In Platons letztem und umfangreichstem Werk Nomoi (Die Gesetze) diskutieren drei Gesprächspartner - ein Athenischer Fremder, ein Kreter und ein Spartaner - die theoretischen Grundlagen einer Gesetzgebung und entwerfen eine Verfassung mitsamt Gesetzen für eine neue Kolonie. Die Gesetzgebung hat den besonderen Zuschnitt und Anspruch, dass die Bürger der neuen Kolonie ein glückliches Leben führen sollen. Überraschenderweise spielt in den Nomoi neben einer rationalen Theologie und einem Astralkult die Volksreligion eine prominente Rolle, was in der Forschung bislang als signifikante Aufwertung (...) der Volksreligion in Platons Schriften gewertet wurde. Lauritz Noack zeigt in seiner Studie auf der Grundlage einer genauen philologischen und philosophischen Interpretation und der Perspektive der Neuen Institutionenökonomik, dass von einer Aufwertung der Volksreligion keine Rede sein kann, da sie weder einen originellen noch einen direkten Beitrag zur Umsetzung der gesetzgeberischen Ziele leistet; vielmehr stellt sie lediglich den Rahmen zur Verfügung, mit dessen Hilfe eine bestimmte Werteordnung vermittelt werden soll. Das Fundament dieser Werteordnung ist aber nicht religiöser, sondern philosophischer Natur. Die Volksreligion ist demnach zwar ein wichtiger Aspekt der Gesetzgebung, aber nur der Form und nicht ihrem Inhalt nach: Sowohl das Ziel der Gesetzgebung, den Bürgern ein langfristig glückliches Lebens auf der Basis massvollen und tugendhaften Verhaltens zu ermöglichen als auch die Umsetzung dieses Ziels über den Weg der Implementierung ethischer Regeln sind genuin philosophischer Natur"-- Introduction, page 1. (shrink)

The stakes associated with an algorithmic decision are often said to play a role in determining whether the decision engenders a right to an explanation. More specifically, “high stakes” decisions are often said to engender such a right to explanation whereas “low stakes” or “non-high” stakes decisions do not. While the overall gist of these ideas is clear enough, the details are lacking. In this paper, we aim to provide these details through a detailed investigation of what we will call (...) the “Simple Stakes Thesis”. The Simple Stakes Thesis, as it will turn out, is too simple. For even if the stakes associated with a specific one-off decision are low—and hence does not engender a right to an explanation—such decisions may nevertheless form part of a high stakes pattern or aggregate of decisions. In such cases, we argue, even a low stakes decision may engender a right to explanation. Not only does this show that the right to explanation is more demanding than so far recognized. It also shows that the stakes thesis is significantly harder to apply in practice. (shrink)

Do privacy rights restrict what is permissible to infer about others based on statistical evidence? This paper replies affirmatively by defending the following symmetry: there is not necessarily a morally relevant difference between directly appropriating people’s private information—say, by using an X-ray device on their private safes—and using predictive technologies to infer the same content, at least in cases where the evidence has a roughly similar probative value. This conclusion is of theoretical interest because a comprehensive justification of the thought (...) that statistical inferences can violate privacy rights is lacking in the current literature. Secondly, the conclusion is of practical interest due to the need for moral assessment of emerging predictive algorithms. (shrink)

Andrei Marmor has recently offered a narrow interpretation of the right to privacy as a right to having a reasonable amount of control over one's self‐presentation. He claims that the interest people have in preventing others from abusing their personal information to do harm is not directly protected by the right to privacy. This article rejects that claim and defends a view according to which concerns about abuse play a central role in fleshing out the appropriate scope of a general (...) right to privacy. (shrink)

By now a consensus has emerged that people, when subjected to high-stakes decisions through automated decision systems, have a moral right to have these decisions explained to them. However, furnishing such explanations can be costly. So the right to an explanation creates what we call the cost problem: providing subjects of automated decisions with appropriate explanations of the grounds of these decisions can be costly for the companies and organisations that use these automated decision systems. In this paper, we explore (...) whether large language models could prove significant in overcoming the cost problem. We provide an initial case for believing that they can but only with serious ethical costs. (shrink)

