This paper analyses the model of interaction at the heart of Axel Honneth's social philosophy. It argues that interaction in his mature ethics of recognition has been reduced to intercourse between human persons and that the role of nature is now missing from it. The ethics of recognition takes into account neither the material dimensions of individual and social action, nor the normative meaning of non-human persons and natural environments. The loss of nature in the mature ethics of recognition is (...) made visible through a comparison with Honneth's initial formulation of his project. As an anthropology of intersubjectivity combining the teaching of the German philosophical anthropologists and G.H. Mead, his first model sought to ground social theory in the natural preconditions of human action. The last part of the article argues that a return to Mead's theory of practical intersubjectivity informed by Merleau-Ponty's germane theory of intercorporeity provides essential conceptual tools to enable the integration of the natural and the material within the theory of recognition. (shrink)

L’usage de corpus n’est pas réservé aux linguistes. Néanmoins ceux-ci en sont des utilisateurs patentés, du fait, entre autres, que leurs analyses portent sur des productions linguistiques ou langagières non finies dont l’étude ne peut s’opérer que sur un échantillon. Mais pour que l’analyse prétende à quelque validité, cet échantillon doit être représentatif. Représentatif de quoi? D’une réalité qui à la fois préexiste à l’analyse et qu’il contribue à cerner et à établir. D’où toute une palette de corpus dont les (...) principaux types en usage dans la discipline, selon les matériaux utilisés, selon la clôture imaginée, selon la fonction assignée…, sont brièvement rappelés. La réflexion est ensuite centrée sur la délimitation de la place et de la fonction du corpus entre faits, analyses et théories ; il est montré, quelques exemples à l’appui, empruntés à la démarche du dialectologue et du lexicologue, que le corpus ne saurait être qu’un construit et que sa construction fait partie intégrante du prisme théorique à travers lequel le linguiste entend appréhender le réel. (shrink)

This article briefly presents some of the main features of the notion of “centrality of work” within the framework of the “psychodynamic” approach to work developed by Christophe Dejours. The paper argues that we should distinguish between at least four separate but related ways in which work can be said to be central: psychologically, in terms of gender relations, social-politically and epistemically.

This paper attempts to show that an expansive normative vision can be drawn from Hegel's texts, one whose scope significantly exceeds the anthropocentric model presented in the ‘objective spirit’ parts of his system. This expansion of normativity is linked to an expansive vision of relationality underpinning Hegel's model of ‘concrete freedom’. In order to put into sharper relief the links between expansive relationality and normativity, the late thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is mobilized as a heuristic contrasting point. In the ‘subjective (...) spirit’ sections of theEncyclopaediaare found insights that anticipate key features of Merleau-Ponty's notion of ‘flesh’. Locating these insights allows us to detect the underlying thread this paper seeks to mine. Hegel's own ‘theory of flesh’ culminates in the notion of ‘constitutive attachments’, the idea that the content of subjectivity is made up of all the bonds linking the human subject to her surrounding worlds and objects. Since freedom for Hegel is ‘being with’, and since normative demands arise from the different ways in which freedom is concretely realized, it would seem that Hegel's relational conception of subjectivity should lead to an equally expansive conception of normativity. Against the objection that Hegel denied any normative status to non-human beings, the paper points to passages in his work, notably his account of aesthetic judgement and natural beauty, which appear to suggest the opposite. (shrink)

Lorsqu’on étudie les effets d’une réforme, il est fréquent de se focaliser sur son contenu et de négliger les modalités, notamment temporelles, de son adoption et de sa mise en œuvre. Intrinsèquement lié à leur contenu qui vise la recomposition complète du paysage de l’enseignement supérieur et de la recherche en France, le rythme effréné des réformes dans ces domaines ne doit rien au hasard et n’a rien d’anodin. Ceux qui sont à l’initiative de ces réformes attendent de la profondeur (...) et de l’.. (shrink)

