Dans son article, l’auteur présente ses expériences comme préposée aux bénéficiaires en CHSLD. Elle témoigne ainsi des difficultés que son travail peut représenter dans le quotidien lorsqu’elle doit travailler avec des corps qui n’obéissent plus, avec des cancéreux ou des personnes atteintes d’alzheimer. Malgré ces difficultés, on rencontre un certain bonheur à travers celles-ci. Est-ce un cheminement philosophique ou un cri du cœur ?

Free will sceptics deny the existence of free will, that is the command or control necessary for moral responsibility. Epicureans allege that this denial is somehow self-defeating. To interpret the Epicurean allegation charitably, we must first realise that it is propositional attitudes like beliefs and not propositions themselves which can be self-defeating. So, believing in free will scepticism might be self- defeating. The charge becomes more plausible because, as Epicurus insightfully recognised,there is a strong connection between conduct and belief—and so (...) between thecontent of free will scepticism (since it is about conduct) and the attitude of believing it. Second, we must realise that an attitude can be self- defeating relative to certain grounds. This means that it might be self-defeating to be a free will sceptic on certain grounds, such as the putative fact that we lack leeway or sourcehood. This charge is much more interesting because of the epistemic importance of leeway and sourcehood. Ultimately, the Epicurean charge of self-defeat fails. Yet, it delivers important lessons to the sceptic. The most important of them is that free will sceptics should either accept the existence of leeway or reject the principle that ‘“ought” implies “can”’. (shrink)

We have no reason to believe that reasons do not exist. Contra Bart Streumer’s recent proposal, this has nothing to do with our incapacity to believe this error theory. Rather, it is because if we know that if a proposition is true, we have no reason to believe it, then we have no reason to believe this proposition. From a different angle: if we know that we have at best misleading reasons to believe a proposition, then we have no reason (...) to believe it. This has two consequences. Firstly, coming close to believing the error theory is idle or pointless. Secondly, philosophers who argue that believing sweeping theories like determinism or physicalism is self-defeating because they are either false or believed for no reason pursue a worthwhile argumentative strategy. (shrink)

Suppose I am a leeway sceptic: I think that, whenever I face a choice between two courses of action, I lack true alternatives. Can my practical deliberation be rational? Call this the Deliberation Question. This paper has three aims in tackling it. Its constructive aim is to provide a unified account of practical deliberation. Its corrective aim is to amend the way that philosophers have recently framed the Deliberation Question. Finally, its disputative aim is to argue that leeway sceptics cannot (...) deliberate entirely rationally about what to do, because of the connection between deliberating and deciding. (shrink)

Here is a skeptical trilemma. We know that we are responsible. We do not know that determinism is false. Yet, if we do not know that determinism is false, we do not know that we are responsible. If we want to avoid the skeptical conclusion of rejecting the first claim, we ought to reject the third. It does not follow that compatibilism is true. But it follows that libertarianism, the view that we are responsible even though responsibility requires indeterminism, is (...) unknowable, at least for now. To see this, we need to compare different forms of skepticism and their response. (shrink)

The use of predictive machine learning algorithms is increasingly common to guide or even take decisions in both public and private settings. Their use is touted by some as a potentially useful method to avoid discriminatory decisions since they are, allegedly, neutral, objective, and can be evaluated in ways no human decisions can. By (fully or partly) outsourcing a decision process to an algorithm, it should allow human organizations to clearly define the parameters of the decision and to, in principle, (...) remove human biases. Yet, in practice, the use of algorithms can still be the source of wrongful discriminatory decisions based on at least three of their features: the data-mining process and the categorizations they rely on can reconduct human biases, their automaticity and predictive design can lead them to rely on wrongful generalizations, and their opaque nature is at odds with democratic requirements. We highlight that the two latter aspects of algorithms and their significance for discrimination are too often overlooked in contemporary literature. Though these problems are not all insurmountable, we argue that it is necessary to clearly define the conditions under which a machine learning decision tool can be used. We identify and propose three main guidelines to properly constrain the deployment of machine learning algorithms in society: algorithms should be vetted to ensure that they do not unduly affect historically marginalized groups; they should not systematically override or replace human decision-making processes; and the decision reached using an algorithm should always be explainable and justifiable. (shrink)

