The aim of this paper is to argue in favor of the idea that it is possible not only to give a special place to reason in our life and in society, but also to offer an integrative rational framework, in in which human ends and goals find their rational expression. The text has three parts. The first describes Alfred Schutz's practical-hermeneutical approach to law and normativity, while making room for a subjective practice of reason. The second proposes to reveal, (...) through the description of knowledge in the world of ordinary life, a form of rationality which offers us practical but consistent ways of making a decision. Ultimately, the third aims at the practical-hermeneutical reconstruction of the law, in order to integrate into the core of legal reasoning references to ends and purposes without prejudicing the objectivity of the reasoning itself. The study aims to make a contribution to the problem of dedifferentiation and positivism of practice in the modern world. Le but de ce papier est d’argumenter en la faveur de l’idée qu’il est possible non seulement de donner une place particulière à la raison dans notre vie et dans la société, mais aussi d’offrir un cadre rationnel intégratif, dans lequel les fins et buts humains trouvent leur expression rationnelle. Le texte comporte trois parties. La première décrit l’approche pratique-herméneutique d’Alfred Schutz à l’égard de la loi et de la normativité, tout en faisant place à une pratique subjective de la raison. La deuxième se propose de dévoiler, à travers la description de la connaissance dans le monde de la vie ordinaire, une forme de rationalité qui nous offre des voies pratiques mais consistantes de prendre une décision. En fin de compte, la troisième vise la reconstruction pratique-herméneutique de la loi, afin d’intégrer dans le noyau du raisonnement légal des références à des fins et buts sans porter préjudice à l’objectivité du raisonnement lui-même. L’étude veut apporter une contribution au problème de la dédifférenciation et du positivisme pratique dans le monde moderne. (shrink)

Descartes is considered to be the founder of modern rationalism. This is a clear statement which, however, does not show the manner in which rationalism as such appeared in the history of science, taking into account the turmoil of the Renaissance centuries, the significance of the Reform and the birth of modern science. As a founder of a new metaphysics, Descartes, through his work, remains par excellence the case in which the scholastic and Renaissance aftermaths as well as the Reform (...) mutations are mixed in a new synthesis that will be called modernity. This study focuses on reinterpreting Cartesianism from this perspective in the vast context of modernity’s metaphysical significance – it is a hypothesis that will need to be developed not only by means of hermeneutical instruments but, especially, by means of those instruments belonging to the history of culture and anthropology. (shrink)

Ion Soteropoulos reconciles the contradiction between the finite and infinite and transforms this reconciliation into the founding principle of motion. This book will appeal to readers interested in the logical mechanics of the physical universe, the hidden powers of our finite brain, and the utility of robots in the future.

Cases of poor care have been documented across the world. Contrary to professional requirements, evidence indicates that these sometimes go unaddressed. For patients, the outcomes of this inaction are invariably negative. Previous work has either focused on why poor care occurs and what might be done to prevent it, or on the reasons why those who are witness to it find it difficult to raise their concerns. Here, we build on this work but specifically foreground the responsibilities of registrants and (...) students who witness poor care. Acknowledging the challenges associated with raising concerns, we make the case that failure to address poor care is a breach of moral expectation, professional requirement and, sometimes, legal frameworks. We argue that reporting will be more likely to take place if those who wish to enter the profession have a realistic view of the challenges they may encounter. When nurses are provided with robust and applied education on ethics, when “real‐world” cases and exemplars are used in practice and when steps are taken to develop and encourage individual moral courage, we may begin to see positive change. Ultimately however, significant change is only likely to take place where practice cultures invite and welcome feedback, promote critical reflection, and where strong, clear leadership support is shown by those in positions of influence across organisations. (shrink)