La présente contribution analyse les deux risques auxquels sont confrontés l’administration pénitentiaire et son personnel, les surveillants notamment, dans leur lutte contre la radicalisation : le risque de la protection insuffisante de la société face à des conversions non repérées et susceptibles d’aboutir à des actes violents de type terroriste, d’une part, et, d’autre part, le risque du signalement systématique pouvant conduire au renforcement du sentiment de discrimination chez certains détenus et, paradoxalement, constituer un terrain favorable au développement de la (...) radicalisation violente. Pour dépasser ces deux risques, il est proposé, à partir de données de terrain, une application équilibrée du principe de précaution qui devrait reposer sur une meilleure formation des personnels par la pratique, entre autres, de l’interprétation croisée. (shrink)

Our aim is to analyze the position of the leader in relation to the ethical dimension of truth-telling within the organization under his/her control. Based on Michel Foucault’s study of truth-telling, we demonstrate that the role of the leader toward the corporation and the imperative of organizational performance place the leader in an ambiguous position: he/she is obliged to take the lead in “telling the truth” internally and externally, but also to bear the consequences of this “truth-telling” for the organization (...) and for himself/herself. In this process of construction and implementing the truth, the leader is organizer and figurehead of the corporation’s truth-telling practices: determining the frontiers between truth that can be said and that which should remain hidden, both inside and outside the corporation; establishing a dialogue based on truth ; guaranteeing that the rules of truth-telling are respected; and offering a truth which is compatible with the firm’s economic and ethical interest. Invested with the authority—the office—of managing truth within the corporation, the leader can be considered to be the “Chief Truth Officer.” From this perspective, we demonstrate that this role requires specific skills, like courage and practical wisdom. (shrink)

The chapter begins by establishing the absence of organizations in the organization of philosophy as a specialist academic discipline. The second section highlights the reasons why this gap is detrimental to philosophical inquiries. The third section seeks to clarify how philosophy, as a type of theoretical inquiry, can contribute to the study of organizations. Three basic features are proposed as underpinning the philosophical method. Hegel’s social theory is then put forward as an exemplary model of what a philosophical account of (...) organizations might achieve. The fourth and final section shifts the perspective to focus on the life of individuals in organizations. Following a recent book combining post-Hegelian critical theory and Christophe Dejours’ psychodynamic approach, the paper highlights important aspects of individual and collective work that lead to a cooperative conception of management. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, EarlyView.

In this essay, I take up James Conant and Cora Diamond’s suggestion that “to take the difference between saying and showing deeply enough is not to give up on showing but to give up on picturing it as a ‘what’ ”. I try to establish that the Tractatus’s talk of “showing” is more coherent than is usually appreciated, that it is indeed a key to the internal unity of the book, and that it positively helps us to work our way (...) into the practice of philosophy, which its author understood as a practice of logical clarification. Thus, it is not a stretch of latent nonsense whose sole function is to conjure up an illusion of sense for the sake of displaying its disintegration. While Wittgenstein’s concept of showing is not meant to “make up for” the impossibility of saying certain things, neither does it stand in need of being “redeemed.” Whether or not it is to prove ultimately coherent, the Tractatus’s talk of “showing,” I shall argue, is certainly not to be “thrown away” in the name of the Tractarian conception of logic, for the simple reason that it essentially belongs with it. (shrink)

This article seeks to re-evaluate the importance of the political in the thinking of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The article first shows that Sartre’s description of Merleau-Ponty’s intellectual trajectory as one of increasing political apathy from the 1950s onwards is inaccurate. The article then demonstrates that throughout the post-war period, including in his project for a new ontology, Merleau-Ponty believed that a revised version of Marxism would provide the methodological framework within which philosophical work could address the political challenges of the present. (...) This revised Marxism was to be a direct alternative to the reifying uses of Marx’s thinking. It would rely upon the latter’s self-reflexive historicism, which meant its very failures showed how philosophy might transform itself in connection with its own time. Cet article tente souligner la place du politique dans la pensée de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. On contestera d’abord la description faite par Sartre de sa trajectoire intellectuelle, selon laquelle il aurait fait preuve d’une apathie croissante, à partir des années cinquante, vis-à-vis des questions politiques. On montrera ensuite que durant toute la période d’après-guerre, jusque dans les recherches ontologiques ultimes, Merleau-Ponty a pensé qu’un usage renouvelé du marxisme permettrait au travail philosophique de répondre aux défis politiques du présent. Une telle révision du marxisme représentait une alternative directe aux usages réifiant de la pensée de Marx. Cette révision serait rendue possible par la réflexivité historiciste de cette pensée, qui fait que, dans ses erreurs mêmes, celle-ci révèle la capacité de la philosophie à se transformer au contact de son temps. (shrink)

