Forced to Fail traces the long legal history of first racial segregation, and then racial desegregation in America. The authors explain how rapidly changing demographics and family structure in the United States have greatly complicated the project of top-down government efforts to achieve an "ideal" racial balance in schools. It describes how social capital—a positive outcome of social interaction between and among parents, children, and teachers—creates strong bonds that lead to high academic achievement.

By analyzing how one obtains the Stone space of the reduced product of an indexed collection of Boolean algebras from the Stone spaces of those algebras, we derive a topological construction, the "reduced coproduct", which makes sense for indexed collections of arbitrary Tichonov spaces. When the filter in question is an ultrafilter, we show how the "ultracoproduct" can be obtained from the usual topological ultraproduct via a compactification process in the style of Wallman and Frink. We prove theorems dealing with (...) the topological structure of reduced coproducts (especially ultracoproducts) and show in addition how one may use this construction to gain information about the category of compact Hausdorff spaces. (shrink)

Deleuze's concept of 'becoming' provides the key to his notoriously complex metaphysics, yet it has not been systematized until now. Bankston tracks the concept of becoming and its underlying temporal processes across Deleuze's writings, arguing that expressions of becoming(s) appear in two modes of temporality: an appropriation of Nietzsche's eternal return (the becoming of the event), and Bergsonian duration (the becoming of sensation). Overturning the criticisms launched by Žižek and Badiou, with conceptual encounters between Bergson, Nietzsche, Leibniz, Borges, Klossowski, (...) and Proust, the newly charted concept of double becoming provides a roadmap to the totality of Deleuze's philosophy. Bankston systematizes Deleuze's multi-mirrored universe where form and content infinitely refract in a vital kaleidoscope of becoming" -- Amazon.com. (shrink)

Let CH be the class of compacta (i.e., compact Hausdorff spaces), with BS the subclass of Boolean spaces. For each ordinal α and pair $\langle K,L\rangle$ of subclasses of CH, we define Lev ≥α K,L), the class of maps of level at least α from spaces in K to spaces in L, in such a way that, for finite α, Lev ≥α (BS,BS) consists of the Stone duals of Boolean lattice embeddings that preserve all prenex first-order formulas of quantifier rank (...) α. Maps of level ≥ 0 are just the continuous surjections, and the maps of level ≥ 1 are the co-existential maps introduced in [8]. Co-elementary maps are of level ≥α for all ordinals α; of course in the Boolean context, the co-elementary maps coincide with the maps of level ≥ω. The results of this paper include: (i) every map of level ≥ω is co-elementary; (ii) the limit maps of an ω-indexed inverse system of maps of level ≥α are also of level ≥α; and (iii) if K is a co-elementary class, k ≥ k (K,K) = Lev ≥ k+1 (K,K), then Lev ≥ k (K,K) = Lev ≥ω (K,K). A space X ∈ K is co-existentially closed in K if Lev ≥ 0 (K, X) = Lev ≥ 1 (K, X). Adapting the technique of "adding roots," by which one builds algebraically closed extensions of fields (and, more generally, existentially closed extensions of models of universal-existential theories), we showed in [8] that every infinite member of a co-inductive co-elementary class (such as CH itself, BS, or the class CON of continua) is a continuous image of a space of the same weight that is co-existentially closed in that class. We show here that every compactum that is co-existentially closed in CON (a co-existentially closed continuum) is both indecomposable and of covering dimension one. (shrink)

The Chang-Łoś-Suszko theorem of first-order model theory characterizes universal-existential classes of models as just those elementary classes that are closed under unions of chains. This theorem can then be used to equate two model-theoretic closure conditions for elementary classes; namely unions of chains and existential substructures. In the present paper we prove a topological analogue and indicate some applications.

