According to some, taking moral testimony is a potentially decent way to exercise one's moral agency. According to others, it amounts to a failure to live up to minimal standards of moral worth. What's the issue? Is it conceptual or empirical? Is it epistemological or moral? Is there a ‘puzzle’ of moral testimony; or are there many, or none? I argue that there is no distinctive puzzle of moral testimony. The question of its legitimacy is as much a moral or (...) political as an epistemological question. Its answer is as much a matter of contingent empirical fact as a matter of a priori necessity. In the background is a mixture of normative and descriptive issues, including the value of autonomy, the nature of legitimate authority, and who to trust. (shrink)

Is international judicial human rights review anti-democratic and therefore illegitimate, and objectionably epistocratic to boot? Or is such review compatible with—and even a recommended component of—an epistemic account of democracy? This article defends the latter position, laying out the case for the legitimacy, possibly democratic legitimacy of such judicial review of democratically enacted legislation and policy-making. The article first offers a brief conceptual sketch of the kind of epistemic democracy and the kind of international human rights courts of concern—in particular (...) the European Court of Human Rights. The article goes on to develop some of the relevant aspects of democratic theory: components of an epistemic justification for democratic majority rule, namely to determine whether proposed policy and legislation bundles are just, and providing assurance thereof. Several critical premises and scope conditions are noted. The article goes on to consider the case for international judicial review, arguing that such review helps secure those premises and scope conditions. The article finally considers the scope such review should have—and some objections to such an account. (shrink)

In the last seven years, close to twenty thousand people have died trying to reach Europe by crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Rescue missions by private actors and NGOs have increased because both national measures and measures by the EU’s border control agency, Frontex, are often deemed insufficient. However, such independent rescue missions face increasing persecution from national governments, Italy being one example. This raises the question of how potential migrants and dissenting citizens should act towards the EU border regime. In (...) contrast to the literature, which mainly addresses migration on the basis of justice requirements, this article focuses on the legitimate authority of the EU’s border regime. Focusing on the legitimacy criteria for states’ claims to regulate migration opens a fruitful normative perspective, given the pervasive disagreement over the content of justice in migration. What reasons for compliance and non-interference does legitimacy supply for potential immigrants and dissenting citizens? And what legitimacy standard may be appropriate for the power that individual states claim over potential immigrants? We argue that, even assuming a minimal legitimacy standard for the state-migrant relationship, the structure of the EU’s border regime exhibits unique features, which cause it to stand in tension with such a standard. By coordinating its Member States’ border regimes, especially through Frontex, the EU claims and exercises power over potential immigrants. However, the asymmetrical delegation of state powers to the EU means that the power involved in regulating European borders is, in core respects, unaccountable. This unaccountability, we argue, is significant for the legitimacy of the EU’s border regime. This article sheds new light on the morality of unauthorised rescue missions by assessing the permissibility of resistance to the EU’s border regime. (shrink)

It helps ordinary citizens evaluate their options and their responsibility for global institutional factors, and it challenges social scientists to address the causes of poverty and hunger that act across borders.The present volume ...

The present article explores ‘anti-cosmopolitan’ arguments that shared institutions above the state, such as there are, are not of a kind that support or give rise to distributive claims beyond securing minimum needs. The upshot is to rebut certain of these ‘anti-cosmopolitan’ arguments. Section 1 asks under which conditions institutions are subject to distributive justice norms. That is, which sound reasons support claims to a relative share of the benefits of institutions that exist and apply to individuals? Such norms may (...) require strict equality, Rawls’ Difference Principle, or other constraints on inequality. Section 2 considers, and rejects, several arguments why existing international institutions are not thought to meet these conditions. (shrink)

This article argues for a systemic conception of freedom as non-domination. It does so by engaging with the debate on the so-called coalition problem. The coalition problem arises because non-domination holds that groups can be agents of (dominating) power, while also insisting that freedom be robust. Consequently, it seems to entail that everyone is in a constant state of domination at the hands of potential groups. However, the problem can be dissolved by rejecting a ‘strict possibility’ standard for interpreting non-domination’s (...) robustness requirement. Frank Lovett and Philip Pettit propose to restrict the relevant domain of possible worlds by reference to two epistemic conditions pertaining to potential group members. I argue that this strategy unduly limits non-domination’s critical potential. I then argue that a suitably systemic conception of domination avoids this problem. By placing explanatory emphasis on social institutions, and how these bear on the feasibility of individual and collective action, a systemic conception of non-domination avoids the coalition problem in a way that retains its critical potential. The article clarifies the relationship between the rule of law and the social norms and objects to the claim that non-domination is bound to deem the latter irrelevant from the point of view of freedom. (shrink)

Indifference is often described as a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically problematic forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.

