In this essay, Giovanbattista Tusa suggests that we are currently witnessing a mutation, which disrupts the mythical imaginary that had confined viruses, climate change, and atmospheric turbulences to an immutable background in the all-too-human narrative of the struggle against nature. I argue that the incapacity of translating this mutation in cultural and social terms, and the repression of this traumatic experience, are the cause of the perturbation that haunts our time. Disorientation pervades philosophy when the entire imaginary to which (...) it had anchored its power to change the world seems to dissolve in the air, when what was silent and distant turns out to be vibrant, more familiar to us than any known proximity. Precisely for this reason, philosophy must rediscover its ability to inhabit times and spaces different from those oriented by the hegemony of capitalist progress, with its correlate of regular catastrophic emergencies and calculated risk. In this essay, Giovanbattista Tusa aims to present a perspective in which, instead of coming back straightforwardly ‘down to earth’, philosophy accepts inhabiting the fluctuating disorientation of its own time, itself populated by intermittent and uncertain opportunities of experiencing differently the past and the future—to encounter different relationships with the times that change. (shrink)

This is the first book to provide a coherent overview over the ethical implications of AI-related technologies in medicine. It explores how these technologies transform practices, relationships, and environments in the clinical field. It provides an introduction into ethical issues such as data security and privacy protection, bias and algorithmic fairness, trust and transparency, challenges to the doctor-patient relationship, and new perspectives for informed consent. The book focuses on the transformative impact that technology is having on medicine, and discusses several (...) strategies for dealing with the resulting challenges. It also introduces innovative methods of ethics research for addressing existing desiderata and future challenges. This book is written to inform health care professionals, policy-makers, and researchers in medicine, health sciences, nursing science, social sciences, and ethics, but may also function as a primary textbook for graduate as well as undergraduate university courses. (shrink)

Relativists make room for the possibility of “faultless disagreement” by positing the existence of subjective propositions, i.e. propositions true from some points of view and not others. We discuss whether the adoption of this position with respect to a certain domain of discourse is compatible with a realist attitude towards the matters arising in that domain. At first glance, the combination of relativism and realism leads to an unattractive metaphysical picture on which reality comprises incoherent facts. We will sketch the (...) contours of a realist-relativist position called “subjectivism”, which avoids this result by giving up the assumption that the points of view of different subjects are all metaphysically “on a par”. (shrink)

Currently, anomalous lived temporality is not included in the main diagnostic criteria or standard symptom checklists. In this article, we present the Transdiagnostic Assessment of Temporal Experience, a structured interview that can be used by researchers and clinicians without a comprehensive phenomenological background to explore abnormal time experiences in persons with abnormal mental conditions regardless of their diagnosis. When extensive data gathered by this scale are available, it will be possible to delineate well-defined anomalous lived temporality profiles for each psychopathological (...) disorder. This instrument may also prove useful for clinicians by providing a more refined assessment of relevant psychopathological symptoms and an in-depth understanding of the patient’s abnormal behaviour as related to specific types of time experience. In the first part of the article, we provide a brief overview of the phenomenological concept of temporality, including pre-phenomenal and phenomenal time, synthesis, conation and synchronization, and of abnormal time experiences in persons affected by psychopathological conditions. In the following part, we describe the basic structure of the interview that comprises seven categories corresponding to the abnormal features of lived temporality: anomalies of synchrony, of time structure, of implicit time flow, of explicit time flow, and anomalous experiences of the past, the present and the future. The paper also includes a section on administration and scoring of the TATE scale, the complete interview and a Likert table for quantifying the frequency, intensity and interference with daily life of the phenomena explored. (shrink)

Risk and crisis communication (RCC) is a current ethical issue subject to controversy, mainly due to the tension between individual liberty (a core component of fairness) and effectiveness. In this paper we propose a consistent definition of the RCC process in public health emergencies (PHERCC), which comprises six key elements: evidence, initiator, channel, publics, message, and feedback. Based on these elements and on a detailed analysis of their role in PHERCC, we present an ethical framework to help design, govern and (...) evaluate PHERCC strategies. The framework aims to facilitate RCC, incorporating effectiveness, autonomy, and fairness. It comprises five operational ethical principles: openness, transparency, inclusivity, understandability, and privacy. The resulting matrix helps understanding the interplay between the PHERCC process and the principles of the framework. The paper includes suggestions and recommendations for the implementation of the PHERCC matrix. (shrink)

