Cet article s'appuie sur la pensée de Wittgenstein pour comprendre comment des règles économiques agissent. L'étude (1993-2000) d'un Atelier de réparation de la RATP dans lequel une nouvelle règle de rendement a été introduite en 1993 met en évidence trois conclusions. Tout d'abord, dans la sélection des tâches, les opérateurs n'appliquent pas les règles de façon mécanique ; ils n'interprètent pas non plus les règles en faisant table rase des usages. Nos observations montrent que « suivre la règle est une (...) pratique ». En second lieu, les équipes développent des stratégies différentes pour obtenir la prime, ce qui illustre une autre thèse de Wittgenstein : « La signification de la règle se constitue dans l'usage. » Enfin, les opérateurs s'appuient sur les règles de l'usage pour trouver un certain usage de la règle. (shrink)

By explicitly addressing moral knowledge from a particularists perspective, this book can engage with an established and vibrant area of moral philosophy whilst making a distinctive and productive contribution to a relatively neglected dimension of it.

Les hypothèses sur l’innéité d’un trait formulées par les sciences cognitives – l’hypothèse d’une faculté innée de langage, par exemple – peuvent-elles échapper à la tautologie? Aucune définition générale de l’innéité ne semble pleinement satisfaisante. En tant que notion dispositionnelle, l’innéité rencontre le « problème de la tautologie » mis en évidence par Locke. Les jugements en matière d’innéité, qu’ils relèvent d’une théorie innéiste ou d’une théorie empiriste (puisque même les empiristes doivent en formuler), dépendent toujours d’une vision particulière du (...) développement cognitif. Ce fait ne condamne pourtant pas ces jugements à la tautologie mais offre au contraire un critère opératoire externe qui permet de les justifier : une explication développementale jugée pertinente permettra de formuler des hypothèses solides en matière d’innéité. (shrink)

L’article se propose d’explorer l’usage que Chomsky fait de la référence à la philosophie de Descartes. À partir des années 1950, le linguiste et philosophe Noam Chomsky remet l’innéisme sur le devant de la scène en défendant l’existence d’une faculté innée de langage. Comme l’indique sans équivoque le titre de son ouvrage paru en 1966, La linguistique cartésienne, Chomsky inscrit sa pensée dans la tradition cartésienne. Mais ce que Chomsky entend par « faculté innée » est-il vraiment similaire à ce (...) que Descartes nomme « idée innée »? L’usage que fait Chomsky de Descartes relève-t-il simplement d’un procédé rhétorique, comme le soutiennent certains commentateurs, ou est-il le signe d’une authentique proximité conceptuelle? Selon certains commentateurs, cet usage est purement rhétorique. D’une part, le tournant naturaliste opéré au XXe siècle a déplacé la réflexion sur l’esprit d’un plan métaphysique purement a priori à un plan scientifique purement empirique. D’autre part, le domaine où s’exerce prioritairement la pensée de Chomsky – le domaine linguistique – est un domaine largement ignoré par Descartes. Enfin, concevoir l'esprit comme contenant des facultés spécifiques innées paraît incompatible avec le caractère indifférencié et uniforme de l’esprit cartésien. L’article entend montrer au contraire que l’usage que fait Chomsky de Descartes révèle un véritable air de famille entre innéisme chomskyen et innéisme cartésien. D’une part, c’est bien le caractère a priori des principes que Chomsky postule qui fait écho aux idées innées cartésiennes. D’autre part, Chomsky dessine une tradition linguistique de type rationaliste qui pose l’universalité des structures grammaticales au nom de l’universalité même des caractères distinctifs fondamentaux de l’esprit que l’on trouve chez Descartes. Enfin, Descartes et Chomsky défendent tous deux un innéisme dispositionnel. En somme, l’article conclut que ce qui relie Chomsky à Descartes n’est pas la définition de la grammaire universelle innée, que ce dernier n’aurait, sans doute, pas acceptée ; c’est une manière similaire de poser le problème de l’acquisition de la connaissance, et partant de le résoudre. (shrink)