My paper tackles the generic relationship between philosophy and law, the necessity of applying philosophy to law, the legitimacy and range of such an approach, the configuration of the way in which philosophy has left its mark in the juridical sphere. It surveys, in a chronological order, as well as in terms of their co-existence, the various stages of the relationship between philosophy and law. 1. Although both have been “within the walls”, law secludes itself, relatively speaking, in “the world (...) taken as a whole”, to shape its own identity, to survive as a self-sufficient, distinct technique (F. Geny), or it does it in a doctrinary way (positivism). 2. The representatives of philosophy in the juridical sphere are doing their best to uphold law’s struggle for knowledge, to have it gain recognition as a “science”, renounce its one-sidedness and harmonize with the others. 3. Juridical norms are not untouchable in relation with philosophy. Philosophy may work within juridical norms if it has an affinity with the content of juridical normativeness and respects its specificity. 4. The conclusion I reach is that we must try to cultivate a joint area bringing together philosophy and law, an area wherein the specific features of the two distinct fields reach a consensus for the sake of the human condition – hic et nunc. Philosophy bestows coherence and casts light on “law for man’s sake”, while the philosophically founded law appears to be the “normative project of the human”, a human practice inextricably connected with other types of practice, with man as a whole. The practical way to fulfil this goal, like the goal itself, will always be liable to criticism and improvement, open to debates and various options in a concrete socio-historical context. (shrink)

Nature Exposed to our Method of Questioning explores how we create our cultural assumptions about personhood, culture and nature.

Before now, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the multiple relations between A. Comte’s and J.S. Mill’s positive philosophy and Franz Brentano’s work. The present volume aims to fill this gap and to identify Brentano’s position in the context of the positive philosophy of the 19th century by analyzing the following themes: the concept of positive knowledge; philosophy and empirical, genetic and descriptive psychology as sciences in Brentano, Comte and Mill; the strategies for the rebirth of philosophy in these (...) three authors; the theory of the ascending stages of thought, of their decline, of the intentionality in Comte and Brentano; the reception of Comte’s positivism in Whewell and Mill; induction and phenomenalism in Brentano, Mill and Bain; the problem of the "I" in Hume and Brentano; mathematics as a foundational science in Brentano, Kant and Mill; Brentano’s critique of Mach’s positivism; the concept of positive science in Brentano’s metaphysics and in Husserl’s early phenomenology; the reception of Brentano’s psychology in Twardowski; The Brentano Institute at Oxford. The volume also contains the translation of the most significant writings of Brentano regarding philosophy as science. I. Tănăsescu, Romanian Academy; A. Bejinariu, Romanian Society of Phenomenology; S. Krantz Gabriel, Saint Anselm College; C. Stoenescu, University of Bucharest. (shrink)

This paper tries to show that the naturalistic view of addiction is mired in contradictions that stem from reducing the addict to a weak-willed subject who loses control over his or her body. From a phenomenological perspective, addiction reveals itself to be a habit which eventually becomes harmful, but has its primary sources in the embodied needs of a worldly subject. The aim of this paper is to uncover the dimensions of the lived addiction that are neglected in the contemporary (...) naturalistic discourse: the lived-body and the worldly context of the addict. Firstly, we try to do justice to the variety of addictions by underlying that their new and surprising forms are determined by the intersubjective tissue wherein the subject operates. Secondly, the loss of control in addiction, how the subject deals with the tendency to satisfy a need, is experienced as powerlessness, as expressed in the accounts of ecstasy addicts regarding altered states of mind. The last section of this paper will argue that this sense of powerlessness cannot be equated with a weakness of the will because a strong, forceful will engenders the same vertigo of being prey to strange powers. The embodied aspect of addiction and the spontaneous, bodily need it saturates will clarify further this claim. (shrink)