Ecological-enactive approaches to cognition aim to explain cognition in terms of the dynamic coupling between agent and environment. Accordingly, cognition of one’s immediate environment (which is sometimes labeled “basic” cognition) depends on enaction and the picking up of affordances. However, ecological-enactive views supposedly fail to account for what is sometimes called “higher” cognition, i.e., cognition about potentially absent targets, which therefore can only be explained by postulating representational content. This challenge levelled against ecological-enactive approaches highlights a putative explanatory gap between (...) basic and higher cognition. In this paper, we examine scientific cognition—a paradigmatic case of higher cognition—and argue that it shares fundamental features with basic cognition, for enaction and affordance selection are central to the scientific enterprise. Our argument focuses on modeling, and on how models promote scientific understanding. We base our argument on a non-representational account of scientific understanding and on the material engagement theory, for models are hereby conceived as material objects designed for scientific engagements. Having done so, we conclude that the explanatory gap is significantly less threatening to the ecological-enactive approach than it might appear. (shrink)

In the paper, after clarifying terms such as ‘identity’, ‘self’ and ‘personhood’, I propose an empirical account of identity based on the notion of “whole phenotype”. This move allows one to claim the persistence of the individuals before and after their being affected by dementia. Furthermore, I show how this account permits us to address significant questions related to demented individuals’ loss of the capacity of moral decisions.

Within the technical frame supplied by the algebraic variety of diagonalizable algebras, defined by R. Magari in [2], we prove the following: Let T be any first-order theory with a predicate Pr satisfying the canonical derivability conditions, including Löb's property. Then any formula in T built up from the propositional variables $q,p_{1},...,p_{n}$ , using logical connectives and the predicate Pr, has the same "fixed-points" relative to q (that is, formulas $\psi (p_{1},...,p_{n})$ for which for all $p_{1},...,p_{n}\vdash _{T}\phi (\psi (p_{1},...,p_{n}),p_{1},...,p_{n})\leftrightarrow \psi (...) (p_{1},...,p_{n})$ ) of a formula $\phi ^{\ast}$ of the same kind, obtained from φ in an effective way. Moreover, such $\phi ^{\ast}$ is provably equivalent to the formula obtained from φ substituting with $\phi ^{\ast}$ itself all the occurrences of q which are under Pr. In the particular case where q is always under Pr in φ, $\phi ^{\ast}$ is the unique (up to provable equivalence) "fixed-point" of φ. Since this result is proved only assuming Pr to be canonical, it can be deduced that Löb's property is, in a sense, equivalent to Gödel's diagonalization lemma. All the results are proved more generally in the intuitionistic case. (shrink)

In order to meet the explanatory challenge levelled against non-representationalist views on cognition, radical enactivists claim that cognition about potentially absent targets involves the socioculturally scaffolded capacity to manipulate public symbols. At a developmental scale, this suggests that higher cognition gradually emerges as humans begin to master language use, which takes place around the third year of life. If, however, it is possible to show that pre-linguistic infants represent their surroundings, then the radical enactivists’ explanation for the emergence of higher (...) cognition is defeated. In this paper, I critically assess experiments designed to show that pre-linguistic infants inherit representational abilities. I begin by outlining these experiments in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, I argue that these experiments only succeed in supporting widespread representationalism by committing a particular kind of circular reasoning, which I call conjunctivist reasoning due to its origins in the debates about the nature of perception. I conclude by developing two independent yet congruent enactivist lines of interpretation for the experiments discussed in 2. I explain the infants’ responses to atypical experimental conditions based on agent-environment codetermination and then I argue that surprise behavior can be explained in terms of embodied habits and unfulfilled anticipation. (shrink)

This paper examines the effectiveness of the use of executive compensation linked to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) goals across US firms. Empirical analysis of a cross-industry sample of 746 listed companies for the period 2002–2013 showed that the use of CSR-linked compensation contracts for Named Executive Officers (NEOs) promotes CSR performance. More specifically, we found that linking NEOs’ compensation to CSR goals produces positive effects in the 3rd year after adoption. As firms accumulate experience and learn how to use the (...) system over the following eight periods, CSR performance increases monotonically. Furthermore, experience accumulated over time affects the different specifications of CSR performance asymmetrically, by reducing both environmental and social CSR concerns and increasing only environmental CSR strengths. Interestingly, we also found that the simultaneous use of other CSR-focused governance systems moderates the effect of a firm’s accumulated experience in using CSR-linked executive compensation on CSR performance: the existence of a CSR committee at the board level and the public release of a CSR report are likely to have a positive moderating effect, while the purchase of a CSR audit has no moderating effect. (shrink)

