_Natural Language and Possible Minds: How Language Uncovers the Cognitive Landscape of Nature_ examines the intrinsic connection between natural language and the nature of mentality, offering to show how language can shed light on the forms of other types of mentality in non-humans.

Contesting much contemporary epistemology and cognitive science, noted philosopher Kenneth M. Sayre argues that, while some cognitive attitudes such as believing take propositions as objects, there are many others whose objects are instead states of affairs.

This article examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon, “Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor”, that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second question, we argue they have not shown epistemic reasons exist for the division of cognitive labor, identifying the errors (...) that led to their conclusions. Furthermore, we generalize the epistemic landscape model, showing that one should be skeptical about the benefits of social learning in epistemically complex environments. (shrink)

Because of its complexity, contemporary scientific research is almost always tackled by groups of scientists, each of which works in a different part of a given research domain. We believe that understanding scientific progress thus requires understanding this division of cognitive labor. To this end, we present a novel agent-based model of scientific research in which scientists divide their labor to explore an unknown epistemic landscape. Scientists aim to climb uphill in this landscape, where elevation represents the (...) significance of the results discovered by employing a research approach. We consider three different search strategies scientists can adopt for exploring the landscape. In the first, scientists work alone and do not let the discoveries of the community as a whole influence their actions. This is compared with two social research strategies, which we call the follower and maverick strategies. Followers are biased towards what others have already discovered, and we find that pure populations of these scientists do less well than scientists acting independently. However, pure populations of mavericks, who try to avoid research approaches that have already been taken, vastly outperform both of the other strategies. Finally, we show that in mixed populations, mavericks stimulate followers to greater levels of epistemic production, making polymorphic populations of mavericks and followers ideal in many research domains. (shrink)

This paper examines two questions about scientists’ search for knowledge. First, which search strategies generate discoveries effectively? Second, is it advantageous to diversify search strategies? We argue pace Weisberg and Muldoon (2009) that, on the first question, a search strategy that deliberately seeks novel research approaches need not be optimal. On the second question, we argue they have not shown epistemic reasons exist for the division of cognitive labor, identifying the errors that led to their conclusions. Furthermore, we generalize (...) the epistemic landscape model, showing that one should be skeptical about the benefits of social learning in epistemically complex environments. (shrink)

Text interpretation – the main interest of discourse analysts – is a central component of the text understanding process. In this article we introduce the Landscape Model, which describes the cognitive processes underlying reading comprehension in a detailed and precise manner. Moreover, this model captures the interpretative processes in which the human mind engages during reading. Within the context of the Landscape Model, we describe the relation between discourse understanding and discourse interpretation, and explain some of the (...) phenomena that are central to the field of discourse analysis as seen from a cognitive perspective. In the first section we describe the basic cognitive processes that underlie discourse understanding, as captured by the Landscape Model. In the following section we illustrate the way that the Landscape Model can be applied to the work of discourse analysts. We conclude by discussing the usefulness of the cognitive Landscape Model for the field of discourse analysis. (shrink)

Atran & Norenzayan's (A&N's) analysis fits with other perspectives on evoked culture: Cultural beliefs might emerge simply from the fact that people share a common cognitive architecture. But no perspective on culture can be complete without incorporating the unstoppable role of communication. The evolutionary landscape of culture will be most completely mapped by theories that describe specifically how communication translates evolved cognitive canals into cultural beliefs.

We do not all make choices, reason, interpret our experience, or respond to our environment in the same way. A recent surge of scientific interest has thrust these individual differences into the spotlight: researchers in cognitive psychology and neuroscience are now devoting increasing attention to cognitive variation. The philosophical dimensions of this research, however, have yet to be systematically explored. Here I make an initial foray by considering how cognitive variation is characterized. I present a central dilemma (...) facing descriptions of individual differences, discuss several distinctions used to categorize variation, and show that these distinctions require further elaboration. Finally, by canvassing several philosophical topics for which the characterization of cognitive variation may have significant implications, I argue that philosophers should take note of how and why our minds differ. (shrink)