The status of indirect discrimination is ambiguous in the current literature. This paper addresses two contemporary and related debates. First, for some, indirect discrimination is not truly a distinct kind of discrimination, but it is simply a legal construct designed to address distributive inequalities between groups. Second, even if one accepts that indirect discrimination is a distinct type of discrimination, the connection between the two kinds of discrimination, direct and indirect, is debated. For some, they are distinct act-types, while for (...) others, indirect discrimination should be conceived as a side effect of prior cases of direct discrimination. In this paper, I argue that indirect discrimination is a distinct act-type that can take place without being connected to prior instances of direct discrimination. (shrink)

A version of the principle of alternate possibilities claims that one is only blameworthy for actions which one was able to avoid. Much of the discussion about PAP concerns Frankfurt’s counterexamples to it. After fifty years of refined debates, progress might seem hopeless. Yet, we can make headway by asking: “what’s our reason for believing PAP?” The best answer is this: lacking eligible alternatives—alternatives whose cost is not too high to reasonably opt for—is a good excuse. Yet, this principle is (...) subject to straightforward counterexamples, unless it is given an epistemicised reading. And in this latter case, it does not support PAP. So, PAP is unsupported, at least for now. (shrink)

Ce recueil réunit des articles qui s'interrogent, depuis un ensemble de perspectives philosophiques des plus diverses, sur le rapport entre nature et éthique.

No one is responsible for their conduct because free will is an illusion, say some skeptics. Even when it seems that we have several options, we only have one. Hence, says the free will skeptic, we should reform our practices which involve responsibility attributions, such as punishment and blame. How seriously should we take this doctrine? Is it one that we could live by? One thorn in the side of the skeptic concerns deliberation. When we deliberate about what to do—what (...) film to go see, whom to befriend, which doctrine to follow—we must presume that our options are open to us. But then, every time that skeptics deliberate, they presume something which is incompatible with their doctrine, i.e. that they have several options. In a word, skeptics cannot deliberate qua skeptics. Some philosophers have responded that deliberators don’t have to presume that their options are open; they only have to presume that their choice will be efficacious. I argue that this proposal uses resources which, if they are available and successful, can be employed to refute skepticism. The upshot is that free will skeptics are pushing for a doctrine that is either false or in tension with deliberation. (shrink)

Responsibility for X is the duty to answer for X. This theory clarifies the link between duty, responsibility and blameworthiness. Blameworthiness, but not responsibility, implies a breach of duty. And a breach of duty involves responsibility, but not blameworthiness — at least for normal adults. These intuitive theses may seem trivial, but they give some reason to accept two controversial theses : excuses are not always partial, and responsibility requires free will.

I offer an unorthodox argument for the thesis that prostitution is not just a normal job. It has the advantage of being compatible with the claim that humans should have full authority over their sexual life. In fact, it is ultimately the emphasis on this authority that leads the thesis that prostitution is a normal job to collapse. Here is the argument: merchants cannot (both legally and morally) discriminate whom they transact with on the basis of factors like the ethnicity (...) or the religion of their client; but if prostitutes are ‘sex merchants’, then they cannot (both legally and morally) discriminate whom they have sex with on the basis of these factors. Yet everyone should have the full discretionary power to refuse to have sex under any circumstances. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Whether it is about Québec independence, French language or immigration, nationalism is a crucial feature of Québec politics. The Québec 2018 election is not an exception. Scholars have developed theories about individual identity, the nation and nationhood, but we lack a citizens’ perspective. We provide the first thorough description of Quebeckers’ nationalism, which reveals a roughly normal (i.e. non-polarized) distribution of ethnic nationalism attitudes. Most importantly, we measure ethnic nationalism with a never tested measure in Québec and we show that (...) it substantially explains vote choice in the Québec 2018 election—especially the support for the Coalition Avenir Québec. Our research builds bridges between debates in political philosophy and political science and deepens our understanding of the Québec 2018 election. (shrink)

Les démocraties s’articulent autour de deux pôles qui ne se réduisent pas l’un à l’autre, mais qui doivent communiquer constamment : la société civile et l’État. Or, l’équilibre à rechercher entre ces deux éléments est mis à mal par la consolidation de l’État administratif qui tend à autonomiser son action par rapport au reste de la société ; la société civile y est d’ordinaire exclue des prises de décisions. Cette exclusion peut toutefois être considérée positivement ou négativement. Comme il sera (...) discuté à partir des philosophies de John Dryzek et d’Iris Marion Young, on devrait tenter de penser à la fois l’inclusion de la société civile dans certaines prises de décisions étatiques et son indépendance pour favoriser sa dimension critique envers l’État. De là, l’État administratif peut être considéré simultanément comme une opportunité de démocratisation et comme une évolution de l’État à surveiller et à critiquer. (shrink)

