Here eight outstanding scholars from the U.S. and Europe reflect upon the issues. They are Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, Ralph McInerny, Robert Spamann, Servais Pinckaers, Wojciech Giertych, Ignacio Carrasco de Paula, Carlo Cafarra, and John M. Haas. Anyone interested in the advancement of human, moral, and spiritual values will welcome this clarifying book.

Recently, the discussion regarding the physicians’ “Right of Conscience” has been on the rise. This issue is often confined to the “reproductive health” arena within the political context. The recent dispute of the Bush-Obama administrations regarding the legal protections of health workers who refuse to provide care that violates their personal beliefs is an example of the political aspects of this dispute. The involvement of the political system automatically shifts the discussion regarding physicians’ ROC into the narrow area of (...) “reproductive health laws.” Indeed, the immediate association that comes to mind when thinking about the practical implications of this dispute is related to the reproductive health arena. This is partly because of the historical context of the first “conscience clauses,” initially enacted by Congress and state legislatures in the mid-1970s; in fact, most of these clauses provided specific exemptions for abortion and few exempted sterilization as well. (shrink)

This work introduces the ACTWith model of moral cognition. This is a model of conscience and conscientious agency, inspired by Socratic philosophy, neurology and artificial intelligence. The ACTWith model is a synthesis across these disciplines, integrating ancient and contemporary insights into the human condition, while distilling this synthesis into a practicable dynamic simplified via architectural paradigms imported from theories of computational models of human learning. It was developed in response to the need in these fields for a clear articulation (...) of conscience. In the world at large, conscience is often referenced, yet hardly understood. This work fills this gap. (shrink)

No question has demanded so much attention from the philosopher of mind as has this one: What is consciousness? One promising answer begins by noting that consciousness is, itself, a conjugate of more basic stuff. For the ethicist, there is a question that seems at least formally related to the question of consciousness: What is conscience? Could it be that a similar approach carries similar promise? The following short paper first examines consciousness as a conjugate, and then pursues the (...) implications of this analysis for a novel understanding of conscience as the grounds for a science of ethics. (shrink)

The compass point of Kantian ethics is Kant’s categorical imperative. The compass point of Kantian ethics directs persons to ends of actions. It directs to ends the attainment of which can be universally prescribed. It directs away from those which can not. Most reviews of the demands of the categorical imperative tend torest in an assay of rationality and its demands. I think that this is a mistake. I think that on Kant’s mature view, the conscience, and so the (...) categorical imperative, have nothing necessarily to do with rationality at all. The following work develops this position. (shrink)

The intellectualistic analysis of conscience Aquinas provides appears to regard conscience as mechanistic and undynamic. Such understanding fails to place Aquinas’s remarks on conscience in the context of the virtue ethics he offers in the Summa and his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. In fact, there is an intricate connection between the virtues and conscience in Aquinas’s thought, and this connection relates directly to his remarks on weakness of will. His connecting conscience to issues in (...) Aristotelian virtue ethics affects subsequent discussions of conscience in significant ways. (shrink)

Can Congress require AIDS service organizations to pledge fidelity to the government's view opposing prostitution as a condition of receiving funding? This term, the Supreme Court will decide whether the First Amendment permits such censorship in USAID v. Alliance for Open Society International (AOSI). The 2008 legislation reauthorizing the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) requires host countries to support “activities promoting abstinence, delay of sexual début, monogamy, and fidelity.” PEPFAR's “conscience clause” allows organizations with a moral or (...) religious objection to opt out of providing services to patients with a sexual orientation of which they disapprove. In addition, the law requires grantees to adopt “a policy explicitly opposing prostitution” and to refrain from any speech or activities the government deems “inconsistent” with that policy. The antiprostitution pledge extends not only to what a recipient says or does with PEPFAR funds, but even to what it says or does with its own private funds. The government, however, has not enforced the pledge against U.S.‐based nongovernmental organizations partly because of a preliminary injunction granted by the lower courts. That injunction is now at risk if the Supreme Court upholds the loyalty oath. (shrink)

