While much is written about reading aloud to children, and as a teaching tool, far less is known about the oral reading that adults do at home, at work or in the community. This article presents the results of a national survey into whether, what, how and why adults across Britain may read aloud rather than in silence. Analysing data from 529 questionnaire responses, the article examines the frequency with which different text types are read aloud, the formations in which (...) this is done – alone, with one other person or in a group – and the purposes of reading aloud and being read to, with attention to differences according to gender and age. Findings suggest that reading aloud happens in a number of different ways and for different purposes, across contexts and life domains, and that it has a significant relationship with aspects of the lifecourse and with identity formation and performance. (shrink)

“Tell me," Wittgenstein once asked a friend, "why do people always say, it was natural for man to assume that the sun went round the earth rather than that the earth was rotating?" His friend replied, "Well, obviously because it just looks as though the Sun is going round the Earth." Wittgenstein replied, "Well, what would it have looked like if it had looked as though the Earth was rotating?” What would it have looked like if we looked at all (...) sciences from the viewpoint of Wittgenstein’s philosophy? Wittgenstein is undoubtedly one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. His complex body of work has been analysed by numerous scholars, from mathematicians and physicists, to philosophers, linguists, and beyond. This volume brings together some of his central perspectives as applied to the modern sciences and studies the influence they may have on the thought processes underlying science and on the world view it engenders. The contributions stem from leading scholars in philosophy, mathematics, physics, economics, psychology and human sciences; all of them have written in an accessible style that demands little specialist knowledge, whilst clearly portraying and discussing the deep issues at hand. (shrink)

Recent discussion in epistemology has seen a huge growth in interest in the topic of epistemic value. In this paper I describe the background to this new movement in epistemology and critically survey the contemporary literature on this topic.

This paper surveys attempts in the recent literature to offer a modal condition on knowledge as a way of resolving the problem of scepticism. In particular, safety-based and sensitivity-based theories of knowledge are considered in detail, along with the anti-sceptical prospects of an explicitly anti-luck epistemology.

This paper explores the question of whether there is an interesting form of specifically epistemic relativism available, a position which can lend support to claims of a broadly relativistic nature but which is not committed to relativism about truth. It is argued that the most plausible rendering of such a view turns out not to be the radical thesis that it is often represented as being.

It is a platitude in epistemology to say that knowledge excludes luck. Indeed, if one can show that an epistemological theory allows ‘lucky’ knowledge, then that usually suffices to warrant one in straightforwardly rejecting the view. Even despite the prevalence of this intuition, however, very few commentators have explored what it means to say that knowledge is incompatible with luck. In particular, no commentator, so far as I am aware, has offered an account of what luck is and on this (...) basis identified what it means for a true belief to be non-lucky. It is just such a view that I propose, however, and I hope to give a flavour of what this strategy involves here. In particular, I have two goals in this paper. The first is to outline the general contours of the position and show how such a view can account for the attraction of adducing a safety condition on knowledge, with all the epistemic benefits that this principle holds. Relatedly, I will also explain how an anti-luck epistemology can assist us in determining the best formulation of this principle. The second goal of the paper is to show anti-luck epistemology in action by highlighting how such a view can deal with the various problems posed by lottery-style examples. (shrink)

Much of the recent debate regarding scepticism has focussed on a certain template sceptical argument and a rather restricted set of proposals concerning how one might deal with that argument. Throughout this debate the ‘Moorean’ response to scepticism is often cited as a paradigm example of how one should not respond to the sceptical argument, so conceived. As I argue in this paper, however, there are ways of resurrecting the Moorean response to the sceptic. In particular, I consider the prospects (...) for three such proposals in this regard: a classical epistemic internalist neo-Mooreanism, a classical epistemic externalist neo-Mooreanism, and a non-classical McDowellian epistemic internalist neo-Mooreanism, and maintain that the last two of these proposals (both of which make appeal to a disjunctivist account of perception, broadly conceived) merit further exploration. Indeed, I claim that a suitably qualified version of neo-Mooreanism would actually sit quite well with the general philosophical motivations behind other key anti-sceptical views and I argue that given this fact neo-Mooreanism is actually at a dialectical advantage relative to other views when it comes to dealing with the sceptical problem as it is typically conceived. (shrink)

Tsuda offers advanced concepts to model brain functions, includ-ing “chaotic itinerancy,” “attractor ruins,” “singular-continuous nowhere-differentiable attractors,” “Cantor coding,” “multi-Milnor attractor systems,” and “dynamically generated noise.” References to physiological descriptions of attractor landscapes governing activity over cortical fields maintained by millions of action potentials may facilitate their application in future experimental designs and data analyses.

Traditional cognitive science is Cartesian in the sense that it takes as fundamental the distinction between the mental and the physical, the mind and the world. This leads to the claim that cognition is representational and best explained using models derived from AI and computational theory. The authors depart radically from this model.