According to Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency, any derivative truth is contingent if and only if it does not admit of a finite proof. Following a tradition that goes back at least as far as Bertrand Russell, several interpreters have been tempted to explain this biconditional in terms of two other principles: first, that a derivative truth is contingent if and only if it contains infinitely complex concepts and, second, that a derivative truth contains infinitely complex concepts if and only (...) if it does not admit of a finite proof. A consequence of this interpretation is that Leibniz’s infinite-analysis account of contingency falls prey to Robert Adams’s Problem of Lucky Proof. I will argue that this interpretation is mistaken and that, once it is properly understood how the idea of an infinite proof fits into Leibniz’s circle of modal notions, the problem of lucky proof simply disappears. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to argue that logic can play an important role in the “toolbox” of molecular biology. We show how biochemical pathways, i.e., transitions from a molecular aggregate to another molecular aggregate, can be viewed as deductive processes. In particular, our logical approach to molecular biology — developed in the form of a natural deduction system — is centered on the notion of Curry-Howard isomorphism, a cornerstone in nineteenth-century proof-theory.

This article introduces Designing for Care (D4C), a distinctive approach to project management and technological design informed by Care Ethics. We propose to conceptualize “care” as both the foundational value of D4C and as its guiding mid-level principle. As a value, care provides moral grounding. As a principle, it equips D4C with moral guidance to enact a caring process. The latter is made of a set of concrete, and often recursive, caring practices. One of the key assumption of D4C is (...) a relational ontology of individual and group identities, which fosters the actualization of caring practices as essentially relational and (often) reciprocal. Moreover, D4C adopts the “ecological turn” in CE and stresses the ecological situatedness and impact of concrete projects, envisioning an extension of caring from intra-species to inter-species relations. We argue that care and caring can influence directly some of the phases and practices within the management of (energy) projects and the design of sociotechnical (energy) artefacts and systems. When issues related to “value change” emerge as problematic (e.g., values trade-offs, conflicts), the mid-level guiding principle of care helps evaluate and prioritize different values at stake within specific projects. Although there may be several actors and stakeholders involved in project management and technological design, here we will focus on the professionals in charge of imagining, designing, and carrying out these processes (i.e., project managers, designers, engineers). We suggest that adopting D4C would improve their ability to capture and assess stakeholders’ values, critically reflect on and evaluate their own values, and judge which values prioritize. Although D4C may be adaptable to different fields and design contexts, we recommend its use especially within small and medium-scale (energy) projects. To show the benefits of adopting it, we envisage the application of D4C within the project management and the technological design of a community battery. The adoption of D4C can have multiple positive effects: transforming the mentality and practice of managing a project and designing technologies; enhancing caring relationships between managers, designers, and users as well as among users; achieving better communication, more inclusive participation, and more just decision-making. This is an initial attempt to articulate the structure and the procedural character of D4C. The application of D4C in a concrete project is needed to assess its actual impact, benefits, and limitations. (shrink)

-- v. 5. V. słownik, indeksy i bibliografia.

How can the discoveries made in the biological sciences play a role in a discussion on the foundation of ethics? This book responds to this question by examining how evolutionism can explain and justify the existence of ethical normativity and the emergence of particular moral systems. Written by a team of philosophers and scientists, the essays collected in this volume deal with the limits of evolutionary explanations, the justifications of ethics, and methodological issues concerning evolutionary accounts of ethics, among other (...) topics. They offer deep insights into the origin and purpose of human moral capacities and of moral systems. (shrink)

AgeTech involves the use of emerging technologies to support the health, well-being and independent living of older adults. In this paper we focus on how AgeTech based on artificial intelligence (AI) may better support older adults to remain in their own living environment for longer, provide social connectedness, support wellbeing and mental health, and enable social participation. In order to assess and better understand the positive as well as negative outcomes of AI-based AgeTech, a critical analysis of ethical design, digital (...) equity, and policy pathways is required. A crucial question is how AI-based AgeTech may drive practical, equitable, and inclusive multilevel solutions to support healthy, active ageing. In our paper, we aim to show that a focus on equity is key for AI-based AgeTech if it is to realize its full potential. We propose that equity should not just be an extra benefit or minimum requirement, but the explicit aim of designing AI-based health tech. This means that social determinants that affect the use of or access to these technologies have to be addressed. We will explore how complexity management as a crucial element of AI-based AgeTech may potentially create and exacerbate social inequities by marginalising or ignoring social determinants. We identify bias, standardization, and access as main ethical issues in this context and subsequently, make recommendations as to how inequities that stem form AI-based AgeTech can be addressed. (shrink)