Given a finite lexicon L of relational symbols and equality, one may view the collection of all L-structures on the set of natural numbers ω as a space in several different ways. We consider it as: (i) the space of outcomes of certain infinite two-person games; (ii) a compact metric space; and (iii) a probability measure space. For each of these viewpoints, we can give a notion of relative ubiquity, or largeness, for invariant sets of structures on ω. For example, (...) in every sense of relative ubiquity considered here, the set of dense linear orderings on ω is ubiquitous in the set of linear orderings on ω. (shrink)

A topological classification scheme consists of two ingredients: (1) an abstract class K of topological spaces; and (2) a "taxonomy", i.e. a list of first order sentences, together with a way of assigning an abstract class of spaces to each sentence of the list so that logically equivalent sentences are assigned the same class. K is then endowed with an equivalence relation, two spaces belonging to the same equivalence class if and only if they lie in the same classes prescribed (...) by the taxonomy. A space X in K is characterized within the classification scheme if whenever Y ∈ K and Y is equivalent to X, then Y is homeomorphic to X. As prime example, the closed set taxonomy assigns to each sentence in the first order language of bounded lattices the class of topological spaces whose lattices of closed sets satisfy that sentence. It turns out that every compact two-complex is characterized via this taxonomy in the class of metrizable spaces, but that no infinite discrete space is so characterized. We investigate various natural classification schemes, compare them, and look into the question of which spaces can and cannot be characterized within them. (shrink)

The study of anarchism as a philosophical, political, and social movement has burgeoned both in the academy and in the global activist community in recent years. Taking advantage of this boom in anarchist scholarship, Nathan J. Jun and Shane Wahl have compiled twenty-six cutting-edge essays on this timely topic in New Perspectives on Anarchism.

The languages of finitary and infinitary logic over the alphabet of bounded lattices have proven to be of considerable use in the study of compacta. Significant among the sentences of these languages are the ones that are base free, those whose truth is unchanged when we move among the lattice bases of a compactum. In this paper we define syntactically the expansive sentences, and show each of them to be base free. We also show that many well-known properties of compacta (...) may be expressed using expansive sentences; and that any property so expressible is closed under inverse limits and co-existential images. As a byproduct, we conclude that co-existential images of pseudo-arcs are pseudo-arcs. This is of interest because the corresponding statement for confluent maps is still open, and co-existential maps are often—but not always—confluent. (shrink)

An error has been found in the cited paper; namely, Theorem 3.1 is false.

The ontologies of Slavoj Žižek and Gilles Deleuze are incommensurable. Rather than appropriate one at the expense of the other, this essay uses Žižek’s notion of parallax to think the two philosophers together, without mediation. Both Deleuze and Žižek provide mirrored philosophical images, with the point of divergence being absolute lack. Deleuze argues that lack, or the being of negation, is an error of representational understanding, while Žižek conceives his philosophy as being driven by absolute lack. A stark opponent of (...) Žižek’s precursor, Hegel, Deleuze rejects opposition as a constitutive feature of reality. However, Žižek mirrors Deleuze’s very concepts in his Lacanian reading of Hegel, while said concepts retain identical terms. For instance, Žižek calls l’objet petit a “difference,” while his term for absolute negation is “repetition,” and finally, he refers to his philosophical system as the “non-All”. These singular concepts in Žižek’s thought share an identical language with that of Deleuze. Deleuze’s philosophy is one of “difference,” while its mode of proliferation is “repetition,” and finally, he often refers to his philosophy as the “One-All”. Mapping these common terms that do not denote a common language, but incommensurable, inverse logics, it becomes evident that Deleuze and Žižek are mirror images of one another, infinitely fragmenting across the expanse of their respective positions. Thus, by triangulating ontology from their unique perspectives, a new ontological shift emerges—one that resists mediation and admixture. (shrink)

A first order representation (f.o.r.) in topology is an assignment of finitary relational structures of the same type to topological spaces in such a way that homeomorphic spaces get sent to isomorphic structures. We first define the notions "one f.o.r. is at least as expressive as another relative to a class of spaces" and "one class of spaces is definable in another relative to an f.o.r.", and prove some general statements. Following this we compare some well-known classes of spaces and (...) first order representations. A principal result is that if X and Y are two Tichonov spaces whose posets of zero-sets are elementarily equivalent then their respective rings of bounded continuous real-valued functions satisfy the same positive-universal sentences. The proof of this uses the technique of constructing ultraproducts as direct limits of products in a category theoretic setting. (shrink)

Many properties of compacta have “textbook” definitions which are phrased in lattice-theoretic terms that, ostensibly, apply only to the full closed-set lattice of a space. We provide a simple criterion for identifying such definitions that may be paraphrased in terms that apply to all lattice bases of the space, thereby making model-theoretic tools available to study the defined properties. In this note we are primarily interested in properties of continua related to unicoherence; i.e., properties that speak to the existence of (...) “holes” in a continuum and in certain of its subcontinua. (shrink)

