a scientific realism hanging on the theses that reality is independent of human conceptualizations and that it is partially and fallibly knowable. Major differences concern its scope. All agree that it is comprehensive, pertaining not only to common sense and science but to intrinsic and ultimate values, (...) and perhaps the divine realities as well. Whereas Jha and Gulick argue a more limited scope, others defend a Polanyian position by drawing in various ways on the personal and social coefficients of the practice of inquiry. The debates show clearly that the relationship between Polanyi’s epistemology, axiology and hermeneutics deserve further scrutiny. (shrink)

metaphysics of goodness is the work of an unrelentingly systematic mind, but this is no surprise at all. It is simply true to form for Bob Neville, who for decades has been working out the intricacies of his systematic thought. For Bob, being systematic has never meant being systematically selective of, but rather systematically attentive to the cosmic miscellany. This is no less true of his most recent work, in which he develops his strongly realist theory of goodness.The work as (...) a whole builds across three parts, each composed of four chapters, from the thesis of form as goodness to an account of personhood and human flourishing. These latter parts, where Neville transitions from cosmological considerations to... (shrink)

Distinguishes between ontological, semantical, epistemological, axiological, methodological, and ethical realism. Another distinction, related to worldview, is between realism within common sense, science, and metaphysics. These distinctions help us to give a tree‐form classification of realist views and their most important alternatives. A methodological comparison is made between critical realism and philosophical naturalism.

Existence -- Categories and distinctions : on classification and taxonomy in metaphysical perspective -- Complexity -- Truth and reality : factual truth as grounded in reality -- Process : on substance and process in metaphysics -- Pragmatic idealism and metaphysical realism -- Scientific realism : the limits of science as revelator of the real -- Nonexistence and nonbeing : on possibilities and merely possible individuals -- Knowledge and its limits : on quantifying knowledge : and essay in epistemetrics (...) -- Explicability and sufficient reason : on the price of an ultimate theory -- Optimalism and the rationality of the real : on the prospect of axiological explanation. (shrink)

According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis: Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two are axiological (that (...) is, pertaining to the claim that science seeks truth). I also flag an additional axiological “challenge,” that of how one might justify the pursuit of a primary aim, such as truth. Bracketing epistemic realism, I argue that the axiological threats can be addressed by embracing a refined realist axiological hypothesis, one that specifies a specific subclass of true claims sought in science. And after identifying three potential responses to the axiological “challenge,” I contend that, while standard axiological realism appears to lack the resources required to utilize any of the responses, the refined realist axiology I embrace is well suited to each. (shrink)

DEFORGE R and SHAW J. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 83–95 Back‐ and fore‐grounding ontology: exploring the linkages between critical realism, pragmatism, and methodologies in health & rehabilitation sciencesAs two doctoral candidates in a health and rehabilitation sciences program, we describe in this paper our respective paradigmatic locations along a quite nonlinear ontological‐epistemological‐axiological‐methodological chain. In a turn‐taking fashion, we unpack the tenets of critical realism and pragmatism, and then trace the linkages from these paradigmatic locations through to the (...) methodological choices that address a community‐based research problem. Beyond serving as an answer to calls for academics in training to demonstrate philosophical‐theoretical‐methodological integrity and coherence in their scholarship, this paper represents critical realism and its fore‐grounding of a deeply stratified ontology in reflexive relation to pragmatism and its back‐grounding of ontology. We conclude by considering the merits and challenges of conducting research from within singular versus proliferate paradigmatic perspectives. (shrink)

Resumen: El realismo crítico personalista plantea una nueva idea de juridicidad. Reclama frente a la escisión radical entre teoría y praxis jurídica, entre lo axiológico y lo normativo, entre la realidad y lo objetivo, que esgrime la argumentación kelseniana, una instancia crítica para el derecho positivo: la existencia de la persona humana concreta, (que hace y vive la historia), como fundamento inmediato de todo lo jurídico. Si partimos de la base de que siendo la teoría general del derecho una invención (...) moderna, hasta su culminación en Kelsen, ¿por qué no admitir que pueda ser matizada por otros marcos axiológicos y cognitivos, también modernos, descuidados desde entonces por esa concepción normativista? Por eso, hablamos de “realismo crítico”. Abstract: The personalist critical realism sets out a new idea about legality facing Kelsen’s argument. Kelsen claims a radical separation between legal theory and praxis, between the axiological and the normative, and between reality and objectivity. However, the personalist critical realism proposes a critical starting point: the existence of the real human being, the one who makes and lives history, as the immediate basis of the legal world. If we start from the assumption that the general theory of law is a modern invention, until it reached its highest point with Kelsen; why do not we admit that it can be elaborated by other cognitive frameworks, also modern, which have been ignored since then, by that normative idea? Therefore, we talk about “critical realism”. (shrink)