From a giant of health care policy, an engaging and enlightening account of why American health care is so expensive -- and why it doesn't have to be. Uwe Reinhardt was a towering figure and moral conscience of health care policy in the United States and beyond. Famously bipartisan, he advised presidents and Congress on health reform and originated central features of the Affordable Care Act. In Priced Out, Reinhardt offers an engaging and enlightening account of today's U.S. health (...) care system, explaining why it costs so much more and delivers so much less than the systems of every other advanced country, why this situation is morally indefensible, and how we might improve it. The problem, Reinhardt says, is not one of economics but of social ethics. There is no American political consensus on a fundamental question other countries settled long ago: to what extent should we be our brothers' and sisters' keepers when it comes to health care? Drawing on the best evidence, he guides readers through the chaotic, secretive, and inefficient way America finances health care, and he offers a penetrating ethical analysis of recent reform proposals. At this point, he argues, the United States appears to have three stark choices: the government can make the rich help pay for the health care of the poor, ration care by income, or control costs. Reinhardt proposes an alternative path: that by age 26 all Americans must choose either to join an insurance arrangement with community-rated premiums, or take a chance on being uninsured or relying on a health insurance market that charges premiums based on health status. An incisive look at the American health care system, Priced Out dispels the confusion, ignorance, myths, and misinformation that hinder effective reform. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce que la sophistique? Un mouvement des Lumieres, rationalisation de l'essor democratique dans les cites grecques? Ou au contraire un conservatisme d'hommes epris de culture et de beau langage? Une philosophie de la conscience et de l'authenticite existentielle, ou une pratique utilitariste et devoyee des pouvoirs du logos, une non-philosophie? Le lecteur francais, reduit jusqu'ici a une vulgate platonico-aristotelicienne, ignore l'existence et les enjeux d'un debat, qui n'est pourtant pas de pure erudition. C'est un debat d'histoire de la philosophie, (...) qui engage les procedures et les strategies selon lesquelles la philosophie a fabrique et utilise son alter ego. C'est un debat hermeneutique, qui rend manifeste la pregnance et les divergences des horizons qui servent a interpreter les quelques vestiges anthentiquement sophistiques parvenus jusqu'a nous. C'est enfin un debat de pensee, propre a suggerer que des alternatives qui vont de soi - comme progres ou reaction, ethique ou immoralite, raison ou irrationalisme -, peuvent se trouver deplacees, dans tous les sens du terme, a l'occasion d'un examen plus attentif et instruit du discours sophistique. (shrink)

Pour l’herméneutique philosophique de Hans-Georg Gadamer, la responsabilité est inséparable de l’expérience de la réalité vivante de la phronesis qui constitue le noyau de la vie éthique. À partir de la réhabilitation du concept de phronesis, Gadamer entend redonner à la philosophie pratique le contenu substantiel qui lui manque en raison de la domination de la raison technique dont l’idéal de la méthode fait l’économie de la responsabilité individuelle et sociale de l’homme. Néanmoins, comme le montre la critique convaincante de (...) Jürgen Habermas, la réhabilitation de la phronesis comme source de la responsabilité ne prend pas en compte la différenciation transcendantale entre idéalité et réalité. En tant qu’elle se trouve fondée sur la communauté de sens que représente la phronesis, la philosophie éthique que développe l’herméneutique ne laisse aucune chance à une reconstruction véritablement philosophique et critique des présuppositions universelles de la responsabilité et de la conscience morale. (shrink)