What kind of equality among Europeans does equal citizenship require, especially regarding education? In particular, is there good reason to insist of equality of education among Europeans—and if so, equality of what? To what extent should the same knowledge base and citizenship norms be taught across state borders and religious and other normative divides? At least three philosophical issues merit attention: (a) The requirements of multiple democratic citizenships beyond the nation state; (b) how to respect diversity while securing such equality (...) and inculcating commitments to justice and norms of citizenship, and (c) The multiple reasons for equality of various kinds among political equals living in a Union as compared to a unitary state. The article responds on the basis of several arguments in favour of certain kinds of equality. All Union citizens must enjoy a high minimum level of education, and all pupils must be informed concerning the various ways of life prevalent in Europe. Furthermore, there must be standards for securing equality of opportunity across the EU, though it is difficult to measure under multiculturalism. Citizens must also be socialised to certain ‘citizenship norms’. This shared basis to be taught in schools should avoid contested religious or philosophical premises as far as possible. Yet the school system should socialise pupils to three commitments: to the just domestic and European institutions and hence the legislation they engender, to principles that justify these institutions; and to a political theory that grounds these principles in a conception of the proper role of individuals, of member states and of the Union. I also argue that equality of result is not a plausible normative requirement among Europeans, while equality of opportunity is. The paper concludes with some comments on the lessons to be drawn for ‘Global’ citizenship. (shrink)

How should the global set of social institutions distribute income and wealth among members of different states? I present a Theory of Global Justice which supports the Bounded Significance of State Borders: The states system must satisfy the Determinate Human Needs of all, and the distribution within each state must satisfy Rawls' Difference Principle. However, justice does not require a Global Difference Principle: income and wealth need not be distributed so as to maximize the income and wealth of the globally (...) worst off. ;The Theory of Global Justice illuminates the status of claims to equality within contractualism. There is no general presumption for equality of condition, and only contingent grounds for equality of certain goods. ;The claim to satisfaction of needs and the claim to equal income and wealth stem from two different sources: The Principle of Human Rights and The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls. The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls applies among citizens within state borders, but not among individuals in different states. ;Chapter 1 presents the central concepts of the Theory of Global Justice: states systems, contractualism and impact arguments. ;The Theory of Global Justice recognizes two kinds of interests as grounding claims on social institutions: Determinate Human Needs, and various controls over factors which affect our lives. Chapter 2 explains the notion of Determinate Human Needs. ;Chapter 3 argues for The Principle of Human Rights. The set of international institutions must seek to secure the satisfaction of the Determinate Human Needs of all. ;Chapter 4 presents the Principle of Equal Procedural Controls. Participants in important procedures can sometimes reasonably claim an equal share of procedural controls. ;The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls applies differently among compatriots and among foreigners. Chapter 5 claims that this principle requires equality of Social Primary Goods and the Difference Principle among citizens. ;Chapter 6 denies that the Principle of Equal Procedural Controls applies among individuals in different states in such a way as to support a Global Difference Principle. State borders thus legitimately affect individuals' grounds for claiming equal shares of procedural controls. (shrink)

According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that are sometimes associated with moral skepticism. (...) The first is the suspicion that in making moral claims we are merely projecting our attitudes onto the world. The second is the suspicion that in arguing for and against moral views we are merely attempting to influence each other to give similar answers to questions that have no determinate answer. (shrink)

Talk about indifference plays an important role in the background of debates about fundamental ethical problems, such as global poverty, economic inequality, sexual discrimination and ethnic strife. It is also a subject that contemporary moral philosophy has largely overlooked. _The Ethics of Indifference _is the first book of its kind to move this important topic to the foreground and subject it to systematic ethical analysis. What is meant by indifference? What forms can indifference take? Who is indifferent, to what, and (...) in what way? Can indifference be a virtue, or is it always a vice? In this book Hallvard Lillehammer examines the ethics of indifference as it applies to real historical examples, such as attitudes to future generations, large scale immigration, public corruption, state terror, corporate harm, commercial exploitation, gender domination, socal status and self esteem. By showing how certain forms of indifference are both highly dynamic and acutely sensitive their object, Lillehammer argues that some of the very features that make indifference ethically admirable or virtuous in some situations can in other situations make it ethically vicious or wrong. He also describes how the ethics of indifference relates to central issues in moral and political philosophy, such as individual responsibility, the ethics of bystanders and the idea of liberal neutrality. By drawing extensively on recent work on indifference and detachment in history, sociology and anthropology, this book_ _also brings together existing scholarship on the nature and ethics of indifference across related humanistic disciplines in uniquely original way. (shrink)

Indifference is sometimes described as a virtue. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper proposes a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically acceptable forms of indifference in terms of how different states of indifference can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of their object.

