Philosophers and psychologists make many different, seemingly incompatible parsimony claims in support of competing models of cognition in nonhuman animals. This variety of parsimony claims is problematic. Firstly, it is difficult to justify each specific variety. This problem is especially salient for Morgan's Canon, perhaps the most important variety of parsimony claimed. Secondly, there is no systematic way of adjudicating between particular claims when they conflict. I argue for a view of parsimony in comparative psychology that solves these problems, based (...) on Sober's view that parsimony claims are claims that one model is more plausible given background theory. (shrink)

Introduction Les femmes n'ont eu véritablement accès au pastorat dans les Églises protestantes françaises qu'en l966. Certes, une femme avait été consacrée en 1948, mais à condition de rester célibataire et sans enfants. Celles qui dans les années suivantes exercèrent exceptionnellement la fonction pastorale ne furent pas consacrées. L'accès des femmes au ministère féminin vient couronner de succès les efforts de plusieurs générations de partisans de l'égalité des sexes au sein du pro..

In psychology, increasing interest in priming has brought with it a revival of associationist views. Association seems a natural explanation for priming: simple associative links carry subcritical levels of activation from representations of the prime stimulus to representations of the target stimulus. This then facilitates use of the representation of the target. I argue that the processes responsible for priming are not associative. They are more complex. Even so, associative models do get something right about how these processes behave. As (...) a result, I argue, we should reconsider how we interpret associative models, taking them to identify regularities in the sequence of representational states in any kind of process, rather than as denoting a particular kind of process. (shrink)

The results generated by experimentalists in psychology and economics haveled to numerous advances in the study of human decision making under risk.Camerer (1995) and Rabin (1998) provide excellent reviews of the relevantliterature. These results clearly display the gap between normative theoriesof ideal behavior and descriptive theories of observed behavior. The mostprominent result is loss aversion – the observation that a loss is given greatervalue than a gain of an equal size – and the resulting S-shaped utility function.Rabin puts the key (...) point as follows: ``Researchers have identified a pervasive feature of reference dependence: In a wide variety of domains, people are significantly more averse to losses than they are attracted to same size gains''(Rabin 1998, 13–14). In what follows, I will show that the ``wide variety of domains'' is wide indeed. In particular, I will review the effects of the S-shaped utility function on the resolution of the decision to commit a crime, to decision to violate professional ethics, and the decision to participate in a rebellion. (shrink)

Association dominated theorizing about the mind in the English-speaking world from the early eighteenth century through the mid-twentieth and remained an important concept into the twenty-first. This endurance across centuries and intellectual traditions means that it has manifested in many different ways in different views of mind. This article traces associationist themes as they developed over the years by presenting the views of central historical figures in each era, focusing specifically on their conception of the associative relation and how it (...) operates in the mind. (shrink)

This paper presents a theory of conclusions based upon the suggestions of Tukey [21]. The logic offered here is based upon two rules of detachment that occur naturally in probabilistic inference, a traditional rule of acceptance, and a rule of rejection. The rules of detachment provide flexibility: the theory of conclusions can account for both statistical and deductive arguments. The rule of acceptance governs the acceptance of new conclusions, is a variant of the rule of high probability, and is a (...) limiting case of a decision-theoretic rule of acceptance. The rule of rejection governs the removal of previously accepted conclusions on the basis of new evidence. The resulting theory of conclusions is not a decision-theoretic logic but does, through the aforementioned limiting property, provide a line of demarcation between decision and conclusion (i.e., nondecision) logics of acceptance. The theory of conclusions therefore complements decision-theoretic inference. The theory of conclusions presented here satisfies Tukey's desiderata, specifically: (1) conclusions are statements which are accepted on the basis of unusually strong evidence; (2) conclusions are to remain accepted unless and until unusually strong evidence to the contrary arises; (3) conclusions are subject to future rejection, when and if the evidence against them becomes strong enough. Finally, the proferred theory of conclusions has a strong conservative bias, reflecting Tukey's aims. (shrink)

Comparative psychology experiments typically test a null statistical hypothesis against an alternative. Coupled with Morgan’s canon, this is often taken to imply that the model positing the simpler psychological capacity should be treated as a ‘default’ that must be ruled out before any other model can be accepted. It has been posited that this practice neglects evidence. I argue that the problem is deeper, including the way it structures the evaluation of evidence that is considered; it frames model choice around (...) the acceptance or rejection of a default. I oppose this default framing in all its forms and develop an evidentialist alternative. Default framing fails to respect the difference between experimental statistical hypotheses and substantive hypotheses such as models. It is not actually supported by the use of null hypothesis significance testing (which I retain), it distorts the weighting of evidence, and it systematically biases practice. (shrink)

