Experiments in particle physics have hitherto failed to produce any significant evidence for the many explicit models of physics beyond the Standard Model (BSM) that had been proposed over the past decades. As a result, physicists have increasingly turned to model-independent strategies as tools in searching for a wide range of possible BSM effects. In this paper, we describe the Standard Model Effective Field Theory (SM-EFT) and analyse it in the context of the philosophical discussions about models, theories, and (bottom-up) (...) effective field theories. We find that while the SM-EFT is a quantum field theory, assisting experimentalists in searching for deviations from the SM, in its general form it lacks some of the characteristic features of models. Those features only come into play if put in by hand or prompted by empirical evidence for deviations. Employing different philosophical approaches to models, we argue that the case study suggests not to take a view on models that is overly permissive because it blurs the lines between the different stages of the SM-EFT research strategies and glosses over particle physicists' motivations for undertaking this bottom-up approach in the first place. Looking at EFTs from the perspective of modelling does not require taking a stance on some specific brand of realism or taking sides in the debate between reduction and emergence into which EFTs have recently been embedded. (shrink)

Three studies examined the co‐existence of natural and supernatural explanations for illness and disease transmission, from a developmental perspective. The participants (5‐, 7‐, 11‐, and 15‐year‐olds and adults; N = 366) were drawn from 2 Sesotho‐speaking South African communities, where Western biomedical and traditional healing frameworks were both available. Results indicated that, although biological explanations for illness were endorsed at high levels, witchcraft was also often endorsed. More important, bewitchment explanations were neither the result of ignorance nor replaced by biological (...) explanations. Instead, both natural and supernatural explanations were used to explain the same phenomena, and bewitchment explanations were highest among adults. Taken together, these data provide insight into how diverse, culturally constructed belief systems about illness co‐exist across development. (shrink)

Our paper studies the anatomy of the discovery of the Higgs boson at the Large Hadron Collider and its influence on the broader model landscape of particle physics. We investigate the phases of this discovery, which led to a crucial reconfiguration of the model landscape of elementary particle physics and eventually to a confirmation of the standard model. A keyword search of preprints covering the electroweak symmetry breaking sector of particle physics, along with an examination of physicists own understanding of (...) the discovery as documented in semiannual conferences, has allowed us an empirical investigation of its model dynamics. From our analyses we draw two main philosophical lessons concerning the nature of scientific reasoning in a complex experimental and theoretical environment. For one, from a confirmation standpoint, some SM alternatives could be considered even more confirmed by the Higgs discovery than the SM. Nevertheless, the SM largely remains the commonly accepted account of EWSB. We present criteria for comparing degrees of confirmation and expose some limits of a purely logical approach to understanding the Higgs discovery as a victory for the SM. Second, we understand the persistence of SM alternatives in the face of disfavourable evidence by borrowing the Lakatosian concept of a research programme, where the core idea behind a group of models survives, while other aspects adapt to incoming data. In order to apply this framework to the model landscape of EWSB, we must introduce a new category of research programme, the model-group, and we test its viability using the example of composite Higgs models. (shrink)

Reestablishing feelings of control after experiencing uncertainty has long been considered a fundamental motive for human behavior. We propose that rituals (i.e., socially stipulated, causally opaque practices) provide a means for coping with the aversive feelings associated with randomness due to the perception of a connection between ritual action and a desired outcome. Two experiments were conducted (one in Brazil [n = 40] and another in the United States [n = 94]) to evaluate how the perceived efficacy of rituals is (...) affected by feelings of randomness. In a between-subjects design, the Scramble Sentence Task was used as a priming procedure in three conditions (i.e., randomness, negativity, and neutral) and participants were then asked to rate the efficacy of rituals used for problem-solving purposes. The results demonstrate that priming randomness increased participants' perception of ritual efficacy relative to negativity and neutral conditions. Implications for increasing our understanding of the relationship between perceived control and ritualistic behavior are discussed. (shrink)