Mes recherches actuelles tendent ä croiser l'analyse epistemologique avec l'esthetique pour degager le röle du sujet historique dans Velaboration des savoirs universels. II s'agit, pour moi, de deplacer le point de vue transcendantal, formel, afin de renouveler la perspective epistemologique par le concept de diathese. Deux questions se posent. Quel est l'apport du sujet 1) dans le processus de structuration formelle des savoirs? (construction, deconstruction, reconstruction de la connaissance), 2) dans la transmission - transformation des savoirs? (decontextualisation et actualisation historique (...) des paradigmes successifs).En diathese, la conscience de soi - chacun, chacune d'entre nous - ne s'envisage que traversee par la conscience d'autrui. II suffit de rompre avec le solipsisme identitaire des formalismes classiques, et leur determinisme problematique, pour constater avec stupefaction que l'autre tient, en soi, la part constitutive de notre biographic- de la langue de la mere ä la langue des autres. Langue etrangere, qui est pourtant le vehicule de la connaissance de soi. D'oü mon interet pour une reconsideration ä la fois epistemologique et esthetique du cogito cartesien, place ä la fois au coup d'envoi des theories de la conscience et du renouvellement de la pensee scientifique moderne et contemporaine.Dans cette perspective, l'indice de verite des analyses et des syntheses produites par le chercheur, ne saurait prendre forme et force que dans la diathese d'une communaute de recherche, ä la fois specifique et historique. De lä, irresistiblement, le logos devient dialogos. Ce qui signifie que, d'une part, chaque conscience se voit de facto qualifiee pour participer ä l'elaboration ou ä la transmission des connaissances et que, d'autre part, pour qu'un acte de conscience individuel devienne epistemologiquement significatif, i l s'avere necessaire qu'il soit formule ä l'interieur d'une communaute de recherche. Laquelle, seule, peut ä la fois l'actualiser (et done le limiter) comme savoir historique, tout en l'universalisant comme savoir formel. Evitant ainsi le piege de l'hypostasier comme savoir absolu. Le concept de diathese ouvre done ä une epistemologie genetique, preoccupee autant de structure et de construction que d'histoire des sciences. Car ce n'est pas tant (mais aussi) la formalisation des enonces scientifiques que le degre de conscience de leur contenu conceptuel, qui determine avec le plus de rigueur le degre de verite des savoirs d'un individu au sein d'une communaute de recherche, ou d'une communaute de recherche dans l'histoire de la connaissance. (shrink)

In recent decades few moral concepts have suffered as much neglect at the hands of ethicists as the notion of conscience. My paper argues that this neglect is largely in reaction to an ‘authoritarian’ conception of conscience that is outdated and based on a naïve faculty psychology. When construed in terms of a narrative of self-integration, in which conscience designates our struggle to balance the affective and cognitive dimensions of moral experience, its neglect appears unjustified. It is (...) my contention that the phenomenon of conscience discloses the experience of moral agency in a way that is highly instructive, and that we miss a valuable window into moral behavior by ignoring it. In order to make this case I argue that the most serious criticisms of conscience—that it has no justifiablemoral criteria, clear distinguishing ‘identity,’ or motivating power—are leveled against a largely obsolete and essentialist reading of conscience. Once we see that ‘having a conscience’ refers to how people contend with the multiple moral warrants that anchor their own sense of accountability, and not some timeless moral intuition, the indispensability of the concept becomes clear. (shrink)

Du point de vue relativiste, la juridicite du droit a ete souvent mise en cause, en tant que norme inventee seulement par ou pour l'homme faible, inapte, bourgeois ou occidental. Cette critique s'attaque particulierement aux droits de l'homme auxquels la mobilisation dune certaine opinion africaine voudrait cependant ajouter le droit aux reparations des prejudices subis pendant l'esclavage et la Traite des Noirs. Souvent ou facilement reduit au droit du plus faible, ce droit semble cependant avoir quelque chance d'etre au moins (...) lu dans un contexte favorable de progres de la conscience morale universelle attestee. (shrink)

In this paper, I seek to challenge two prevailing views about religious accommodation. The first maintains that religious practices deserve accommodation only if they are regarded as something unchosen on a par with the involuntary circumstances of life people must face. The other view maintains that religious practices are nothing more than preferences but questions the necessity of their accommodation. Against these views, I argue that religious conducts, even on the assumption that they represent voluntary behaviours, deserve in certain circumstances (...) certain kinds of accommodation. In the first part of the paper, I explain how religious conscience should be understood and show that they must be understood as one possible expression, along with nonreligious or secular beliefs, of a person’s convictions of conscience. In the second part, I demonstrate that the main ground for religious accommodation is the need to protect fairly, through such rights as religious freedom and freedom of conscience, the ethical commitments and conscientious beliefs of all citizens. (shrink)