The corporate social responsibility literature recognizes that firms’ existing CSR reputation can serve as a safeguard from the impact of reputation-damaging events on a firm’s social legitimacy. However, the literature has yet to focus on the extent to which CSR activities can help mitigate such damage, post-event. This article examines how a firm’s social actions following a product recall facilitate the recovery of its diminished social legitimacy. We test our predictions using a sample of 197 product recalls involving 168 publicly (...) traded corporations from 1999 to 2009 and demonstrate that the speed of the CSR response, the frequency of CSR activities, and the intensity of CSR activities have a significant effect on firm recovery following crisis. The effects were most pronounced in instances where the magnitude of the recall was most severe. The visibility of the recall has a limited impact on post-event recovery. We discuss our contributions to research on strategic CSR and recovery. (shrink)

Most studies on the ethics of privacy focus on what others ought to do to accommodate our interest in privacy. I focus on a related but distinct question that has attracted less attention in the literature: When, if ever, does morality require us to safeguard our own privacy? While we often have prudential reasons for safeguarding our privacy, we are also, at least sometimes, morally required to do so. I argue that we, sometimes, ought to safeguard our privacy for the (...) sake of the possible wrongdoer, in order to prevent the possible wrongdoer from committing a morally defiling act that renders them worse off. I illustrate the variety of cases in which this duty binds us and contrast my view to some other claims in the literature which also purport to show that we sometimes have a duty to safeguard our own privacy. (shrink)

This paper argues that humans possess unique cognitive abilities due to the presence of a functional system that exists in the human brain that is absent in the non-human brain. This system, the frontal feedback system, was born in the hominin brain when the great phylogenetic expansion of the prefrontal cortex relative to posterior sensory regions surpassed a critical threshold. Surpassing that threshold effectively reversed the preferred direction of information flow in the highest association regions of the neocortex, producing the (...) frontal feedback system. This reversal was from the caudo-rostral bias characteristic of non-human, or pre-human, brain dynamics to a rostro-caudal bias characteristic of modern human brain dynamics. The frontal feedback system works through frontal motor routines, or action schemes, manipulating the release and reconstruction of stored sensory memories in posterior sensory areas. As an obligatory feature of frontal feedback, a central character, or self, emerges within this cortical network that manifests itself as agent in these reconstructions as well as in the experience of sensory perceptions. Dynamical-systems modeling of cortical interactions is combined in the paper with recent neuroimaging studies of “resting-state” brain activity to bridge the gap between microscopic and macroscopic levels of cortical behavior. This synthesis is used to support the proposal of an information flow reversal occurring in the hominin brain and also to explain how such a reversal generates the wide variety of cognitive and experiential phenomena that many consider to be uniquely human. (shrink)

Many seem to think that AI-induced responsibility gaps are morally bad and therefore ought to be avoided. We argue, by contrast, that there is at least a pro tanto reason to welcome responsibility gaps. The central reason is that it can be bad for people to be responsible for wrongdoing. This, we argue, gives us one reason to prefer automated decision-making over human decision-making, especially in contexts where the risks of wrongdoing are high. While we are not the first to (...) suggest that responsibility gaps should sometimes be welcomed, our argument is novel. Others have argued that responsibility gaps should sometimes be welcomed because they can reduce or eliminate the psychological burdens caused by tragic moral choice-situations. By contrast, our argument explains why responsibility gaps should sometimes be welcomed even in the absence of tragic moral choice-situations, and even in the absence of psychological burdens. (shrink)

This chapter provides an analysis of the long process of introducing an electronic identity for online authentication in Germany. This process is described as a multi-facet innovation, involving actors from different policy fields shifting over time. The eID process started in the late ‘90s in the context of eGovernment and eCommerce with the legislation on e-signatures, which were supposed to allow for online authentication of citizens. When after 5 years it was recognized that this was not the case, a new (...) digital ID card, which had meanwhile been announced, was chosen as token for the eID. This process was dominated by the concerns for visual inspection and border control, including the storage of digital fingerprints. Under the leadership of the Ministry of the Interior (BMI) and technical guidance of the Federal Agency for Information Security (BSI), technical specifications have to a large extent been adopted from the electronic passport, which had been smoothly introduced 2 years before. However, in the legislative process some concern regarding digital fingerprints on the eID card was raised and led to an opt-in solution. In 2009, a bill on the new ID card was passed which regulates the eID function for online authentication as well. This is characterized as a radical innovation by introducing a double-sided, mutual authentication of the citizen and the service provider and implementing the principle of proportionality regarding the access of service providers to data on the chip. At the time of writing, field tests are conducted. Roll-out of the new eID card is to start in November 2010. Therefore no figures about adoption can be provided here. (shrink)