There has been considerable debate in the literature as to whether work in experimental philosophy actually makes any significant contribution to philosophy. One stated view is that many X-Phi projects, notwithstanding their focus on topics relevant to philosophy, contribute little to philosophical thought. Instead, it has been claimed the contribution they make appears to be to cognitive science. In contrast to this view, here we argue that at least one approach to X-Phi makes a contribution which parallels, and also (...) extends, historically salient forms of philosophical analysis, especially contributions from Immanuel Kant, William James, Peter F. Strawson and Thomas Nagel. The framework elaborated here synthesizes philosophical theory with empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience and applies it to three perennial philosophical problems. According to this account, the origin of these three problems can be illuminated by viewing them as arising from a tension between two distinct types of cognition, each of which is associated with anatomically independent and functionally inhibitory neural networks. If the parallel we draw, between an empirical project and historically highly influential examples of philosophical analysis, is viewed as convincing, it follows that work in the cognitive sciences can contribute directly to philosophy. Further, this conclusion holds whether the empirical details of the account are correct or not. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo mostra que, com o contínuo desenvolvimento da sociedade tradicional e a mudança no ambiente aquático, a paisagem do Pavilhão das Orquídeas mudou diversas vezes. A cognição da paisagem do Pavilhão das Orquídeas, pelos literatos das dinastias passadas, também tem sido continuamente sublimada devido a uma série de fatores naturais e sociais. Como uma importante paisagem histórica, ao sul do rio Yangtze, o Pavilhão das Orquídeas contém mais significado histórico e cultural do que a própria paisagem. Das Dinastias (...) Wei e Jin à Dinastia Tang, o belo ambiente aquático e a paisagem cultural do Pavilhão das Orquídeas despertaram o desejo e a apreciação em todo o país pela sua beleza. No entanto, desde a Dinastia Song até ao final da Dinastia Ming, fatores como a guerra, o crescimento populacional e as alterações climáticas causaram danos ao ambiente aquático, e a paisagem do Pavilhão das Orquídeas não foi poupada. Os estudiosos tiveram que relembrar a paisagem do Pavilhão das Orquídeas em seus trabalhos devido à sua destruição. Na Dinastia Qing, o poder imperial interveio para reconstruir a paisagem do Pavilhão das Orquídeas. Os literatos e funcionários, no sul do rio Yangtze, aceitaram gradualmente o domínio do regime Qing, e a imagem da paisagem do Pavilhão das Orquídeas foi remodelada. Desde a República da China, os adeptos do final da Dinastia Qing têm usado o local e as suas atividades rituais para reforçar o seu sentido de identidade através de novas formas de mídia. O prefácio do Pavilhão das Orquídeas é uma coleção de acontecimentos, artigos e caligrafias, que supera o valor geral de visualização. Embora a caligrafia atinja o seu significado último, a influência de eventos e artigos é a condição para que ela entre no mundo clássico, e a aparência lendária e o apoio do poder imperial são as ajudas importantes para a sua difusão. (shrink)

Accession Number: ATLA0001712240; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 407-429.; Physical Description: graphs, tables ; Language(s): English; General Note: Bibliography: p 426-429.; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay.

This essay aims to show that the concept of landscape does not indicate something static or well-defined in the physical world but is rather the result of a process deriving from our being embodied in the world. Landscape is embodied cognition produced by our subjectivity, which, in turn, constantly hybridises the relationship between inside and outside. The key point, therefore, is to grasp and problematise the interaction between landscape and mindscape. However, this relationship would not be complete (...) without also taking into account the fact that we are integrated in an environment and analysing the fact that we live in an acted environment: our actions are decisive for understanding the environment beginning from the very perception we have of it. Indeed, this perception it itself a true founding act. The specific nature of the walkscape thus allows us to take this dynamic aspect of our relationship with the environment into account before grasping the last fundamental element for achieving a complete understanding of the problem: the currently ongoing transformation that brings us to be immersed not only in natural environments, but also in new digital environments. Taken together, therefore, the concepts of landscape, mindscape and walkscape allow us to clarify the theoretical implications of our being part of an integrated system together with the environment, be it natural or digital. (shrink)

Aesthetic appreciation of landscape is by no means limited to the sensuous enjoyment of sights and sounds. It very often has a reflective, cognitive element as well. This sometimes incorporates scientific knowledge, e.g.,geological or ecological; but it can also manifest what this article will call 'metaphysical imagination', which sees or seems to see in a landscape some indication, some disclosure of how the world ultimately is. The article explores and critically appraises this concept of metaphysical imagination, and (...) some of the roles it can play in our aesthetic encounters. (shrink)

Despite an impressive number of investigations and indirect evidence, the mechanisms that link patterns and processes across the landscape remain a debated point. A new definition of landscape as a semiotic interface between resources and organisms opens up a new perspective to a better understanding of such mechanisms. If the landscape is considered a source of signals converted by animal cognition into signs, it follows that spatial configurations, extension, shape and contagion are not only landscape patterns (...) but categories of identifiable signals. The eco-field hypothesis, by which cognitive templates are used to identify spatial configurations as carriers of meaning according to an active function, are combined with the sign theory to create an eco-semiotic model of landscape representation. Signs from landscape change in efficacy according to mechanisms of degradation, and metric sign categories have to be considered. An interdisciplinary coalescence is expected by using the theoretical approach in different fields of conservation and resource management and planning. (shrink)

My investigation into the cognitive aspects of landscape description takes as its focus the landscapes that the poet evokes on the Shield of Achilles. Drawing on studies in cognitive psychology I note the extent to which an audience might derive a ‘spatial mental model’ from the topographical or ‘locative’ indicators that the Homeric poet offers. Then I consider the ‘non-locative’ information that the poet conveys about the landscapes of the Shield. In this connection I develop Barbara Tversky's (...) notion of landscape representation as a ‘cognitive collage’. What makes the scenes on the Shield vivid, however, is human presence. Finally, therefore, I draw on enactivist theories of cognition, recently introduced into Classics, which offer a valuable supplementary approach to ‘reading’ and enjoying landscape descriptions in Homer. (shrink)

