The new critical edition of Stein’s lectures on philosophical and theological anthropology makes it possible to research further her theory of the person as developed during her middle period in Munster, that is, between 1932 and 1933. Her project revolves around the anthropological foundations of a Catholicpedagogy. Th is phase of her work is marked by various debates. On one hand, she attempts to bring the intellectual legacy of Husserl and phenomenology intodialogue with Thomas Aquinas and other Scholastic thinkers. On (...) the other hand, she confronts the ideas and spirit of National Socialism with her Catholic faith.Stein’s Munster phenomenological method contrasts with Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology; she develops an “eidetic psychology within a universal ontology.” In her “somatological” anthropology, the human being appears as a unity of lived body, soul, and mind. As a person, the human being is investigated as species, double species (man-woman), individual, as having a communal essence (outside the concept of race), and, ultimately, as a seeker of God. Stein examines the freedom of human beings, which lies between the givens of nature and grace, as well as the tension between knowledge and faith. In the final section of this paper, I discuss Stein’s position over against contemporary deconstructivist feminism. (shrink)

Es gibt ein Ziel, auf das alle philosophische Einzelforschungen hinarbeiten und zu dessen Erreichung sie zusammenwirken: das Ziel, die Welt zu verstehen. (Edith Stein) Edith Stein ist eine Philosophin, die auf Grund der Weite des Horizonts, in dem sie denkt, in kein Raster passt. Die Beitrage dieses Bandes, die auf eine Tagung anlasslich der Prasentation des Edith Stein-Lexikons an der FernUniversitat in Hagen im November 2017 zuruckgehen, machen das systematische und ideengeschichtliche Profil in Steins Denken transparent. Die versammelten namhaften Stein-Forscherinnen (...) und -forscher aus verschiedenen europaischen Landern zeigen die immer wieder uberraschende Aktualitat von Steins phanomenologischem Ansatz, der bis in Grundfragen der Anthropologie und Bioethik auch heute fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. "Verschiedene Grundbegriffe und -phanomene Edith Steins werden im Rahmen des vorliegenden Tagungsbandes vorgestellt und diskutiert. Dabei entsteht eine Synopse ihres Denkens und zugleich wird dessen Kern immer genauer sichtbar. Es gibt Beitrage zur Phanomenologie, zur Anthropologie, zur Religionsphilosophie und zur Frage, wie wir heute Stein lesen konnen." (Aus dem Vorwort) Mit Beitragen von Beate Beckmann-Zoller, Angela Ales Bello, Christof Betschart, Tonke Dennebaum, Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz, Martin Hahnel, Marcus Knaup, Ugo Perone, Harald Seubert, Claudia Mariele Wulf. (shrink)

There is a striking correspondence -which reveals, at the same time, its important differences- between Edith Stein and Simone Weil, not only in their life circumstances but also in their intellectual preoccupation with the subject of the human being, liberty, and their relationship with the Absolute.

Coleen Zoller - Interpreting Plato's Dialogues - Journal of the History of Philosophy 45:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 45.3 486-487 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Reviewed by Coleen Zoller Susquehanna University J. Angelo Corlett. Interpreting Plato's Dialogues. Las Vegas: Parmenides Publishing, 2005. Pp. xii + 137. Cloth, $28.00. In Interpreting Plato's Dialogues, J. Angelo Corlett succeeds at offering a concise summary of various competing answers to the question of how Plato's dialogues ought to be interpreted. The significance (...) of the question is rooted in the fact that one's assumptions about Plato's mode of expression inevitably influence how one interprets the dialogues. Meanwhile, the question is bewildering because, as Corlett quotes Woodruff, "reading.. (shrink)

We investigate the relation between intermediate predicate logics based on countable linear Kripke frames with constant domains and Gödel logics. We show that for any such Kripke frame there is a Gödel logic which coincides with the logic defined by this Kripke frame on constant domains and vice versa. This allows us to transfer several recent results on Gödel logics to logics based on countable linear Kripke frames with constant domains: We obtain a complete characterisation of axiomatisability of logics based (...) on countable linear Kripke frames with constant domains. Furthermore, we obtain that the total number of logics defined by countable linear Kripke frames on constant domains is countable. (shrink)