This book is a systematic defense of a nonnaturalist, intuitionist moral realism. It supplies an account of moral facts according to which moral value is supervenient, undefinable, and nonreducible. The author also argues that "we must accept without proof some claim to the effect that a given thing is intrinsically good or bad if we are to prove that anything at all is so". The project is explicitly in the tradition of philosophers such as Brentano, Moore, and Ross. The (...) author focuses on developing his views rather than engaging in current debates by explicit reference to other work in value theory. The account is responsive to what one might take to be the most significant objections to it, but there are few references to specific arguments of recent and contemporary philosophers. On the one hand, this helps maintain the tightly interwoven systematic character of the account; but on the other, those not already disposed to accept some of its main claims may not find the articulation and defense of them compelling. (shrink)

This article responds to Oscar Horta’s article “In Defense of the InternalAspects View: Person-Affecting Reasons, Spectrum Arguments andInconsistent Intuitions”. I begin by noting various points of agreementwith Horta. I agree that the “better than relation” is asymmetric, and pointout that this will be so on an Essentially Comparative View as well as on anInternal Aspects View. I also agree that there are various possible Person-Affecting Principles, other than the one my book focuses on, that peoplemight find plausible, and that in (...) some circumstances, at least, these mighthave deontological, rather than axiological significance. In particular,I grant that Horta’s Actuality-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, hisTime-Dependent Person-Affecting Principle, and his Identity-DependentPerson-Affecting Principle, might each be relevant to what we ought todo, without necessarily being relevant to which of two outcomes is better.But I reject Horta’s claim that essentially comparative principles don’tapply in Spectrum Arguments. I also argue against Horta’s view that thetwo Standard Views that underlie our intuitions in Spectrum Argumentsare contradictory. I question Horta’s position that there isno point in rejecting the transitivity of the “better than” relation on thebasis of Spectrum Arguments, on the grounds that doing so won’t solvethe predicament that Spectrum Arguments pose. Finally, I conclude mypaper by challenging Horta’s interesting contention that my views aboutnontransitivity support an anti-realist metaethics, and are incompatiblewith the sort of realist approach to metaethics that I favor. (shrink)

Are things good because we desire them or do we desire them because they are good? Theories that countenance only desire-dependent values are idealist, those that countenance desire-independent values are realist. A value can be either subject-relative or subject-neutral. Subjectivism countenances only subject-relative and desire-dependent values. Subject-neutral idealism countenances at least some subject-neutral values. Realism repudiates the dependence of value on actual desires, but endorses an important relation between value and the fittingness of desires. Normative realism takes normative (...) facts about the fittingness of desires to ground the value facts, while axiological realism takes value facts to ground facts about fittingness. An important variant of axiological realism, namely representational realism, holds that desires are appearances of value, and that the fittingness of a desire is simply a matter of accurate representation. (shrink)

_Dialectic_ is now widely regarded as a classic of contemporary philosophy. This book, first published in 1993, sets itself three main aims: the development of a general theory of dialectic, of which Hegelian dialectic can be seen to be a special case; the dialectical enrichment and deepening of critical realism, viz. into the system of dialectical critical realism; and the outline of the elements of a totalizing critique of Western philosophy. The first chapter clarifies the rational core of (...) Hegelian dialectic. Chapter two then proceeds to develop a general theory of dialectic. Isolating the fallacy of 'ontological monovalence', Roy Bhaskar then shows how absence and other negating concepts such as contradiction have a legitimate and necessary ontological employment. He then goes on to give a synoptic account of key dialectical concepts such as the concrete universal; to sketch the further dialectical development of critical naturalism through an account of what he calls four-planar social being; and following consideration of the dialectical critique of analytical reason, he moves on to the real definition of dialectic as absenting absence and in the human sphere, the axiology of freedom. Chapter three extends and deepens critical realism’s characteristic concerns with ontology, science, social science and emancipation not only into the realms of negativity and totality, but also into the fields of reference and truth, spatio-temporality, tense and process, the logic of dialectical universalizability and on to the plane of ethics, where it articulates a combination of moral realism and ethical naturalism, whereby consideration of elemental desire involves commitment to the eudaimonistic society. This is then followed by a sublime discussion of key moments in the trajectory of Western philosophy, the tradition of which can now be seen to be based on what the author calls the unholy trinity of the epistemic fallacy or the reduction of being to knowledge, primal squeeze or the collapse of structure and alethic truth, and ontological monovalence. (shrink)

