In the “Appendix” to the Treatise, Hume claims that he has discovered a “very considerable” mistake in his earlier discussion of the self. Hume's expression of the problem is notoriously opaque, leading to a vast scholarly debate as to exactly what problem he identified in his earlier account of the self. I propose a new solution to this interpretive puzzle. I argue that a tension generated by Hume's conceptual skepticism about real “principles of union” and his account of fictions of (...) the imagination is the defect identified in the “Appendix.”. (shrink)

Psychological studies show that the beliefs of two agents in a hypothesis can diverge even if both agents receive the same evidence. This phenomenon of belief polarisation is often explained by invoking biased assimilation of evidence, where the agents’ prior views about the hypothesis affect the way they process the evidence. We suggest, using a Bayesian model, that even if such influence is excluded, belief polarisation can still arise by another mechanism. This alternative mechanism involves differential weighting of the evidence (...) arising when agents have different initial views about the reliability of their sources of evidence. We provide a systematic exploration of the conditions for belief polarisation in Bayesian models which incorporate opinions about source reliability, and we discuss some implications of our findings for the psychological literature. (shrink)

There has been considerable puzzlement over how to respond to higher-order evidence. The existing dilemmas can be defused by adopting a ‘two-dimensional’ representation of doxastic attitudes which incorporates not only substantive uncertainty about which first-order state of affairs obtains but also the degree of conviction with which we hold the attitude. This makes it possible that in cases of higher-order evidence the evidence sometimes impacts primarily on our conviction, rather than our substantive uncertainty. I argue that such a two-dimensional representation (...) is naturally developed by making use of imprecise probabilities. (shrink)

Refutes the methodological separatists who hold that the logic of explanation and testing in the human sciences is fundamentally different than in the natural sciences, and develops complementary accounts for interpretation and explanation, ...

An interpretation is offered of Thrasymachus' account of the nature of justice and just action in book I of the 'Republic' which is internally consistent throughout on all important points. Just action is not defined in terms of its practical consequences, as many commentators assume, but rather in terms of its logical consequences 'vis-a-vis' just agents. When one man acts justly towards another, the performance of the just act renders the just agent vulnerable to unfair or unjust exploitation by those (...) with whom he deals. The "strong man", in Thrasymachus' sense, would thus never be a just man. It is argued that Socrates addresses himself to this position, but that, while the textual Thrasymachus is silenced, Socrates' best arguments are, in fact, inadequate to refute Thrasymachus. (shrink)

'Ugly as sin', 'ugly duckling', 'rear its ugly head'. The word 'ugly' is used freely, yet it is a loaded term: from the simply plain and unsightly to the repulsive and even offensive, definitions slide all over the place. Hovering around 'feared and dreaded', ugliness both repels and fascinates. But the concept of ugliness has a lineage that has long haunted our cultural imagination. Gretchen E. Henderson explores perceptions of ugliness through history, from ancient Roman feasts to medieval grotesque (...) gargoyles, from Mary Shelley's monster cobbled from corpses to the Nazi Exhibition of Degenerate Art. Covering literature, art, music and even Uglydolls, Henderson reveals how ugliness has long posed a challenge to aesthetics and taste. Henderson digs into the muck of ugliness, moving beyond the traditional philosophic argument or mere opposition to beauty, and emerges with more than a selection of fascinating tidbits. Following ugly bodies and dismantling ugly senses across periods and continents, [this book] draws on a wealth of fields to cross cultures and times, delineating the changing map of ugliness as it charges the public imagination. Illustrated with a range of artefacts, this book offers a refreshing perspective that moves beyond the surface to ask what 'ugly' truly is, even as its meaning continues to shift. (shrink)

Kelly Aguirre, Phil Henderson, Cressida J. Heyes, Alana Lentin, and Corey Snelgrove engage with different aspects of Robert Nichols’ Theft is Property! Dispossession and Critical Theory. Henderson focuses on possible spaces for maneuver, agency, contradiction, or failure in subject formation available to individuals and communities interpellated through diremptive processes. Heyes homes in on the ritual of antiwill called “consent” that systematically conceals the operation of power. Aguirre foregrounds tensions in projects of critical theory scholarship that aim for dialogue (...) and solidarity with Indigenous decolonial struggles. Lentin draws attention to the role of race in undergirding the logic of Anglo-settler colonial domination that operates through dispossession, while Snelgrove emphasizes the link between alienation, capital, and colonialism. In his reply to his interlocutors, Nichols clarifies aspects of his “recursive logics” of dispossession, a dispossession or theft through which the right to property is generated. (shrink)

“I am not mad, most noble Festus, but speak the words of truth and soberness.” In this cry of Paul's we hear the idealist in all ages making his agonized claim to realism in face of the Powers that Be. Festus and Agrippa represent the ex-officio history-makers in this scene. Paul is proclaiming fundamental facts and possibilities that those who have power fail to see. And so, in claiming to be sane, he becomes the spokesman for all who see the (...) Not-Yet as stronger than the Now, and behold What is Meant to Be as more powerful than What Is. (shrink)

Storchak, Ehlis, and Fallgatter provide an extensive literature review on electrophysiological measurements, which indicate that general predictive deficits in self‐monitoring are associated with various positive symptoms in patients with schizophrenia.

