The extent to which a HEC becomes involved with policy formation depends in large measure on the credibility the committee has within the institution. Although on the basis of training, insight, or experience the HEC is in an ideal position to formulate policy, premature involvement in this area can jeopardize the effectiveness of the HEC in other areas which are equally if not more important. To the extent that the HEC does engage in policy formation it must do so with (...) considerable political as well as ethical acumen. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 5, June 2020, Page 72-74.

Includes "Belief and Will," the Inaugural Address by H. H. Price, in addition to six Symposia: e.g., "Can an Effect Precede its Cause?" "When is a Principle a Moral Principle?" and "Sensing and Observing." Participants include Gilbert Ryle, Margaret MacDonald, A. J. Ayer and W. B. Gallie. The papers are much concerned with what one can and cannot say, in accordance with the current British, or Oxford, fashion.--V. C. C.

In the recent methodological individualism-holism debate on explanation, there has been considerable focus on what reasons methodological holists may advance in support of their position. We believe it is useful to approach the other direction and ask what considerations methodological individualists may in fact offer in favor of their view about explanation. This is the background for the question we pursue in this paper: Why be a methodological individualist? We start out by introducing the methodological individualism-holism debate while distinguishing two (...) forms of methodological individualism: a form that says that individualist explanations are always better than holist accounts and a form that says that providing intervening individualist mechanisms always makes for better explanations than purely holist ones. Next, we consider four lines of reasoning in support of methodological individualism: arguments from causation, from explanatory depth, from agency, and from normativity. We argue that none of them offer convincing reasons in support of the two explanatory versions of individualism we consider. While there may well be occasions in which individualists’ favorite explanations are superior, we find no reason to think this always must be the case. (shrink)

Building upon the foundations laid by Russell, Donnellan, Chastain, and more recently, Almog, this paper addresses key questions about the basic mechanism by which we think of worldly objects, and (in contrast to many connected projects), does so in isolation from questions about how we speak of them. I outline and defend a view based on the notion of bound cognition. Bound cognition, like perception, is world-to-mind in the sense that it is generated by the item being thought of rather (...) than by the mind doing the thinking. It is a direct, two-place, non-representational relation, and it is prior to any epistemic connection between the thinker and the object of thought. Although the paradigm case for bound cognition involves sensory perception of an individual, I argue that the cognitive relations falling under the heading of bound cognition also include non-perceptual cognitive relations (such as the relation between a thinker and a historical individual) as well as cognitive relations to non-individuals (such as pairs, pluralities, species, and features). Four illustrative cases are discussed, and anticipated worries about abstract and empty cases are addressed. (shrink)

An empirical study of whether the ordinary conception of race in the United States is biological or social, and how different conceptions connect to racism.

A partir d’une enquête empirique auprès de « soixante-huitards », cet article revisite la question des générations politiques sous l’angle du genre. Le genre s’avère en effet essentiel pour appréhender les effets différenciés qu’ont pu avoir les événements de Mai-Juin 68 sur les trajectoires des enquêtés. En partant du constat que les femmes sont significativement plus nombreuses que leurs homologues masculins à revendiquer le sentiment d’appartenir à une « génération de 68 », l’article rend compte de l’influence du genre sur (...) les formes de politisation postérieures à Mai 68 et sur les incidences personnelles et quotidiennes du militantisme en Mai 68. (shrink)

This book explores Goethe's ethics of happiness and the role of resignation within them. Prandi has carefully separated autobiographical material from literary expository of these themes in order to clarify the misunderstanding that has resulted from relying on Goethe's fictional works to document his personal ethical convictions. The book aims in part at working out in detail the usefulness of Spinoza's Ethics in evaluating ethical views expressed in poetry and fiction; and in part at correcting erroneous and confused ideas about (...) Goethean resignation. Prandi studies the 'natural morality' Goethe developed and practiced, using Lucretius and Spinoza as models of influence. All three define the good as what makes people rationally happy; each has his own resignation model to offer. From a deep analysis of views on happiness and resignation, the author's discussion leads to some surprising new conclusions. (shrink)