The article discusses the features of landscape philosophy, as well as the prospects of its practical application to analyze the crises of modern society associated with the scientific and technological revolution, globalization and the massification of culture. The concept of landscape becomes particularly important in connection with the urban turn in philosophy. The analysis given in this article has shown that landscape philosophy explains the negative characteristics of colonial cognition. The interpretation of the concept of space in (...) landscape philosophy is considered. Following S. Goryainov, we consider landscape philosophy as a philosophy of crisis. Our analysis has shown that landscape philosophy contributes to the approbation of models for solving the crisis of language and mind. Landscape philosophy and philosophical anthropology reveal existential problems. The works of M. de Unamuno, M. Scheler, M. Foucault and V. Podoroga were analyzed in this context. The significance of Unamuno's philosophy for the analysis of the role of individual creative space in the contemporary world is revealed. The applicability of Scheler's concept of spirit for the analysis of the problems of landscape philosophy is revealed. It is proved that within the framework of Podoroga's landscape philosophy, the problem of the correlation of politics and political. Using the concepts of utopia, atopia, and heterotopia, various aspects of the crisis of contemporary man man associated with the transformation of the subject's identity, the fragmentation of meanings and significance are studied. Thus, Podoroga's works are valuable for crisis philosophy because they analyze both spatial and political aspects of the crisis of contemporary society. Podoroga's works make it possible to reflect the contradictions of contemporary society, which ensures the prospects of their application for the analysis of changes in the contemporary social space. (shrink)

Weisberg and Muldoon’s epistemic landscape model (ELM) has been one of the most significant contributions to the use of agent-based models in philosophy. The model provides an innovative approach to establishing the optimal distribution of cognitive labor in scientific communities, using an epistemic landscape. In the paper, we provide a critical examination of ELM. First, we show that the computing mechanism for ELM is correct insofar as we are able to replicate the results using another programming language. (...) Second, we show that small changes in the rules that determine the behavior of individual agents can lead to important changes in simulation results. Accordingly, we claim that ELM results are robust with respect to the computing mechanism, but not necessarily across parameter space. We conclude by reflecting on the possible lessons to be gained from ELM as a class of simulations or cluster of models. (shrink)

What makes us conscious? Many theories that attempt to answer this question have appeared recently in the context of widespread interest about consciousness in the cognitive neurosciences. Most of these proposals are formulated in terms of the information processing conducted by the brain. In this overview, we survey and contrast these models. We first delineate several notions of consciousness, addressing what it is that the various models are attempting to explain. Next, we describe a conceptual landscape that addresses (...) how the theories attempt to explain consciousness. We then situate each of several representative models in this landscape and indicate which aspect of consciousness they try to explain. We conclude that the search for the neural correlates of consciousness should be usefully complemented by a search for the computational correlates of consciousness. (shrink)

Since the onset of the digital revolution, humankind has experienced an unprecedented acceleration of changes triggered by technological advancements. Frequently used digital media have unquestionably penetrated our everyday life, shaping human cognition in multiple ways. The rise of artificial intelligence, which coevolved with a new, interdisciplinary field of cognitive science, has amplified these effects, contributing new ways of affecting human society, in terms of efficient human-machine interaction and knowledge generation and accumulation, at an exponential rate. Simultaneously, cultural shifts driven (...) by globalization and social media have fostered new modes of communication, identity formation, and knowledge dissemination on a global scale. Understanding the intricate dynamics of techno-cultural evolution and its influence on cognition is essential for comprehending the contemporary society and preparing it for the future challenges. We need to adapt for the current and future information environments and digital landscapes, improving human resilience to new technologies and addressing core human vulnerabilities. Thanks to human flexibility, enabled by neural plasticity, that may be feasible, ideally combined with alleviation of known negative effects of digital technologies. (shrink)

Religion is not an evolutionary adaptation per se, but a recurring by-product of the complex evolutionary landscape that sets cognitive, emotional and material conditions for ordinary human interactions. Religion involves extraordinary use of ordinary cognitive processes to passionately display costly devotion to counterintuitive worlds governed by supernatural agents. The conceptual foundations of religion are intuitively given by task-specific panhuman cognitive domains, including folkmechanics, folkbiology, folkpsychology. Core religious beliefs minimally violate ordinary notions about how the world is, (...) with all of its inescapable problems, thus enabling people to imagine minimally impossible supernatural worlds that solve existential problems, including death and deception. Here the focus is on folkpsychology and agency. A key feature of the supernatural agent concepts common to all religions is the triggering of an "Innate Releasing Mechanism," or “agency detector,” whose proper domain encompasses animate objects relevant to hominid survival - such as predators, protectors and prey - but which actually extends to moving dots on computer screens, voices in wind, faces on clouds. Folkpsychology also crucially involves metarepresentation, which makes deception possible and threatens any social order; however, these same metacognitive capacities provide the hope and promise of open-ended solutions through representations of counterfactual supernatural worlds that cannot be logically or empirically verified or falsified. Because religious beliefs cannot be deductively or inductively validated, validation occurs only by ritually addressing the very emotions motivating religion. Cross-cultural experimental evidence encourages these claims. (shrink)