We argue that informal logic is epistemological. Two central questions concern premise acceptability and connection adequacy. Both may be explicated in tenns of justification, a central epistemological concept. That some premises are basic parallels a foundationalist account of basic beliefs and epistemic support. Some epistemological accounts of these concepts may advance the analysis of premise acceptability and connection adequacy. Infonnallogic has implications for other aspects of philosophy. If causal interpretations are acceptable premises and thus justified, does the world have a (...) causal structure? If evaluative premises are acceptable, i.e., justified, is value an objective feature of the world? (shrink)

This paper describes a pilot study devoted to developing the teaching of philosophy within prison education in Scotland. The study paired the CoPI approach to learning and teaching with a set of educational resources created around a high-profile MOOC that introduced students to core topics in philosophy. The primary goal of the study was to determine the extent to which the teaching of philosophy in prisons in this specific manner could enhance the intellectual virtues, and thereby the intellectual character, of (...) the students. The results that were collected suggested that the project generated significant success on this front. In addition, the study had a further consequence, which had not been anticipated, in that it also helped the students to develop important personal and interpersonal skills, and thereby also enhanced their character more generally. (shrink)

For the tradition, an action is rational if maximizing; for Gauthier, if expressive of a disposition it maximized to adopt; for me, if maximizing on rational preferences, ones whose possession maximizes given one's prior preferences. Decision and Game Theory and their recommendations for choice need revamping to reflect this new standard for the rationality of preferences and choices. It would not be rational when facing a Prisoner's Dilemma to adopt or co-operate from Amartya Sen's "Assurance Game" or "Other Regarding" preferences. (...) But there are preferences which it maximizes to adopt and co-operate from. (shrink)

There are two kinds of resentment relevant to the politics of multiculturalism today. 1 The first, which is basically Nietzsche’s conception of ressentiment, occurs under conditions in which people are subject to systematic and structural deprivation of things they want (and need), combined with a sense of powerlessness about being able to do anything about it. It manifests itself in terms of a focused anger or hatred towards that group of people who seem to have everything they want, and yet (...) also symbolize their powerlessness to get it. For Nietzsche, of course, it was out of this set of emotions and psychological state of mind that the ‘slave revolt’ that gave birth to modern morality emerged, supplanting the aristocratic values oriented around good and bad with the reactive and slavish values of those oriented around good and evil (Nietzsche 1989: 36- 39). The desire to lash out or take revenge against those who you perceive as keeping you down, keeping you from enjoying all the benefits and advantages others enjoy and that you want or feel you deserve, for Nietzsche, is a basic emotional orientation that can – in combination with other complex forces - reshape an entire culture. A second form of resentment is of a more moralized kind; a reactive sentiment bound up with holding another morally accountable for their actions. I resent your curtailment of my liberty, for example, just because I believe we share certain moral commitments – for example, a.. (shrink)

As a recent addition to the editorial board for the journal of Philosophy in the Contemporary World, I wanted to revisit a practice from past editions of the journal—interviewing philosophers who engage philosophical practice that reflects the mission of PCW. In this interview, a model for what I hope will continue to be a regular feature, I have a dialogue with the philosopher Burcu Gurkan. Professor Gurkan currently lives and works in Turkey while I live in work in the central (...) US, so what follows is edited from an email exchange.—Taine Duncan. (shrink)

Illegitimacy in a historic, single community at Penrith, Cumbria (1557–1812), has been studied using aggregative analysis, family reconstitution and time series analysis. This population was living under extreme conditions of hardship. Long, medium and short wavelength cycles in the rate of illegitimacy have been identified by time series analysis; each represents a different response to social and economic pressures. In a complex interaction of events, the peaks of the cycles in wheat prices were associated with rises in adult mortality which (...) promoted an influx of migrants and a concomitant rise in illegitimacy. The association between immigration and illegitimacy was particularly noticeable after the mortality crises of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Children of immigrant families also tended to produce illegitimate offspring. Native and immigrant families responded differently to extrinsic fluctuations, and variations in their reproductive behaviour were probably related to access to resources. (shrink)

The effect of nutrition on fertility and its contribution thereby to population dynamics are assessed in three social groups (elite, tradesmen and subsistence) in a marginal, pre-industrial population in northern England. This community was particularly susceptible to fluctuations in the price of grains, which formed their basic foodstuff. The subsistence class, who formed the largest part of the population, had low levels of fertility and small family sizes, but women from all social groups had a characteristic and marked subfecundity in (...) the early part of their reproductive lives. The health and nutrition of the mother during pregnancy was the most important factor in determining fertility and neonatal mortality. Inadequate nutrition had many subtle effects on reproduction which interacted to produce a complex web of events. A population boom occurred during the second half of the 18th century; fertility did not change but there was a marked improvement in infant mortality and it is suggested that the steadily improving nutritional standards of the population, particularly during crucial periods in pregnancy (i.e. the last trimester), probably made the biggest contribution to the improvement in infant mortality and so was probably the major factor in triggering the boom. (shrink)