We argue that intelligible appeals to interlevel causes (top-down and bottom-up) can be understood, without remainder, as appeals to mechanistically mediated effects. Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of causal and constitutive relations, where the causal relations are exclusively intralevel. The idea of causation would have to stretch to the breaking point to accommodate interlevel causes. The notion of a mechanistically mediated effect is preferable because it can do all of the required work without appealing to mysterious interlevel causes. When interlevel (...) causes can be translated into mechanistically mediated effects, the posited relationship is intelligible and should raise no special philosophical objections. When they cannot, they are suspect. (shrink)

Completeness is an important but misunderstood norm of explanation. It has recently been argued that mechanistic accounts of scientific explanation are committed to the thesis that models are complete only if they describe everything about a mechanism and, as a corollary, that incomplete models are always improved by adding more details. If so, mechanistic accounts are at odds with the obvious and important role of abstraction in scientific modelling. We respond to this characterization of the mechanist’s views about abstraction and (...) articulate norms of completeness for mechanistic explanations that have no such unwanted implications. _1_ Introduction _2_ A Balancing Act: When Do Details Matter? _3_ The Norms of Causal Explanation _4_ The Norms of Constitutive Explanation _5_ Salmon-Completeness _6_ From More Details to More Relevant Details _7_ Non-explanatory Virtues of Abstraction _8_ From Explanatory Models to Explanatory Knowledge _9_ Mechanistic Completeness Reconsidered _10_ Conclusion. (shrink)

Mr. Wellman’s highly original contribution to the relatively new field of justification in ethics consists of characterizing the different ways in which ethical statements can be challenged and showing how each sort of challenge can be met by an appropriate response, enabling reasonable men to appropriately discuss or reflect on ethical issues. In developing his unique, systematic, methodology of ethics, Mr. Wellman has, first, rigorously reviewed and refuted the main arguments for the view of the nature of all reasoning as (...) deductive and, second, convincingly presented arguments for the existence of nondeductive evidences in ethics. Mr. Wellman’s broad definition of reasoning and his rejection of the identification of justification with reasoning reveals new dimensions of justification which will have wide implications in other areas of human speculation. (shrink)

Intentionality is one of the central problems of modern philosophy. How can a thought, action or belief be about something? Sachs draws on the work of Wilfrid Sellars, C. I. Lewis and Maurice Merleau-Ponty to build a new theory of intentionality that solves many of the problems faced by traditional conceptions. In doing so, he sheds new light on Sellars’s influential arguments concerning the ‘Myth of the Given’ and shows how we can build a productive discourse between American pragmatism, analytical (...) philosophy and European phenomenology. (shrink)

The rise of mechanistic science in the seventeenth century helped give rise to a heated debate about whether teleology—the appearance of purposive activity in life and in mind—could be naturalized. At issue here were both what is meant by “teleology” as well as what is meant “nature”. I shall examine a specific episode in the history of this debate in the twentieth century with the rise of cybernetics: the science of seemingly “self-controlled” systems. Against cybernetics, Hans Jonas argued that cybernetics (...) failed as a naturalistic theory of teleology and that the reality of teleology is grounded in phenomenology, not in scientific explanations. I shall argue that Jonas was correct to criticize cybernetics but that contemporary work in biological organization succeeds where cybernetics failed. I will then turn to contemporary uses of Jonas’s phenomenology in enactivism and argue that Jonas’s phenomenology should be avoided by enactivism as a scientific research program, but that it remains open whether enactivism as a philosophy of nature should also avoid Jonas. (shrink)

_Psychological Types_ is one of Jung's most important and most famous works. First published by Routledge in the early 1920s it appeared after Jung's so-called fallow period, during which he published little, and it is perhaps the first significant book to appear after his own confrontation with the unconscious. It is the book that introduced the world to the terms 'extravert' and 'introvert'. Though very much associated with the unconscious, in _Psychological Types_ Jung shows himself to be a supreme theorist (...) of the conscious. In putting forward his system of psychological types Jung provides a means for understanding ourselves and the world around us: our different patterns of behaviour, our relationships, marriage, national and international conflict, organizational functioning. Appearing in paperback for the first time this central volume from Jung's Collected Works will be essential to anyone requiring a proper understanding of Jung's psychology. (shrink)