In the last decades ontology has been successfully developed in many directions and has fostered various approaches for depicting the contemporary ontological landscapes. An important task is to outline recent thought on the conceptual interfaces between science and philosophy. The present volume opens up a view onto the plurality of different ontological schemes. The papers collected here discuss the interfaces between ontology and empirical research that are created by the notions of a whole, a thought, a number, a quality, an (...) ability, a kind, notions of causation, dynamicity, and social objects, the application of relevant logical tools for the reconsideration of ontological paradigms, as well as the investigation of the consequences in cognitive sciences on the development of ontology. (shrink)

The smooth integration of the natural sciences with everyday lived experience is an important ambition of radical embodied cognitive science. In this paper we start from Koffka’s recommendation in his Principles of Gestalt Psychology that to realize this ambition psychology should be a “science of molar behaviour”. Molar behavior refers to the purposeful behaviour of the whole organism directed at an environment that is meaningfully structured for the animal. Koffka made a sharp distinction between the “behavioural environment” and the (...) “geographical environment”. We show how this distinction picks out the difference between the environment as perceived by an individual organism, and the shared publicly available environment. The ecological psychologist James Gibson was later critical of Koffka for inserting a private phenomenal reality in between animals and the shared environment. Gibson tried to make do with just the concept of affordances in his explanation of molar behaviour. We argue however that psychology as a science of molar behaviour will need to make appeal both to the concepts of shared publicly available affordances, and of the multiplicity of relevant affordances that invite an individual to act. A version of Koffka’s distinction between the two environments remains alive today in a distinction we have made between the field and landscape of affordances. Having distinguished the two environments, we go on to provide an account of how the two environments are related. Koffka suggested that the behavioural environment forms out of the causal interaction of the individual with a pre-existing, ready-made geographical environment. We argue that such an account of the relation between the two environments fails to do justice to the complex entanglement of the social with the material aspects of the geographical environment. To better account for this sociomaterial reality of the geographical environment, we propose a process-perspective on our distinction between the landscape and field of affordances. While the two environments can be conceptually distinguished, we argue they should also be viewed as standing in a relation of reciprocal and mutual dependence. (shrink)

The dynamic approach to understanding of the human consciousness, its cognitive activities and cognitive architecture is one of the most promising approaches in the modern epistemology and cognitive science. The conception of embodied mind is under discussion in the light of nonlinear dynamics and of the idea co-evolution of complex systems developed by the Moscow scientific school. The cognitive architecture of the embodied mind is rather complex: data from senses and products of rational thinking, the verbal (...) and the pictorial, logic and intuition, the analytical and synthetic abilities of perception and of thinking, the local and the global, the analogue and the digital, the archaic and the post-modern are intertwined in it. In the process of cognition, co-evolution of embodied mind as an autopoietic system and its surroundings takes place. The perceptual and mental processes are bound up with the structure of human body. Nonlinear and circular connecting links between the subject of cognition and the world constructed by him can be metaphorically called a nonlinear cobweb of cognition. Cognition is an autopoietic activity because it is directed to the search of elements that are missed; it serves to completing integral structures. According to the theory of blow-up regimes in complex systems elaborated by Sergey P.Kudyumov and his followers, the idea of co-evolution is connected with the concept of tempoworlds. To co-evolve means to start to develop in one and the same tempoworld and to use the possibility – in case of a proper intergation into a whole structure – to accelerate the tempo of evolution. The cognitive activities of the human being can be considered as a movement (active walk) in landscapes of co-evolution when he cognizes and changes environment and is changed himself by the very activities. The similar conclusion can be drawn from Francisco Varela’s conception of enactive cognition. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate compassion and its place within mindfulness-based approaches. Compassion is an orientation of mind that recognizes pain and the universality of pain in human experience and the capacity to meet that pain with kindness, empathy, equanimity and patience. We outline how learning to meet pain with compassion is part of how people come to live with chronic conditions like recurrent depression. While most mindfulness-based approaches do not explicitly teach compassion, we describe how the structure of the (...) programme and teachers' embodiment enable participants to cultivate compassion in the landscape of suffering. We describe a case example of how this process unfolded for someone through mindfulness-based cognitive therapy. (shrink)

This article—the first of a linked set of three outlining the development and practice of a different approach to science/religion dialogue—begins with an overview of some persistent tensions in the field. Then, using a threefold heuristic of encounter, engagement, and expression, it explores the routes taken by James Ashbrook and Andrew Newberg to develop a dialogue between theology and neuroscience, discussing some of the problems associated with these and their implications for attempts to further develop neurotheology. Finally, it proposes a (...) different way of thinking about this enterprise and points toward a new methodology for supporting this endeavor. (shrink)