Andreas Follesdal,Victor Muñiz Fraticelli | : A Principle of Subsidiarity regulates the allocation and/or use of authority within a political order where authority is dispersed between a centre and various sub-units. Section 1 sketches the role of such principle of subsidiarity in the EU, and some of its significance in Canada. Section 2 presents some conceptions of subsidiarity that indicate the range of alternatives. Section 3 considers some areas where such conceptions might add value to constitutional and political deliberations in (...) Canada. Section 4 concludes with some reminders of crucial contested issues not fully resolved by appeals to subsidiarity alone, exemplified by the protection of human rights. | : Un principe de subsidiarité réglemente la répartition et/ou l’usage de l’autorité au sein d’un ordre politique où l’autorité est dispersée entre un centre et des sous-unités variées. La section 1 de cet article montre le rôle d’un tel principe de subsidiarité dans l’Union européenne, et certaines de ses implications au Canada. La section 2 présente des conceptions de la subsidiarité qui indiquent un éventail d’alternatives. La section 3 considère certains domaines où de telles conceptions pourraient ajouter de la valeur aux délibérations constitutionnelles et politiques au Canada. La section 4 conclut en rappelant certains problèmes cruciaux contestés, non entièrement résolus par les seuls appels à la subsidiarité, exemplifiés par la protection des droits humains. (shrink)

Recent years have seen the emergence of a new brand of moral philosopher. Straddling the gap between academia on the one hand, and the world of law, medicine, and politics on the other, bioethicists have appeared, offering advice on ethical issues to a wider public than the philosophy classroom. Some bioethicists, like Peter Singer, have achieved wide notoriety in the public realm with provocative arguments that challenge widely held beliefs about the relative moral status of animals, human foetuses and newborn (...) babies. Other bioethicists practice their trade with greater protection from public scrutiny, confining their thoughts to committees in government circles, universities, charitable institutions, or hospitals. But what exactly is it that bioethicists have to offer in such contexts? What sort of expertise do bioethicists have that justifies their employment on these committees, or the time and space accorded to their views on television and the radio, or in newspapers and magazines? In spite of being an expanding group of professionals who attract large sums of private and public funding, bioethicists are sometimes met with suspicion or even hostility, both inside and outside academia. One common criticism is that the presence of bioethicists is unproductive in practical bioethical debate. In light of this criticism one might wonder why the relevant funding bodies have not spotted the hoax and withdrawn their funding. Certainly, if bioethicists.. (shrink)

In this essay, it is first argued that there are several important motivations for considering as wholly legitimate the question concerning the presence of Socrates in Plato’s work. After sketching how reason in Plato’s dialogues is generally portrayed as embedded in the soul as a whole, I then apply these insights in arguing that this relation between character and thinking should inform our understanding of Plato’s Socrates as well. Socrates is present in the texts because reason, according to Plato, is (...) dependent on both dialogue and character. This is not to say, however, that the character of Socrates is philosophy incarnate, or that the reader is supposed to ‘become’ Socrates; rather, Socrates constitutes an irreducible element in philosophy, and correspondingly, the reader comes to relate to philosophy by relating to the Socrates of the dialogues. Finally, I illustrate the thesis, and its fecundity, by focusing on an issue in the Phaedrus. (shrink)

In our tradition, Socrates, as he figures in the work of Plato, stands for rationality. In one way, of course, the tendency to treat him as rationality incarnate is not too far of the mark; for Socrates does indeed introduce into our thought and discussions a demand for argument, for stringency and consistency. However, the manner in which Socrates carries out his historically influential elenctic activity belies the shortcomings of this oft-quoted and inspirational picture. It is these irrational features of (...) the figure of Socrates in Plato's early dialogues that shall concern us in this article. Although we shall see that a certain sort of interlocutor is required for Socratic questioning to get off the ground, heavily irrational features are brought to the activity from Socrates himself. Furthermore, Socrates’ irrationality is no extraneous matter in relation to the very notion of dialectic rationality, but results from certain features of rationality itself understood in the mode of critical dialogue.1. (shrink)

Online news sites have become an internet ‘staple’, but we know little of the forces driving the popularity of such sites in relation to what could be understood as the latest iteration of the web – social media services. This research in brief article discusses empirical results regarding the uses of Twitter for news sharing. Specifically, we present a comparative analysis of links emanating from the service at hand to a series of media outlets over a six-month period in two (...) countries; Sweden and Norway. Focusing on linking practices among highly active Twitter accounts, we problematize the assumption that online communication involves two or more humans by directing attention to more or less automated ‘bot’ accounts. In sum, it is suggested that such automated accounts need to be dealt with more explicitly by researchers as well as practitioners interested in the popularity of online news as expressed through social media activity. (shrink)