Dawid's account of non-empirical theory assessment is meant to complement traditional theory assessments. I contend that his arguments don't provide support for this account. His three arguments, the no alternatives argument, the unexpected explanatory connections argument, and the meta-inductive argument from prior theories' success, are all problematic, particularly for an assessment of string theory. In particular, I argue that the meta-inductive argument is idle, because it's role in underwriting the future predictive success of a theory is subsumed by the normal (...) accounting of its predecessor's predictions in theory growth and testing. Dawid's arguments are interdependent, so showing that one fails is sufficient to cast doubt on his entire account. (shrink)

Lakatos’s methodology of scientific research programmes centres around series of theories, with little regard to the role of models in theory construction. Modifying it to incorporate model-groups, clusters of developmental models that are intended to become new theories, provides a description of the model dynamics within the search for physics beyond the standard model. At the moment, there is no evidence for BSM physics, despite a concerted search effort especially focused around the standard model account of electroweak symmetry breaking. Using (...) the framework provided by Lakatosian research programmes, we can capture the way the periphery of a model-group changes as the available parameter space shrinks, while its central tenets remain untouched by unfavourable experimental findings. By way of motivation, I provide two case studies of model-groups that offer alternative mechanisms for electroweak symmetry breaking: supersymmetry and composite-Higgs models. Both of these model-groups are under pressure from the discovery of the Higgs boson, yet they have both been active research projects in the years after the Higgs discovery. However, a proper assessment of the progress of an ongoing research programme is impossible through a purely Lakatosian lens, so I propose replacing it with Laudan’s problem-solving account, which provides ongoing assessment, while offering normative guidance concerning the pursuit-worthiness of research programmes. My incorporation of model-groups into Lakatosian research programmes captures the developments of two attempts to expand our physical description of the world, and Laudan’s problem-solving rationality allows us to assess their pursuit-worthiness. (shrink)

A report on the 2019 Bonn “Simplicities and Complexities” Conference, organized by "The Epistemology of the Large Hadron Collider" research unit.

Heidegger holds that our age is dominated by the ambition of reason to possess the world. And he sees in Leibniz the man who formulated the theorem of our modern age: nothing happens without a reason. He calls this attitude `calculating thought' and opposes to it a kind of thought aimed at preserving the essence of things, which he calls `meditating thought'. Cristin's book ascribes great importance to this polarity of thinking for the future of contemporary philosophy, and thus (...) compares the basic ideas of the two thinkers. Leibniz announces the conquest of reason; Heidegger denounces the dangers of reason. Their diversity becomes manifest in the difference between the idea of reason and the image of the path. But is Leibniz's thought really only `calculating'? And do we not perhaps also encounter the traces of reason along Heidegger's path? With these questions in mind we may begin to redefine the relation between the two thinkers and between two different conceptions of reason and philosophy. The hypothesis is advanced that Heidegger's harsh judgment of Leibniz may be mitigated, but it also becomes clear that Heidegger's rewriting of the code of reason is an integral part of our age, in which many signs point to new loci of rationality. With his original interpretation, aware of the risks he is taking, Renato Cristin offers a new guide to the understanding of reason: he shows forth Leibniz as one who defends the thought of being in the unity of monadology, and Heidegger as a thinker who preserves the sign of reason in his meditating thought. (shrink)

Cognitive flexibility, the adaptation of representations and responses to new task demands, improves dramatically in early childhood. It is unclear, however, whether flexibility is a coherent, unitary cognitive trait, or is an emergent dimension of task-specific performance that varies across populations with divergent experiences. Three-to 5-year-old English-speaking U.S. children and Tswana-speaking South African children completed two distinct language-processing cognitive flexibility tests: the FIM-Animates, a word-learning test, and the 3DCCS, a rule-switching test. U.S. and South African children did not differ in (...) word-learning flexibility but showed similar age-related increases. In contrast, U.S. preschoolers showed an age-related increase in rule-switching flexibility but South African children did not. Verbal recall explained additional variance in both tests but did not modulate the interaction between population sample (i.e., country) and task. We hypothesize that rule-switching flexibility might be more dependent upon particular kinds of cultural experiences, whereas word-learning flexibility is less cross-culturally variable. (shrink)