If I decide to disclose information about myself, this act may undermine other people’s ability to conceal information about them. Such dependencies are called privacy dependencies in the literature. Some say that privacy dependencies generate moral duties to avoid sharing information about oneself. If true, we argue, then it is sometimes justified for others to impose harm on the person sharing information to prevent them from doing so. In this paper, we first show how such conclusions arise. Next, we show (...) that the existence of such a dependency between the moral significance you are inclined to attribute to privacy dependencies and judgments about permissible self-defense puts pressure on at least some ways of spelling out the idea that privacy dependencies ought to constrain our data-sharing conduct. (shrink)

In this paper, we defend what we call the ‘Hybrid View’ of privacy. According to this view, an individual has privacy if, and only if, no one else forms an epistemically warranted belief about the individual’s personal matters, nor perceives them. We contrast the Hybrid View with what seems to be the most common view of what it means to access someone’s personal matters, namely the Belief-Based View. We offer a range of examples that demonstrate why the Hybrid View is (...) more plausible than the Belief-Based View. Finally, we show how the Hybrid View generates a more plausible fit between the concept of privacy, and the concept of a (morally objectionable) violation of privacy. (shrink)

Many believe that we ought to treat people as individuals and that this form of treatment is in some sense incompatible with treating people as members of groups. Yet, the relation between these two kinds of treatments is elusive. In this paper, we develop a novel account of the normative requirement to treat people as individuals. According to this account, treating people as individuals requires treating people as agents in the appropriate capacity. We call this the Agency Attunement Account. This (...) view has the surprising implication that it's not only possible to fail in treating people as individuals but also possible to fail in treating people as members of groups, on the presumption that people's agency is sometimes nested in, and exercised via, agential groups. (shrink)

According to a popular view, privacy is a function of people not knowing or rationally believing some fact about you. But intuitively it seems possible for a perpetrator to violate your right to privacy without learning any facts about you. For example, it seems plausible to say that the US National Security Agency’s PRISM program violated, or could have violated, the privacy rights of the people whose information was collected, despite the fact that the NSA, for the most part, merely (...) collected information without examining it, and thus, for the most part, did not acquire knowledge about specific people. This pair of judgements creates the challenge of aligning one of the most popular accounts of what privacy is with a suitable account of the right to privacy. Call this the alignment challenge. -/- In this paper, I criticize two recent attempts to answer the alignment challenge: one based on risk, proposed by Björn Lundgren, and one based on modal robustness, proposed by Carissa Véliz. I then offer my preferred response, which I call the inquiry account. According to this account, the right to privacy protects against certain forms of inquiry. This account explains why there is a gap between what privacy is a what the right to privacy protects people against. Moreover, it explains why it is possible to violate someone’s right to privacy without obtaining knowledge. (shrink)

Mainz and Uhrenfeldt have recently claimed that a violation of the right to privacy can be defined successfully under reliance on the notion of ‘Negative Control’. In this reply, I show that ‘Negative Control’ is unrelated to privacy right violations. It follows that control theorists have yet to put forth a successful normative account of privacy.

It is estimated that over 800 million people are hungry each day and two billion are suffering from the consequences of vitamin and mineral deficiencies. While a paradigm shift towards a multi-dimensional and multi-sectoral approach to food and nutrition insecurity is emerging, technical approaches largely prevail to tackle the causes of hunger and malnutrition. Founded in original in-depth field research among smallholder farmers in southwest Kenya, we argue that incorporating cultural or social dimensions in this technical debate is imperative and (...) that by systematically overlooking these dimensions, food insecurity cannot be accurately captured nor properly addressed. Based on a sub-location in rural southwest Kenya where the food plate is rapidly narrowing towards a high-calorie low nutrient diet and where over 80 % of households experience food shortages at least once a year, conclusions suggest that preferences, the local function of food, and the practices that emerge therefrom can affect the regularity of meals and their composition. The findings allow us to complement emerging research and program development with a more comprehensive and locally adapted approach to tackle food and nutrition insecurity. (shrink)