Philosophers and psychologists have long worried that the human tendency to anthropomorphize leads us to err in our understanding of nonhuman minds. This tendency, which I call intuitive anthropomorphism, is a heuristic used by our unconscious folk psychology to understand nonhuman animals. The dominant understanding of intuitive anthropomorphism underestimates its complexity. If we want to understand and control intuitive anthropomorphism, we must treat it as a cognitive bias and look to the empirical evidence. This evidence suggests that the most common (...) control for intuitive anthropomorphism, Morgan’s Canon, should be rejected, while others are incomplete. It also suggests new approaches. (shrink)

I challenge the dominant understanding of what it means to say two thoughts are associated. The two views that dominate the current literature treat association as a kind of mechanism that drives sequences of thought. The first, which I call reductive associationism, treats association as a kind of neural mechanism. The second treats association as a feature of the kind of psychological mechanism associative processing. Both of these views are inadequate. I argue that association should instead be seen as a (...) highly abstract filler term, standing in for causal relations between representational states in a system. Associations, so viewed, could be implemented by many different mechanisms. I outline the role that this view gives associative models as part of a top-down characterization of psychological processes of any kind and of any complexity. (shrink)

There are two roles that association played in 18th–19th century associationism. The first dominates modern understanding of the history of the concept: association is a causal link posited to explain why ideas come in the sequence they do. The second has been ignored: association is merely regularity in the trains of thought, and the target of explanation. The view of association as regularity arose in several forms throughout the tradition, but Thomas Brown (1778–1820) makes the distinction explicit. He argues that (...) there is no associative link, and association is mere sequence. I trace this view of association through the tradition, and consider its implications: Brown's views, in particular, motivate a rethinking of the associationist tradition in psychology. Associationism was a project united by a shared explanandum phenomenon, rather than a theory united by a shared theoretical posit. (shrink)

Efforts to recruit and retain farmers have traditionally supported the farm business through a focus on access to land, capital, and business skills. While these efforts are critical, a small body of work indicates that these may be insufficient because they rarely account for the social and economic needs of farm households and how the (in)ability to meet these needs interacts with the development and economic viability of the farm enterprise. Social and economic needs include, but are not limited to (...) access to health insurance and health care, childcare, adequate household and retirement income, affordable housing, and food security. This article introduces a symposium intended to shed light on these underappreciated needs and how they connect to the farm enterprise. We contend that a greater understanding of farm households’ lived realities meeting their social and economic needs could lead to a paradigm shift in how we understand and support farm families’ resilience. We set the stage for the eight articles in this symposium in two ways. First, we present the theoretical and empirical reasons why considering household-level needs is crucial when working towards supporting the agricultural sector. Second, we review the literature on farm households’ social and economic needs. We then thematically summarize the key insights from the eight articles. Despite variations in topics studied, research designs, and geographical contexts, we note a clear pattern in what the authors see as the implications of their findings. Namely, they reaffirm the need to challenge the traditional view that separates household needs from farm enterprise activities and outcomes. Their collective call for stronger social and agricultural programs and policies is noteworthy and may in part be connected to the structural underpinnings of the challenges meeting social and economic needs highlighted across the articles. (shrink)

Have I made a mistake in my Anarchism, or has the editor of Liberty himself tripped? At any rate, I must challenge the Anarchism of one sentence in his otherwise masterful paper upon 'State Socialism and Anarchism.' If I am wrong, I stand open to conviction. It is this. 'They [Anarchists] look forward to a time...when the children born of these relations shall belong exclusively to the mothers until old enough to belong to themselves.'.

"An impressively reasoned and startlingly unorthodox treatise on religion." - Belles Lettres Florence Nightingale (1820-1920) is famous as the heroine of the Crimean War and later as a campaigner for health care founded on a clean environment and good nursing. Though best known for her pioneering demonstration that disease rather than wounds killed most soldiers, she was also heavily allied to social reform movements and to feminist protest against the enforced idleness of middle-class women. This original edition provides bold (...) new insights into Nightingale's beliefs and a new picture of the relationship between feminism and religion. Suggestions for Thought to the Searchers after Truth Among the Artisans of England (1860), which contains the novel Cassandra , is a central text in 19th-century history of feminist thought and is published here for the first time. Nightingale argues that work was the means by which every individual sought self-fulfillment and served God. She wrote influentially about the group most Victorians declared to be above work: unmarried, middle-class women. (shrink)

Florence Larocque et Anne-Marie Reynaud.