Facultés, concepts, théories et modules innés... Le débat philosophique contemporain sur la structure naturelle de l'esprit multiplie les références aux idées innées. Noam Chomsky lui-même, défenseur d'une faculté innée de langage, s'inscrit dans la lignée de la philosophie moderne. Mais les idées innées contemporaines ont-elles le même sens que celles posées par Descartes et Leibniz? Les progrès des sciences biologiques et cognitives permettent-ils d'attester ou d'infirmer l'existence des idées innées? L'étude analyse les théories modernes et contemporaines des idées innées puis (...) propose une définition de l'innéisme qui démontre l'actualité du débat amorcé à l'âge classique entre innéisme et empirisme."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

This surprising selection of photographs by Ansel Adams, Eugène Atget, Alfred Stieglitz, Carleton Watkins, and others, focuses on the tree as subject matter.

Offers an analysis of three strongly contrasting primitive civilizations, showing how behavior is influenced by custom and tradition.

ABSTRACTEvaluative conditioning is a change in the liking of a stimulus due to its previous pairings with another stimulus. In three...

We compare two different elicitation methods for measuring risk attitudes on a sample of French farmers. We consider the lottery tasks initially proposed by Holt and Laury (Econ Rev 92:1644–1655, 2002) and by Eckel and Grossman (Evol Hum Behav 23:281–295, 2002; J Econ Behav Org 68:1–7, 2008). The main empirical result from this within-subject study is that risk preference measures are affected by the type of mechanism used. We first show that this risk preference instability can be related to non-expected (...) utility preferences of farmers. Using a risk-taking psychometric questionnaire, we then demonstrate that risk preferences of farmers are context-dependent. This may be another explanation of the observed risk preference instability. (shrink)

One rationale policy-makers sometimes give for declining to fund a service or intervention is on the grounds that it would be ‘unaffordable’, which is to say, that the total cost of providing the service or intervention for all eligible recipients would exceed the budget limit. But does the mere fact that a service or intervention is unaffordable present a reason not to fund it? Thus far, the philosophical literature has remained largely silent on this issue. However, in this article, we (...) consider this kind of thinking in depth. Albeit with certain important caveats, we argue that the use of affordability criteria in matters of public financing commits what Parfit might have called a ‘mistake in moral mathematics’. First, it fails to abide by what we term a principle of ‘non-perfectionism’ in moral action: the mere fact that it is practically impossible for you to do all the good that you have reason to do does not present a reason not to do whatever good you can do. And second, when used as a means of arbitrating between which services to fund, affordability criteria can lead to a kind of ‘numerical discrimination’. Various attendant issues around fairness and lotteries are also discussed. (shrink)

El artículo trata del papel hermenéutico de Hch 9,4 en las enarrationes agustinianas, señalando que, por el lugar y función de esta obra, ese texto bíblico es una herramienta hermenéutica útil para entender toda la exposición agustiniana de los salmos.