1. The problem. The concept of confirmation of an hypothesis by empirical evidence is of fundamental importance in the methodology of empirical science. For, first of all, a sentence cannot even be considered as expressing an empirical hypothesis at all unless it is theoretically capable of confirmation or disconfirmation, i.e. unless the kind of evidence can be characterized whose occurrence would confirm, or disconfirm, the sentence in question. And secondly, the acceptance or rejection of a sentence which does represent an (...) empirical hypothesis is determined, in scientific procedure, by the degree to which it is confirmed by relevant evidence. (shrink)

Recent accounts of teleological naturalism hold that organisms are intrinsically goaldirected entities. We argue that supporters and critics of this view have ignored the ways in which it is used to address quite different problems. One problem is about biology and concerns whether an organism-centered account of teleological ascriptions would improve our descriptions and explanations of biological phenomena. This is different from the philosophical problem of how naturalized teleology would affect our conception of nature, and of ourselves as natural beings. (...) The neglect of this metatheoretic distinction has made it difficult to understand the criteria we should use for evaluating proposals to naturalize teleology. We argue that a clearer distinction between scientific and philosophical contexts shows that we need more than one set of criteria for evaluating proposals to naturalize teleology, and that taking these into account might advance or dissolve recurring debates in the literature. (shrink)

The movements to teach the responsible conduct of research and engineering ethics at technological universities are often unacknowledged aspects of the ethics across the curriculum movement and could benefit from explicit alliances with it. Remarkably, however, not nearly as much scholarly attention has been devoted to EAC as to RCR or to engineering ethics, and RCR and engineering ethics educational efforts are not always presented as facets of EAC. The emergence of EAC efforts at two different institutions—the Illinois Institute of (...) Technology and Utah Valley University —provide counter examples. The remarkably successful UVU initiative gave birth to EAC as a scholarly movement and to the associated Society for Ethics Across the Curriculum. EAC initiatives at the Colorado School of Mines, however, point up continuing institutional resistances to EAC. Finally, comparative reflection on successes and failures can draw some lessons for the future. One suggestion is that increasing demands for accountability and pedagogical research into what works in teaching and learning offers special opportunities. (shrink)

Social distancing has become the most prominent measure many countries have implemented to combat the spread of COVID-19. The aim of the current study was to explore the potential role of empathy and self-construal styles, as individual personality traits, on self-reported social distancing. Participants completed the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, the Singelis Self-Construal Scale, and were asked to rate their level of social distancing and how much they endorsed social distancing on a five-point Likert-scale. Across a large and diverse sample, results (...) showed that trait-levels of empathic concern and perspective taking positively correlates with social distancing. However, we did not find evidence to suggest that trait-levels of personal distress correlates with social distancing. We interpret these findings as suggesting that empathy, both its altruistic and cognitive dimensions, plays an important role in motivating people to socially distance and should be emphasized during times of crisis. Furthermore, we suggest that emphasizing a person’s self-distress during times of crisis may not be an effective approach in promotion social distancing policies. We also found that both independence and interdependence self-construal styles positively correlates with social distancing. While we expected the latter result, we did not expect the former. This suggests that more work is needed to fully understand how self-construal styles, along with their cultural level analogs, influences social distancing. Overall, these results provide us with novel multi-national data about the role of individual differences on social distancing tendencies specifically, and human behavior during a global health crisis more generally. (shrink)

Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of justice depend on what they are responsible for? For example, how far should healthcare provision depend on patients' past choices? What values would be realized and which hampered by making justice sensitive to responsibility? Would it give people what they deserve? Would it advance or hinder equality? The (...) explosion of philosophical interest in such questions has been fuelled by increased focus on individual responsibility in political debates. Political philosophers, especially egalitarians, have responded to such developments by attempting to map out the proper place for responsibility in theories of justice. This book both reflects on these recent developments in normative political theory and moves the debate forwards. (shrink)

This book makes two important contributions toward a general and systematic theory of rights-a powerful philosophical analysis of the language of rights and an explanation of the nature of rights. In working out these ideas, Wellman has provided a new and cohesive way of thinking and talking about rights of every sort. Wellman succeeds in bringing all kinds of rights-moral, legal, institutional, etc.-under one unified theory in a way that illuminates their similarities and differences. This enables him to deal in (...) a consistent way with a very broad range of philosophical questions, questions that are too often dealt with in isolation from each other. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction The Once Received View (ORV) Criticisms of the ORV The “Model Model” of Scientific Theories Mechanisms: Investigating Nonformal Patterns in Scientific Theories Conclusion.