Meta-axiological distinctions introduced here introduced here include cognitivism and non-cognitivism on the status of evaluative discourse, as well as revisionary and non-revisionary positions. I argue that anti-realist and error-theoretical views of evaluative claims tend to be revisionary in ways that conflict with the realist orientation of much evaluative discourse, yet I contend that this does not provide a decisive reason in favor of cognitivism. While categorical aesthetic imperatives are hard to justify, some of these hypothetical imperatives have important implications (...) in arguments over literary value. Dispositional accounts of value and 'ideal judge' conditions are also canvassed. In what follows I shall take up some central issues in meta-axiology, the branch of philosophy that engages in second-order reflection over values and evaluative discourse. My highly selective survey will be conducted with an eye to the implications of key philosophical strategies for questions pertaining to the topic of literary value. I propose no systematic theory of the latter, but do schematically indicate what I take to be some cogent basic assumptions and lines of future enquiry. (shrink)

This article critically reflects on the research portfolio by the ecological economist Clive Spash who has helped pinpoint specific and systemic blindspots in a political-economic system that prioritises myopic development trajectories divorced from ecological reality. Drawing on his published work and collaborations it seeks to make sense of the slow, or absent, progress in averting global warming and ecological destruction. Three strands of key concern and influence are identified and discussed with reference to their orientation and explicit expression regarding Ontology, (...) Epistemology and Axiology. Some complementary points about indeterminacy and holism are presented to further strengthen the arguments for a transition towards a social-ecological economic system that puts values and principles back into focus. While Clive Spash's work has made a strong case within the economic community and appealing to ecology professionals, the value-myopia or value-vacuum has to be tackled across all disciplines, politics and society for a meaningful and urgently required transformation in decision making. Hence, the article finishes with some suggestions for the (higher) education system, and highlights the importance of simplicity and sufficiency, as well as strong sustainability-driven citizen and community action as necessary catalysts of change in this social-ecological transformation. (shrink)

Marxist axiology presupposes the theory of historical materialism: this article is concerned with an adaptive interpretation of the latter. Its concern is reflected in the proposed definition of value: value is the family of classes of states of affairs identified by the relation of preference of an ideal social subject. The article presents the hierarchy of social categories based on the adaptive interpretation of historical materialism: primary classes, secondary classes strata, etc. In the course of argumentation the aforementioned definition of (...) value becomes more and more realistic and permits ever more precise determination of values accepted in a society. (shrink)

This paper discusses the question about the nature of values and how we experience them from the point of view of moral phenomenology. Two senses of this term are distinguished: a historical sense and a methodological one. The paper analyses first the experience of values by focussing on affective acts such as feelings, emotions, desires and volitions. Two different versions of the thesis, their arguments, and counter arguments are then examined: Dispositionalism and Realism. Both can be found in the (...) tradition of the Brentano school including that taken up by his pupils from the Graz school, in phenomenology, and in current Metaethics. Finally I argue that value dispositionalism is a better option to understand the experience of value. (shrink)

In this essay, I provide normative guidelines for developing a philosophically interesting and plausible version of social constructivism as a philosophy of science, wherein science aims for social-epistemic values rather than for truth or empirical adequacy. This view is more plausible than the more radical constructivist claim that scientific facts are constructed. It is also more interesting than the modest constructivist claim that representations of such facts emerge in social contexts, as it provides a genuine rival to the scientific axiologies (...) of scientific realists and constructive empiricists. I further contrast my view with positions holding that the aims of science are context dependent, that the unit of normative analysis is the scientific community, and that the aims of science are non-epistemic social values. (shrink)

The fact that the goals and methods of science, as well as its empirical conclusions, are subject to change, is shown to allow at once for: (a) the objectivity of warrant for knowledge claims; (b) the absence of a priori standards from epistemology; (c) the normative character of epistemology; and (d) the rationality of axiological innovation. In particular, Laudan's attempt to make axiological constraints undercut epistemic realism is confuted.