L’article se propose d’explorer l’usage que Chomsky fait de la référence à la philosophie de Descartes. À partir des années 1950, le linguiste et philosophe Noam Chomsky remet l’innéisme sur le devant de la scène en défendant l’existence d’une faculté innée de langage. Comme l’indique sans équivoque le titre de son ouvrage paru en 1966, La linguistique cartésienne, Chomsky inscrit sa pensée dans la tradition cartésienne. Mais ce que Chomsky entend par « faculté innée » est-il vraiment similaire à ce (...) que Descartes nomme « idée innée »? L’usage que fait Chomsky de Descartes relève-t-il simplement d’un procédé rhétorique, comme le soutiennent certains commentateurs, ou est-il le signe d’une authentique proximité conceptuelle? Selon certains commentateurs, cet usage est purement rhétorique. D’une part, le tournant naturaliste opéré au XXe siècle a déplacé la réflexion sur l’esprit d’un plan métaphysique purement a priori à un plan scientifique purement empirique. D’autre part, le domaine où s’exerce prioritairement la pensée de Chomsky – le domaine linguistique – est un domaine largement ignoré par Descartes. Enfin, concevoir l'esprit comme contenant des facultés spécifiques innées paraît incompatible avec le caractère indifférencié et uniforme de l’esprit cartésien. L’article entend montrer au contraire que l’usage que fait Chomsky de Descartes révèle un véritable air de famille entre innéisme chomskyen et innéisme cartésien. D’une part, c’est bien le caractère a priori des principes que Chomsky postule qui fait écho aux idées innées cartésiennes. D’autre part, Chomsky dessine une tradition linguistique de type rationaliste qui pose l’universalité des structures grammaticales au nom de l’universalité même des caractères distinctifs fondamentaux de l’esprit que l’on trouve chez Descartes. Enfin, Descartes et Chomsky défendent tous deux un innéisme dispositionnel. En somme, l’article conclut que ce qui relie Chomsky à Descartes n’est pas la définition de la grammaire universelle innée, que ce dernier n’aurait, sans doute, pas acceptée ; c’est une manière similaire de poser le problème de l’acquisition de la connaissance, et partant de le résoudre. (shrink)

La psychologie des peuples a connu un grand succès dans les années 1930 dans les milieux les plus divers: sur les bancs de l'Université, tant des facultés de lettres que de celles de médecine, comme dans le monde colonial. Elle demeure imprégnée des postulats raciologiques du siècle précédent: hérédité raciale, influence du milieu géographique et du climat dans la formation des caractères nationaux, représentation inégalitaire de la différence et ses usages politiques ont été manifestes dans le domaine de la politique (...) coloniale. Les enseignements de la psychologie ethnique ont, en effet, eu des applications directes dans la politique scolaire à travers la mise en place d'un enseignement rudimentaire et à tendance ségrégationniste qui a réduit considérablement les ambitions de la mission civilisatrice. (shrink)

Among the characteristic features of depression is a diminishment in or lack of action and motivation. In this paper, I consider a dominant philosophical account which purports to explain this lack of action or motivation. This approach comes in different versions but a common theme is, I argue, an over reliance on psychologistic assumptions about action–explanation and the nature of motivation. As a corrective I consider an alternative view that gives a prominent place to the body in motivation. Central to (...) the experience of depression are changes to how a person is motivated to act and, also as central, are changes to bodily feelings and capacities. I argue that broadly characterizing motivation in terms of bodily capacities can, in particular, provide a more compelling account of depressive motivational pathology. (shrink)

One response to the chronic shortage of organs for transplant in the United States has been the passage of laws establishing first-person authorization for donation of organs, providing legal grounds for the retrieval of organs and tissues from registered donors, even over the objections of their next of kin. The ethical justification for first-person authorization is that it is a matter of respecting the donor’s wishes. The objection of some next of kin may be that the donor would not have (...) wished for his or her loved ones to have their preferences overridden, had they considered that possibility. This article examines the basis of the conflict and suggests a remedy grounded in the provision of donor-intent options that have the ability to clarify the donor’s wishes. (shrink)

This article asks about the conditions of a sociological operationalization of the capability approach developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Raising the question of freedom and social opportunities, the capability approach has so far mainly been discussed by economists and philosophers. In order to adopt this approach for a sociological and pragmatist perspective, it engages with methodological and theoretical issues. Whereas capabilities have until now mainly been studied within quantitative frameworks, the author opts for a qualitative method of inquiry (...) that draws on a pragmatist and configurational approach. Such a shift towards qualitative inquiry is a key condition for a better sociological understanding of notions like freedom and opportunities that stand at the core of the capability approach. (shrink)

The Ideal Worlds objection is an objection that purports to identify a potentially fatal flaw in some of our most influential moral theories: including, among others, rule consequentialism, Kant's Law of Nature Formula of the Categorical Imperative and Scanlonian contractualism. In this article, I offer an account of the objection, a survey of some of the ways defenders of affected theories have sought to avoid it, and the problems that those responses can encounter.