That Socrates took himself to possess a divine sign is well attested by ancient sources. Both Plato and Xenophon mention Socrates’ daimonion on numerous occasions. What is problematic for contemporary scholars is that Socrates unfailingly obeys the warnings of his sign. Scholars have worried that Socrates seems to ascribe greater epistemic authority to his sign than his own critical reasoning. Moreover, he never so much as questions the authority of his sign to guide his actions, much less its divine nature. (...) Socrates’ unquestioning obedience to his sign thus appears to be in conflict with another of Socrates’ defining characteristics: namely, his relentless rationality. However, Socrates does not seem to recognize such inconsistency. The problem of the daimonion, then, is this: is Socrates’ professed commitment to rationality consistent with his unquestioning deference to his daimonion’s warnings? And if so, how? In this paper, I first discuss several solutions to the problem of the daimonion. I aim to show that none of the accounts of Socrates’ sign that have appeared in the scholarly literature are adequate. I then propose a new account of the daimonion, which, I argue, secures the rationality of Socrates’ obedience to his divine sign. (shrink)

Confucian education is best captured by the programme described in the Great Learning. Education is presented first as the process of self-cultivation for the sake of developing virtuous character. Self-cultivation then allows for virtue to be cultivated in the familial, social and international dimensions. My central thesis is that Confucianism can serve as a universal framework of educating people for the common good in its promotion of personal cultivation for the sake of human progress. On this account the common good (...) specifically refers to the social order accomplished by the virtuous behaviour found in the members of society. In this paper I argue that the Confucian notion of “lesser learning” sheds light on the concept of general education and the notion of “greater learning” improves our understanding of liberal education. Under this analysis the necessity of general education is assured although its importance should not be overly exaggerated. Furthermore, the objectives of liberal education deserve greater emphasis due to their historical importance and enduring relevance to promoting the common good of universal humanity. (shrink)

Doctors’ survival predictions for terminally ill patients have been shown to be inaccurate and there has been an argument for less guesswork and more use of carefully constructed statistical indices. As statisticians, the authors are less confident in the predictive value of statistical models and indices for individual survival times. This paper discusses and illustrates a variety of measures which can be used to summarise predictive information available from a statistical model. The authors argue that models and statistical indices can (...) be useful at the group or population level, but that human survival is so uncertain that even the best statistical analysis cannot provide single-number predictions of real use for individual patients. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify Locke’s distinction between simple and complex ideas. I argue that Locke accepts what I call the “compositional criterion of simplicity.” According to this criterion, an idea is simple just in case it does not have another idea as a proper part. This criterion is prima facie inconsistent with Locke’s view that there are simple ideas of extension. This objection was presented to Locke by his French translator, Pierre Coste, on behalf of Jean Barbeyrac. Locke responded (...) to Barbeyrac’s objection, but his response, along with a passage from Chapter XV of Book II of the Essay, “Of Duration and Expansion, considered together,” has been taken to show that he did not accept the compositional criterion. I examine these passages and argue that they are not in tension with but rather affirm that criterion. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:What more can be said about COVID-19 and the social determinants of health? This article describes neglected perspectives that derive from the history of social epidemiology, a field that identifies the social etiology of disease and variations in disease incidence among people differentially located in the social structure. The "discovery" of social determinants of diseases like COVID-19 is nothing new for epidemiology: debate over how to analyze structural determinants versus individual-level risk factors persisted throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. By (...) the late 20th century, research had highlighted fundamental causes of health disparities, such as social conditions and structural racism; these are structural factors, embedded in the social fabric of life. Measurement of structured inequalities within systems faces complex and challenging problems, as research aims to better account for these lived realities at different levels of analysis and as multiple factors merge to influence outcomes (revealed in intersectionality theory). At each of these intersections, there are opportunities for bioethicists to consider their ethical implications. It is imperative to understand the social and ethical roots of our present conversations about health inequalities, in order to partner intelligently with researchers on the forefront of advocating for change. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hume on the Self and Personal Identity ed. by Dan O’BrienBridger EhliDan O’Brien, ed. Hume on the Self and Personal Identity. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022. Pp. xxiv + 321. Softcover. ISBN: 9783031042751. $129.99This is an engaging collection of essays on a central topic in Hume’s philosophy. Perhaps Hume’s best-known contribution to the philosophy of the self is his denial, in section 1.4.6 of the Treatise, “Of personal identity,” (...) of the existence of a simple, enduring self that is accessible by reflection. But as his distinction between personal identity “as it regards our thought or imagination” and personal identity “as it regards our passions or the concern we take for ourselves” suggests, he has more to say about the self and personal identity than the skeptical doctrines presented in T 1.4.6 (T 1.4.6.5). One virtue of the collection is that it strives to capture the breadth and complexity of Hume’s thinking about the self.The collection, which focuses primarily on the Treatise, is divided into three parts. The essays in Part 1 consider Book 1 and the Appendix. Andrew Ward’s “How Sceptical is Hume’s Theory of Personal Identity?” argues for the provocative thesis that Hume’s intention in the Appendix is not to express dissatisfaction with either his metaphysics of the self or his psychological explanation of ascriptions of identity and simplicity to the self. According to Ward, Hume’s aim is rather to “clarify and strengthen his sceptical position” by reinforcing his rejection of realist accounts of personal identity (13). To my mind, Ward does not adequately address the textual evidence that has led other commentators to believe that the Appendix identifies a defect in T 1.4.6’s discussion of the self, such as Hume’s complaint that he does not “know how to correct [his] former opinions, nor how to render them consistent” (T App 10).Donald Ainslie’s “Hume’s Bundle” is also chiefly concerned with the interpretation of the Appendix. Ainslie has defended an influential reading according to which Hume’s problem in the Appendix concerns his psychological explanation of ascriptions of unity to the self. Here, he argues against interpretations according to which Hume’s problem concerns his metaphysical account of the self as a bundle of perceptions. According to Ainslie, Hume did not worry about how one’s perceptions come to be bundled together, because he treated the fact that perceptions come in distinct bundles as brute. This argument against the bundling interpretation seems less than decisive. At least some versions of that interpretation can be understood to hold that Hume’s problem in the Appendix arises from his being unable to answer a causal question: what is the cause of one’s perceptions’ being bundled together? In the “Letter from a Gentleman,” Hume suggests that the maxim according to which everything has a cause enjoys moral, albeit neither intuitive nor demonstrative, certainty [End Page 377] (LG 26). Insofar as he accepts this maxim, he would hold that the question of the cause of the bundling of one’s perceptions has an answer and, accordingly, that the bundling of one’s perceptions is not brute.The themes of Galen Strawson’s “What I Call Myself ” will be familiar to readers of his The Evident Connexion. Strawson argues against a traditional reading of Hume according to which he both holds that the self is nothing more than a bundle of perceptions and denies the existence of subjects of experience. Central to Straw-son’s case is what he calls the “Experience/Experiencer Thesis,” which says that the existence of an experience requires the existence of a subject of experience. Strawson takes Hume to endorse this “necessary truth” and, hence, to hold that no perception can exist without its being experienced by a subject (48). But there is a text that tells against Hume’s endorsing the Experience/Experiencer Thesis. In section 1.4.2, “Of scepticism with regard to the senses,” Hume argues that “the continu’d existence of... perceptions involves no contradiction” (T 1.4.2.40). Because what it is for perceptions... (shrink)