As a die-hard supernaturalist, someone "at two with nature" (Woody Allen) who would be at one with God, the author has mixed feelings about Theodore Nunez's defense of "naturalism." Unlike neopragmatists, the author is not troubled by Nunez's general realism about value; he takes exception not to Nunez's theoretical account of truth, but to his specific axiology. He does not share Nunez's confidence that "projective nature" can provide reliable moral inspiration, suggesting instead that such inspiration can arise only from (...) trust in the holiness of God. (shrink)

In order to make some headway on the debate about whether Kant was a constructivist, nonconstructivist, or instead defends a hybrid view that somehow entirely sidesteps these categories, I attempt to clarify the terms of the debate more carefully than is usually done. First, I discuss the overall relationship between realism and constructivism. Second, I identify four main features of Kantian constructivism in general. Third, I examine three rival versions of metanormative Kantian constructivism, what I’ll call axiological, constitutivist, (...) and rationalist constructivist. I argue that Kant is best seen as a rationalist constructivist. I conclude by arguing that although it’s a constructivist view, this reading avoids the main pitfalls of traditional Kantian constructivism. In doing so, it helps us to achieve a satisfying rapprochement between constructivist and non-constructivist readings of Kant. (shrink)

Nikolai Lossky is key to the history of the Husserl-Rezeption in Russia. He was the first to publish a review of the Russian translation of Husserl’s first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen that appeared in 1909. He also published a presentation and criticism of Husserl’s transcendental idealism in 1939. An English translation of both of Lossky’s publications is offered in this volume for the first time. The present paper, which is intended as an introduction to these documents, situates Lossky within (...) the Rezeptionsgeschichte of Husserl in Russia and explains why he is central to it. It also explains what Lossky principally found in Husserl: he saw in the latter’s critique of psychologism support for his own ontology, epistemology, and axiology. Lossky characterizes his ontology as an ideal-realism. According to ideal-realism, both the realm of ideal beings and the realm of real beings are mind-independent. Per his epistemology, which he calls “intuitivism,” real beings are intuited by sensual intuition and ideal beings by intellectual intuition. The realm of ideal beings includes the subrealm of values, which is intuited by axiological intuition. This thoroughly realist conception contrasted sharply with the subjectivist tendencies of the time. So, when Lossky took cognizance of Husserl’s critique of psychologism, he thereupon found an ally in his battle against the various subjectivisms. But, when Husserl took the transcendental idealist turn, Lossky was at the forefront of the backlash against the new direction Husserl wanted to give to phenomenology. (shrink)

There are at least three well-known accounts of value and evaluations which assign a central role to emotions. There is first of all the emotivist view, according to which evaluations express or manifest emotional states or attitudes but have no truth values. Second is the dispositionalist view, according to which to possess a value or axiological property is to be capable of provoking or to be likely to provoke emotional responses in subjects characterised in certain ways. Third, there is (...) an epistemology of values that is sometimes invoked by the naïve realist. If the naïve realist is one for whom evaluations are made true by the possession by objects of monadic, mind-independent axiological properties, then one natural question is: What sort of cognitive access do we have to such properties? These value properties, the realist may say, are properties we come to know of by virtue of our emotions. Emotions, he may say, present value properties to us. One variant of this view is the claim that values are the "formal objects" of emotions. Closely related to these claims is the view that our emotions are appropriate to value properties, or not. Indignation and injustice, it is sometimes said, are related in one or more of these three ways. (shrink)

Mensch and Barge in their interpretation of Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of genealogical ethics as a basis of ethical weakness in the emerging field of “leadership-as-practice,” suggest that L-A-P is lacking in ethical grounding especially because of its relativist philosophy. I address this valid ethical concern in L-A-P theory by arguing that there is a form of realism in Nietzchean axiology and that the dialogic potentialities in material-social interactions may offer a greater capacity for ethical reflexivity than a reliance on (...) rules. (shrink)

A light form of value realism is defended according to which objective properties of comparison objects make value comparisons true or false. If one object has such a better-making property and another lacks it, this is sufficient for the truth of a corresponding value comparison. However, better-making properties are only necessary and usually not sufficient parts of the justifications of value comparisons. The account is not reductionist; it remains consistent with error-theoretic positions and the view that there are normative (...) facts. (shrink)

This article emerges out of the dialogue and exchange between critical realism and integral theory. It is a contribution to and within critical realist discourse, philosophically underlabouring for the senses of the good and goodness with a metaReality schema, arguing for, in performing the necessity of, the intimate intertwining of transcendental and phenomenological methods. One implication of the study is the recontextualizing of the singular philosophical status of the axiology of freedom.