Dans cet article, nous appuyant sur un corpus de 3 444 075 tweets correspondant à 44 107 210 tokens (mots, signes de ponctuation, émojis, émoticônes, etc.) recueillis en décembre 2016, nous nous intéressons aux procédés de segmentation à l’œuvre dans les tweets. Après avoir évoqué certaines caractéristiques de ces écrits particuliers, nous rappelons les procédés généraux de segmentation à l’écrit : les signes de ponctuation et les connecteurs. Nous nous penchons ensuite sur la segmentation opérée dans les tweets par ces (...) deux procédés généraux. Enfin, nous montrons que les émoticônes et les émojis constituent des procédés spécifiques permettant de diversifier les stratégies de segmentation des utilisateurs de tweets (et d’autres écrits numériques, tels les SMS et les courriels). (shrink)

Jean-Philippe Perreault | : Au point de départ de cette réflexion sur l’innovation religieuse, deux considérations : d’une part, il existe nécessairement de la nouveauté et de la créativité religieuses dans la mesure où les religions évoluent, s’adaptent et demeurent vivantes ; d’autre part, la jeunesse est elle-même pensée et construite comme source de nouveauté et de progrès. L’innovation religieuse se trouve conséquemment au centre du thème de recherche « jeunes et religions ». Sous forme de « notes (...) de recherche », l’intention ici est d’identifier quelques repères permettant une problématisation de la question de l’innovation religieuse dans l’étude du rapport des jeunes aux religions. Pour ce faire, nous interrogerons les conditions d’une telle innovation, tant sur le plan empirique qu’épistémologique : de quelle innovation est-il question, qui innove et innove en regard de quoi? Quelle épreuve épistémologique devrions-nous faire subir aux principaux concepts pour nous assurer de leur opérationnalité, de leur fécondité et de leur scientificité pour nos travaux? | : At the starting point of this reflection on religious innovation, there are two considerations : on the one hand, there is necessarily novelty and religious creativity insofar as religions evolve, adapt and remain alive ; on the other hand, youth is itself thought and constructed as a source of novelty and progress. Therefore, religious innovation is at the center of the research theme “youth and religions”. In the form of “research notes”, the intention here is to identify a few benchmarks that allow a problematization of religious innovation question in the study of relationship between young people and religions. To do so, we will question the conditions for such an innovation, both empirically and epistemologically : what innovation is in question, who innovates and innovates compared to what? What epistemological test should the main concepts undergo to ensure their operationality, their fertility and their scientificity for our work? (shrink)

This review seeks to present a comprehensive picture of recent discussions in the social sciences of the anticipated impact of AI on the world of work. Issues covered include: technological unemployment, algorithmic management, platform work and the politics of AI work. The review identifies the major disciplinary and methodological perspectives on AI’s impact on work, and the obstacles they face in making predictions. Two parameters influencing the development and deployment of AI in the economy are highlighted: the capitalist imperative and (...) nationalistic pressures. (shrink)

The book will be an indispensable resource for anyone interested in contemporary philosophy and the social sciences.

In this paper, we propose a framework capable of dealing with anaphora and ellipsis which is both general and algorithmic. This generality is ensured by the compination of two general ideas. First, we use a dynamic semantics which reperent effects using a monad structure. Second we treat scopes flexibly, extending them as needed. We additionally implement this framework as an algorithm which translates abstract syntax to logical formulas. We argue that this framework can provide a unified account of a large (...) number of anaphoric phenomena. Specifically, we show its effectiveness in dealing with pronominal and VP-anaphora, strict and lazy pronouns, lazy identity, bound variable anaphora, e-type pronouns, and cataphora. This means that in particular we can handle complex cases like Bach–Peters sentences, which require an account dealing simultaneously with several phenomena. We use Haskell as a meta-language to present the theory, which also consitutes an implementation of all the phenomena discussed in the paper. To demonstrate coverage, we propose a test suite that can be used to evaluate computational approaches to anaphora. (shrink)