The complexity class of [Formula: see text]-polynomial local search problems is introduced and is used to give new witnessing theorems for fragments of bounded arithmetic. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1, the [Formula: see text]-definable functions of [Formula: see text] are characterized in terms of [Formula: see text]-PLS problems. These [Formula: see text]-PLS problems can be defined in a weak base theory such as [Formula: see text], and proved to be total in [Formula: see text]. Furthermore, the [Formula: (...) see text]-PLS definitions can be skolemized with simple polynomial time functions, and the witnessing theorem itself can be formalized, and skolemized, in a weak base theory. We introduce a new [Formula: see text]-principle that is conjectured to separate [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. (shrink)

We determine the exact bounds for the length of an arbitrary reduction sequence of a term in the typed λ-calculus with β-, ξ- and η-conversion. There will be two essentially different classifications, one depending on the height and the degree of the term and the other depending on the length and the degree of the term.

I argue that letter 98 of Book 10 of Pliny's Letters (= Epistulae) was deliberately moved from its original position in the sequence of letters in order to serve as a metaphor for the solution to the problem of Christians in Bithynia and Pontus. This solves a chronological problem in Pliny's Letters and is evidence of the hand of an active editor.

This dissertation concerns Plato's theory of education and the problem of how one can actually acquire knowledge of the Forms. Plato's theory of education aims to make one a good person, which requires knowledge of the Form of the Good. Yet, how exactly one would acquire such knowledge has remained a mystery. Various models of learning are presented by Plato: elenctic refutation ; hypothesis; recollection; the mathematical, dialectical, and political studies of the Republic's curriculum; and diairesis to name just those (...) that are explicit. I have argued here that as rich as these learning strategies are we need to augment our examination of Socratic pedagogy with a full exegesis of Platonic epistemology. ;In order finally to appreciate how they, Socratic education and Platonic epistemology, are meaningfully inseparable, I have explored the following questions: what kind of teacher Socrates is and the way in which he struggles against the sophistic methods of teaching; why Plato has Socrates include ten years of mathematical study in the ideal philosophical curriculum and how we can take the Republic's paradoxical curriculum seriously; how the philosopher utilizes the mathematical training in coming to know a Platonic Form; what role opposites play in Plato's metaphysical imagination; and what kind of person would one be if one actually knew the Form of the Good. I have shown that if one were to partake of a Socratic education, to pursue the requisite mathematical training, and to arrive finally at knowledge of the Platonic Forms, then one would be the sort of person that Socrates has in mind when he articulates the principles of Socratic intellectualism. ;What has been novel about this approach is its demonstration of how, despite the fact that Socratic learning and Platonic epistemology have separately been the object of perennial scholarly attention, the two taken genuinely together have been in need of fresh critical engagement. This inquiry reveals the metaphysical constraints on knowledge and in so doing reconciles Plato's theory of knowledge with Socrates' style of educating potential philosophers. (shrink)

Aktuelle bioethische Debatten werden vor allem von zwei Schwierigkeiten überschattet: zum einen von der Unklarheit des Begriffes menschlicher Autonomie. Hier geht es um individualethische Fragen, vor allem um Beginn und Ende menschlichen Lebens. Zum anderen bedroht die Verschiebung individueller Wissensträgerschaft zum anonymen Kollektivsubjekt angesichts einer zunehmenden Ökonomisierung des Gesundheitswesens das ärztliche Ethos des Helfens und Heilens. Diese und weitere konfliktgeladene Problemstellungen diskutiert Jan P. Beckmann in seinem neuen Buch.