There is a long-standing discussion concerning the nature of moral discourse. Multiple views range from realism—according to which moral discourse is closer to scientific discourse than to fictional discourse—to anti-realism—according to which moral discourse is rather closer to fictional discourse. In this paper, I want to motivate a novel anti-realist account. On this view, there are no moral properties or truths, neither mind-independent nor mind-dependent ones (i.e., anti-realism). However, moral cognition results from the use of higher order cognitive abilities (...) with enough resources to grant moral discourse with all the features of a realist talk (i.e., cognitive quasi-realism). I defend this view based on empirical evidence on human moral development and by showing that the resulting account can meet the demands of robust moral realism. The paper concludes by placing the proposed view within the metaethical landscape by comparing it against other forms of anti-realism, most significantly against expressivism. (shrink)

This study examined the effects of emotional subject matter and descriptive style in short story excerpts on text (e.g. rich in meaning) and reader response-oriented (e.g. liking) ratings. Forty-eight subjects, including equal numbers of trained and novice male and female students, read two examples of each text twice and either generated or received interpretations between readings in a within-subjects design. In general, intellectual challenge slowed the pace of reading, whereas suspense-based arousal increased it. Emotional subject matter had a more powerful (...) effect than descriptive style on both cognitive (challenging, rich in meaning) and affective (expressive, personally relevant) scales and were read more quickly. Generating interpretations fostered subjective reactions to the Emotional excerpts (images), whereas Descriptive texts were less amenable to subjective responses. Consistent effects were also found for background and gender. As in everyday life, subject matter had a dominant effect in engaging a person's involvement. (shrink)

Cognition is predominantly seen as information processing in multidisciplinary landscape of cognition studies, despite having had a formidable opposition from embodied and embedded perspectives in the last few decades. This paper analyses cognitive processes involved in different task domains of Kashmiri carpet weaving practice from the theoretical frameworks of cognitivism and situated-distributed cognition. After introducing the practice and its task domains (Section −1), paradigmatic cognitive activities involved in them are discussed and how these are explained by the (...) two theoretical paradigms and why the latter framework explains these processes better (Section-2). During this discussion (Section – 3), a way via culture impacts the practice and resultant cognitive operations turns out to be workspace of the actors. (shrink)

Quite unexpectedly, cognitive psychologists find their field intimately connected to a whole new intellectual landscape that had previously seemed remote, unfamiliar, and all but irrelevant. Yet the proliferating connections tying together the cognitive and evolutionary communities promise to transform both fields, with each supplying necessary principles, methods, and a species of rigor that the other lacks. (Cosmides and Tooby, 1994, p. 85).

Capturing information means for every organism acquiring knowledge about the living and not living objects that exist in its surroundings. In this way, the “historical” concept of Umwelt, as a subjective surrounding has been recently integrated in the theory of landscape ecology where a landscape is not only a geographical entity but also a cognitive medium. The landscape may be considered a semiotic context used by the organisms to locate resources heterogeneously distributed in space and time. (...) In particular, inside a landscape there are different eco-fields defined as spatial arrangements of objects carrier of meaning that organisms utilize to track resources. Along this epistemic path the sonic component of the landscape is an important carrier of information commonly used by the majority of animal species to managing many vital functions. In particular birds, which are animals with a complex system of acoustic communication, seem to organize acoustic centers for public information. These sonic patterns (soundtopes) are characterized by a great variability in space and time and function like a special eco-field that allows species to share information about the status of resources and the dynamics of populations. The availability of such public information avoids a deeper and more expensive exploration of the environment to assess its quality. (shrink)

Conversational Artificial Intelligence (CAI) systems (also known as AI “chatbots”) are among the most promising examples of the use of technology in mental health care. With already millions of users worldwide, CAI is likely to change the landscape of psychological help. Most researchers agree that existing CAIs are not “digital therapists” and using them is not a substitute for psychotherapy delivered by a human. But if they are not therapists, what are they, and what role can they play in (...) mental health care? To answer these questions, we appeal to two well-established and widely discussed concepts: cognitive and affective artifacts. Cognitive artifacts are artificial devices contributing functionally to the performance of a cognitive task. Affective artifacts are objects which have the capacity to alter subjects’ affective state. We argue that therapeutic CAIs are a kind of cognitive-affective artifacts which contribute to positive therapeutic change by (i) simulating a (quasi-)therapeutic interaction, (ii) supporting the performance of cognitive tasks, and (iii) altering the affective condition of their users. This sheds new light on why virtually all existing mental health CAIs implement principles and techniques of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy — a therapeutic orientation according to which affective change and, ultimately, positive therapeutic change is mediated by cognitive change. Simultaneously, it allows us to conceptualize better the potential and limitations of applying these technologies in therapy. (shrink)