It is a hallmark of the Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory that it has consistently made philosophical reflection a central component of its overall project. Indeed, the core identity that this tradition has been able to maintain arguably stems from the fact that a number of key philosophical assumptions have been shared by the generations of thinkers involved in it. These assumptions form a basic ‘philosophical matrix’, whose main aim is to allow for a ‘critique of reason’, the heart (...) of the critique of modern society, which emphasises the collective, historically situated and naturalistically grounded nature of rationality. In this matrix, Feuerbach's place has been only a minor one. This paper aims to show that there is more to be retrieved from Feuerbach for critical theory than at first meets the eye. The first section identifies key conceptual features that are shared by the central authors of the Frankfurt School. They signal a collectivist and materialist shift from Kant to Marx via Hege.. (shrink)

Axel Honneth, célèbre théoricien allemand de la reconnaissance qui s’inscrit dans la filiation de l’École de Francfort et notamment de Jürgen Habermas, et Jacques Rancière, éminent penseur français de la mésentente qui a rompu avec la tradition althussérienne, sont deux figures centrales du paysage intellectuel contemporain. Leurs pensées se situent dans deux traditions distinctes, mais elles ont toutes deux à voir avec le marxisme pris au sens large, qu’elles considèrent sous un angle critique. Les deux penseurs portent intérêt à des (...) domaines spécifiques au sein de la philosophie et hors d’elle. S’ils partagent tous deux un souci du domaine politique, Axel Honneth se meut dans la philosophie sociale, la philosophie morale et la philosophie du droit ; il fait un usage important et réfléchi des sciences sociales. Jacques Rancière se tourne, pour sa part, vers l’histoire, l’esthétique et la littérature. Mais une confrontation entre leurs deux pensées paraît s’imposer, tant leurs modèles sont influents dans le champ des sciences sociales, de la théorie politique et de la philosophie critique aujourd’hui. Il s’agit de savoir si les paradigmes qu’ils mettent en avant pour critiquer la société, pour rendre raison de son évolution et des transformations qui doivent la rendre plus juste ou plus libre, le paradigme de la reconnaissance et celui de la mésentente, sont concurrents, s’ils sont exclusifs l’un de l’autre, ou s’ils sont compatibles. (shrink)

Si une pensée a autant de coordonnées intrinsèques qu'a de dimensions catégoriales le système de variantes qu'elle « instantie », alors l'exemplarité de chacune de ses coordonnées est totalement fixée par les dimensions de ce système et cette pensée se laisse adéquatement exprimer selon l'axe longitudinal unique d'une pro-position posant ses coordonnées comme autant de substitutions effectuées sur les variables de catégories. Mais, inversement, si aucune pensée ne se laisse adéquatement caractériser par des coordonnées qui lui seraient intrinsèques, et si (...) une pensée n'ade coordonnées que relativement aux systèmes auxquels elle peut être corrélée selon le contexte à la faveur de sa juxtaposition avec d'autres pensées, alors ce dont ses coordonnées sont exemplaires paraîtra indéterminé aussi longtemps qu'on exprimera cette pensée dans une proposition, c'est-à-dire abstraction faite des dimensions selon lesquelles elle est coordonnée. Nous voudrions montrer ici, sur le cas des preuves mathématiques, que la comparaison par Wittgenstein des preuves mathématiques à des paradigmes fait précisément pièce à cette seconde possibilité. (shrink)

Le témoignage a retenu de très près l’herméneutique philosophique de Paul Ricœur. De son sens quasi empirique, celui du témoin d’un procès, à sa signification religieuse, celle du témoin de la foi, en passant par sa signification morale, le témoin vit du bien dont il témoigne. Se trouvant donc au croisement du juridique, de l’historique, de l’éthique et du religieux, le témoignage trouve, dans les analyses de Paul Ricœur, son principe unificateur dans le concept d’identité narrative. J.-Ph. Pierron montre que (...) pour le philosophe de Temps et récit, le témoignage dans le témoin est texte. Il donne donc à penser, ce qui implique une herméneutique de la réception, axée sur l’analyse d’un accueil du témoignage. Corrélativement, parler d’identité narrative, c’est donner l’occasion au témoignage de passer insensiblement d’un pôle d’extériorité, celui du narrateur qui n’est pas l’acteur de ce qu’il raconte, à un pôle d’intériorité, qui fait constitution progressive de soi. En quoi doit se définir une éthique du témoignage. Bearing witness is a very important concept in the philosophical hermeneutic of Paul Ricoeur. From its quasi-empirical meaning, that of the testimony of a witness in a trial, to its religious significance, that of a witness to the faith, and its moral significance, the witness lives from the good to which he bears witness. Bearing witness, which lies at the core of legal, historical, ethical, and religious testimony, finds its unifying principle in the analysis of Paul Ricoeur in the concept of narrative identity. J.-P. Pierron shows that, for the philosopher of Time and Narrative, the testimony of the witness becomes text in the one who bears witness. Thus, it leads to thinking, which implies a hermeneutic of receiving, centered on the analysis of how testimony from a witness is received. Correlatively, to speak of narrative identity is to give an opportunity for bearing witness to move imperceptibly from a position of exteriority, that of a narrator who is not the actor of that which he recounts, to a position of interiority, which makes for a progressive constitution of the self. This ought to define an ethic of bearing witness. (shrink)