Despite its long period of dominance, the details of associationism as developed by the British Empiricists in the 18th and 19th centuries are often ignored or forgotten today. Perhaps as a result, modern understandings of Empiricist associationism are often oversimplified. In fact, there is no single core view that can be viewed as definitional, or even weaker, as characteristic, of the tradition. The actual views of associationists in this tradition are much more diverse than any such view would allow, even (...) on fundamental aspects of the concept of association. This paper presents some of the most striking theoretical diversity and most significant discussions within the Empiricist associationist tradition. Recognizing this diversity, Empiricist associationism is best viewed as a project with shared questions and methods rather than a shared substantive theory of mind. This discussion can inform our understanding of the historical tradition, and also inform our current use of association and associationism. The concept of association is more flexible than it is often treated, and even its basic nature and function remain up for debate. (shrink)

Que vient révéler une grossesse en adolescence? Derrière cette question mettant en scène plusieurs personnages (certains dans les coulisses) se cachent plusieurs générations, des couples, la famille au sens intergénérationnel et aussi parfois au sens transgénérationnel. Comment penser ces fécondations qui entraînent des grossesses – à interrompre? à poursuivre? Quelles places pour les sujets, les couples et les familles? Trente ans d’expérience en centre de planification et d’éducation familiale nourrissent le questionnement dont l’auteur fait part dans cet article.

I suggest addressing the problems Yarkoni identifies by separating substantive from statistical hypotheses, and treating them differently. A statistical test of experimental data only bears directly on statistical hypotheses. Evaluation of related substantive hypotheses requires an additional, qualitative inference to the best explanation. Statistical inference cannot do all of the work of theory choice.

How secularism lost its soul -- Why belief belongs in public life (and unbelievers should be glad) -- Spinoza's guide to theocracy -- Why there are no religions of the book -- Has God found science? -- Darwin made me do it -- Original virtue -- The search for the theory of everyone -- Ethics from below -- The Umma and the community of conscience -- The future is openness.

Michael Rea has argued that philosophical naturalists cannot coherently regard the adoption of naturalism as a “research program” as more epistemically rational than the adoption of the alternatives, like intuitionism or supernatural theism. I show that Rea’s argument fails by overlooking several species of epistemic reasons for adopting research programs.

In defending a new framework for incorporating metacognitive debiasing strategies into critical thinking education, Jeffrey Maynes draws on ecological rationality theory to argue that in felicitous environments, agents will achieve greater epistemic success by relying on heuristics rather than more ideally rational procedures. He considers a challenge presented by Mercier and Sperber’s “interactionist” thesis that individual biases contribute to successful group reasoning. I argue that the challenge can be met without assuming an individualist ideal of the critical thinker as a (...) solitary reasoner. Focusing on cognitive laziness and myside bias, I then argue that a more complete reckoning with the implications of interactionism about reasoning will require us to transcend individualism more fully to embrace the selection, design, regulation, and navigation of dialogic environments as central pedagogical aims of critical thinking education. (shrink)

By attending to how people speak about their gender, we can find diverse answers to the question of what it is like to have a gender identity. To some, it is little more than having a body whereas others may report it as more attitudinal or dispositional—seemingly contradictory views. In this paper, I seek to reconcile these disparate answers by developing a theory of how individual gender identity comes about. In the simplest possible terms, I propose that gender identity is (...) how we make sense of our gender subjectivity, the totality of our gendered experiences of ourselves. Gender identity is constituted by gender subjectivity, but this constitutive relationship is underdetermined. While gender subjectivity may narrow the range of inhabitable gender identities, it is always compatible with more than one. To arrive at a gender identity, we arrange gender subjectivity like building materials. My theory helps us understand how different people offer seemingly incompatible accounts of their gender identity without questioning their authenticity or validity. They simply arrange similar building materials differently. (shrink)