Written in 1839 and chosen as the winning entry in a competition held by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences, Schopenhauer's Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will marked the beginning of its author's public recognition and is widely regarded as one of the most brilliant and elegant treatments of free will and determinism. Schopenhauer distinguishes the freedom of acting from the freedom of willing, affirming the former while denying the latter. He portrays human action as thoroughly determined but (...) also argues that the freedom which cannot be established in the sphere of human action is preserved at the level of our innermost being as individuated will, whose reality transcends all dependency on outside factors. This volume offers the text in a previously unpublished translation by Eric F. J. Payne, the leading twentieth-century translator of Schopenhauer into English, together with a historical and philosophical introduction by Günter Zöller. (shrink)

Written by a select international group of leading privacy scholars, Social Dimensions of Privacy endorses and develops an innovative approach to privacy. By debating topical privacy cases in their specific research areas, the contributors explore the new privacy-sensitive areas: legal scholars and political theorists discuss the European and American approaches to privacy regulation; sociologists explore new forms of surveillance and privacy on social network sites; and philosophers revisit feminist critiques of privacy, discuss markets in personal data, issues of privacy in (...) health care and democratic politics. The broad interdisciplinary character of the volume will be of interest to readers from a variety of scientific disciplines who are concerned with privacy and data protection issues. (shrink)

This paper examines the relation between intuition and concept in Kant in light of John McDowell's neo-Kantian position that intuitions are concept-laden.2 The focus is on Kant's twofold pronouncement that thoughts without content are empty and that intuitions without concepts are blind. I show that intuitions as singular representations are not instances of passive data intake but the result of synthetic unification of the given manifold of the senses by the power of the imagination under the guidance of the understanding. (...) Against McDowell I argue that the amenability of intuitions to conceptual determination is not due some pre-existing, absolute conceptuality of the real but to the "work of the subject."3 On a more programmatic level, this paper seeks to demonstrate the limitations of a selective appropriation of Kant and the philosophical potential of a more comprehensive and thorough consideration of his work. Section 1 addresses the unique balance in Kant's philosophy between the work on particular problems and the orientation toward a systematic whole. Section 2 outlines McDowell's take on the Kantian distinction between intuition and concept in the context of the Kant readings by Sellars and Strawson. Section 3 exposes McDowell's relapse into the Myth of the Given. Section 4 proposes a reading of Kant's theoretical philosophy as an epistemology of metaphysical cognition. Section 5 details Kant's original account of sensible intuition in the Inaugural-Dissertation of 1770. Section 6 presents the transition from the manifold of the senses to the synthesis in the imagination and the unification through the categories in the Critique of pure reason . Section 7 addresses Kant's formalism in epistemology and metaphysics.Esse artigo examina a relação entre intuição e conceito em Kant à luz da posição neokantiana de John McDowell de que intuições estão conceitualmente "carregadas". 1 O foco é sobre o duplo pronunciamento de Kant, segundo o qual pensamentos sem conteúdo são vazios e intuições sem conceitos são cegas. Mostro que intuições como representações singuares não são casos de introdução passiva de dados, mas o resultado da unificação sintética do múltiplo dado dos sentidos pelo poder da imaginação sob a orientação do entendimento. Contra McDowell, defendo que a amabilidade das intuições para com a determinação conceitual não é devida a alguma conceitualidade pré-existente, absoluta do real, mas ao "trabalho do sujeito".2 Num nível mais programático, o presente artigo visa demonstrar as limitações de uma apropriação seletiva de Kant e o potencial filosófico de uma análise mais abrangente e aprofundada de sua obra. A seção 1 aborda o equilíbrio único na filosofia de Kant entre o trabalho com problemas particulares e a orientação em direção a um todo sistemático. A seção 2 descreve a posição de McDowell acerca da distinção kantiana entre intuição e conceito no contexto das leituras de Kant por Sellars e Strawson. A seção 3 expõe a reincidência de McDowell no "mito do dado". A seção 4 propõe uma leitura da filosofia teórica de Kant como uma epistemologia do conhecimento metafísico. A seção 5 detalha a explicação original de Kant sobre a intuição sensível na "Dissertação de 1770". A seção 6 apresenta a transição do múltiplo dos sentidos para a síntese na imaginação e para a unificação por meio das categorias na Crítica da razão pura . A seção 7 aborda o formalismo de Kant na epistemologia e na metafísica. (shrink)