The question about truth, experience and sharing of truth can be addressed from the viewpoint of a shared sense of community. The search for truth is related to the sensus communis and the conscience – con scientia – that is formed in the community. The sensus communis is not only a general faculty in all men, but also the sense that founds community. Thereby the knowledge is true only in front of the other. Truth reveals itself in conversation. By (...) conversation it means that there are both someone who asks questions and someone who answers them, and that they change their roles. In order to understand each other, they have to share a common field of experience. The approach to the concept of truth as a representation of things loses its place and gives way to the understanding of truth as something where meaning as sense and truth as open and exposed concept appears in the foreground. Phenomenology reveals that community correlates and imposes a set of senses to the consciousness and conscience of the individual. This lets phenomenologists focus on life, culture and language. The truth transforms from meaning into sense. It becomes a dynamic determination of a human being. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the concept of the «feeling» elaborated by William James in the text The Varieties of Religious Experience: a study in human nature as a mean towards a moral education. The analysis of the feeling expecially the religious one is structurally connected, in this writing of James, not only with thebiographical problem of the conscience and the knowledge of the self, but also with the strategically wider issue, of «a study of the human nature». The analysis of (...) the experience conducted from the pragmatist perspective allows us to specify the pedagogical function of the «spiritual feeling» in the path of consciousness of the subject: the faith, in fact, seen in its operative dynamic, increases the experimental conviction that the world can improve and it prepares in such way to raise and to invigorate the relationship with the life. In such perspective it is underlined the «therapeutic» function of moral emotions for the existence in general, and their specific impact on the process of formation and behavior of the human being. (shrink)

La catégorie du suranné, appliquée à l’objet esthétique, notamment au produit de l’activité artistique, désigne une mesure, un kairos, qui se situe entre l’ancien qui ne s’érige pas encore en classique et le contemporain qui n’est pas encore jugé démodé. Il qualifie tout objet esthétique en passe d’acquérir une valeur d’ancienneté sans pour autant s’affirmer comme universellement acceptable et sans s’imposer impérativement. Il ne détermine ni ce qui a vieilli ni ce que l’on qualifierait de vieillot; il dénote, plus particulièrement, (...) un état intermédiaire, plus ou moins officiellement reconnu, qu’il relie au présent. Dans cet ordre d’idées, le suranné implique pour la conscience esthétique un jeu dialectique entre ce qui est directement vécu et ce qui est poursuivi, avec, en plus, un rien de dédain, mais aussi avec un certain regret à son égard. Il équivaut à un présent rétentionnel dont on voudrait, mais ne pourrait, se détacher; d’où la nostalgie que la conscience esthétique éprouve pour lui. D’ordre éminemment transitoire, l’objet suranné est un objet esthétiquement intermédiaire qui s’identifie à une hystérésis formelle autant que fonctionnelle. Dès lors, le suranné assure une continuité esthétique, oriente la conscience vers le passé, actualise l’inactuel et cautionne le rapprochement de ce qui est sujet à distanciation. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the crisis of the modern philosophy caused by the generally accepted approach towards the ontology issues of existence and the ways to solve these problems. Before Kant’s theory the fundamental principle of the universe organization in the ontology was the determination of the existence as the number of objects that were independent from the subject and explored as they were. Kant showed then that the subject deals only with the images of its own conscience. (...) The existence became not the thing-in-itself, but the thing, that opens to the human mind. But this experience gave no answer to the question about the differences between the immanent perceptions of conscience and the universe itself. This article reveals that the transition from the understanding of things as independent existing objects toward the understanding of their subjective origin as objects themselves demands more radical conclusions. These conclusions consist of that fact that the ontology should concentrate more exploring existence as the unformed organic whole and not to forget about its general problemsand presentations about the conscience. Currently we can get non-verbal knowledge about the existence itself and take steps of getting verbal one. Separation of the existence as the unformed organic whole from the presentations of conscience prevents from mistake of determining the things created by the subject in the process of universe perception as its attributes (the plurality of interpretations turns into the ontology pluralism). (shrink)

In this paper, I seek to challenge two prevailing views about religious accommodation. The first maintains that religious practices deserve accommodation only if they are regarded as something unchosen on a par with the involuntary circumstances of life people must face. The other view maintains that religious practices are nothing more than preferences but questions the necessity of their accommodation. Against these views, I argue that religious conducts, even on the assumption that they represent voluntary behaviours, deserve in certain circumstances (...) certain kinds of accommodation. In the first part of the paper, I explain how religious conscience should be understood and show that they must be understood as one possible expression, along with nonreligious or secular beliefs, of a person’s convictions of conscience. In the second part, I demonstrate that the main ground for religious accommodation is the need to protect fairly, through such rights as religious freedom and freedom of conscience, the ethical commitments and conscientious beliefs of all citizens. (shrink)