Here is a crucial principle for debates about moral luck, responsibility, and free will: a subject is blameworthy for an act only if, in acting, she did what she ought not to have done. That is, ‘blameworthiness’ implies ‘ought not’ (BION). There are some good reasons to accept BION, but whether we should accept it depends on complex questions about the objectivity of ought and the subjectivity of blameworthiness. This paper offers an exploratory defence of BION: it gives three prima (...) facie reasons to accept it, provides a plausible interpretation of it, and shows how holding out against objections can yield fruitful lessons. Five objections to BION are considered: the objection from conscience, from reasons, from suberogation, from objectivity, and from excuses. Their main problem is to either over-subjectify blameworthiness or to over-objectify obligations. To accept BION, we must occupy a desirable middle ground. (shrink)

In this introduction, I briefly summarize Sophia Moreau's Faces of Inequality. I situate her monograph within two highly contemporary bodies of literature — relational egalitarianism and discrimination theory — to show how it provides important insights for understanding both what it means to treat others as equals in society and how to define wrongful discrimination. Moreau's work on discrimination is of great relevance for philosophers and socio-legal theorists alike as the commentaries from the symposium contributors demonstrate, including Dale Smith, Pablo (...) Gilabert, Andrea Sangiovanni, Daniel Viehoff, Jessica Eisen, Alysia Blackham, and Iyiola Solanke. (shrink)

With “slow living” as the newest incarnation of the simplicity movement, the search for fresh inspiration on ways to live a more authentic life is as pressing as ever. Turning to Eastern traditions, people are discovering the Japanese concept of wabi sabi. The perfect antidote to today’s frenzied, consumer-oriented culture, wabi sabi encourages slowing down, living modestly, and appreciating the natural and imperfect aspect of material culture. While defying definition, wabi sabi is best expressed in brief, evocative bites. In The (...) Little Wabi Sabi Companion, Diane Durston, a noted writer on Japanese art and culture, presents a collection of reflections, along with classic poetry and verse from both Eastern and Western traditions, that capture the wabi sabi moment, and inspire readers to do the same. The subtle beauty of nature, the simplicity of a found object, the impermanence of an autumnal flower arrangement, the solitude of a single fisherman in his boat are all celebrated and reflected upon in this easily browseable book. The text is complemented by photography and calligraphy inspired by the wabi-sabi spirit. This collection of simple, yet profound insights in an irresistable, hold-in-the-hand package offers readers the opportunity for integrating moments of contemplation and meditation into their daily lives, and to discover the essence of wabi sabi. (shrink)

Introduction : but is it ethics? -- Alterity : the problem of transcendence -- Singularity : the unrepresentable face -- Responsibility : the infinity of the demand -- Ethics : normativity and norms -- Scarce resources? : Levinas, animals, and the environment -- Failures of recognition and the recognition of failure : Levinas and identity politics.

This article contrasts Epicurus's and Diogenes the Cynic's respective views on acceptable desires. I emphasize their appeals to nature to legitimize or de-legitimize certain types of desires.

Here is a crucial principle for debates about moral luck, responsibility, and free will: a subject is blameworthy for an act only if, in acting, she did what she ought not to have done. That is, ‘blameworthiness’ implies ‘ought not’ (BION). There are some good reasons to accept BION, but whether we accept it mainly depends on complex questions about the objectivity of ought and the subjectivity of blameworthiness. This paper offers an exploratory defence of BION: it gives three _prima (...) facie_ reasons to accept it, provides a plausible interpretation of it, and shows how holding out against objections can yield fruitful lessons. Five objections to BION are considered: the objection from conscience, from reasons, from suberogation, from objectivity, and from excuses. Their main problem is to either over-subjectify blameworthiness or to over-objectify obligations. To accept BION, we must occupy a desirable middle ground. (shrink)

Diogène de Sinope et Calliclès affirment tirer leurs éthiques de l'observation de la nature. En cela, ils s'opposent explicitement à Socrate. Mais leur position est-elle une véritable forme de naturalisme ou un simple usage métaphorique? Ce texte défend la première option, après avoir montré que malgré leur ressemblance métaéthique, ces deux éthiques normatives sont radicalement opposées.