[Sebastian Gardner] German idealism has been pictured as an unwarranted deviation from the central epistemological orientation of modern philosophy, and its close historical association with German romanticism is adduced in support of this verdict. This paper proposes an interpretation of German idealism which seeks to grant key importance to its connection with romanticism without thereby undermining its philosophical rationality. I suggest that the fundamental motivation of German idealism is axiological, and that its augment of Kant's idealism is intelligible in (...) terms of its combined aim of consolidating the transcendental turn and legitimating the kind of relation to value articulated in German romanticism. /// [Paul Franks] German idealists regard Spinozism as both the realism that outflanks Kant's idealism and the source of the conception of systematicity with which to fortify idealism. But they offer little argument for this view. To fill the gap, I reconstruct arguments that could underlie Jacobi's and Pistorius's tentative but influential suggestions that Kant is or should be a Spinozist. Kant is indeed a monist about phenomena, but, unlike Spinoza, a pluralist about noumena. Nevertheless, it is arguable that the Third Antinomy can be solved by a more thoroughgoing Spinozistic monism. The resulting Spinozism outflanks Kant by acknowledging Jacobi's charge that philosophy annihilates immediacy and individuality, whereas Kant's commitment to things in themselves can seem a half-hearted attempt to avoid the charge. However, the German idealist contention is that only a synthesis of such a Spinozism with Kantian idealism can retrieve immediacy and individuality, thus overcoming nihilism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Four Majestic Philosophical Thoroughbreds and a Deranged DonkeyWesley J. Wildman (bio)I. IntroductionFor me, this special issue is miraculous fun. I'm so grateful in an undirected way that the universe affords such possibilities. To think, the human project might have ended already had any one of a litany of disasters occurred, from asteroid collisions to our dalliance with self-destructive technologies. No more friends. No more wonderful and silly philosophical arguments. (...) But the human project hasn't ended, not this week anyway, and here we are, celebrating the American Journal of Theology and Philosophy, and enjoying a vigorous exchange of ideas.I'm also grateful in a directed way to specific people—to LeRon Shults and Robert Neville for editing the book that inspired this discussion, Religion in Multidisciplinary Perspective,1 to LeRon for editing this special issue, and additionally to Lisa Landoe Hedrick, Bin Song, Demian Wheeler, Bob, and LeRon for their contributions. These five friends have done me a great honor.It is fascinating—as well as a rare privilege—to witness how one's writings land in the minds and lives of diverse readers. What I hope that means is that there is more to say and write, more insights to wring from the drenched, raggedy fabric of reality, more reason to joyfully embrace the inassimilable density of value that confronts us. That is cause for celebration. Surely this is one reason we dabble in philosophy, dancing atop the brooding axiological depths, telling stories about what lies beneath, and occasionally fighting with one another about what matters most in those stories. To me, making that vision of the depth dimension of reality count for the wellbeing of others is what matters most. But I'm up for quibbling over stories, too; it's a welcome diversion from the daily labors of practical, prosocial philosophy.A word about the peculiar title of this essay is in order. Aren't philosophical theologians supposed to be more serious than that? In fact, the title refers to a memorable experience I shared with my old friend Larry Martin when we worked together in Piedmont, California. One weekend we trekked into [End Page 83] the California mountains to go white-water rafting. It was my first time to experience this particular form of joyful intensity, and I was glad for Larry's company.We were two and the rafts were large, so we were teamed with a crew of Pentecostal church leaders for whom the rafting day was a bonding adventure. Between them and Larry and me, we took up several rafts. We set off through class-four rapids, which I later found out was a rather extreme introduction to white-water rafting. Fortunately, nothing terrible happened to me, apart from a bruised knee when the base of the raft slammed onto a rock right where I was perched. One raft flipped but it wasn't ours and everyone survived.We were exhausted but strangely energized when we pulled into a clearing for lunch. There we found a great pile of sandwiches wrapped in foil, just begging to be eaten by famished rafters. Unwisely, I reached for one, only to discover that this group of Pentecostal church leaders wanted to pray over their meal first. Suitably humbled, and simultaneously impressed with their ability to delay gratification, I listened as they prayed—all of them speaking in tongues—for a seemingly endless period of time.After a minute, I noticed movement in the corner of my vision, my eyes remaining inappropriately open during this act of prayer. I turned to see a donkey walk out of the woods and come to rest in a corner of the clearing. It began braying, expressing a bizarre kind of sympathy with the tongues-talkers, I supposed. As the outburst of glossolalia wound down, the donkey turned and walked back into the forest.To say that I was astonished is a gross understatement. Was that a corporate Saint Francis of Assisi moment? A coincidence to end all coincidences? A practical joke played by two people from the rafting company in an extremely realistic donkey suit? The full measure of my astonishment lies in my... (shrink)