First published in 1999. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

In this introductory essay, we outline the relationship between political dissensus and radical democracy, focusing especially on how such a politics might inform the study of business ethics. This politics is located historically in the failure of liberal democracy to live up to its promise, as well as the deleterious response to that from reactionary populism, strong-man authoritarianism, and exploitative capitalism. In the context of these political vicissitudes, we turn to radical democracy as a form of contestation that offers hope (...) in an affirmative, inclusive and sustainable alternative. On this basis we introduce the papers in the special issue as a collective exploration of the ethics and politics of radical democracy as manifesting in dissensus and the subversion of corporate and elite power by alternative democratic practices and realities. (shrink)

We study the degrees of unsolvability of sets which are cohesive . We answer a question raised by the first author in 1972 by showing that there is a cohesive set A whose degree a satisfies a' = 0″ and hence is not high. We characterize the jumps of the degrees of r-cohesive sets, and we show that the degrees of r-cohesive sets coincide with those of the cohesive sets. We obtain analogous results for strongly hyperimmune and strongly hyperhyperimmune sets (...) in place of r-cohesive and cohesive sets, respectively. We show that every strongly hyperimmune set whose degree contains either a Boolean combination of ∑2 sets or a 1-generic set is of high degree. We also study primitive recursive analogues of these notions and in this case we characterize the corresponding degrees exactly. MSC: 03D30, 03D55. (shrink)

Alchemy is central to Jung's hypothesis of the collective unconscious. In this volume he begins with an outline of the process and aims of psychotherapy, and then moves on to work out the analogies between alchemy, Christian dogma and symbolism and his own understanding of the analytic process. Introducing the basic concepts of alchemy, Jung reminds us of the dual nature of alchemy, comprising both the chemical process and a parallel mystical component. He also discusses the seemingly deliberate mystification of (...) the alchemists. Finally, in using the alchemical process as providing insights into individuation, Jung emphasises the importance of alchemy in relating to us the transcendent nature of the psyche. (shrink)

In the Global Burden of Disease study, disease burden is measured as disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). The paramount assumption of the DALY is that it makes sense to aggregate years lived with disability (YLDs) and years of life lost (YLLs). However, this is not smooth sailing. Whereas morbidity (YLD) is something thathappens toan individual, loss of life itself (YLL) occurs when that individual’s life has ended. YLLs quantify something that involves no experience and does not take place among living individuals. (...) This casts doubt on whether the YLL is an individual burden at all. If not, then YLDs and YLLs are incommensurable. There are at least three responses to this problem, only one of which is tenable: a counterfactual account of harm. Taking this strategy necessitates a re-examination of how we count YLLs, particularly at the beginning of life. (shrink)

According to an increasingly popular view known as non-doxasticism, religious faith need not include belief, but only some cognitively weaker attitude. This view comes with great promises, as it offers a way for the agnostic to partake in religion. My concern is how such a non-doxastic faith might be understood as a rational attitude. I offer three desiderata for any account of rational, non-doxastic faith. These desiderata are based on general considerations regarding epistemic rationality and on major themes from current (...) literature on the closely related notions of trust and hope. The first desideratum states that faith must be able to meet the demands of reason. The second requires, perhaps surprisingly, that faith should not imply trust. The third requires that faith should imply hope while excluding despair. I show how several prominent accounts of non-doxastic faith, by Lara Buchak, Daniel Howard-Snyder and Daniel McKaughan, all fail to meet at least one of these desiderata. I also suggest that the desiderata should make us prefer a reconstructive methodology. (shrink)

Bioethics is now taken seriously. Is there a danger of its being taken in or taken over? Might it be influenced in other ways, less visible and less easily avoided? As private corporations and bioethicists build relationships with each other, bioethicists must ask themselves about the opportunities, the constraints, and the subtle shifts in attitude and focus that such ties might create.