A central project of Enlightenment thought is to ground claims to natural freedom and equality. This project is the foundation of Suchon’s view of freedom. But it is not the whole story. For, Suchon’s focus is not just natural freedom, but also the necessary and sufficient conditions for oppressed members of society, women, to avail themselves of this freedom. In this paper I, first, treat Suchon’s normative argument for women’s right to develop their rational minds. In Section 2, I consider (...) Suchon’s three necessary and sufficient conditions for freedom, and the manners in which women are blocked from meeting them. The normative argument together with the obstacles to women meeting the conditions for freedom raises the question of how to get women into a position where they can enjoy the freedom to which they are entitled. In Section 3, I outline Suchon’s answer: women must live a life without attachment. I argue this answer situates Suchon both chronologically and theoretically between the Béguines, a medieval women’s spiritual movement, and 20th century feminist separatism. I conclude that Suchon’s view of freedom is radical, both for its time and ours, and deserves greater attention from historians of philosophy and of feminist thought. (shrink)

Behavioral research has revealed how normal human cognitive processes can tend to lead us astray. But do these affect economic researchers, ourselves? This article explores the consequences of stereotyping and confirmation bias using a sample of published articles from the economics literature on gender and risk aversion. The results demonstrate that the supposedly ‘robust’ claim that ‘women are more risk averse than men’ is far less empirically supported than has been claimed. The questions of how these cognitive biases arise and (...) why they have such power are discussed, and methodological practices that may help to attenuate these biases are outlined. (shrink)

The problem of theorizing privacy moves on two levels, the first consisting of an inadequate conceptual vocabulary and the second consisting of an inadequate institutional grammar. Privacy rights are supposed to protect individual subjects, and so conventional ways of understanding privacy are subject-centered, but subject-centered approaches to theorizing privacy also wrestle with deeply embedded contradictions. And privacy’s most enduring institutional failure modes flow from its insistence on placing the individual and individualized control at the center. Strategies for rescuing privacy from (...) irrelevance involve inverting both established ways of talking about privacy rights and established conventions for designing institutions to protect them. In terms of theory, turning privacy inside out entails focusing on the conditions that are needed to produce sufficiently private and privacy-valuing subjects. Institutionally, turning privacy inside out entails focusing on the design, production, and operational practices most likely to instantiate and preserve those conditions. (shrink)

Philosophers of mind and language who advance causal theories face a sort of conjunction problem. When we say that the thing had in mind or the thing referred to is a matter of what causally impacted the thinker or speaker, we must somehow narrow down the long conjunction of items in a causal chain, all of which contributed to the having in mind, but only one of which becomes the object of thought or the linguistic referent. Here, I sketch a (...) notion of cognitive focus intended to do this narrowing. The notion borrows three key aspects from visual focus and some technological aides—causation, amplification, and suppression. I suggest a broader application of this framework to address the conjunction problem not only in ordinary contexts of perceptual focus but also in evidence cases involving non-perceptual cognitive focus. I further suggest cognitive focus is helpful in distinguishing referential vs. attributive thought. (shrink)

This paper highlights the need to apply an equity lens when assessing the impact of preemption and related legal doctrines on community health. Community autonomy to set and pursue public health priorities is an essential part of achieving health equity. Unfortunately, the priorities of organized industry interest groups often conflict with health equity goals. These groups have a history of successfully using law to limit community autonomy to pursue public health measures, most notably through preemption and related legal doctrines. We (...) examine this phenomenon using two examples. First, we look at dental association efforts to block the spread of dental therapists in Indian Country. Native dental therapists have been improving the oral health of native people in Alaska for over a decade; yet the national and state dental associations have sought with mixed success to leverage state and federal laws to hinder other tribal governments from utilizing these providers. We compare these efforts with a restaurant association-led movement to limit what municipal governments can do to address food-based health inequities, focusing on a “model” ALEC bill that started in Ohio. Finally, we discuss how municipalities and Tribes are fighting back and continuing to pursue health equity for their communities. (shrink)