Abstract In recent debates, both physicalist and anti-physicalist philosophers of mind have come to agree that understanding the nature of phenomenal concepts is key to understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness itself. Recently, however, Derek Ball (2009) and Michael Tye (2009) have argued that there are no such concepts. Their case is especially troubling because they make use of a type of argument that proponents of phenomenal concepts have typically found persuasive in other contexts; namely, arguments much like those that (...) Tyler Burge used to motivate a certain form of externalism about mental content. The goal of this paper is to defend phenomenal concepts against this line of attack. Burge-style arguments, I contend, cannot be successfully used to make the case that there are no phenomenal concepts. As such, phenomenal concepts must remain central to understanding the nature of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

This paper initiates the reverse mathematics of social choice theory, studying Arrow's impossibility theorem and related results including Fishburn's possibility theorem and the Kirman–Sondermann theorem within the framework of reverse mathematics. We formalise fundamental notions of social choice theory in second-order arithmetic, yielding a definition of countable society which is tractable in RCA0. We then show that the Kirman–Sondermann analysis of social welfare functions can be carried out in RCA0. This approach yields a proof of Arrow's theorem in RCA0, and (...) thus in PRA, since Arrow's theorem can be formalised as a Π01 sentence. Finally we show that Fishburn's possibility theorem for countable societies is equivalent to ACA0 over RCA0. (shrink)

"Characterized by breadth of coverage, a refreshingly balanced approach to controversial issues, & a highly readable style."-Theological Studies.

Issues of methodology are central to the philosophy of moral progress. However, the idea that effective moral methodology, as well as being instrumental to progress, might also constitute progress has not been adequately explored. This paper will critically assess the merits of this idea – what I call ‘pure proceduralism about moral progress’ – taking Philip Kitcher's recent theory of ‘democratic contractualism’ (2021) as a test case. An epistemology of pure procedural moral progress will be sketched: namely, a naturalised epistemology (...) of paradigmatic instances of moral progress. Assuming an ideal procedure exists and has been at least approximately instantiated (an empirical claim), we learn about its form by studying paradigms of historical moral progress. From this epistemological method will be derived theoretical constraints on what can count as a theory of moral progress per se: it must capture the core semantic constraints on the term ‘moral progress,’ those features without which we would not recognise a change as moral progress. While this poses a tougher challenge for pure proceduralism than for more traditional approaches to moral methodology, it will be concluded that the potential of pure proceduralism as a viable metaethics of moral progress remains an exciting open question. (shrink)

Moral revolutions are rightly coming to be recognised as a philosophically interesting and historically important mode of moral change. What is less often acknowledged is that the very characteristics that make a moral change revolutionary pose a fundamental challenge to the possibility of moral progress. This is because moral revolutions are characterised by a diachronic form of deep moral disagreement: moral agents on either side of a moral revolution adopt different standards for assessing the merits of a moral argument, and (...) according to the standards they adopt, agents on neither side of the revolution ought to accept the arguments being put forward by those on the other. This threatens to undermine the progressive status of many of our most celebrated historical examples of moral revolutions: if a moral revolution only looks progressive in light of a change in evaluative standards it itself brought about, then moral progress seems relative to a particular historical perspective; if prior to a moral revolution taking place the moral arguments in its favour fall short of the relevant standards, moral revolutions can never be the outcome of rational argumentation. This apparent relativism and irrationality sits uncomfortably alongside our common-sense intuition that the moral revolutions upon which our contemporary moral worldview rests count as genuine moral progress. In this paper, I deepen currently popular Kuhnian-inspired accounts of moral revolution by incorporating Wittgensteinian ideas from _Philosophical Investigations_ and _On Certainty_. The result is an original way of thinking about deep moral disagreements, moral revolutions, and moral progress. (shrink)