The frontal feedback model argues that the sudden appearance of art and advancing technologies around 40,000 years ago in the hominid archaeological record was the end result of a recent fundamental change in the functional properties of the hominid brain, which occurred late in that brain's evolution. This change was marked by the switching of the driving mechanism behind the global, dynamic function of the brain from an "object-centered" bias, reflective of nonhuman primate and early hominid brains, to a "self-centered" (...) bias, reflective of modern Homo sapiens and perhaps late Homo erectus brains. Such a change in the global-functional properties of the brain was provided for by the progressive enlargement of the primate frontal lobe throughout its evolution. In late-developing hominids, this progressive enlargement effectively succeeded in reversing the preferred direction of information flow in the highest association areas of the neocortex from a caudo-rostral bias to a rostro-caudal bias. It was this reversal specifically that provided for the ability of humans to use symbolic thought in the creative expression of art, language, and the development of advancing technologies. Part 2 discusses the specific changes in the brain that occurred as a result of the reversal and how those changes were and are manifested as human abilities and experience. (shrink)

Some say that we should respect the privacy of dead people. In this article, I take this idea for granted and use it to motivate the stronger claim that we sometimes ought to respect the privacy of our past selves.

A correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01640-1.

The paper argues that the rich cognitive abilities of humans are the result of a unique functional system in the human brain which is absent in the nonhuman brain. This "frontal feedback system" is suggested to have evolved in the transition from the great apes to humans and is a product of a reversal in the preferred direction of information flow in the human cortex due to the phylogenetic enlargement of the human frontal lobe. The frontal feedback system forms an (...) autonomous functional unit in the cortex whereby action-schemes in frontal cortices continually create fictitious sensory scenarios in posterior sensory cortices by manipulating the release of sensory representations there. These internal scenarios are created free of environmental constraints and reflect the human's internal cognitive and language processes. Nonhumans do not have a frontal feedback system and their internal cognitive processes are stimulus-bound. Evidence in support of the proposal is presented and some implications of the frontal feedback model for human experience are discussed. (shrink)

On cover: Die Philosphie Westeuropas im zwanzigsten Jahrhundert.

Focusing on the genesis of the work, its documetnation and the politics of canon construction, Ruth Noack discusses Triangle in relation to conceptualism, perfromance and the position of women in Tito's Yugoslavia.

Swedenborg als den Reformator der christlichen Gotteslehre, Swedenborg als den Exegeten des geistigen Sinnes der Bibel und Swedenborg als den Künder einer neuen Kirche. -- Verlag.

Zu den beiden -Bosewichten- der antiken Philosophie, Kallikles und Thrasymachos, existiert uberraschend wenig detailreiche Sekundarliteratur, obwohl das intellektuelle Interesse an ihren bei Platon uberlieferten Anschauungen uberaus gross ist - denn das Faustrecht fasziniert. Der vorliegende Kommentar zu den entsprechenden Textstellen des -Gorgias- bzw. des ersten Buches des -Staates- soll die Lucken in der Sekundarliteratur nun schliessen. Gangigen Standpunkten heutiger Interpreten, zwar nicht offen fur Kallikles und Thrasymachos Partei zu ergreifen, Ihnen aber warmherziges Verstandnis auszusprechen, tritt der Autor entschieden entgegen. Er (...) nahert sich dem Problem um das durch Kallikles und Thrasymachos vertretene sophistische Recht des Starkeren von Platons Seite her. Das Buch sagt insgesamt dem anhaltenden Rehabilitierungsstreben zur Sophistik bzw. der um sich greifenden Diffamierung Platons den Kampf an. Damit wird den Sophisten diejenige Rolle zugewiesen, die ihnen geschichtlich gesehen auch zukommt, nicht Aufklarer, sondern Aufwiegler zu sein. Nicht zuletzt kommt uber die umfangreiche Charakterdarstellung des Kallikles und Thrasymachos hinaus die ethische Grundhaltung ihres grossen Gegenspielers Sokrates zum Tragen. Das Buch zeichnet ihn als echten Bezwinger des Immoralismus aus. Und Sokrates erweist sich schliesslich einmal mehr als der, der er ist: als der wahre Erzieher der Menschheit.". (shrink)

Often, when we share information about ourselves, we contribute to people learning personal things about others. This may happen because what we share about ourselves can be used to infer personal information about others. Such dependencies have become known as privacy dependencies in the literature. It is sometimes claimed that the scope of the right to privacy should be expanded in light of such dependencies. For example, some have argued that inferring information about others can violate their right to privacy. (...) Others have argued that sharing personal information about yourself that license such inferences can by itself violate the right to privacy. In this paper, we argue that the latter view should be rejected. (shrink)