African philosophy in the twentieth century is largely the work of African intellectuals under the influence of philosophical traditions from the colonial countries. Among them are few names such as Amilcar Cabral, Franz Fanon, Kwame Nkrumah, and Julius Nyerere etc. This paper is an attempt to analyze the politicalphilosophy of Nkrumah, first President of Republic of Ghana in West Africa. The paper argues that from the African political and economic point of view Nkrumah advocated a socialist system created out of (...) the enculturation of African humanist values with the inherited European political culture and social traditions to liberate unite and integrate Ghana and rest of Africa. Following an interdisciplinary approach this paper assesses Nkrumah’s thought both as an individual, intellectual and as a politician. His book ‘Consciencism’ describes the more political than socio-economic approach to class contradictions in African society. In his ‘Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare’ he talked of three objectives i.e. nationalism, pan-Africanism and socialism. He offered the African liberationmovement a strategy of socialist revolution. Nkrumah who had earlier embraced Gandhian non-violence positive action later adopted the Fanonian lines of revolutionary violence recommending the use of universal method i.e. armed struggle to defeat colonialism.. Nkrumah played an important part in spreading the ideas of socialism in Africa. He had a holistic politico-cultural thought that was reflected in many of his speeches and works. Though critics in his thought have found profound contradictions or confusions but none can obscure the main achievements. Remembered as ‘the redeemer’ by the Africans, he provided the charisma they needed for a leading statesman against any form of imperialism. (shrink)

John Rawls, in his Political Liberalism (1993), claims that his justice-as-fairness prescription for liberal democracy does not require its citizens to harbor doubts regarding the truth claims of their religious, philosophical, or moral comprehensive doctrines. Citizens, he says, need not be “hesitant or uncertain, much less skeptical, about [their] own beliefs.” This claim is necessary for the protection of liberty of conscience, a “primary goods”, but it is also necessary to his description of his scheme as a “reasonable utopia” (...) since citizens are not likely to agree to a demand for skepticism. The problem arises for Rawls’s scheme when he says that for a citizen to participate in this political process she must be “reasonable” and that to qualify as “reasonable”, she must acknowledge what Rawls calls the “burdens of judgment” (that is, “limits on what can be reasonably justified to others”). This acknowledgment allows her not only to qualify as reasonable herself, but forces her to concede the reasonableness of other citizens who hold different truth claims from her own. Rawls’s fourth “burden of conscience” is an admission that the truth claims of all citizens, including her own, are conditioned by what Rawls calls her “total experience”. Unless she is willing to make the admission that her truth claims are contingent, a citizen cannot qualify as “reasonable” and is excluded from the conversation of public reason whose purpose is to produce a consensus on justice principles. This leaves his scheme in the category of “unreasonable utopias”. (shrink)

Le problème de l’identité personnelle est une préoccupation essentielle des philosophes modernes depuis que la conscience est mise en scène philosophiquement. Cependant parmi eux il n’y en a pas beaucoup qui considèrent la mémoire comme le fondement de l’identité humaine, bien qu’aujourd’hui, et grâce aux neurosciences, on sache pourtant qu’elle joue un rôle capital. D’une manière générale, les empiristes s’y intéressent davantage que les rationnalistes. Ceux‐ci ayant comme idéal normatif les systèmes mathématiques ne pensent pas qu’elle puisse contribuer à (...) élargir nos connaissances du monde. C’est ce qui explique que le système des idées claires et distinctes chez Descartes, s’établit directement par la conscience présente. De son côté, l’empiriste sceptique Hume, bien qu’il ait souligné l’importance de la mémoire dans notre personnalité, n’a pas pu mettre en pleine lumière sa nature et son fonctionnement. L’esprit considéré comme l’ensemble des perceptions et des idées est loin de constituer l’identité de l’homme normal. On voit dans les théoriesbergsoniennes de la durée et de la mémoire une toute autre perspective qui fonde l’identité personnelle sur l’équilibre mental de la conscience présente et de l’inconscient, c’est‐à‐dire du moi superficiel et du moi profond. (shrink)

Mahatma Gandhi inculcated and lived a value-based life in spite of the human limitations to live a perfect moral life. The seven social sins that he has listed are as follows: Politics without principle, Wealth without wor, Pleasure without conscience, Knowledge without character, Commerce without morality, Science without humanity, and Worship without sacrifice. The second and the fifth, get special attention in the context of the present issue on Business Ethics. It is a recognised aspect of social ethics that (...) business with all its intricate dynamics ought to be conducted in an ethical manner. Absence of morality will take away humane and just character altogether. Wealth in itself is not bad, but acquiring wealth for its own sake, that too by unjust means, would go against the spirit ofmorality. This is because; the means and ends are inherently related to each other. Hence, the role of business in enhancing human life will be fulfilled if various means adopted by are basically humane and therefore, moral. In this paper I would like to deal with: Globalisation of Business, The Business of Education, The Business of Health Care, and A Theological Reflection of Business Ethics. (shrink)