With the arrival of new methods of genome editing, especially CRISPR/cas 9, new perspectives on germline interventions have arisen. Supporters of germ line genome editing claim that the procedure could be used as a means of disease prevention. As a possible life-saving therapy, it provides benefits that outweigh its risks. Opponents of GGE claim that the medical and societal risks, especially the use of GGE for genetic enhancement, are too high. In our paper, we analyze the risks and benefits of (...) GGE. We show that the medical risk on an individual level might be reduced by further research in the near future so that they may be outweighed by the benefits. We also show that the societal risks of the procedure, i.e. genetic enhancement, are manageable by establishing a regulative framework before the GGE is implemented. Since the effects of modifying genes for the genepool of a given population are extremely difficult to model, the medical risks on the population level might be too high. (shrink)

El transhumanismo como filosofía e ideología tecnologicista tiene cada vez más adeptos y se coloca en los ámbitos académicos como una posición positiva, posible y deseable. Su implementación aparece solapada en una vida cotidiana que depende, como nunca antes, de los avances tecnológicos. La posición que manejaremos es que esta ideología, que sobredimensiona el papel de la tecnología en la sociedad, tiene una visión limitada respecto con los conflictos éticos, económicos y sociales que dimanan de sus presupuestos. El problema no (...) es negar la tecnología sino qué rol juega en la construcción de la sociedad. El transhumanismo puede estar vendiendo un falso sueño de libertad, donde la uniformidad, la ausencia de crítica, la discriminación y la separación radical entre pobres y ricos definan ese mundo paradisíaco que propone. (shrink)

To be successful, the research agenda for a novel control view of cognition should foresee more detailed, computationally specified process models of cognitive operations including higher cognition. These models should cover all domains of cognition, including those cognitive abilities that can be characterized as online interactive loops and detached forms of cognition that depend on internally generated neuronal processing.

We consider the ways humans engage in social epistemic actions, to guide each other's attention, prediction, and learning processes towards salient information, at the timescale of online social interaction and joint action. This parallels the active guidance of other's attention, prediction, and learning processes at the longer timescale of niche construction and cultural practices, as discussed in the target article.

The paper provides a conceptual distinction between evidence assessment criteria and standards of proof. Evidence must be assessed in order to check whether it satisfies a relevant standard of proof, and the assessment is operated with some criterion; so both criteria and standards are necessary for fact-finding. In addition to this conceptual point, the article addresses three main questions: Why do some scholars and decision-makers take assessment criteria as standards of proof and vice versa? Why do systems differ as to (...) criteria and standards? How can a system work if it neglects one of these things? The answers to the first and second question come from the historical and procedural differences between the systems. The answer to the third focuses on the functional connection between criteria and standards. (shrink)

Unlike in the phrase “Virtual Reality,” in the phrase “Augmented Reality” the stress is put on the word “reality.” It seems, though, that we still lack a concept of reality which can fit the world of both humans and computers. In connection with this philosophical issue, this paper aims to provide the background for a better insight into the meaning of Augmented Reality and its impact on human behavior. My thesis is that an ecological version of direct perception’s realism constitutes (...) the most natural framework from which to start. The ecological approach to perception – namely, the Gibsonian theory of affordances – together with a non-dualistic, pragmatist and evolutionist notion of reality, perfectly fits this purpose. Thus, after a brief survey of the present state of AR technologies, it should become natural to interpret AR digital contents as implementations of affordances. (shrink)

According to Reid, opinions that contradict the principles of common sense are not only false but also absurd. Nature has given us an emotion that reveals the absurdity of an opinion: the emotion of ridicule. An appeal to ridicule in philosophical arguments may easily be discounted as a logical fallacy in the same manner as an appeal to the common consent of people. This essay traces the origins of Reid's defense of ridicule in the works of Addison, Hutcheson, Shaftesbury and (...) Campbell. Reid rejected a non-epistemic view of the sense of ridicule. According to Reid, ridicule includes both a feeling and a particular act of judgment based on the principles of common sense. (shrink)