What explains the unique features of human culture? Culture is not uniquely human, but human culture is uniquely cumulative. Cumulative culture is a product of our collective intelligence and is supported by cognitive processes and learning strategies that enable people to acquire, transform, and transmit information and technologies within and across generations. Technological and social innovations are currently driving unprecedented changes in cultural complexity and diversity. Innovation is a cognitively and socially complex, multistep process that typically requires (cumulative) cultural learning (...) to achieve. I argue that the technological solutions that characterize twenty-first-century innovation can only be explained by understanding both the capacity to learn from and build upon the insights of others and the transmission systems that store the knowledge and technologies of previous generations. Human uniqueness is a product of cumulative cultural learning, transmission, and innovation. (shrink)

El texto explora uno de los temas principales del trabajo filosófico de Julia Iribarne: la dimensión monadológica de la fenomenología husserliana, cuyo marco primario de referencia conceptual y teórico es la constitución de la intersubjetividad. Desde esta perspectiva, el escrito se centra en la dimensión teleológica de la subjetividad, para mostrar que en el pensamiento fenomenológico de Julia Iribarne existe una convergencia entre centralidad del yo trascendental y la teleología de la razón, que debe desplegarse en la historia, bajo la (...) jurisdicción ética de la responsabilidad individual, como coherente desarrollo del núcleo original del pensamiento occidental.The text investigates one of the main themes of Julia Iribarne’s philosophical work, i.e. the monadological dimension of Husserlian phenomenology, that has in the constitution of intersubjectivity its main conceptual and theoretical container. From there the paper focuses the teleological dimension of subjectivity, with the aim of showing how in Julia Iribarne’s phenomenological thought there is a convergence between the centrality of the transcendental subject and the teleology of the reason, that should show itself in the history, under the ethic sign of the individual responsibility, as coherent development of the original nucleus of the Western thought. (shrink)