This article reconsiders the early hominid ‘‘lithic niche’’ by examining the social implications of stone artifact making. I reject the idea that making tools for use is an adequate explanation of the elaborate artifact forms of the Lower Palaeolithic, or a sufficient cause for long-term trends in hominid technology. I then advance an alternative mechanism founded on the claim that competency in making stone artifacts requires extended learning, and that excellence in artifact making is attained only by highly skilled individuals (...) who have been taught and practiced for extensive periods. Consequently both competency and expertise in knapping comes at a high learning cost for both the individual learner and the social group to which they belong. Those high intrinsic costs of learning created contexts in which groups selected cost-reducing forms of social learning and teaching, and in which specialization could develop. Artifacts and their manufacturing processes probably acquired functions as social signals—as honest signals of valuable capacities. The magnification of these signals, through competition between knappers and through inspiring later craftspeople, may account for a substantial amount of the accumulated elaboration visible in the archaeological record. Consequently lithic artifacts operated as material symbols from an early time in hominid evolution. (shrink)

Swear words are highly colloquial expressions that have the capacity to signal the speaker's affective states, i.e., to display the speaker's feelings with respect to a certain stimulus. For this reason, swear words are often called 'expressives'. Which linguistic mechanisms allow swear words display affective states, and, more importantly, how can such 'affective content' be characterized in a theory of meaning? Even though research on expressive meaning has produced models that integrate the affective aspects of swear words in a compositional (...) framework, there is extensive evidence that swear words cannot be assigned a single or stable affective interpretation across contexts. For example, even though expletive adjectives (e.g., 'damn'), particularistic insults (e.g., 'bastard') and slurs (e.g., 'wop') typically express (and elicit) negatively valenced affective states, they can also be interpreted positively in some contexts. Thus, inspired in recent developments in formal sociolinguistics, I propose an 'indexical' approach to affective meaning. Under this approach, an affective expression is associated with a set of affective qualities, anyone of which may emerge at a given context depending on the interpreter's prior assumptions about the speaker's affective states and/or relation with the target of the swear word. To define this set, also called 'indexical field', I will use the dimensions pleasure, arousal and dominance, standardly employed in cognitive psychology to characterize and measure affective episodes. In this dissertation, thus, the affective meaning of an expression is given by the set of affective states it typically conveys within a linguistic community, but its interpretation at a given context is established by taking into account the interpreter's prior assumptions about the speaker's affective states and/or attitudes with respect to the target of the affective expression. (shrink)

When should a scientific community be cognitively diverse? This article presents a model for studying how the heterogeneity of learning heuristics used by scientist agents affects the epistemic efficiency of a scientific community. By extending the epistemic landscapes modeling approach introduced by Weisberg and Muldoon, the article casts light on the micro-mechanisms mediating cognitive diversity, coordination, and problem-solving efficiency. The results suggest that social learning and cognitive diversity produce epistemic benefits only when the epistemic community is faced with (...) problems of sufficient difficulty. (shrink)

The dynamical hypothesis states that cognitive systems are dynamical systems. While dynamical systems play an important role in many cognitive phenomena, the dynamical hypothesis as stated applies to every system and so fails both to specify what makes cognitive systems distinct and to distinguish between proposals regarding the nature of cognitive systems. To avoid this problem, I distinguish several different types of dynamical systems, outlining four dimensions along which dynamical systems can vary: total-state versus partial-state, internal (...) versus external, macroscopic versus microscopic, and systemic versus componential, and illustrate these with examples. I conclude with two illustrations of partial-state, internal, microscopic, componential dynamicism. (shrink)

Warlpiri Aborigines utilize graphic and cognitive systems to represent their connections to landscape. The Dreaming is the primary mechanism through which Warlpiri organize and understand the significance of places. Each Dreaming myth has an accompanying graphic map, which references incidents and places associated with Ancestors. The maps recount sites along Dreaming tracks, and provide assessments of resources. Warlpiri create these coded images to coordinate physiographic and mythical components of the landscape. They structure knowledge about the world and (...) facilitate the recollection of activities in space. Dreaming maps signify, among other things, aspects of cultural ecology around which society is organized. (shrink)