Una de las características más notables de los numerosos estudios sobre lectura en voz alta es que no han prestado atención a los jóvenes universitarios. Es más, casi en la totalidad de casos, la lectura en ambientes universitarios se asocia a la lectura silenciosa (Duncan, 2015). Tal como señala la profesora Duncan (2015, 2018, 2020; Duncan y Freeman, 2019), una de las mayores expertas británicas en cuestiones de lectura en voz alta y alfabetización oral en adultos, (...) existen cientos de investigaciones sobre los efectos de la lectura en voz alta en niños, adolescentes y en la tercera edad. Ortlieb y Young (2016) explican que esto se debe a que las ayudas económicas a la investigación buscan, por un lado, potenciar la educación infantil y prevenir dificultades de aprendizaje y, por el otro, frenar algunas enfermedades mentales degenerativas propias de la vejez. Del mismo modo, existe una creencia generalizada que dice que esta lectura es cosa de niños, que es una práctica para llevarse a cabo en clases de primaria y secundaria y que, con suerte, algunos padres la implementan cada noche con sus vástagos con la esperanza de despertarles el hábito de la lectura por placer (Cassany, 2007; Israel y Duffy, 2014). Pero a nivel universitario, se presenta como un procedimiento casi anecdótico, entre otras razones, por la falta de formación del profesorado (Warner et al., 2016). Incluso en el reciente estudio de Duncan (2020), esta afirma que su libro no trata sobre cómo trabajar esta lectura en el aula universitaria sino más bien de examinar los hábitos de lectura en voz alta de adultos en el siglo XXI. (shrink)

As part of the “Solar Geoengineering: Ethics, Governance, and International Politics” roundtable, this essay examines dilemmas arising in exploring nonideal scenarios of solar geoengineering deployment. Model-based knowledge about solar geoengineering tells us little about possible climatic responses to malicious, self-interested, or competing deployments, and even less about political or cultural responses outside of the climate system. The essay argues that policy for governing solar geoengineering in a world of multiple states and uneven power relations requires a broader base for solar (...) geoengineering knowledge, beyond that offered by modeling, and a better understanding of nonideal scenarios, especially those motivated by logics beyond reducing climate impacts. It highlights the interests of military and security actors in such knowledge, and the potential for it to facilitate securitization and further reduce the prospect of multilateral collaborative governance of geoengineering in the public interest. The essay concludes that further research can be ethically justified but must be comprehensively governed. (shrink)

"The structural patterns of the comic … deny the sovereignty of the individual."The question of the nature of humor is not new. Many have applied themselves to understanding it in both general and specific ways, and because of the widespread interest in the subject, humor research is not limited to any one discipline or theory, although many available humor theories conform to the concerns of particular paradigms. Given the inevitable and pervasive pluralism around humor, there is no dominant perspective on (...) how it can best be understood. Each theory that sheds light on the phenomenon may be valuable in its own way, although clearly some theories are better than others.1Thomas Veach is a recent thinker who has... (shrink)

Marx did not approach the state in answer to some such broad and abstract philosophical question as: What is the state? Nor did he offer a full sociological or historical or analytic account of state institutions and functions, and there are hence clear and substantial dangers in extrapolating to all or most conditions an account which is, in large part, specific to bourgeois society. Failing a comprehensive and formal treatise on politics and the state, Marx's own discussion consists of a (...) number of scattered and not altogether consistent general observations and some detailed investigation of the role and character of the state in particular historical situations. It seems sensible, then, to begin an elucidation of his account of the state with a comment on the nature of his interest in the subject. Why did he need a theory of the state? At what points does it become important to his explanatory and his revolutionary doctrines? (shrink)

We survey the contents of Finocchiaro's papers collected in Arguments about Arguments , pointing out, where appropriate, their expected interest for readers of Philosophy of the Social Sciences. The papers include essays about argument theory and reasoning, the nature of fallacies and fallaciousness, critiques of noteworthy contributions to argumentation theory, and historical essays on scientific thinking. Key Words: arguments • dialectic • dialectical approach • empirical logic • evaluation • fallacies • informal logic • interpretation • reasoning.

We have already seen what happens in a typical experiment in quantum physics. When an observation is recorded say on a phosphor screen or photographic plate quantum entities (like photons or electrons) will appear as particles in precise positions. But their observed distribution is predicted by Schroedinger's wave function, and in appropriate conditions they exhibit Airy's wave associated ring pattern. This suggests that while unobserved they were behaving as waves which can spread out in more than one direction at once (...) but once they are observed, they have just a single position, a characteristic of a particle. The act of observation "collapses the wave function" and an actual state precipitates, as it were, out of the cloud of previously possible states. This is what scandalized Einstein: that the chance event of an observation should not merely uncover but actually create the reality of the universe. But the question arises: what is so special about a device such as a light sensitive plate, that its interception of a quantum entity should count as an observation and so "create" actuality in this way? (shrink)