Il tema principale del saggio è un’interpretazione del metodo fenomenologico che, focalizzando la questione dell’identità, ne mette in evidenza il lato trascendentale ed egologico. L’obiettivo è il recupero dell’idea di filosofia come scienza rigorosa e il conseguente ritorno alla centralità del soggetto fenomenologico-trascendentale.Viene introdotto il concetto di circolo fenome-nologico, con il quale si intende indicare la ricorsività della riduzione e la necessità di restare in essa, per mantenere il livello fenomenologico dell’esperienza e della conoscenza. Si tratta di una circolarità virtuosa, (...) non solo perché è produttiva, ma anche perché procede attraverso una costante messa fra parentesi dei risultati e una continua riapertura degli orizzonti. Il circolo fenomenologico è un continuo campo di rimandi, caratteristico anche della correlazione noetico-noematica, tra l’io e il mondo, tra la libertà de-ll’atteggiamento e la verità dell’evidenza, un campo polarizzato i cui elementi si relazionano incessantemente e dal quale l’io esce con l’obiettivo però di farvi ritorno. L’io trascendentale dev’essere libero di compiere questo ritorno a se stesso, perché dentro di sé risiede la verità. Questa circolarità è dunque generatrice di libertà per quanto riguarda l’esercizio del metodo del “vedere fenomenologico”, e portatrice di verità per quanto riguarda l’esito del metodo stesso.Viene sottolineato come l’aspirazione fenomenologica a “vivere nella verità” sia uno sforzo per ricostituire quella verità fluente rappresentata dalla vita della soggettività nel terreno del mondo-della-vita. L’epoché, in quanto “totale rivolgimento esistenziale”, diventa il perno di uno stile di vita rivolto alla verità. Per la fenomenologia, vivere nella verità vuol dire vivere nella libertà, perché se la verità scaturisce dall’epoché, e se quest ’ultima si realizza come “sguardo veramente libero”, allora la verità non è solo legata alla libertà, ma ne è anche dipendente.Si sostiene qui che la soggettività fenomenologico-trascendentale rappresenta la chiave per una svolta rispetto alla situazione culturale attuale, nella quale il concetto di “io” è diventato uno dei principali bersagli critici. Viene mostrato come la soggettività sia collegata al metodo: infatti, annota Husserl in un manoscritto del 1924, “la soggettività è il mio tema, ed è un tema puro e in sé conchiuso, indipendente. Mos-trare che e come ciò sia possibile è il compito della descrizione del metodo della riduzione fenomenologica. Il “tema” di Husserl è dunque il suo compito filosofico e la sua missione esistenziale.Da qui si può interpretare anche la fenomenologia dell’intersoggettività sul piano storico-fattuale: la teoria fenomenologica dell’esperienza dell’estraneo non va confusa con i problemi della multiculturalità né tanto meno con le retoriche dell’alterità, ma è un’istanza che ripropone oggi l’antica questione della filosofia che si determina come ethos della theoria e quindi come “ragione pratica”, un’istanza che rimette al centro dell’attenzione quel fondamento che rischia di andare perduto nell’anonimato della tecnoscienza e nell’indistinto di una forma culturale globalizzata e globalizzante, un’istanza che richiama tutti noi a ritornare a ciò che Husserl chiamerebbe la costituzione originaria di senso della civiltà europea.El tema principal del paper es una interpretación del método fenomenológico que, enfocando la cuestión de la identidad, pone en evidencia su dimensión trascendental y egológica. El objetivo es el rescate de la idea husserliana de filosofía como ciencia rigurosa o estricta y el consiguiente regreso a la centralidad del sujeto fenomenológico-trascendental.Se introduce el concepto de círculo fenomenológico, que alude a la recursividad de la reducción y la necesidad de permanecer en ella, para mantener el nivel fenomenológico de la experiencia y del conocimiento. Se trata de una circularidad virtuosa, no sólo porque es productiva, sino porque avanza a través de una constante puesta entre paréntesis de los resultados y una continua reapertura de los horizontes. El círculo fenomenológico es un infinito campo de rebotes referenciales –propio en primer lugar de la correlación noético-noemática– entre el ego y el mundo, entre la libertad de la actitud y la verdad de la evidencia, un campo polarizado cuyas partes se relacionan incesantemente y del cual el ego sale pero con el objetivo de volver a entrar. El ego trascendental debe ser libre de cumplir este retorno a sí mismo, porque dentro de sí reside la verdad. Esta circularidad es entonces generadora de libertad por lo que se refiere al ejercicio del método del “mirar fenomenológico”, y portadora de verdad por lo que se refiere al resultado del método mismo.Se subraya la aspiración fenomenológica a “vivir en la verdad” como esfuerzo que se propone reconstruir esa verdad fluyente constituida por la vida de la subjetividad en el terreno del mundo de la vida. La epoché, en tanto “total transformación existencial”, se vuelve el perno de un estilo de vida orientado hacia a la verdad. Para la fenomenología, vivir en la verdad quiere decir vivir en la libertad, porque si la verdad surge de la epoché, y si esta última se realiza como “mirada verdaderamente libre”, entonces la verdad no está sólo ligada a la libertad, sino que resulta dependiente de ella.Se sostiene que la subjetividad fenomenológico-trascendental representa la clave para un viraje respecto de la situación cultural que prevalece en la actualidad, en la cual el concepto de “yo” se ha vuelto uno de los principales blancos de crítica. Se muestra aquí la radicalidad del nexo entre la subjetividad y el método. En un manuscrito de 1924 Husserl efectivamente anota: “la subjetividad es mi tema, y es un tema puro y en sí completo, independiente. Mostrar que ello es posible y de qué manera, es el cometido de la descripción del método de la reducción fenomenológica”. El “tema” de Husserl es por lo tanto su cometido filosófico y su misión existencial.A partir de aquí es posible interpretar también la fenomenología de la intersubjetividad a nivel histórico-fáctico: la teoría fenomenológica de la experiencia del extraño no debe ser confundida con los problemas de la multiculturalidad ni, menos aún, con las retóricas de la alteridad, sino que es una instancia que vuelve nuevamente actual la antigua cuestión de la filosofía que se determina como ethos de la theoria y por ende como “razón práctica”, una instancia que vuelve a poner al centro de nuestra atención ese fundamento que corría el riesgo de perderse en el anonimato de la tecnociencia y en lo indistinto de una forma cultural globalizada y globalizante, una instancia que reclama un retorno, de parte de todos nosotros, a lo que Husserl llamaría la constitu-ción originaria de sentido de la civilización europea. (shrink)