Neste artigo considerarei as principais objeções marxistas ao modelo de Honneth para uma Teoria Crítica da sociedade e também as objeções centrais de Honneth aos modelos inspirados em Marx. Depois tentarei esboçar uma reaproximação entre ambas posições ao mostrar como o conceito normativo de reconhecimento de Honneth não é oposto a argumentos funcionalistas, e sim que ele contém uma dimensão socioteórica: a ideia de que a reprodução social e a evolução social revolvem ao redor de lutas pela interpretação de normas (...) sociais centrais. Ao iluminar o lado socioteórico do reconhecimento, é possível esboçar um modelo de Teoria Crítica da sociedade que, de fato, corresponda às características descritivas e normativa delineadas pelo próprio Marx. No entanto, o preço desta reaproximação para a Teoria Crítica de Honneth é uma ênfase maior na divisão do trabalho como o mecanismo central da reprodução social. (shrink)

Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) was born in Landshut, Bavaria, the son of Paul Johann Anselm, a renowned legal theorist who had been called from Jena by the king of Bavaria to modernize the kingdom’s penal code. Feuerbach’s brothers all became distinguished scholars in their fields and his nephew Anselm a renowned classicist painter. After enrolling in theological studies in Heidelberg, Feuerbach became enthralled in Hegel’s philosophy and moved to Berlin to study with him. He presented his dissertation in 1828 at the (...) university of Erlangen and began his career there as a young Privat Dozent. Posterity has associated Feuerbach’s name to his anthropological critique of religion, presented in the 1841 The Essence of Christianity. Yet his writings touched on many other areas of philosophy. His life-long interest in religion arose from his attempt to solve the classical, fundamental questions of philosophy, of the human being’s place in the world, the relationships between thinking and being, reason and nature, mind and body, and the epistemological implications entailed in answering these questions. (shrink)

Axel Honneth was born on 18 July 1949 in Essen, Germany, in the coal-mining part of North Rhine Westphalia, the son of Horst Honneth, a medical doctor, and Annemarie Honneth. His adolescence and early adulthood coincided with the eruption of radical movements around the world, notably in his native country. The legacies of his early involvement in politics can be traced throughout his work. His postgraduate research focused on social and political issues, and embraced the “critical theory” tradition of the (...) Frankfurt School. This is a strand in the Western philosophical landscape whose defining characteristic is precisely that it seeks to establish strong connections between philosophical analysis and the reality of the social and political worlds. In particular, the philosophers of the Frankfurt School seek to align their theoretical work with the progressive movements within the social that aim to challenge and transform oppressive social structures. The political bent of Honneth’s philosophical work can be witnessed in the positive references to Marx in his early articles, his criticisms of Habermas’ theoretical models, and his attempt recently to recalibrate a socialist project for the new century. (shrink)