We examine some of the ramifications of extended cognition for virtue epistemology by exploring the idea within extended cognition that it is possible to decentralize cognitive agency such that cognitive agency includes socio-cultural practices. In doing so, we first explore the (seemingly unquestioned) assumption in both virtue epistemology and extended cognition that cognitive agency is an individualistic phenomenon. A distributed notion of cognitive agency alters the landscape of knowledge attribution in virtue epistemology. We conclude by (...) offering a pragmatic notion of cognitive agency, where the situation sets the benchmarks for whether cognitive agency is individualistic or socio-culturally distributed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mild Cognitive Impairment:Where Does It Go From Here?John Bond (bio) and Lynne Corner (bio)Keywordsbiomedicalization, dementia, mild cognitive impairment, subjectivityThe joy of formal interdisciplinary discussion of this kind is the way that ideas presented through the gaze of social scientists stimulate such exciting thoughts and responses from other disciplines such as philosophy and psychology. We would like to thank Sabat and Thornton for their supportive and provocative reactions (...) to our paper. In the spirit of their responses, it is not our intention to respond to their thoughts directly; rather, we take the opportunity to theorize sociologically about this new category of psychiatry that has come to be known simply as mild cognitive impairment (MCI). In reviewing the responses of Sabat and Thornton, three thoughts emerged. First, together we have covered ontologic, epistemologic, methodologic, and theoretical questions about MCI, but none of us has posed basic political questions, such as: Why has MCI emerged as a new psychiatric label at this particular time? Second, this discussion brings together social scientists with a psychologist and a philosopher, but important constituents are missing. Consequently we are missing "insider" views on the importance of MCI to clinical practice. Third, this discussion highlights for us even more acutely the central question: Is MCI a real entity? In the following, we reflect on the first of these because our response also addresses the third. We first revisit the "evidence" about the importance of MCI for clinical practice.The notion of MCI as the transitional state between normal aging and Alzheimer's disease and other dementias has existed in a number of guises for many years, with benign senescent forgetfulness (Kral 1962) being the forerunner of a number of other terms, including questionable dementia, incipient dementia, isolated memory impairment, mild neurocognitive decline, age-associated memory impairment, age-associated cognitive decline, and cognitive-impairment-not-demented (Geda et al. 2004). Given that psychiatric labels implying the existence of MCI have been part of the practice landscape for over forty years, it is perhaps not surprising that its reinvention in the form of MCI has not, it appears, raised much attention outside specialist centers in North America and Europe. The reaction from grassroots clinical practice has been similar in intensity to their subdued reaction to the antipsychiatry movement in the 1960s. But for specialist clinics like the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, it has been an expanding [End Page 29] industry with numerous published papers, international conference presentations, and research funding opportunities.MCI can be distinguished from similar diagnostic categories that preceded its appearance in 1991. A key diagnostic criteria is the requirement for a subjective memory complaint by the person subsequently diagnosed as having MCI. Other diagnostic criteria include normal general cognitive function, normal activities of daily living, and memory being impaired for age, but not being demented (Petersen et al. 1999; Petersen and Morris 2003). To our knowledge, the idea of subjectivity being an important diagnostic criterion, as opposed to a means of identifying signs and symptoms, is a first in medical science. We know of no other medical category or diagnosis where subjectivity plays such a significant role, other than perhaps severe health phobias. Broadly speaking, two kinds of clinical evidence for MCI exist: first, that originating from studies (some quite small) applying the diagnostic criteria in specialist clinic populations; and, second, that found in large population studies. The main distinction between these two sets of evidence is that one is based on selected clinic populations and the other on unselected community populations. Most studies conclude that people whose memory is impaired for their age, as measured by similar cognitive tests such as the Mini-Mental State Examination, show decline in cognition that often leads to Alzheimer's disease and other kinds of dementia in the future. This finding is not remarkable given that it has long been known that age is a predictor of cognitive impairment. However, the population studies suggest a lower conversion rate than those for specialist clinics (Ritchie, Artero, and Touchon 2001).Petersen (2005) provides a robust defense as to why MCI might be a useful category in research and also indicates the potential benefits of treating MCI... (shrink)

How does the integration of mixed reality devices into our cognitive practices impact the mind from a metaphysical and epistemological perspective? In his innovative and interdisciplinary article, “Minds in the Metaverse: Extended Cognition Meets Mixed Reality” (2022), Paul Smart addresses this underexplored question, arguing that the use of a hypothetical application of the Microsoft HoloLens called “the HoloFoldit” represents a technologically high-grade form of extended cognizing from the perspective of neo-mechanical philosophy. This short commentary aims to (1) carve up (...) the conceptual landscape of possible objections to Smart’s argument and (2) elaborate on the possibility of hologrammatically extended cognition, which is supposed to be one of the features of the HoloFoldit case that distinguishes it from more primitive forms of cognitive extension. In tackling (1), I do not mean to suggest that Smart does not consider or have sufficient answers to these objections. In addressing (2), the goal is not to argue for or against the possibility of hologrammatically extended cognition but to reveal some issues in the metaphysics of virtual reality upon which this possibility hinges. I construct an argument in favor of hologrammatically extended cognition based on the veracity of virtual realism (Chalmers, 2017) and an argument against it based on the veracity of virtual fctionalism (McDonnell and Wildman, 2019). (shrink)

This ambitious, interdisciplinary book seeks to explain the origins of religion using our knowledge of the evolution of cognition. A cognitive anthropologist and psychologist, Scott Atran argues that religion is a by-product of human evolution just as the cognitive intervention, cultural selection, and historical survival of religion is an accommodation of certain existential and moral elements that have evolved in the human condition.