Leibniz occupe une position centrale dans la pensee de Husserl, surtout en ce qui concerne la determination phenomenologique du probleme de l'intersubjectivite, mais ii joue un rdle important tout le long du parcours de Husserl. Ce rdle de Leibniz a peut-£ tre ete neglige, parce que avec lui on introduirait dans la phenomenologie une conception monadologique qui contrasterait avec l'idee de science rigoureuse. Au contraire, Husserl ne craint pas d'utiliser les concepts de Leibniz de monade et harmonie, toutefois il envisage (...) justement une phenomenologie de Tintersubjectivite vue comme harmonie cognitive des sujets et communaute intermonadique. Cette comparison avec Leibniz non seulement revet une importance historiographique en ce qui concerne la genese et le developpement de la pensee de Husserl, mais elle peut aussi se reveler utile du point de vue theorique, pour indiquer une des lignes de developpement de la phenomenologie. (shrink)

La critique de Heidegger à l'endroit de Leibniz est connue et il suffit de renvoyer à la Marburger Vorlesung de 1928 et à Der Satz vom Grund de 1957. Mais l'ensemble de l'interprétation de Heidegger révèle une double attitude: d'une part une attaque contre le rationalisme , d'autre part une défense du sens de l'être-là contenu dans le principe de la raison suffisante. Sur la base de cette ambiguïté on peut reconsidérer l'influence de Leibniz sur la pensée de Heidegger, revoir (...) l'interprétation unilatéral et montrer que, d'une certaine façon, Heidegger s'approche à certains thèmes monadologiques fondamentaux. Tout ceci peut amener a entrevoir la présence de Leibniz aussi bien chez Heidegger même que dans la phénoménologie de la période après-Husserl, surtout pour ce qui concerne les problèmes de l'intersubjectivité et du rapport au monde. (shrink)

Retributive restrictions are principles of justice according to which what a criminal deserves on account of his individual conduct and character restricts how states are morally permitted to treat him. The main arguments offered in defense of retributive restrictions involve thought experiments in which the state punishes the innocent, a practice known as telishment. In order to derive retributive restrictions from the wrongness of telishment, one must engage in moral argument from generalization. I show how generalization arguments of the same (...) form can be used subversively to derive morally unacceptable conclusions from other scenarios in which the state intentionally inflicts undeserved coercion. For example, our considered moral convictions approve of punishment policies that inflict collateral damage, such as the ubiquitous policy of excluding the family members of inmates from prison facilities outside visiting hours. I present a generalization argument for the conclusion that these policies are seriously unjust. If we firmly believe that these policies are not unjust, then we should put less stock in generalization arguments. We should not use them to support retributive restrictions. This conclusion has broad implications for the theory and practice of criminal justice. (shrink)

Competing Explanations of Competing Explanations: Accounting for Conflict Between Scientific and Folk ExplanationsThis paper focuses on the level of people’s explanatory reasoning. It examines why laypeople prefer folk explanations of various physical or biological phenomena to alternative, well‐understood scientific explanations. Shtulman and Legare call this psychological phenomenon “explanatory co‐existence.” On the basis of new experimental data, they evaluate two possible accounts of explanatory co‐existence, a theory‐based and an associative account, and argue that a theory‐based account is the better supported.

I EXISTENTIAL PROOFS INTRODUCTION Metaphysical problems, like all philosophical problems, arise from a sense of puzzlement. What is puzzling is that the ...

O objetivo do estudo é revisar a literatura brasileira sobre a problemática de desenvolvimento de crianças assistidas em clínicas-escola de 1980 a 2008, para avaliar mudanças nos problemas desenvolvimentais em relação ao sexo da criança. Os artigos são oriundos das bases eletrônicas Bvs, Indexpsi, L..

Der Autor folgt der Hypothese, dass Husserls Denken der Krisis auf den folgenden Bezug gebaut ist: einerseits beeinflusst die Lebenswelt als Fluss die Art der Wissenschaft, die das Subjekt von ihr haben kann, andererseits beansprucht die transzendentale Subjektivitat die Relativierung der ganzen Lebenswelt. Der Fluss und das Bewusstsein werden Metaphern dieses Bezuges, indem sie die Paradoxien des Weltratsels ausdrucken. Aus der Moglichkeit, die Welt als wirkliche Lebenswelt zu denken, erscheint die Phanomenologie der Lebenswelt als eine Umwalzung des Rationalismus zu einem (...) Relationismus. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION BY THE EDITORS Gilbert Ryle, in his Concept of Mind (1949), attacked volitional theories of human actions; JL Austin, in his "If and Cans" ...