This paper develops a theory of how democratic governance is possible. It analyses democracy as a laminated system consisting of three interdependent levels – the political/institutional, the social/interactional, and the psychological/intrapsychic – each of which is necessary for the others to exist. Each level is subject to a regulatory principle that is necessary for it to function appropriately. At the political/institutional level, competing political parties must be governed by the regulatory principle of ‘loser’s consent,’ in which the losing party must (...) agree to cede power to the winning party. At the social/interactional level individuals from opposing political parties must be governed by the regulatory principle of a superordinate identity as citizen, which allows them to transcend their partisan political identities. At the psychological/intrapsychic level individuals must be governed by the regulatory principle of mutuality/thirdness which allows the possibility of an alternative to the binary identities that result from the doer/done-to position. (shrink)

Some people change dramatically over time, and often those changes result partly from what they have chosen to do for a living. Drawing on the work of Richard Sennett and Sandeep Jauhar, I explore how practicing in a market-driven medical system can corrupt the character of doctors.

The central ideas of logical, or scientific, empiricism as it developed during the twenties and early thirties in Vienna and in Berlin, grew out of collaborative efforts of scientifically interested philosophers and philosophically interested scientists. Those thinkers noted that while the claims made by the physical sciences were amenable to objective test by experiment and observation, the pronouncements put forward by metaphysics were incapable of any such objective critical appraisal. And while hypotheses advanced in the physical sciences would eventually be (...) accepted or rejected and thus lead to the growth of a body of objective scientific knowledge, the problems and pronouncements of metaphysics, inaccessible to objective appraisal, kept reappearing over and over again. (shrink)

The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (the OECD Convention) obligates signatory nations to make bribery of foreign public officials a criminal act on an extraterritorial basis. The purposes of this article are to describe the nature and consequences of bribery, outline the major provisions of the OECD Convention, and analyze its role in promoting transparency and accountability in international business. While the OECD Convention is not expected to totally eliminate the seeking or (...) taking of bribes, there are hopes that a uniform set of rules will curtail corrupt behavior, as long as those rules are both enforceable and enforced. (shrink)

Theology in the modern era often assumes that the consummate form of theological discourse is objective prose—ignoring or condemning apophatic traditions and the spiritual eros that drives them. For too long, Kierkegaard has been read along these lines as a progenitor of twentieth-century neo-orthodoxy and a stern critic of the erotic in all its forms. In contrast, Hughes argues that Kierkegaard envisions faith fundamentally as a form of infinite, insatiable eros. He depicts the essential purpose of Kierkegaard’s writing as to (...) elicit ever-greater spiritual desire, not to provide the satisfactions of doctrine or knowledge. -/- Hughes’s argument revolves around close readings of provocative, disparate, and (in many cases) little-known Kierkegaardian texts. The thread connecting all of these texts is that they each conjure up some sort of performative “stage setting,” which they invite readers to enter. By analyzing the theological function of these texts, the book sheds new light on the role of the aesthetic in Kierkegaard’s authorship, his surprising affinity for liturgy and sacrament, and his overarching effort to conjoin eros for God with this-worldly love. (shrink)

Although studies in organizational storytelling have dealt extensively with the relationship between narrative, power and organizational change, little attention has been paid to the implications of this for ethics within organizations. This article addresses this by presenting an analysis of narrative and ethics as it relates to the practice of organizational downsizing. Drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s theories of narrative and ethics, we analyze stories of organizational change reported by employees and managers in an organization that had undergone persistent downsizing. Our (...) analysis maintains that the presence of a dominant story that seeks to legitimate organizational change also serves to normalize it, and that this, in turn, diminishes the capacity for organizations to scrutinize the ethics of their actions. We argue that when organizational change narratives become singularized through dominant forms of emplotment, ethical deliberation and responsibility in organizations are diminished. More generally, we contend that the narrative closure achieved by the presence of a dominant narrative amongst employees undergoing organizational change is antithetical to the openness required for ethical questioning. (shrink)

Despite all the attention to Big Data and the claims that it represents a “paradigm shift” in science, we lack understanding about what are the qualities of Big Data that may contribute to this revolutionary impact. In this paper, we look beyond the quantitative aspects of Big Data and examine it from a sociotechnical perspective. We argue that a key factor that distinguishes “Big Data” from “lots of data” lies in changes to the traditional, well-established “control zones” that facilitated clear (...) provenance of scientific data, thereby ensuring data integrity and providing the foundation for credible science. The breakdown of these control zones is a consequence of the manner in which our network technology and culture enable and encourage open, anonymous sharing of information, participation regardless of expertise, and collaboration across geographic, disciplinary, and institutional barriers. We are left with the conundrum—how to reap the benefits of Big Data while re-creating a trust fabric and an accountable chain of responsibility that make credible science possible. (shrink)