Investigation of spiritual-moral factors of psychological defence of personality is being put in practice through Christian cognition about a man and with the help of modern psychological achievement in science. The most important spiritual factors are sin and passion. Sin is observed as one of the reasons of moral men'sdiseases, which brings to moral, psychological and body's destructions and unconscious psychological defence. Defensive mechanisms is the way to support men's sin passion, blunt conscience, keep positive illusion and unbroken “I” (...) of his personality. All the necessary ways to overcome destructive psychologicaldefence and to get mental healthy are being observed. Confession, prayer, keep eating, taking part in Church Mystery, charity-wisdom are the main ways in Christian Tradition. (shrink)

Confucius proposes the view of human beings as moral agents that have to behave according to their own individual thinking and reflection. In Analects, I, 4, one of his disciples says: “Have I passed on to others anything that I have not tried out myself?” And in Analects, XIII, 23, Confucius says: “The gentleman agrees with others without being an echo.” That is, when one agrees with others it is because using his (today we will say “his or her”) own (...) understanding he (or she) has arrived at the same conclusions. In Analects, XV, 16, he is quite explicit: “When a man is not in the habit of saying: What shall I think of this? What shall I think of this? I can indeed do nothing with him.” In this sense it is clear that he believes in moral autonomy and in human equality. Contrary to what a lot of scholars think, he is not a communitarian thinker; he is a philosopher who wants people to think by themselves. From this early time in the History of China he was proposing what Socrates defended in Athens; the importance of an internal moral conscience. So, if we can speak about Enlightenment in the Greek world, we cansay that Confucius was an enlightenment figure in the Chinese world. In this sense I believe we can conclude that Confucius is not a good example to argue for “Asian Values”. On the contrary, Confucius presents a universalistic theory that strengthens the position of the individual and of his or her self-cultivation. And if one of the objectives of education is that individuals can think by themselves, don’t we have to conclude that the political implication of this theory for the modern world is democracy? (shrink)

The contemporary secularism is found to be a philosophy of life “as if there were no God” or a kind of ideology, which demands an absolute autonomy of human being to shape his destination. In the philosophy of Descartes at least three sources of secularism could be found: his theory of cognition which resulted in developing other than the classical concept of truth and rationality; his metaphysics; his arguments for the existence of God and in his concept of the nature (...) of God. Karl Marx’s criticism of religion was a next powerful factor on the advance of secularism. Marx makes the charge against the religion that it acts to reinforce the break down the conscience of man living in the modern society, into a public and a private realm. The widest criticism of religion was made by Marx in: Acontribution to the Hegel’s criticism on the philosophy of law”. Especially its first seven paragraph, are particularly important in view of the advance of secularism. F. Nietzsche undermines metaphysics by showing that knowledge of a non-empirical world is cognitively superfluous. He makes clear that he has moved beyond the assumption that there might be a metaphysical world to a positing of the empirical world as the only one. Nietzsche considers that the notion of God is inimical to human nature and human life. Is this really so in reality? Is Nietzsche’s consideration about God and religion in any way applicable to our own age? (shrink)

Parti d'une formulation maladroite de Rousseau laissant croire qu'il ne s'était rien fait sur le thème de l'éducation des Quelques pensées sur l'éducation de Locke à l'Émile, nous avons d'abord voulu montrer le côté fallacieux d'une telle proposition pour bien faire ressortir au contraire l'intérêt d'un tel sujet au siècle des Lumières, sujet qui mobilise toute l'attention des philosophes. Et cette importance accordée à l'éducation est nettement perceptible sur quatre points, qui sont au coeur de l'articulation logique de notre travail. (...) Ainsi, nous montrons d'abord que l'éducation est un topos philosophique par excellence depuis la mise en évidence cartésienne des préjugés attachés à l'enfance. Philosopher, c'est donc former l'individu à repérer et à dénoncer ces présupposés qu'on impose à sa conscience. Cela passe évidemment par une réforme du préceptorat. Ensuite, nous avons mis en valeur l'importance philosophique de l'éducation au siècle du sensualisme où tout part des sens et donc de l'enfance. Dans un troisième moment, nous nous sommes attaché à comprendre comment le siècle des Lumières envisageait l'importance de l'éducation non en termes d'individus mais d'espèce. Faisant intervenir Turgot et Condorcet, nous avons analysé les progrès de l'esprit humain de sa source ténébreuse à la lumière du siècle des philosophes et montré en quoi l'éducation est le socle même d'un tel processes. Enfin, nous terminons en pointant du doight le rôle indispensable de la raison dans toute tentative éducative. Nous inspirant alors de Kant, nous montrons les interactions entre raison et éducation tant au niveau privé que public. En conclusion, nous nous interrogeons sur la portée pratique de ces théories philosophiques. (shrink)