Dès le début du xixe siècle, Jeanne d’Arc connaît la célébrité dans toute l’Europe. Élevée au pinacle, installée au panthéon des Français, elle devient un sujet en or pour les compositeurs et leurs librettistes, parce qu’elle permet d’aborder les thèmes les plus divers, de l’héroïque au religieux en passant par le pastoral et le tragique. Elle fait l’objet de nombreuses mises en scène dans des genres musicaux aussi variés que l’opéra, l’opéra-comique, le ballet, la mélodie, la pantomime ou le théâtre (...) en musique. La question centrale qui se pose pour chaque compositeur est la suivante : comment représenter Jeanne d’Arc, cette « figure sublime »? Comment donner voix à une héroïne que l’on a vue sous tous les jours, tour à tour grandiloquente, simple et pieuse, puis égérie nationale avant de devenir sainte en 1920? Au travers d’une étude sur la voix donnée à Jeanne, dans deux œuvres majeures du répertoire qui lui a été consacré, Giovanna d’Arco de Verdi, créée à la Scala de Milan en 1845, et Jeanne d’Arc au Bûcher de Paul Claudel et Arthur Honegger, créée à Bâle en 1938, nous essaierons de déceler l’esprit d’une époque, et par là de mieux distinguer quelques-unes des facettes données à la Pucelle d’Orléans. (shrink)

I take it as given that we manage to linguistically refer to objects we can neither perceive nor uniquely describe. Kripke accounts for this fact by appeal to causal-historical chains of communication. But Evans famously presented what has seemed to many a devastating counterexample to Kripke’s view: the phenomenon of reference-shifting. Here, I’ll agree with critics that Kripke’s view is insufficient to handle cases of reference shift, but I’ll argue for an alternative version of the causal-historical account that is immune (...) to Evans’ counterexample. The key move will be at the foundations; it will require a change in what it is we’re giving a causal-historical account of. Critically, I’ll argue that we should reject two claims associated with the causal-historical picture. First, we should reject the claim that names are used to think of their referents. Second, we should reject the claim that later speakers defer to earlier ones. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a partial analysis of the role of values in qualitative data collection in social research. The partial analysis shows that nonepistemic values have both required and permissible roles to play during this phase of research. By appeal to the analysis, I reject the ideal of value-free science as applied to qualitative data collection, and I demonstrate why two alternative ideals should likewise be dismissed as standards for values in qualitative data collection. Also, I briefly discuss (...) the extent to which the partial analysis carries over to quantitative data collection in social research. (shrink)

We investigate if private family firms have a greater environmental performance focus than nonfamily firms, and if this relationship is moderated by the strength of the firms’ social embeddedness. We empirically test these issues using a representative sample of 1452 private Australian small and medium-sized enterprises. Contrary to prevailing assumptions and previous indicative findings in the public firm context, our results show that family firms have a lower environmental performance focus than nonfamily firms. However, in cases where the firm is (...) highly embedded in the social community, we find that family firms have a higher environmental performance focus. We explain our unexpected results by considering the role of financial risk in publicly held family firms. Accordingly, we posit that prior findings in the public firm context may be evidence of families expropriating wealth from nonfamily shareholders rather than altruistic pro-environmental behavior. (shrink)

In this article I examine the view, common amongst several contemporary legal positivists, that rules of recognition are to be understood as conventional rules of some kind. The article opens with a discussion of H.L.A. Hart's original account of the rule of recognition in the 1st edn of The Concept of Law and argues that Hart did not view the rule of recognition as a conventional rule in that account. I then discuss Hart's apparent turn towards a conventionalist understanding of (...) the rule of recognition in the ‘Postscript’ to the 2nd edn of The Concept of Law, and attempt to cast doubt on the strength of Hart's commitment to such a turn, and on the reasons prompting him to make it. Finally, I consider one of the most interesting contemporary conventionalist accounts of rules of recognition, namely Andrei Marmor's view that such rules should be understood as the constitutive conventions of partly autonomous social practices. My aim in this part of the article is to compare Marmor's account with my earlier interpretation of Hart's views, and to consider whether Marmor's account truly is conventionalist in character and whether it provides us with a persuasive conventionalist understanding of rules of recognition. (shrink)