The United States recognized intellectual property rights from its earliest days and included, in its constitution, a clause which expresses this, "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." These few words found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 have grown into a massive body of laws that govern works that were unimaginable to Thomas Jefferson and his contemporaries. Our question (...) today is very simple: is the latest metamorphosis of copyright law, the Digital Millennial Copyright Act of 1998, prudent policy? Specifically, we are concerned with three issues which critics have raised regarding this act: chilling effects on fair use, suppression of innovation, and overreach. We will also touch on the criticism which stresses that the DMCA further expands a system which increasingly and unfairly favors the content industries. This will be limited to illustrating extant tensions between copyright owners and society and also the difficulties law faces in keeping pace with the current, rapid and overwhelming technological and cultural change. We rely primarily on leading cases to establish the impact on fair use and innovation or to demonstrate over reach. (shrink)

There seems no good reason for doctors to work in secret. Individual users of healthcare and the community in general, which ultimately bears the cost, are perfectly entitled to know how their health services and health providers are performing. The promulgation of surgical report cards has been hailed by some as a liberating step in the right direction. This paper seeks to analyse, from a clinician’s perspective, the evolution and limitations of report cards. Ultimately, the importance of report cards will (...) not be their immediate utility, which is minimal, but as a first step in a much wider and far more important debate about how we meaningfully measure the quality of health services and providers (including managers and bureaucrats), the likely cost of such an enterprise, how much we are willing and able to pay and how we reconcile the competing needs of information versus clinical and preventive care when all are competing for the same and inadequate pool of resources. (shrink)

Two herdsmen meet and bicker; bargain over a stake; duel in balladeering; and ballot their umpire for a final decision. The first half of their poem dramatizes the process of challenge and defiance from which the bout materializes; the result is a draw. Critics attempt what none of its three herdsmen try out loud, namely to solve the pair of riddles with which the song-contest ends, before the judge pronounces the result. Solutions range between putative attribution to the bucolic minds (...) of the riddlers, and ascription to their creator, the intellectual, urban, bookish, Hellenizing poetaster, who here, in any event, dares a touch of rustic needling that he precisely did not find in his studies in Theocritea, which include no riddles. Solution has generally seemed the self-evident challenge to scholar-readers. (shrink)