By analysis of the connection between the "lower" man and the "higher" man within the human person, I have endeavored to show their "coincidence" in the unfolding of the novum or a good conscience. I have also endeavored to show that it can be aroused by the discovery of "homo absconditus" or of "Deus Absconditus." In this way we become able to approach the Divine. Moreover, in each infrastructure there appears the tendency towards "personalization" by "right" of its reality (...) or existence within the personal human being. (shrink)

Undoubtedly, Edmund Husserl's work is one of the most important contributions to the philosophy of the Twentieth Century to the field of culture, specifically influence on the formation of a new psychiatric - psychological paradigm embodied in the phenomenological psychology and psychiatry - existential. Thispaper aims to draw a brief introduction to the issues concerning the constitution originating from the life of the subject as the psychological level of objectivity and intersubjectivity, with emphasis on aspects related to the synthetic processes (...) taking place in the Genesis passive. Highlight how interesting from the notion ofintentionality of consciousness phenomenological analysis husserliano realizes the formation of the conscience of the time, the embodiment of the spatiality and intersubjectivity whose origin lies in the synthetic processes taking place since preyoica instinctive affection in intrauterine life. (shrink)

The principle that values cannot be derived from facts, though first explicitly formulated by David Hume, does not seem to be consistent with Hume's assertions that value becomes intelligible through experience, and that the will is determined by pleasure and pain. Moral reasoning involving pleasures and pains in the context of the peculiarities of human existence in society must be more complicated than reasoning involving ordinary, i.e. natural, pleasures and pains. Nevertheless, all pains and pleasures must be sensations. Hence Hume's (...) moral philosophy becomes an example of an ethics in which facts, namely pleasures and pains, are related to values. However, many philosophers have argued that values must have a transcendental origin. Ludwig Wittgenstein's arguments concerning ethics and aesthetics constitute an interesting contemporary example of such transcendental conceptions of value. For Wittgenstein, the voice of conscience is God; the will can affect the subject at the limits of the world, and not things in the world; therefore, ethics must be transcendental (not expressible in the way facts in the world are). It seems that this attitude in ethics and aesthetics rules out any empirical discourse on values, which can hardly be called totally fruitless. An example of such discourse may even be one describable in Wittgensteinian terms: values can be defined through facts as modifications in the limits of the world, and through facts as things "in the world". If such descriptions are possible and expressible, a reference to a transcendental realm to account for the existence of conscience would become redundant. (shrink)

The relationship between mankind and nature is a precarious one at best; at once seemingly irreconcilable and yet there is still certain interdependency. In discussing this relationship we need not merely touch upon modern science or environmentalism as the ancient Chinese thinker Lao-tzu had something to say on the matter in the pre-Qin period of Chinese history. But Lao-tzu writes not merely about the relationship between mankind and its environment, taking theterm ‘nature’ in a much broader sense. I would like (...) to discuss Lao-tzu’s idea of nature from the evolution of the meaning of the term, the relationship between mankind and nature and one of establishment and co-existence. This paper will consider how mankind and nature have an interdependent coexistencethat often turns into contradictory and at times conflicting circumstances. It will divide the relationship between mankind and nature into three categories, namely“mankind and natural conscience,” “mankind and other objects” and “mankind and the natural environment” an pose questions as to how to use Lao-tzi’s thought to establish a “coexistence” between mankind and nature. (shrink)