In a series of powerful and challenging articles emerging since the mid-1990s, Brian Leiter has argued that certain theoretical strains in contemporary legal philosophy are ‘epistemologically bankrupt’, in virtue of their reliance on misguided argumentative devices: analysing concepts, such as the concepts of law and of authority; and doing so by appealing to intuitions regarding the correct way to understand the concepts in question. In response to this state of affairs, Leiter advocates that jurisprudence ought to attempt to catch-up with (...) ‘naturalistic’ developments which have influenced the direction of other branches of philosophy – such as epistemology, philosophy of mind, and moral philosophy – in the last few decades. This article offers a critical analysis of some of Leiter’s proposals for what Jurisprudence should become, in light of his views on the relevance of naturalism for this discipline. (shrink)

Issus de deux journées d’étude organisées en 2008 et 2010 dans le cadre du programme de recherche « Modèles familiaux et cultures politiques » (École française de Rome), les neuf articles de ce volume examinent la construction des liens familiaux à l’époque moderne dans des territoires (Italie, France, espace germanique, péninsule Ibérique et son empire) et des configurations politiques, juridiques, sociales et économiques variées. La première partie s’attache à la formation du lien matrimon...

The author argues that Christian theologians must consider the suffering of children in their moral evaluation of divorce. A review of recent social science literature shows the negative consequences of divorce, especially in low-conflict cases, and suggests the need to return to the tradition for retrieval of theologies of marriage that include children. In St. John Chrysostom, the author finds a three-in-one flesh metaphor that she claims is a more adequate description of marriage with children as lived reality. With the (...) addition of parallel material from Vatican II and John Paul II, the author argues, it is possible to construct a new theology of marriage that moves beyond relationship to include commitments to spouses, children, and society. (shrink)

Traditional cognitivism treats a situated agent's point of view in terms of deficit egocentrism. Can Ballard et al.'s framework remedy this characterization? And will its fusion of computational and enactivist explanations change assumptions about what cognition is? “Yes” is suggested by considering human infants' developing spatial knowledge, but further questions are raised by analysis of their robot counterparts.

Clinical exchange: one model to achieve culturally sensitive care This paper reports on a clinical exchange programme that formed part of a pre‐registration European nursing degree run by three collaborating institutions in England, Holland and Spain. The course included: common and shared learning including two summer schools; and the development of a second language before the students went on a three‐month clinical placement in one of the other base institutions’ clinical environments. The aim of the course was to enable students (...) to become culturally sensitive carers. This was achieved by developing a programme based on transcultural nursing principles in theory and practice. Data were gathered by interview, focus groups, and questionnaires from 79 exchange students, fostering the strategies of illuminative evaluation. The paper examines: how the aims of the course were met; the factors that inhibited the attainment of certain goals; and how the acquisition of a second language influenced the students’ learning about nursing. A model is presented to illustrate the process of transformative learning from the exchange experience. (shrink)

The common assumption is that if a group comprising moral agents can act intentionally, as a group, then the group itself can also be properly regarded as a moral agent with respect to that action. I argue, however, that this common assumption is the result of a problematic line of reasoning I refer to as “the collective fallacy.” Recognizing the collective fallacy as a fallacy allows us to see that if there are, in fact, irreducibly joint actors, then some of (...) them will lack the full-fledged moral agency of their members. The descriptivist question of whether a group can perform irreducibly joint intentional action need not rise and fall with the normative question of whether a group can be a moral agent. (shrink)

Individuals often face administrative hurdles in attempting to access health care, public programmes, and other legal statuses and entitlements. These ordeals are the products, directly or indirectly, of institutional and policy design choices. I argue that evaluating whether such ordeals are justifiable or desirable instruments of social policy depends on assessing, beyond their targeting effects, the process-related burdens they impose on those attempting to navigate them and these burdens’ distributive effects. I here examine specifically how ordeals that levy time costs (...) reduce and constrain individuals’ free time, and how such time-cost ordeals may thereby create, deepen and compound disadvantages. (shrink)