Ranging across both standard philosophical territory and the landscape of cutting-edge cognitive science, Mindware: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Second Edition, is a vivid and engaging introduction to key issues, research, and opportunities in the field.Starting with the vision of mindware as software and debates between realists, instrumentalists, and eliminativists, Andy Clark takes students on a no-holds-barred journey through connectionism, dynamical systems, and real-world robotics before moving on to the frontiers of cognitive technologies, (...) enactivism, predictive coding, and the extended mind. Throughout, he highlights challenging issues in an effort to engage students in active debate. Each chapter opens with a brief sketch of a major research tradition or perspective, followed by concise critical discussions dealing with key topics and problems. (shrink)

This experiment examined responses to excerpted episodes from short stories that either focused on action or on the experiences of the characters. The effects of instructional sets to approach the texts from the viewpoint of subjective involvement or objective detachment were also studied. The two story types and two reading sets were factorially combined in a within-subjects design. Scale ratings of the story excerpts and reading times (syllables per second) were measured. A total of subjects (20 males and 20 females) (...) read six segments from each of the episodes as quickly and accurately as possible. Pretest data were obtained for each segment indicating how much it “provided insight into the characters' experiences”, and its level of suspense and surprise. Segments which “provided in sight” were read more slowly, whereas surprising segments were read more quickly. Under the Subjective Set, subjects slowed the pace of reading if they judged the text to be “rich in meaning about life”. For the Objective Set, stories that were judged to have evoked “images” were read more slowly. Females were more responsive to the Subjective Set than were the males, finding the stories to be “richer in meaning” and more “personally relevant”. Females also slowed their reading pace for segments that they judged to be “rich in meaning about life”, while males slowed down if the stories evoked “images”. (shrink)

Summary: A review of the cognitivist/extended cognition and extended mind landscape.

The concept of cognition has undergone considerable extension, first, by intensive empirical study of representational systems and their role for the possession and application of cognitive capacities and second, by the turn to practical knowledge. By these two developments, the field of research on cognition has been opening with respect to which all eager attempts of demarcation between the humanities and the sciences seem to be outdated. This brings about institutional changes in the scientific landscape as can be (...) seen in the current tendency to find interdisciplinary centres for the investigation of cognitive phenomena all over the world. (shrink)

I motivate three claims: Firstly, attentional traits can be cognitive virtues and vices. Secondly, groups and collectives can possess attentional virtues and vices. Thirdly, attention has epistemic, moral, social, and political importance. An epistemology of attention is needed to better understand our social-epistemic landscape, including media, social media, search engines, political polarisation, and the aims of protest. I apply attentional normativity to undermine recent arguments for moral encroachment and to illuminate a distinctive epistemic value of occupying particular social (...) positions. A recurring theme is that disproportionate attention can distort, mislead, and misrepresent even when all the relevant claims are true and well supported by evidence. In the informational cacophony of the internet age, epistemology must foreground the cognitive virtues of attunement. (shrink)

The primary goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive overview and analysis of the various relations between material artifacts and the embodied mind. A secondary goal of this essay is to identify some of the trends in the design and use of artifacts. First, based on their functional properties, I identify four categories of artifacts co-opted by the embodied mind, namely (1) embodied artifacts, (2) perceptual artifacts, (3) cognitive artifacts, and (4) affective artifacts. These categories can overlap (...) and so some artifacts are members of more than one category. I also identify some of the techniques (or skills) we use when interacting with artifacts. Identifying these categories of artifacts and techniques allows us to map the landscape of relations between embodied minds and the artifactual world. Second, having identified categories of artifacts and techniques, this essay then outlines some of the trends in the design and use of artifacts, focussing on neuroprosthetics, brain-computer interfaces, and personalisation algorithms nudging their users towards particular epistemic paths of information consumption. (shrink)

Transformations in the “behavioral innovativeness” of species—broadly, the capacity to generate new or novel behaviors—have been associated with significant evolutionary shifts in cognition by both philosophers and scientists. Whilst intuitively and theoretically appealing, this assumption lacks strong empirical support. One barrier is the absence of a good measure of behavioral innovation. This paper offers a solution to this problem by breaking down innovation into its components and presenting a novel multi-dimensional framework for characterising and comparing putative cases of behavioral innovation.

[from the publisher's website] Questions about the existence and attributes of God form the subject matter of natural theology, which seeks to gain knowledge of the divine by relying on reason and experience of the world. Arguments in natural theology rely largely on intuitions and inferences that seem natural to us, occurring spontaneously—at the sight of a beautiful landscape, perhaps, or in wonderment at the complexity of the cosmos—even to a nonphilosopher. In this book, Helen De Cruz and Johan (...) De Smedt examine the cognitive origins of arguments in natural theology. They find that although natural theological arguments can be very sophisticated, they are rooted in everyday intuitions about purpose, causation, agency, and morality. Using evidence and theories from disciplines including the cognitive science of religion, evolutionary ethics, evolutionary aesthetics, and the cognitive science of testimony, they show that these intuitions emerge early in development and are a stable part of human cognition. -/- De Cruz and De Smedt analyze the cognitive underpinnings of five well-known arguments for the existence of God: the argument from design, the cosmological argument, the moral argument, the argument from beauty, and the argument from miracles. Finally, they consider whether the cognitive origins of these natural theological arguments should affect their rationality. (shrink)