In her introduction to this collection, Tymieniecka presents her phenomenology of life - the leitmotif of the three-volume anniversary publication of Analecta Husserliana - as something that stands out from preceding historical attempts to investigate life in an 'integral' or 'scientific' way. After an incubation lasting throughout the 2000 years of Occidental philosophy, this scientific phenomenology/philosophy of life at last uncovers the entire area of the 'inner workings of Nature', exposing the way in which the 'sufficient reason' and the 'ground' (...) of beingness as such crystallise out of the 'onto poietic' process. This onto-poietic process, continuing as it does in the human creative condition, also reveals the authentic genius of the works of the human spirit. This new and original philosophy, free of fallacious simplifications, speculations and reductionism, opens up a basic starting point for all philosophy. Life, 'the theme of our times', at last receives a profound philosophical treatment. (shrink)

Wild Ideas is a collection of essays that brings a fresh and refreshing perspective to the wilderness paradoxically at the center of our civilization.

The desire for unity among Christians, called the popular term "ecumenism", has its origins. The split between the Byzantine and Catholic churches finally established itself in the minds of ordinary people after the Crusades and the capture of the Crusaders of Constantinople in 1204. Subsequent centuries were marked by unity competitions, but the Roman Catholic Church was the initiator of these competitions. In Catholic theology, all churches that were not under papal jurisdiction were considered to be objects of missionary activity. (...) The result of such missionary unity was the deepening of the divide between the Catholic and Eastern churches. Segments of the latter proclaimed unity with Rome, beginning their existence as Uniate churches. (shrink)

Arguments for slavery reparations have fallen out of favor even as reparations for other forms of racial injustice are taken more seriously. This retreat is unsurprising, as arguments for slavery reparations often rely on two normatively irregular claims: that reparations are owed to the dead (as opposed to, say, their living heirs), and that the present generation inherits an as yet unrequited guilt from past generations. Outside of some strands of Black thought and activism on slavery reparations, these claims are (...) widely rejected. I develop an argument for slavery reparations around those foundational claims by adopting the normative framework of Immanuel Kant. On what I call the Basic Argument for slavery reparations, the application of Kant’s retributivist theory of punishment to slavery justifies reparations as a kind of proportional punishment for slavery. I also show that Kant’s philosophy offers reparations theorists resources to overcome several contemporary objections to slavery reparations. (shrink)

This collection is the final volume of a four book survey of the state of phenomenology fifty years after the death of Edmund Husserl. Its publication represents a landmark in the comprehensive treatment of contemporary phenomenology in all its vastness and richness. The diversity of the issues raised here is dazzling, but the main themes of Husserl's thought are all either explicitly treated, or else they underlie the ingenious approaches found here. Time, historicity, intentionality, eidos, meaning, possibility/reality, and teleology are (...) the main concerns of this collection devoted to studies in aesthetics, metaphysics and literary interpretation, written by such authors as, among others, R. Cobb-Stevens, C. Moreno Marquez, J. Swiecimski, Sitansu Ray and M. Kronegger. These original studies of phenomenological aesthetics and literary theory by scholars from all parts of the world were gathered by the World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learn ing during the year 1988/89 during its assessment of the phenomeno logical movement, fifty years after Husserl's death. IX A -T. Tymieniecka (ed.), Analecta Husserliana, Vol. XXXVII, ix. (shrink)

Charles James William Pfoundes (1840?1907), a young emigrant from Southeast Ireland, spent most of his adult life in Japan, received a Japanese name ?Omoie Tetzunostzuke?, first embraced and then turned against Theosophy and, from 1893, was ordained in several Japanese Buddhist traditions. Lacking independent means but educated, intellectually curious, entrepreneurial, fluent in Japanese and with a keen interest in Asian culture, Pfoundes subsisted as a cultural intermediary, explaining Japan and Asia to both Japanese and foreign audiences and actively seeking involvement (...) in global expositions and congresses, in Asia and beyond. Drawing on a previously unstudied collection of Pfoundes' personal documents, this paper first outlines Pfoundes' unusual career and then focuses on his engagement, in the last 15 years of his life, in actual or proposed international congresses and expositions in London, Chicago, Japan, Hanoi, St Louis and Oregon. The paper thereby draws attention, through the forgotten figure of Charles Pfoundes, to the distinctive nineteenth century phenomenon of great international expositions and their associated congresses, viewing these complicated events as another kind of crossroads; innovative nodes and material stimuli to the kinds of travel, cultural communication and interaction which, like monastic, trade, political and ethnic networks, helped to exchange and promote modern representations of Buddhism. (shrink)