This anthology offers a unique collection of contributions focusing on the discussion about the so-called dual-process theories within the field of moral psychology. In general, dual-process theories state that in cognitive systems, two sorts of processes can be differentiated: an affective, associative process and an analytical, rule-based process. This distinction recently entered the debate on the relationship between intuitive and rational approaches to explaining the phenomenon of moral judgment. The increasing interest in these theories raises questions concerning their general impact (...) on social contexts. The anthology aims at presenting stepping-stones of an analysis of the merits and drawbacks of this development. For that purpose, the authors discuss general questions concerning the relationship between ethics and empirical sciences, methodological questions, reassessments of established terminology and societal implications of dual-process theories in moral psychology. (shrink)

This study investigated the business ethics experiences of Australian managers in China, using qualitative methodology to identify themes. Thirty-one Australian managers who had spent on average 8.7 years working in business connected to China participated in in-depth interviews regarding their business ethics experiences in China. Commonly, managers identified issues relating to a broad spectrum which could be labelled "bribery and facilitation". Other repeated themes included requests for visa assistance, employee theft, nepotism and non-adherence to contractual obligations. This study has important (...) implications for helping Australian managers improve the way they approach potential ethical situations in China. Four key coping strategies can be identified from the data: managers spoke of not compromising their own morals, of attempting to understand the motivation of Chinese colleagues, of talking to others and of adhering to company policy. These strategies suggest practical steps may be taken by organisations when training managers for business activities in China. In particular, structuring of mentoring relationships between experienced and less experienced practitioners may be of assistance. Cultural training for managers and clear company policy on contentious issues such as bribery may also be of benefit. The themes identified in the study also have implications for academics researching expatriate business peoples' experiences in China. (shrink)

This is the first feminist special issue of The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. Introduction written by Brand [Weiser] and Korsmeyer with essays by Hilde Hein, Paul Mattick, Jr., Timothy Gould, Joanne B. Waugh, Joseph Margolis, Mary Devereaux, Noel Carroll, Flo Leibowitz, Anita Silvers, Elizabeth Ann Dobie, Renee Cox, and Ellen Handler Spitz. A fuller publication from Indiana University Press followed in 1995 edited by Brand [Weiser] and Korsmeyer entitled, Feminism and Tradition in Aesthetics.

Introduction -- Practical reasons and judicial use of force -- Deviating from legal standards -- The legal duties of judges -- The normative classification of legal results -- Reasons to deviate -- Adherence rules -- Obeying adherence rules -- The judicial oath -- Legal duty and political obligation -- Systemic effects -- Agent-relative principles -- Optimal adherence rules -- Guidance rules -- Treating like cases alike -- Implementation -- Theoretical implications -- Conclusion.

The concept of transformation has become a buzzword within the last few years. This has to do, first, with the ever broader recognition of the profound character of the environmental crisis, secondly, with increasingly obvious limits to existing forms of (global) environmental governance, thirdly, with the emergence of other dimensions of the crisis since 2008 and, fourthly, with intensified debates about required profound social change, especially of societal nature relations. However, the term transformation itself is contested. It largely depends on (...) theoretical assumptions as well as the plausibility and applicability of the arguments which are made. In this paper, a historical-materialist approach to social-ecological transformation is outlined by referring to a theoretically sophisticated understanding of ‘subject(s)’ of transformation as well as the ‘object(s)’ of what is to be transformed. Theoretical concepts like the capitalist mode of production, regulation and hegemony, a critical understanding of the state and governance as well as the term societal nature relations are key. Such a perspective contributes to a more sophisticated understanding of the obstacles and requirements of real-world transformation. Finally, the argument has implications for visions and strategies, i.e., an emancipatory and democratic shaping of social relations and societal nature relations. (shrink)

Innovation is fundamental to cumulative culture, allowing progressive modification of existing technology. The authors define innovation as an asocial process, uninfluenced by social information. We argue that innovation is inherently social – innovation is frequently the product of modifying others' outputs, and successful innovations are acquired by others. Research should target examination of the cognitive underpinnings of socially-mediated innovations.