Cumulative technological culture (CTC) refers to the increase in the efficiency and complexity of tools and techniques in human populations over generations. A fascinating question is to understand the cognitive origins of this phenomenon. Because CTC is definitely a social phenomenon, most accounts have suggested a series of cognitive mechanisms oriented toward the social dimension (e.g., teaching, imitation, theory of mind, and metacognition), thereby minimizing the technical dimension and the potential influence of non-social, cognitive skills. What if we have failed (...) to see the elephant in the room? What if social cognitive mechanisms were only catalyzing factors and not thesufficient and necessaryconditions for the emergence of CTC? In this article, we offer an alternative, unified cognitive approach to this phenomenon by assuming that CTC originates in non-social cognitive skills, namely technical-reasoning skills which enable humans to develop the technical potential necessary to constantly acquire and improve technical information. This leads us to discuss how theory of mind and metacognition, in concert with technical reasoning, can help boost CTC. The cognitive approach developed here opens up promising new avenues for reinterpreting classical issues (e.g., innovation, emulation vs. imitation, social vs. asocial learning, cooperation, teaching, and overimitation) in a field that has so far been largely dominated by other disciplines, such as evolutionary biology, mathematics, anthropology, archeology, economics, and philosophy. (shrink)

This study examines to what extent perceived corporate social responsibility reduces employee cynicism, and whether trust plays a mediating role in the relationship between CSR and employee cynicism. Three distinct contributions beyond the existing literature are offered. First, the relationship between perceived CSR and employee cynicism is explored in greater detail than has previously been the case. Second, trust in the company leaders is positioned as a mediator of the relationship between CSR and employee cynicism. Third, we disaggregate the measure (...) of CSR and explore the links between this and with employee cynicism. Our findings illustrate that the four distinct dimensions of CSR of Carroll are indirectly linked to employee cynicism via organizational trust. In general terms, our findings will help company leaders to understand employees’ counterproductive reactions to an organization, the importance of CSR for internal stakeholders, and the need to engage in trust recovery. (shrink)

Background: The phenomenon of forceful physical restraint in pediatric care is an ethical issue because it confronts professionals with the dilemma of using force for the child’s best interest. This is a paradox. The perspective of healthcare professional working in pediatric wards needs further in-depth investigations. Purpose: To explore the perspectives and behaviors of healthcare professionals toward forceful physical restraint in pediatric care. Methods: This qualitative ethnographic study used focus groups with purposeful sampling. Thirty volunteer healthcare professionals (nurses, hospital aids, (...) physiotherapists, and health educators) were recruited in five pediatric facilities in four hospitals around Paris, France, from March to June 2013. The data were processed using NVIVO software (QSR International Ltd. 1999–2013). The data analysis followed a qualitative methodological process. Ethical Considerations: The research was conducted in compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Written informed consent was collected systematically from participants. Findings: This study provides elements to help understand why restraint remains common despite its contradiction with the duty to protect the child and the child’s rights. All participants considered the use of forceful physical restraint to be a frequent difficulty in pediatrics. Greater interest in the child’s health was systematically used to justify the use of force, with little consideration for contradictory or ethical aspects. Raising the issue of forceful restraint always triggered discomfort, unease and an outpour of emotions among healthcare professionals. The findings have highlighted a form of hierarchy of duties that give priority to the execution of the technical procedure and legitimize the use of restraint. Professionals seemed to temporarily suspend their ability to empathize in order to apply restraint to carry out a technical procedure. This observation has allowed us to suggest the concept of “transient empathic blindness.” Conclusion: Using physical restraint during pediatric care was considered a common problem by participants. This practice must be questioned, and professionals must have access to training to find alternatives to strong restraint. Conceptualizing this phenomenon with the concept of “transient empathic blindness” could help professionals understand what happens in their minds when using forceful restraint. (shrink)