Voyages and crises of philosophy refer to philosophical knowledge of truth, in contrast to skepticism and relativism. They encompass the rational foundation of philosophy and the application of a critical method to central contents. Realist phenomenology plays a key role in the seventh voyage by providing an objective foundation to a priori knowledge. It shows also that essential necessity possesses a supreme form of intelligibility. Cognition is reached via insight and deduction. Three kinds of essences explain the difference between empirical (...) and a priori sciences, while the "impoverishment of a priori" is transcended through necessary essences. Rethinking Edmund Husserl's method allows access to real existence, where objective values replace axiological nihilism. Rigorous philosophy is thus compatible with divinely revealed truth about the mysteries of God and man. (shrink)

That people do wrong would appear to be a moral datum: a moral realm without wrongdoing may not be coherent. Thus, an adequate philosophic theory of morality ought to allow for it. But such a theory ought also to explain wrongdoing, both axiologically and causally. This is so if we take such a theory to have practical significance. Indeed, insofar as moral philosophy and its cognate areas have practical significance, explaining wrongdoing is arguably the most pressing practical issue for theory (...) construction in this domain. For a philosophical theory of morality to have practical significance, and, further, to have influence on behavior, it must be psychologically relevant to the organisms that it ranges over. That is, the concepts that the theory purports to explain must be plausibly realized within the psychology of the creatures for which the theory is intended. Any theory satisfying this constraint would then be in a position to illuminate those psychological features that are explanatory of blameworthy behavior. The argument presented here is that moral realism and its underlying moral psychology, cognitivism, face serious difficulties allowing for and explaining, both metaphysically and psychologically, such behavior. Moral cognitivism and realism fail to adequately account for this most fundamental of moral phenomena. Hence, a comprehensive understanding of moral experience is impossible within the cognitivist/realist perspective. (shrink)

Many system architects select their system methodologies without explicit consideration of the philosophical perspectives that impact their decisions. This paper describes how the concepts of ontology and epistemology apply in systems science. Ontology is how we specify terms of reference for existence, allowing us to understand the theory of existence via an ‘existence framework’. Epistemology, the theory of knowledge, allows us to explore new models and theories of knowledge acquisition so the best system-based methodologies can be deployed to solve complex (...) system problems. After introducing these concepts, the paper presents system science issues and assesses the impact of ontological, axiological and epistemological perspectives on system methodology selection, research, system design and deployment. An ontological viewpoint such as realism, as an objective view is contrasted versus nationalism, a personal perceptional view. An epistemological viewpoint is explored comparing knowledge as a product of sensory perception or rational reflection. The paper’s significant contribution is that it helps system architects understand that their philosophical views of systems science impact their system methodology choices. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is, firstly, to explicate and give a critical assessment of the methodological, epistemological, and philosophical foundations that led to the “rhetorical turn” in modern philosophy, and, secondly, to answer the question of how justified the grounds for such a “rhetorical turn” are. The answer proposed is based on a reconstruction of Eugene Dupréel’s critical arguments that were directed against the “classical philosophy” and their reception in Chaim Perelman’s works during his “turning point” period (1947 – (...) 1949). The article proves that these two scholars’ critique of classical philosophy proceeds from a realistic position, therefore it does not apply to the epistemological principles of idealistic philosophy. Their criticism of the classical theory of progress and the ideal of universally valid knowledge is “axiological” in nature and boils down to a reassessment of all traditional values. As a result of this reassessment, the methodological principles of sophistry (subjectivism, pragmatism, pluralism, relativism, conventionalism, etc.) are actually rehabilitated. The criticism of philosophy that appeals to spoken language and everyday knowledge, is not justified, since it is based on a misunderstanding of the conceptual and constructive nature of the philosophical language. Although the rhetorical analysis of philosophical texts should be recognized as fruitful and useful, rhetoric cannot be an instrument of philosophizing, since the interpretation of values depends on their understanding, which is given by “classical philosophy”. (shrink)