In the well-known intentionality quote of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano characterises the mental phenomena through the following features: the intentional inexistence of an object, the relation to a content, and the direction toward an object. The text argues that this characterisation is not general because the direction toward an object does not apply to the mental phenomena of sensation. The second part of the paper analyses the consequences that ensue from here for the Brentanian classification of mental (...) phenomena: in Brentano’s psychology one can distinguish two concepts of mental phenomena—the mental phenomenon in a broad sense and the mental phenomenon in a narrow sense; the former concept allows the separation of the mental from the physical, while the narrow concept allows the distinguishing of the main classes of mental phenomena. The third part of the paper shows that, with respect to sensation, the absence of a direction toward an object is compatible with both Brentano’s early taxonomies of philosophical sciences, and his early program for the establishment of a new, empirical and non-speculative philosophy. For this reason, I hold that intentionality is important for the foundation of both psychology, and empirical philosophy. (shrink)

In this commentary, I will argue that the componential and emergent views of cognitive control as defined by Cooper (2010) do not necessarily oppose each other, and I will try to make a case for their interdependence. First, I will use the construct of cognitive inhibition—one of the main componential control functions mentioned in the target articles—to illustrate my line of reasoning. Then, I will comment on how some of the target articles, each from a different perspective, bring arguments in (...) favor of this integrative view. (shrink)

The paper argues that Brentano was the exponent of a methodological monism, which is based on the requirement that science should be grounded on experience, and not on a speculative-idealistic principle, as in the case of German idealism. In Brentano’s psychological writings, this methodological requirement concretized in two different theses: The method of psychology is identical with the method of natural science; The method of psychology is inspired by the method of natural science. The thesis of this study is that (...) an important part of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint is elaborated in accordance with T1. By contrast, Brentano’s Descriptive Psychology illustrates the subsequent decision to give up this idea. In its place, the aforementioned requirement is elaborated in the spirit of a methodological particularism that recommends the scientist elaborate his methods according to the specificity of the phenomena under investigation and to the difficulties that need to be overcome when approaching them. (shrink)

The two works this paper focuses on (Anastasios Yannopoulos, Orthodoxy and the Problems of Contemporary World and Georgios Mantzaridis, Globalization and Universality. Phantom and Truth) represent a thorough analysis of contemporary history, in which globalization is the direction and purpose of the new vision in human relations and community. The lost of the individuality of these relations is considered to be a disease which has very strong religious and anthropological effects. The common feature is the reaffirmation of community in the (...) perspective of Eastern anthropology. (shrink)

Back in the Good Old Days of Logical Positivism, theories of meaning were part of a normative project that sought not merely to describe the features of language and its use, but so to speak to separate the wheat from the chaff. In this paper, I side with Herman Cappelen (2013) in thinking that we need to rethink and reintroduce the important distinction between sense and nonsense that was ditched along with other normative aspirations during Logical Positivism’s spectacular demise. Despite (...) this, my delineation of the bounds of sense is different from Cappelen’s. One of my goals in the present paper is to argue that category mistakes are paradigmatic examples of nonsensical sentences. To this end I describe one candidate for what it might be that makes category mistakes nonsensical. (shrink)

Le lien entre l’expérience acquise par Machiavel au service de la République florentine (1498-1512) et l’œuvre politique écrite après son éloignement forcé des affaires est explicite. Tous les commentateurs se sont attachés à déceler, dans la correspondance diplomatique et les écrits mineurs ante res perditas, les thèmes qui réapparaîtront de manière aboutie dans les textes majeurs de Machiavel. Cependant, le passage de la pratique à la « théorie » n’est pas immédiat. Le ritratto, composé d’extraits d’expérience regroupés autour d’une question (...) particulière, permet une problématisation originale de l’histoire présente et s’inscrit dans l’écart qui se creuse, tout au long de l’activité diplomatique de Machiavel, entre la politique florentine qu’il est censé servir et sa propre vision des choses. Aussi le traité du Prince se fonde-t-il, non sur une réalité brute, mais sur une expérience déjà disposée dans un certain nombre de ritratti. Un immense effort pour rationaliser la politique à partir du particulier est ainsi entrepris par Machiavel, sans pour autant sacrifier ce qui précisément déclenche cette entreprise et la rend interminable, à savoir, l’irréductibilité de la fortune. (shrink)