Two key axes carry the parameters that define Rancière’s approach to poetry. The first axis is constituted by his well-known account of aesthetic modernity as a democratic “regime of the arts”, which breaks with the previous, “representative” one, by allowing all subjects and all genres to be appropriated in expressive gestures. These expressive gestures can no longer rely on the old representational rules and references and therefore require constantly reinvented creative forms. The second axis that emerges from the dismantlement of (...) the old regime of representation is therefore a new mode of expressive creativity inherent in individual and collective action. The combination of these two principles creates the structural conditions and the contradictions of the modern aesthetic field, within which individual poets define their tasks and encounter new limits and difficulties. Viewed as a series of individual, situated attempts at linguistic creation within a field in which the structures of perception and diction are inherently up for grabs, poetry becomes a particularly significant exercise. The great poets provide exemplary models of what saying and doing can mean in the conditions of modernity as a regime of equality; and from their individual exemplarity, profound theoretical implicit lessons can be drawn. Rancière’s writings on poetry as a result always seek to accomplish two aims: provide substantive hermeneutic reconstructions of writing practices, taken as exemplary forms of modern “poiesis”; and critique alternative theoretical uses of poetry and through these, alternative conceptions of modern practice and theory. To review these aspects of Rancière’s approach to poetry, I have adopted a genealogical approach, as it is the simplest way to give a sense of the richness of Rancière’s long engagement with the works of poets. (shrink)

Axel Honneth a élaboré une critique de la société moderne au prisme du concept de reconnaissance. Jacques Rancière a construit une théorie de la politique moderne à partir du concept de mésentente. Ils s'attachent tous deux à analyser les logiques d’exclusion et de domination qui structurent les sociétés contemporaines. Dans un précieux dialogue, les deux philosophes explorent les affinités et les tensions entre leurs approches respectives. Ils contribuent ainsi à renouveler le cadre d’une théorie critique et à repenser les conditions (...) du changement social et politique. La discussion est enrichie par des textes des deux penseurs, et elle est précédée d’une présentation substantielle qui remet en perspective ce dialogue critique. (shrink)

Recognition, Work, Politics includes a range of essays in contemporary French critical theory around politics, recognition, and work, and their philosophical articulations. These issues are addressed from directions that include post-structuralism, the paradigm of the gift, recognition theory, and post-marxism.

We consider a situation where an individual is facing an uncertain situation, but may costly alter his knowledge of the uncertainties. We study in this context how risk aversion may modify the individual search behavior. We consider a one-armed bandit problem (where one arm is safe and the other is risky) and study how the agent risk aversion can change the sequence of arms selected. The main result is that when the utility function is more concave, the agent has more (...) chances to select the safe arm. We also discuss how search is affected by risk aversion. (shrink)

On se propose de montrer que l’écart entre les critiques heideggérienne et wittgensteinienne de l’adoption du point de vue logique sur le sens et l’écart entre leurs conceptions respectives de la sensibilité du sens au contexte deviennent visibles et intelligibles à partir du moment où ils sont rapportés l’un à l’autre. On cherchera la clé de ce double écart dans un désaccord fondamental des deux philosophes sur le sort qui peut et doit être fait à l’usage philosophique du petit mot (...) « qua », usage qui semble aussi ancien que la métaphysique elle-même.The paper aims at showing that both the gulf between Heidegger’s and Wittgenstein’s respective ways of inveighing against the prevailing of a logical point of view upon sense, and the gulf between their respective accounts of the context-sensitivity of sense, can be at once brought to light and rendered intelligible by being aligned on each other. It is contended that both of these clashes hinge upon a fundamental disagreement as to what could and should be made of the traditional use in metaphysics of the little word « als », in a word, of its use as « qua ». (shrink)

While examining the reception given by the media to the World Youth Day held in July 2002 in Toronto (Canada) as well as their promotion of the event, the author tries to draw the profile of the youth, and its links with catholic religion. The analysis of press articles published into two important Quebec daily newspapers allows the identification of different visions of the youth put forward by the media. It can be noticed that the emphasis put on youth heterogeneity (...) at the beginning quickly moves to the presentation of a homogeneous youth united around Pope John-Paul II. However, such a relation of youth toward Catholicism goes against research major conclusions on this topic. To this reception of the WYD by Quebec media, several explanations about, among others, mass media status, role, and functioning in our society are proposed. (shrink)

Tarde make of the art a plan of invention which leaves of a very wide definition - everything human making- to include meanings of the word more specialized. He does not break only so privilege indû of fine art, but accentuates the capacity of the art, fundamental for the, contemporary societies, to socialize very sensations, communicating in a common sensational, the difference of the individuals.

Critique as Social Practice first appeared in German in 2009, in the series of the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt. Its English translation comes out in the recently launched collection...