Some thoughts just come to mind together. This is usually thought to happen because they are connected by associations, which the mind follows. Such an explanation assumes that there is a particular kind of simple psychological process responsible. This view has encountered criticism recently. In response, this paper aims to characterize a general understanding of associative simplicity, which might support the distinction between associative processing and alternatives. I argue that there are two kinds of simplicity that are treated as characteristic (...) of association, and as a result three possible versions of associative processing. This provides a framework that informs our understanding of association as a current and historical concept, including how various specific versions in different parts of psychology relate to one another. This framework can also guide debates over normative evaluations of actions produced by processes thought to be associative. (shrink)

Drawing on the principle of subsidiarity, this article develops a framework for allocating medical decision-making authority in the absence of capacity to consent and argues that decisional authority in paediatric transgender healthcare should generally lie in the patient. Regardless of patients’ capacity, there is usually nobody better positioned to make medical decisions that go to the heart of a patient’s identity than the patients themselves. Under the principle of subsidiarity, decisional authority should only be held by a higher level decision-maker, (...) such as parents or judges, if lower level decision-makers are incapable of satisfactorily addressing the issue even with support and the higher level decision-maker is better positioned to satisfactorily address the issue than all lower level decision-makers. Because gender uniquely pertains to personal identity and self-realisation, parents and judges are rarely better positioned to make complex medical decisions. Instead of taking away trans youth’s authority over their healthcare decisions, we should focus on supporting their ability to take the best possible decision for themselves. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 6, June 2019, Page W3-W4.

Numerous mediators are involved in both the control and the transmission of nociceptive messages, and several lines of research have been developed in the management of pain. Complete enkephalin- degrading enzyme inhibitors, which produce naloxone-reversible analgesia in all tests where morphine has been found to be active, remains the most promising way. CCK compounds, especially the CCKB antagonists also may be interesting drugs. Indeed, they are able to strongly potentiate the antinociceptive effects of the opioids. [dickenson, wiesenfeld-hallin et al.].

En faisant du sujet de droit la prémisse anthropologique de la société, la modernité bouleverse la nature de l’intérêt général qui se mesure désormais à l’aune des aspirations individuelles. L’intérêt général est moins un principe qu’une notion relationnelle, qui articule, par le moyen du contrat, la composition des droits et des intérêts particuliers. Pourtant, la réciprocité initiale entre le droit et l’intérêt débouche sur une tension contrariant le projet de composer un intérêt général apte à les satisfaire également. L’étude conjointe (...) de deux auteurs, Thomas Hobbes et John Locke, permet de saisir que la priorité accordée à l’un des deux pôles, le droit et l’intérêt, aboutit à des pensées politiques radicalement divergentes, selon qu’elles portent l’accent sur l’exigence de la justice ou sur la poursuite de l’utilité sociale. Parce que la satisfaction des intérêts menace parfois de se retourner contre les droits, tandis que la protection des droits tend à discriminer les intérêts, la question se pose de savoir si l’univocité de la formule « intérêt général » ne masque pas une dualité dans sa nature, rendant problématique son statut d’idéal régulateur pour les sociétés modernes. (shrink)

La clôture évoque un espace dont il est difficile, voire impossible, de franchir les limites. Si le terme renvoie surtout à l’histoire de l’enfermement religieux, il peut aussi être associé à d’autres espaces, réels ou imaginaires, d’internement, de séparation et de frontières contraintes : la prison, la maison de correction, l’asile psychiatrique, le harem, la maison close, et encore le paradis et l’enfer, ou le corps féminin virginal ou voilé… Comment la différenciation des sexes s’organise...

Dès le tournant des xixe et xxe siècles en France, les féministes abordent la question du nom des femmes dans une perspective égalitaire et identitaire qui englobe la nomination, la dénomination et la filiation, à savoir le nom comme réputation et identité personnelle, le pseudonyme, le nom des femmes mariées, l’appellation Madame/Mademoiselle et la transmission du nom. À partir des moments forts du débat et des mobilisations autour du nom des femmes, une généalogie conceptuelle est retracée de la Belle Époque (...) aux premières années du xxie siècle. Les discours et pratiques féministes radicales de la Belle Époque, d’Hubertine Auclert et de Clémence Royer en particulier, posent les termes du débat qui est repris par les féministes modérées et par les féminismes d’État, à partir des années 1970, puis à nouveau par les féministes radicales qui œuvrent aux changements législatifs et administratifs (1985, 2002, 2012, 2013). Au-delà du droit, les pratiques égalitaires et l’inscription du nom des femmes dans l’espace public restent un objectif féministe. (shrink)