To provide a qualitative analysis of abnormal temporal experiences of persons affected by feeding and eating disorders. This is a naturalistic explorative study on a group of 27 patients affected by FED interviewed over a two-year period in a clinical/psychotherapeutic setting. Clinical files were analysed by means of Consensual Qualitative Research. Twenty-one out of twenty-seven patients affected by FED reported at least one ATE. The main categories identified are 1) Irruption of disturbing bodily experiences ; 2) Anxiety for the passing (...) of time ; 3) Ritualization/Digitalization of time. ATE are a relevant feature of the life-world inhabited by people with FED and may represent an important link between abnormal bodily experiences and disorders of personal identity in these patients. The sample number is small but our preliminary findings justify testing a larger number of patients. (shrink)

In this paper, I will defend a communitarian perspective on the so-called “hinge propositions” (hinges, for short). Accordingly, I will argue that hinges play a normative role, in the sense that, among other things, they govern the mechanisms of social inclusion/exclusion. In particular, I will examine the so-called “religious hinges”; and I will argue that such hinges, being the product of mere indoctrination, are particularly effective in shaping boundaries among communities. Finally, with the help of Peter Munz's theory of altruism, (...) I will attempt to explain why religious hinges play the role they do. (shrink)

The writings of the Scottish physician and philosopher John Gregory play an important role in the modern codification of medical ethics. It is therefore appropriate to use his work as a historical example in approaching the question how elements of aesthetics were incorporated in 18th century medical ethics. The concept of a Gentleman is pivotal to the entire medical ethics of John Gregory as it provides him with the ethical source of the duty to patients. Gregory makes the trustworthiness of (...) the physician a central point of his medical ethics, and it is in this context that Gregory declares good manners as an essential moral quality of a physician. This paper delineates how good manners are ethically justified in Gregory's medical ethics and concludes with an exploration of the importance of Gregory's conception for present day reflection on the inherence of aesthetics in ethical determinations. (shrink)

While many European countries are entering unknown legal terrain where the embryo in vitro is concerned, France can already look back on a long tradition of public discussion and legal codification of ways of dealing with in vitro embryos. In its comprehensive law of 1994, France had still rejected embryo research; however, due to the promising perspectives of stem cell research, the new law now pending implies a clear liberalization of the 1994 provisions. Both the French lawmakers and the National (...) Ethics Commission have repeatedly argued that possible utilization of embryos for research purposes may seem legitimate from the moment that there is no more "parental project." De facto, this concept implies that an embryo can be transformed into an object from the moment that the parents cease to desire it and that the value of protection is solely dependent on the will of third persons. At the same time, France is still speaking of guaranteeing respect for the "dignity of the embryo," which would mean that an embryo must not be reduced to a thing and treated for purposes which are not his own. Therefore, the French solution is not a consistent and honest solution, and in its new legal provisions, France has involved herself in manifold contradictions. France has rejected the conception of pre-embryo, but is de facto following Britain's model without making it explicit. (shrink)

The present work is a comment of a recent paper by Fortin and coauthors in which the authors propose the introduction of Bohmian mechanics in the philosophy of chemistry and the use of standard quantum mechanics as a mere instrument of prediction. This way would allow overcoming the obstacles found in linking molecular chemistry and quantum mechanics. Starting from some remarks on the orbital concept, we highlight and discuss some general issues that need to be taken into account when two (...) scientific theories coexist within the same investigation field, i.e. SQM and BM. (shrink)

"Rereads the writings of Plato in the light andperspective of the paradigm of the Tubingen School, but it doesso on the basis of very precise principles of contemporaryepistemology which render the undertaking soundly andconvincingly scientific and highly, even fascinatingly readable".

To qualify as a fully rational agent, one must be able rationally to revise one’s beliefs in the light of new evidence. This requires, not only that one revise one’s beliefs in the right way, but also that one do so as a result of appreciating the evidence on the basis of which one is changing one’s mind. However, the very nature of belief seems to pose an obstacle to the possibility of satisfying this requirement – for, insofar as one (...) believes that p, any evidence that not-p will strike one as misleading and, on the face of it, believing that a certain piece of evidence is misleading is incompatible with appreciating the fact that such evidence should bear on the question at hand. Call this the ‘Paradox of Belief Revision’. This paper introduces the Paradox of Belief Revision, compares it with Kripke’s Dogmatism Paradox, and suggests that we may be able to see a way out of the former if we assume that rational agents are systematically aware of their own beliefs as beliefs they have. (shrink)