Comme de nombreux penseurs antiques avant et après eux et contrairement à Socrate, Calliclès et Diogène ont déclaré avoir fondé leur éthique sur l’observation de la nature. Et pourtant, les deux discours normatifs qui sont tirés d’une nature que l’on pourrait a priori croire être la même sont on ne peut plus opposés. Calliclès croit que l’homme est appelé à dominer autrui ; Diogène pense plutôt qu’il doit se dominer lui-même ; le premier est un hédoniste débridé, le second croit (...) que le bonheur ne s’achète qu’au prix du sacrifice des désirs artificiels. Comment expliquer cette dichotomie ? Nous empruntons deux routes explicatives. D’abord, nous montrons que pour Calliclès et Diogène, la notion de nature non seulement diffère, mais est observée sous un angle différent. La première est celle des tyrans et de dieux anthropomorphes, la seconde, celle de petits animaux et de dieux autarciques. La première concerne la relation des hommes entre eux ; la seconde, celle de l’homme avec lui-même. Ensuite, nous exposons la différence des présupposés normatifs qui précèdent ou accompagnent l’observation de la nature ; nous contrastons, pour ce faire, les formes d’anticonventionnalisme et d’anti-intellectualisme défendues par Calliclès et Diogène. -/- SUMMARY. Like many ancient thinkers before and after them and contra Socrates, Callicles and Diogenes said they based their ethics on the observation of nature. And yet, the two normative discourses that are derived from nature that we might a priori believe to be the same could not be more opposed. Callicles believes that people are called to dominate others, Diogenes rather thinks people must dominate themselves. The first is an unbridled hedonist, the second believes that happiness can be bought only at the price of sacrificing artificial desires. How to explain this dichotomy? We take two explanatory routes. First, we show that for Callicles and Diogenes, the notion of nature not only differs but is observed from a different angle. The first one is the nature of tyrants and anthropomorphic gods, the second that of small animals and autarkic gods. The first focuses on the relationship between people, the second focuses on the relationship of a person with themselves. Secondly, we expose the difference in normative assumptions that precede or accompany the observation of nature; in order to do so, we contrast anticonventionalism and anti-intellectualism forms proper to both Callicles and Diogenes. (shrink)

Despised since ancient times, ugliness gains unprecedented appeal among early modern writers and painters. Subverting all norms, they value the beauty of deformity and, by extolling the paradoxical pleasure of mimesis, they helped create a new subjectivity.

Feminism and Deconstruction incisively examines the contemporary relevance of setting these movements beside one another. Diane Elam has written an intelligent and accessible introduction, which explores how feminism and deconstruction have been linked -- as theories and movements, as philosophies and disciplines. Elam's work allows the reader to rethink the political and contemplate the possibility that there is indeed life after identity politics. Feminism and Deconstruction is essential reading for anyone who needs a no-nonsense but stimulating guide through one (...) of the mazes of contemporary theory. (shrink)

In the 70 years since Alan Turing’s ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ appeared in Mind, there have been two widely-accepted interpretations of the Turing test: the canonical behaviourist interpretation and the rival inductive or epistemic interpretation. These readings are based on Turing’s Mind paper; few seem aware that Turing described two other versions of the imitation game. I have argued that both readings are inconsistent with Turing’s 1948 and 1952 statements about intelligence, and fail to explain the design of his game. (...) I argue instead for a response-dependence interpretation. This interpretation has implications for Turing’s view of free will: I argue that Turing’s writings suggest a new form of free will compatibilism, which I call response-dependence compatibilism. The philosophical implications of rethinking Turing’s test go yet further. It is assumed by numerous theorists that Turing anticipated the computational theory of mind. On the contrary, I argue, his remarks on intelligence and free will lead to a new objection to computationalism. (shrink)