Before presenting his own account of value in the Ethics, Spinoza spends much of EIAppendix and EIVPreface attempting to refute a series of axiological ‘prejudices’ that he takes to have taken root in the minds of his readership. In doing so, Spinoza adopts what might be termed a ‘genealogical’ argumentative strategy. That is, he tries to establish the falsity of imagined readership’s prejudices about good and bad, perfection and imperfection, by first showing that the ideas from which they have arisen (...) are themselves false. Many elements of this genealogy, however, remain unclear. First, both the nature of the metaethical prejudices Spinoza believes we have been labouring under, and the metaphysical prejudices that he takes to have given rise to them, continue to attract widespread disagreement. Although much less commented on, it is also not entirely obvious why Spinoza takes the one to have engendered the other. In this article, I attempt to clarify Spinoza’s reasoning in both of these respects, ultimately concluding that Spinoza offers us two accounts of how this process has occurred, the first beginning from an anthropocentric doctrine of divine providence, the second from more secular, perhaps more purely Aristotelian metaphysical tradition. (shrink)

The increasing pressure from different facets of society exerted on multinational companies to become more philanthropic and claim ownership of their impacts is now becoming a standard practice. Although research in corporate social responsibility has arguably been recent, the application of activities taking a voluntary form from MNCs seem to vary reflecting a plethora of factors, particularly one obvious being the backwater local communities of developing countries where most of the natural extraction projects are located. This chapter examines views of (...) two Papua New Guinea local communities hosting large-scale mining operations and explains the demands arising from situational relativities, which are becoming too conspicuous for mine developers not to ignore. The research undertaken with several assertions highlights the perceived imperativeness allowing companies to integrate the CSR into the essential management pursuits of running mines in PNG. (shrink)

This article examines the actions and testimonies of 14 nurses who killed psychiatric patients at the state hospital of Meseritz-Obrawalde in the Nazi 'euthanasia' program. The nurses provided various reasons for their decisions to participate in the killings. An ethical analysis of the testimonies demonstrates that a belief in the relief of suffering, the notion that the patients would 'benefit' from death, their selection by physicians for the 'treatment' of 'euthanasia', and a perceived duty to obey unquestioningly the orders of (...) physicians were the primary ethical reasons that were stated for their behavior. However, 20 years had elapsed between the killings and the trial, thus giving ample opportunity for the defendants to develop comfortable rationales for their actions and for their attorneys to have observed successful defenses of others accused of euthanasia. (shrink)

Cumulative technological culture can be defined as the progressive diversification, complexification, and enhancement of technological traits through generations. An outstanding issue is to specify the cognitive bases of this phenomenon. Based on the literature, we identified four potential cognitive factors: namely, theory-of-mind, technical-reasoning, creativity, and fluid-cognitive skills. The goal of the present study was to test which of these factors—or a combination thereof—best predicted the cumulative performance in two experimental, micro-society conditions differing in the nature of the interaction allowed between (...) participants. The task was to build the highest possible tower. Participants were also assessed on the four aforementioned cognitive factors in order to predict cumulative performance and attractiveness. Our findings indicate that technical-reasoning skills are the best predictor of cumulative performance, even if their role may be restricted to the specific technological domain. Theory-of-mind skills may have a facilitator role, particularly in the Communication condition. Creativity can also help in the generation of novel ideas, but it is not sufficient to support innovation. Finally, fluid cognition is not involved in cumulative technological culture. Taken together, these findings suggest that domain-specific knowledge remains critical for explaining cumulative technological culture. (shrink)

This study focuses on the differences in the perception of business ethics across two groups of management students from France and Romania (n = 220). Data was collected via the ATBEQ to measure preferences for three business philosophies: Machiavellianism, Social Darwinism, and Moral Objectivism. The results show that Romanian students present more favorable attitudes toward Machiavellianism than French students; whereas, French students valued Social Darwinism and Moral Objectivism more highly. For Machiavellianism and Moral Objectivism the results are consistent with the (...) literature and our hypotheses. However, contrary to our expectations, we find that Social Darwinism is more important in France than Romania. The results indicate that religious practice does not influence preferences for the three business philosophies. In terms of gender differences, women have less favorable attitudes toward Machiavellianism and more favorable attitudes toward Moral Objectivism than men. (shrink)