This paper shows that Thomas Aquinas has a compatibilist position on the freedom of the will, where compatibilism is understood as the doctrine that determinism does not preclude freedom. Thomas’s position concerning free will is compatibilist regarding both the divine and human wills. Thomas pioneers the idea that human freedom is an image of divine freedom. It is on account of the notion that god is the exemplar toward which human beings proceed that it is much easier to understand why, (...) if the freedom of god’s will is compatible with the determinism of omnibenevolence, it is acceptable that the freedom of the human will is compatible with the determinism that ensues from what Thomas calls the “natural necessity” of the human will. The evidence for his compatibilist stance on divine freedom emerges from Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG) I.74–91, whereas the strongest evidence for Thomas’s compatibilist position about human freedom derives from the Summa Theologiae (ST) and Quaestiones Disputatae De Malo (QDM) 6. This paper establishes a compatibilist reading of Thomas’s account of the freedom of the divine will and shows that Thomas’s theory of human freedom is modeled upon his treatment of divine freedom. Finally, I argue that the position maintained in QDM 6 does not abandon the theory presented in ST but instead is a clarification of it. Thus, Thomas presents a theory of freedom that is uniformly compatibilist. (shrink)

Recent reconstructions of Heidegger's thoughts on ethics have a curious paradoxical feature. On the one hand, Heidegger, particularly in his Aristotle lectures of the 1920s, offers a view of practical reason on which Dasein has its “moral knowledge” in a fully perceptual, non-cognitive way. This generally sets Heidegger in opposition to the whole business of principled moral justification before the fact. On the other hand, the literature is peppered with what appear to be principled denunciations of immorality—particularly violations of other (...) Dasein—grounded in the analytic of Dasein. To see human life as having a stable ergon (“business” or “function”), with certain broad tasks to pursue and vices to avoid, is not necessarily counter-Aristotelian; on the contrary, it is basic to the kind of Aristotelianism Husserl pursued in his own lectures on ethics. Here I set Heidegger's Aristotelian model of practical reason amid the competing, though similar, Aristotelianisms of John McDowell and Husserl, which differ on their handling of the human ergon. I conclude that Heidegger's views on practical reason and moral knowledge certainly constrain and very much alter the business of moral justification, but they do not precisely rule it out. (shrink)

Based on economic ethics, this paper reflects on and aims to improve the semantics of responsibility. The traditional concept of responsibility is threatened with erosion when responsibility is attributed to an actor who is unable to exercise individual control over the outcome of his actions. In the modern world-society this is increasingly the case. The concept of ordo-responsibility is helpful in identifying a suitable approach for the attribution and acceptance of responsibility. The perspective of economic ethics systematically differentiates between the (...) initial basic game of business and the related meta-games of politics and public discourse. In this way, the focus shifts to the rule-setting processes and rule-finding discourses for which the actors can accept governance responsibility and discourse responsibility, respectively. These two forms of ordo-responsibility demonstrate a characteristic which is extremely important for processes of New Governance: they can be attributed to corporative actors, and they can be perceived by them in their own well-reflected interests. (shrink)

The processing, representation, and perception of bodily signals (interoception) plays an important role for human behavior. Theories of embodied cognition hold that higher cognitive processes operate on perceptual symbols and that concept use involves reactivations of the sensory-motor states that occur during experience with the world. Similarly, activation of interoceptive representations and meta-representations of bodily signals supporting interoceptive awareness are profoundly associated with emotional experience and cognitive functions. This article gives an overview over present findings and models on interoception and (...) mechanisms of embodiment and highlights its relevance for disorders that are suggested to represent a translation deficit of bodily states into subjective feelings and self-awareness. (shrink)

This article joins in and extends the contemporary debate on the right to privacy. We bring together two strands of the contemporary discourse on privacy. While we endorse the prevailing claim that norms of informational privacy protect the autonomy of individual subjects, we supplement it with an argument demonstrating that privacy is an integral element of the dynamics of all social relationships. This latter claim is developed in terms of the social role theory and substantiated by an analysis of the (...) role of privacy in intimate relationships, in professional relationships and in social interactions between strangers in public. We conclude by arguing that it is not always reasonable to assume a conflict between individual privacy on the one hand and society on the other. Legislators and participants in public debate also have to take into account the consequences of limiting privacy on social interaction and the integration of the society. (shrink)