Le solidarisme de Léon Bourgeois constitue une tentative convaincante de surmonter l’opposition traditionnelle entre libertés individuelles et justice sociale. Bourgeois tente de relever ce défi en faisant appel aux nouvelles découvertes scientifiques en sociologie comme en biologie. En bref, l’observation de la nature nous montrerait que les humains sont en rapport de solidarité les uns avec les autres. De ce fait, on pourrait tirer un devoir de solidarité que l’État serait à même d’imposer aux individus. Fonder une théorie politique sur (...) des théories scientifiques présente un double risque : d’une part, subir l’influence des biologistes collectivistes et de leur vision organiciste de la société ; d’autre part et surtout, se rendre coupable du sophisme naturaliste. Nous exposerons comment Bourgeois tombe initialement dans le piège du sophisme naturaliste avant de s’en extirper. Entre son texte Solidarité (1987) et son Essai d’une philosophie de la solidarité (1907), la progression est frappante. Au final, donc, Bourgeois nous semble présenter une théorie politique qui, tout en s’inspirant des sciences, ne s’y assujettit pas. (shrink)

"Analyzes current understandings of victimhood in discussions of child soldiers, identity politics, violent conflict, and global responses to atrocity."--.

People value highly the digital technologies that are so pervasive in everyday life and work, certainly as measured by economists. Yet there are also evident harms associated with them, including the likelihood that they are affecting political discourse and choices. The features of digital markets mean they tend toward monopoly, so great economic and political power lies in the hands of a small number of giant companies. While tougher regulation may be one way to tackle the harms they create, it (...) does not get at the structural problem, which is their advertising-driven business model. The hunt for people's attention drives algorithmic promotion of viral content to get ever-more clicks. An alternative policy intervention to reclaim public space would be to create a public service competitor that could drive competition along other dimensions. Online space must be reclaimed as a public space from the privately-owned US and Chinese digital giants. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Turing proposed a new approach to the concept of thinking, based on his claim that intelligence is an ‘emotional concept’; and that the response-dependence interpretation of Turing’s ‘criterion for “thinking”’ is a better fit with his writings than orthodox interpretations. The aim of this paper is to clarify the response-dependence interpretation, by addressing such questions as: What did Turing mean by the expression ‘emotional’? Is Turing’s criterion subjective? Are ‘emotional’ judgements decided by social consensus? (...) Turing’s take on these issues impacts current philosophical debates on response-dependent concepts and on the nature of artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Glycerol is a small and simple molecule produced in the breakdown of glucose, proteins, pyruvate, triacylglycerols and other glycerolipid, as well as release from dietary fats. An increasing number of observations show that glycerol is probably involved in a surprising variety of physiopathologic mechanisms. Glycerol has long been known to play fundamental roles in several vital physiological processes, in prokaryotes and eukaryotes, and is an important intermediate of energy metabolism. Despite some differences in the details of their operation, many of (...) these mechanisms have been preserved throughout evolution, demonstrating their fundamental importance. In particular, glycerol can control osmotic activity and crystal formation and then act as a cryoprotective agent. Furthermore, its properties make it useful in numerous industrial, therapeutic and diagnostic applications. Few studies have focussed directly on glycerol, however, and while its metabolism is increasingly well documented, much of the details remain unknown. Considering the importance of glycerol in multiple vital physiological processes, its study could help unlock important physiopathological mechanisms. BioEssays 23:534–542, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

This paper examines the journals of Frances W. Willard, founder and organ izer of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union in the United States, and their revelations about the gender battle that raged within the psyche of Willard and other young women of her day. The failure of organized Chris tianity to provide solace or unbiased counsel to women such as Willard is apparent in a close reading of Willard's work. Within the pages of her journals, the struggle she faced is (...) obvious on almost every page; her strug gle with what society said she should do, and what she knew she was capable of doing, is present for all to see. The paper argues that because, however, lived in the United States within a short window of nineteenth- century time, she was able to form a 'Boston Marriage' with a young woman who provided her with the comfort and support she needed. The Boston Marriage, arguably, was available only for relatively well-to-do, white-middle-class women of an educated class, who had attended col lege and, because they were able to find a 'service' career of some kind, could live together in harmony. Enlightened families, like that of Henry James, were able to support female members of their class who did not 'fit in' to societal norms of the day and accept their lifestyle, while negat ing the sexuality of it. Organized religion, however, did not, and it is the failure of her church to help her find a way of life she can tolerate about which Willard writes. You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination. So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them; male and female he created them. (shrink)

Explorations in Anthropology and Theology. Frank A. Salamone and Walter Randolph Adams. eds. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 1997. xii. 279 pp. $57.50 (cloth); $32.50 (paper).